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INTRODUCTION 
1. General Introduction 
Expropriation of foreign property is not a new phenomenon. However, 
since World War II the issue has gained a new lease of life. With the 
decolonisation and independence of numerous States of Asia and Africa, the 
controversy over the rules relating to this branch of international law has 
intensified. There is a lot of disagreement as to the amount of compensation that 
must be paid to the affected person. The attempts at codification of the law on 
this issue by several private bodies,l and under the auspices of the League of 
Nations, as well as the United Nations indicate the importance attached to the 
subject under discussion. 
The main parties in the controversy are the capital exporting States which 
invest in Latin American, erstwhile socialist, Asian and African countries 
(referred to as developing States). The latter States, in pursuance of their 
economic programmes, resort to the nationalisation of those investments. Thus, 
the post-World War II period witnessed dramatic nationalisations and other 
fonns of economic restructuring in many countries, with widely differing 
ideological, political and economic systems, throughout the world, even Western 
European countries, such as Britain and France. This nationalisation of foreign 
property reached its peak in the mid-1970s. 
The problem came to the fore with the Russian nationalisations of foreign 
property in the early 1920s, and was followed by the Mexican expropriation of 
foreign-oil interests in 1938. Since then, it seems that the positions of the 
Private bodies, such as the Institute of International Law, Harvard Law School and the 
International Law Association. 
2 
contesting parties have not changed or improved substantially. Therefore, in the 
case of Mexican measures, in a celebrated exchange between the United States 
and Mexican Governments, two entirely different views on the principles 
governing the treatment of foreign property were articulated. 
Six decades later, the Government of Iran, before the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal, has substantially taken a similar position to that of the Mexican 
Government, and the Government of the United States has also maintained the 
stance that it took in the Mexican expropriation. This indicates that since then, 
the parties to the dispute have maintained their positions. 
The developing States have sought to assert their views in international 
forums in which they enjoy a numerical majority. They have used that majority 
to pass resolutions which incorporate their views on expropriations. Thus, during 
the 1960s and 1970s the United Nations General Assembly was the main forum 
for their efforts. They have also taken positions during disputes involving 
foreign nationalisations indicating that they are not prepared to accept rules 
which have been formulated without their active participation. 
The capital exporting States, however, have shown a rigid adherence to the 
rules governing expropriation of foreign property developed in the early 
twentieth century (referred to as the traditional doctrine). They have sought to 
reiterate their position in the disputes involving foreign nationalisations, and in 
bilateral investment treaties.2 
Under the traditional doctrine, the expropriation of foreign property is 
governed by international law, and must be for a public purpose, non- ) 
discriminatory in form, effected with due process of law and accompanied by 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. The doctrine does not distinguish 
between expropriation and nationalisation in the application of the above rules. 
2 Before the traditional principles of international law moved away from the illegality of 
nationalisations of foreign property towards the recognition of their legality, the capital exporting 
States' strategy was to use domestic courts to pursue nationalised property which was brought into 
the jurisdiction of these courts. For an excellent account of the issue, see M. Sornarajah, The 
Pursuit o(Nationalized Property. Martinus Nijhoft: Dordrecht (1986). 
3 
Moreover, expropriation is not limited to direct taking of property, but also to 
other forms of State intervention, which fall short of direct taking, but which are 
subject to the law relating to the expropriation of foreign property. 
In responding to the traditional rules, however, the developing States have 
asserted the following basic principles: 
1. The expropriation of foreign property is governed by the national law of 
the expropriating State. 
2. The right to nationalise foreign property is not subject beyond the duty to 
pay (appropriate) compensation having regard to all the circumstances. 
3. In the case of large-scale nationalisations, the nationalising State's ability 
to pay compensation should be taken into consideration. 
Despite the above conflict between the two parties over the rules governing 
the expropriation of foreign property, they have in effect derogated from their 
positions. In settling the compensation disputes, the capital exporting States have 
relinquished their stance on full compensation, and agreed to amounts well below 
that standard. On their part, the developing States, through adoption of bilateral 
investment treaties, have accepted the traditional concepts and standards in this 
respect. 
Current global economic circumstances and trends are favourable to foreign 
investment. However, these circumstances and trends may change. "Dormant 
economic nationalism may be aroused if the dominance of the foreign investor 
within an economy is seen as established.,,3 Then, expropriation may once more 
come into vogue. Thus, expropriation, and particularly compensation, could 
become hotly debated issues in the future. 
Apart from this argument which IS hard to deny, the contemporary 
international tribunal practice, viz., the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 
continues to deal with the issue under consideration. In its recent awards in dual 
M. Somarajah, The International LGll' on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press 
(1994) at 281, 
4 
national cases, the Tribunal, for the first time in the history of the subject, has 
recognised the impact of dual nationality status on the quantum of compensation. 
This finding itself justifies a study of the subject which takes the new 
developments into account. 
2. Terminology 
Although the expropriation of foreign property is not a new phenomenon, 
the terminology in this respect is by no means settled.4 There are various terms 
used by authors in this field, such as 'expropriation', 'nationalisation' 
'socialisation' 'confiscation', 'taking', 'wealth deprivation' and 'requisition'. 
Up to the end of World War II, writers often called all types of takings 
'expropriations'. Wortley, for instance, defines "nationalisation" as an 
"expropriation in pursuance of some national political programme."s Some 
publicists distinguished between expropriations and confiscations. To them, 
expropriations are any takings accompanied by payment of an adequate 
compensation, whereas confiscations are takings without indemnity.6 According 
to Brownlie, "if compensation is not provided, or the taking is regarded as 
unlawful, then the taking is sometimes described as confiscation.,,7 Some 
authors, however, wish to reserve the term 'confiscation' to forfeiture of the 
property of a convicted criminal, or forfeiture of property smuggled into the 
State.8 However, in modem law, the terms illegal or unlawful expropriations 
have replaced the word confiscation. 
4 1. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford 
(1998) 534. 
5 B. A. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law, University Press, Cambridge 
(1959) at 36. 
6 Note that the issue of whether the payment of adequate compensation is a condition of the 
legality of an expropriation will be considered in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
7 Brownlie, op. cit., at 534. 
II S. Friedman, Expropriation in International Law, Stevens & Sons Ltd., London (1953) at 1. 
It has been stated that in the United Nations debates on permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, Resolution 626 (VII), the terms 'expropriation', 'nationalisation', and 'confiscation' 
have been interchangeably used to denote a taking of private property under government authority 
without adequate compensation. 1. N. Hyde, "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and 
Resources", 50 A.1.I.L. (1956) 8:'-+ at 854 n. 1. 
). 
5 
Moreover, Friedman distinguished between 'nationalisation' and 
'socialisation', asserting that the former is a measure of an "economic character 
and permitting the reorganisation of certain forms of property within a given 
sector of economy in order to ensure their survival amid new conditions of 
production." He further noted that the object of "socialization" is "to secure the 
benefits of technical reorganization to new social classes acceding to power.,,9 
However, for Wortley, this distinction is of no avail, and he observes that "this 
distinction seems to be without much value in intemationallaw, because the term 
'socialisation' seems to refer more directly to communist or fascist theory than 
does the term 'nationalisation. ",10 Similarly, one commentator considers 
'nationalisation' and 'socialisation' identical. I I 
Some scholars use the term 'taking' as a neutral term embracing all types of 
acquiring of foreign property. 12 It was also used in the Harvard Draft Convention 
on State Responsibility,13 the ALI Third Restatement,14 and the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal's awards. However, Garcia-Amador took a critical view 
of the term 'taking'. While accepting that it has a wider meaning than that of 
expropriation, he states that when the term 'taking' is translated into other 
1 . b' 15 anguages, It may e Inexact. 
Other authors, such as Weston, prefer the term 'wealth deprivation' .16 
When a State deprives an owner of his property the State may not keep the 
9 Friedman, op. cit., at 6. 
10 Wortley, op. cit., at 37. 
II Brownlie, op. cit., at 535. 
12 I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law (2nd ed.), Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 
(1992) at 139. 
13 L. B. Sohn and R. R. Baxter, "Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests 
of aliens", 55 A.l.l.L. (1961) 560. See also M. Domke, "Foreign Nationalizations. Some Aspects 
of Contemporary International Law", ibid., 585 at 588. 
14 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States (1987), Section 712, 196. 
15 F. V. Garcia-Amador, Fourth Report to the International Law Commission on the subject of 
the "Responsibility of State for Injuries caused in its territory to the Persons or Property of 
Aliens", reprinted in 2 Y.B.I.L.c. (1959) 1 at 11, para. 39. 
16 B. H. Weston, "The International Economic Order and the Deprivation of Foreign 
Proprietary Wealth: Reflections upon the Contemporary International Law Debate", in R·
o 
B. 
Lillich (cd.), International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens. Charlottesville. 
University Press of Virginia, (1983) 89 at 130 n. 29. See also F. G. Dawson and B. H. Weston. 
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property concerned. In the case of an agranan reform, the State usually 
distributes the lands to landless farmers. Weston maintains that there may be 
wealth deprivation without any taking by the State. For example, a group of 
persons, often aliens, may be obliged to sell their property to another group of 
persons - i.e. nationals (referred to as indigenisation). This occurred in many 
African countries under the label of "Africanization." 17 Referring to the 
definition of the terms 'wealth deprivation' suggested by Weigel and Weston,18 
Piran observes that it "can easily cover taxation and other forms of legal wealth 
deprivations which normally are not considered to come under the concept of 
expropriation as understood commonly." I 9 Additionally, Weston's terminology -
wealth deprivation - has been used by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
only on one occasion.2o 
The term 'requisition' has been defined as seIzure of private property 
(movable and generally food and consumer goodS21 ) by a State in an emergency 
situation justified in the public interest.22 Thus, according to Fawcett: 
The state may ... take possession of private property for the time 
being, without or with payment for its use, and this may be called 
requisition. For example, the requisition of ships for war service 
(emphasis added).23 
Before leaving the definition of the subject, it is worth a brief look at the 
issue of whether 'nationalisation' has special characteristics which distinguish it 
from other forms of State interference with private property. There is no 
"Prompt, Adequate and Effective: A Universal Standard of Compensation ?", 30 F ord.L.R. (1961-
62) 727. 
17 Seidl-Hohenveldern, op. cit., at 138-139. 
III For the definition of the term, see H. Piran, Nationalization of Foreign Property in 
International Law and Iran-United States Tribunal (unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Liverpool, 1992) at 8. 
19 Ibid., at 9. 
20 Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 141-7-2 
(29 June, 1984), reprinted in 6 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports (hereinafter Iran-U.S. 
C.T.R.) (Grotius Publications. Cambridge) 219 at 224-225. 
21 K. Katzarov, TheofJ! of Nationalisation, Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague (1964) at 146. 
22 Wortley, op. cit., at 29. 
23 1. E. S. Fawcett, "Some Foreign Effects of Nationalization of Property". 27 B.Y.I.L. (1950) 
355 at 356. 
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consensus among authorities on the issue. Thus, juristic opInIOns are divided 
. . 24 Into two main groups. The first group consists of scholars such as Foighel, 
K t 25 F " 26 p' 27 B l' 28 d WhO h . l' . a zarov, ranclonl, Iran, rown Ie an lte w 0 see natlona lsatlon as 
a hopeful trend. For example, having enumerated the common features between 
expropriation and nationalisation measures, the latter jurist comments: 
on the international level the presence of these common features does 
not entail the automatic application of rules relating to expropriation 
to a measure of nationalisation. 29 
In the same vein, Amerasinghe30 points out that there are three elements 
which are often mentioned for justifying the differentiation of nationalisation 
from other forms of expropriation, namely: economic motivation, public 
ownership and exploitation for the public benefit. While nationalisation may be 
a species of expropriation, the elements which form its composition are of 
enough significance to require that it be distinguished from expropriation in view 
of the requirements of legality. 
In contrast, members of the second group are more pessimistic, either 
denying that the term 'nationalisation' has any place in the language of 
international law, or expressing doubts as to whether it does. Thus, Wortley 
states that "Nationalization differs in its scope and extent rather than in its 
24 1. Foighel, Nationalization: A study in the Protection of Alien Property in International Law, 
Stevens & Sons Ltd., Copenhagen (1957) at 17-19. 
25 Katzarov, op. cit., at 142-144 and 335. 
26 F. Francioni, "Compensation for Nationalisation of Foreign Property: The Borderland 
Between Law and Equity", 24 LC.L.Q. (1975) 255 at 258. 
J7 P' . 66 
- Iran, op. Cit., at : 
"These factors compel one to submit that there are enough reasons to believe that nationalization 
has a character distinct from other forms of expropriations both in structure and in its juridical 
nature." 
2R Brownlie, op. cit., at 534-535: 
"Expropriation of one or more major natural resources as part of a general programme of social 
and economic reform is described as nationalisation." 
29 G. White, Nationalisation afForeign Property. Stevens & Sons Ltd., London (1961) at 50. 
30 C. F. Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
(1967) at 123. 
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juridical nature from other types of expropriation. ,,3 I O'Connell takes a similar 
view.32 
Likewise, to some, such as Doman33 and Fawcett,34 expropriation is a form 
of nationalisation, while others consider nationalisation as a special form, not 
distinct from expropriation.35 
In view of the foregoing, it is fair to say that while 'requisition' is often 
used in a particular case (e.g. when a State intervenes with private property in an 
emergency situation) 'confiscation' is virtually no longer used in modem law. 
Moreover, due to the problems indicated above, the terms 'taking' and 'wealth 
deprivation' may not be appropriate for the present purposes. The present author 
does not consider 'socialisation' and 'nationalisation' identical. It seems that 
socialisation is based on Marxist ideology. Since the collapse of Communism in 
1990, the term socialisation has not been welcomed by even the erstwhile 
Communist States. The term nationalisation also may not be used as a suitable 
word in this respect, because it would include only a measure of expropriation 
which is a part of a general economic reform or is planned to achieve greater 
social justice.36 In such circumstances, 'expropriation' is still the most 
appropriate term to describe any deprivation by State organs of a right of 
property, or transfer of the power of control. While nationalisation is the main 
species of expropriation it is also a separate concept in international law. 37 
The present study is concerned with the expropriation of private, not 
public, foreign property. Similarly, we confine ourselves only to expropriation in 
31 Wortley, op. cit., at 36. 
32 D. P. O'Connell, International Law (2nd ed.), Vol. II, Stevens & Sons Ltd., London (1970) 
at 769. 
33 N. R. Doman, "Post-war Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe", 48 Col.L.R. (1948) 
1125 at 1125. 
34 Fawcett, op. cit., at 356. 
35 Friedman, op. cit., at 12. 
J() For the definition of nationalisation, see, e.g., the definition suggested by the Institute de 
Droit International in 1952 (cited by Domke, op. cit., at 587-588); Katzarov, op. cit., at 160, and 
Francioni, op. cit., at 257. 
37 Note that in this thesis the term expropriation refers to a general concept which covers all 
fonns of State interference with foreign property. including large-scale expropriation. namely 
nationalisation, and expropriation of isolated items of property. 
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peace time; intervention with foreign property during war time does not form part 
of our thesis. 
In the light of these developments and controversies, the principal aim of 
this thesis is not to propose any simple solution to the problem of either 
expropriation in general or compensation in particular. It is rather to suggest the 
development of a conceptual framework within which these issues may be re-
evaluated and out of which a more clearly defined and positive set of structures 
may be hoped to emerge. In this regard, a number of helpful developments will 
be emphasised. These include the modem jurisprudence of the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal which, for all its difficulties, has made significant advances, e.g., in the 
area of 'indirect expropriation' and the problem of claims by dual nationals. 
Finally, is the eternally problematic area of standards of compensation. The ., 
flexible concept of 'appropriate compensation' will be examined as an area of 
potentially very significant promise. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPTS AND 
PROCEDURES IN EXPROPRIATION 
1. Expropriation Cases Prior to World War I 
Referring to the fact that legal rules relating to the expropriation of foreign 
property have been determined by the economic, political, and social processes of 
the time, Dawson and Weston described the status of State interference with 
private property rights before World War I as follows: 
From about the mid- nineteenth century to W orId War I, the 
international scene, dominated by European cultures, was 
characterized by impressive material transformations ... in respect of 
which the State played a comparatively negative role, protecting a 
regime of laissezJaire and assuring the 'sanctity' of private wealth.l 
The period from the middle of the nineteenth century to 1914 displayed 
certain economic characteristics, of which its outstanding feature was an 
enormous expansion of overseas investment by British and American investors.2 
Therefore, State interference with private property rights during the 
nineteenth century "was confined principally to the regulation of private wealth." 
Expropriation of foreign property took place rarely, and only for limited 
purposes. These measures were never the major national policy, but were 
confined to limited deprivations involving the expropriation of isolated items of 
property. 3 
F. G. Dawson and B. H. Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and Effective: A Universal Standard of 
Compensation?", 30 Ford.L.R. (1961-62) 727 at 728-729. 
:2 B. A. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law, University Press, Cambridge 
(1959) at 58. 
3 Dawson and Weston, op. cit.. at 729. 
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Having stated the important features of the period with regard to the 
expropriation of foreign property, it is timely to examine the cases which were 
considered in this period. They are generally presented in chronological order. 
The Sicilian Sulphur Monopoly case. In 1836 the Sicilian Government 
granted a monopoly for purchasing and exporting sulphur to a French company.4 
The British Government protested on the ground that the rights of British 
subjects trading in sulphur were infringed by the monopoly. The protest was 
based upon the Treaty of 1816 between Great Britain and the Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies. Matters became serious and the British Government ordered 
warships to prepare for an attack on Naples, whereupon the Sicilian Government 
abolished the monopoly and agreed to the establishment of a Commission for the 
settlement of disputes. Eventually, the sums awarded by the Commission were 
paid. 
The Finlay case.5 This case concerned Mr. Finlay, a British subject, whose 
land was taken for the garden of King Otho' s palace, by the Greek Government 
in 1836. There was a dispute between the two Governments concerning the 
amount of compensation. After considerable negotiation Greece consented to 
refer the dispute to arbitration and in 1850, Lord Palmers ton awarded a sum of 
30,000 drachmas in favour of Finlay. 
The Savage case.6 In 1852 a decree was promulgated by the Government 
of Salvador by which a monopoly of gunpowder was declared, and the decree 
further provided that all unsold gunpowder should be removed from the country 
on pain of confiscation. The result of this decree was to make the sale of 
gunpowder by a United States nationa1, Savage, impossible. He offered it to the 
Government, without result, and finally they confiscated the property. 
Consequently, through his Government, he claimed for an indemnity. The two 
4 27 B.F.S.P. (1839-40) at 1163-1242, and 29 ibid., (1840-41) at 111-120. 
39 Ibid., (1849-50) at 410-479. 
6 J. B. Moore, History and Digest of International Arbitration to which the United States has 
beel1 a Party. Vol. 2, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. (1898) at 1855. 
12 
Governments agreed to refer the case to arbitration. The panel of three arbitrators 
adjudicated the case and awarded Mr. Savage a sum of money $ 4,497 
compensation plus interest at 6 percent. 
The Jonas King case.7 In this case, similar to that of Finlay, the Greek 
Government expropriated a piece of land belonging to Jonas King, an American 
national, without compensation. The Government of the United States 
subsequently took up the case and sought compensation for the expropriation in 
1853. After some negotiation as to the amount due, the Government of Greece 
paid a sum of$ 25, 000 to Mr. King, in satisfaction of his claim. 
The Delagoa Bay Railway case.8 In 1883 Edward McMurdo, an American 
national, obtained from the Portuguese Government a concession for the 
construction and operation of a railway. McMurdo transferred his concession to 
a Portuguese company in return for fully paid shares and cash, and the rights of 
this company were in tum acquired by an English company registered in London. 
In 1889 the Portuguese Government issued a decree cancelling the concession 
and the railway was also seized. Protests were made by the United Kingdom and 
the United States, and after some negotiation the Portuguese Government 
accepted in principle the liability to pay compensation. In 1891, the dispute was 
referred to arbitration, and in 1900, the arbitral tribunal rendered its award, under 
which Portugal was obliged to pay damages. 
The Religious Properties case.9 After the revolution of 1910, the 
Portuguese Government dissolved religious associations and confiscated their 
property. The British, French and Spanish Governments protested on behalf of 
their nationals, and in 1913 it was agreed to submit their claims to a tribunal of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration. After the proceedings had been interrupted 
by World War I, in 1920 the British and French claims were decided by the 
7 Moore, Digest of International Law. Government Printing Office. Vol. 6, Washington D.C. 
(1906) at 262-264. 
R M. M. Whiteman. Damages in International Law, Vol. 3. Government Printing Office. 
Washington D.C. (1943) at 1694-1703. 
9 1 R.I.A.A. (1920) 7. 
13 
tribunal by consent. The Portuguese Government was confirmed as owner of the 
expropriated property but was obliged to pay to the British and French 
Governments lump sums as compensation to the claimants represented. 
Moreover, the Spanish Government did not join in the compromis, dated 31 July, 
1913 between the other governments, and consequently the claimants concerned 
brought claims directly before the tribunal. However, the tribunal rejected 
seventeen claims as inadmissible, on the grounds that the claimants failed to 
establish their Spanish nationality. 
The last case which will be examined is the Italian Life Insurance 
Monopoly case.1O In 1912 the Italian Government established a life insurance 
monopoly, a measure under which the entire life insurance business of the 
country was to be entrusted to the State, and it was provided that no 
compensation could be claimed by existing insurance companies. Several 
countries, including Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain and the 
United States protested against this law. Consequently, it may be presumed that 
because of these protests certain amendments were introduced into the original 
Bill, under which the foreign insurance companies were allowed time to wind up 
their businesses, although their real property was not to be affected. 
The authority of these cases as precedent regarding the expropriation of 
foreign property in international law was the subject of a debate, between Fachiri 
II and Sir J. Fischer Williams,12 in three volumes of the British Year Book of 
International Law. The former author took the view that these cases constitute a 
satisfactory authority for a general proposition that the confiscation of alien 
property is contrary to international law, however, the latter took a contrary 
position. After examining the same cases, Friedman also rejects any weight of 
10 G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1940-44), Vol. 5, Government Printing 
Office, Washington D.C. at 588. In 1911 a similar law was proposed by Uruguay, but faced 
protests by Britain and France. Consequently, the Uruguayan Government abandoned her 
proposal. In ibid. 
11 A. P. Fachiri, "Expropriation and International Law", 6 B.Y.I.L. (1925) 159, and the same 
author's other literature, "International Law and the Property of Alien", 10 ibid., (1929) 32. 
12 1. Fischer Williams, "International Law and the Property of Aliens", 9 B.Y.I.L. (1928) 1. 
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authority for them and concludes that "The value of the precedent would 
therefore seem to be negligible.,,13 
Unlike the nineteenth century In which State interference with private 
property was confined to limited expropriations involving isolated items of 
property, "a unique feature of the twentieth century ... is the direct interference 
and participation of the State in the national and international economic order." 14 
Dawson and Weston further state that: 
Two World Wars, the Great Depression, the 'bipolarization' of the 
world, the spread of nationalism, the development of the corporate 
and welfare states, the formation of state trading monopolies, and the 
consequent dislocation of traditional social, economic, and political 
patterns have precipitated demands for long-overdue social and 
economic reforms ... the growing intensity of unsatisfied demands for 
wealth, power, knowledge, respect, health, security ... may be often 
met only through centralized planning and large-scale public 
participation in finance and technology ... 15 
Thus, the above factors, and particularly two World Wars, led to wave of 
nationalisations, which differed significantly from the previous wave, both in 
strength and in nature. Our study of these measures, therefore, falls into two 
parts: the first dealing with nationalisations in the inter-war period,16 and the 
second relating to post-war nationalisation measures. 
2. Expropriation and Nationalisation Measures in the Inter-War Period 
This period witnessed great changes in the economic structure of the world. 
As Katzarov observes: 
13 
69. 
The First World War had an intense effect on the solution of 
economic problems, especially on the aspirations which had taken 
shape with regard to the effect of legislation on property. Whereas 
before the First World War legislation had disregarded these 
problems and concentrated on political events, leaving economic 
S. Friedman, Expropriation in International Law, Stevens & Sons Ltd., London (1953) at 
14 Dawson and Weston, op. cit., at 730. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Note that two celebrated cases, Norwegian Shipowners' Claims and the Chorzow Factory 
case, on the expropriation of foreign property which were considered in this period, will also be 
examined. 
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questions to struggle to make headway painfully and slowly, after 
1917 there was a complete change in this field. 17 
The Russian revolution of 1917 introduced a new concept of property. As 
a result, a new form of taking emerged which was by no means comparable to the 
types of takings discussed in the last sub-section. This new phenomenon, which 
both in character and extent was .completely different from the classical 
expropriations, entailed the taking of private property on a large-scale. 
The period was characterised as "the high noon of arbitral tribunals and 
claims commissions.,,18 Among many international disputes concernIng 
requisitioned property after W orId War I, significant cases, such as Russian 
nationalisation measures, the Norwegian Shipowners' Claims, the Chorzow 
Factory case and Mexican oil nationalisation will be considered. 19 
2.1 Russian Nationalisations (1917) 
Following the 191 7 social revolution and the emergence of Marxist 
ideology a number of nationalisation measures were taken in Russia. The new 
regime then attempted to socialise all economic activities within its territory. 
By a decree of 8 November, 1917, private ownership of land was 
abolished.2o The Decree of 17th December nationalised the Russian banks and, 
consequently, banking operations became a State monopoly; existing private 
banks were merged into the State Bank. A further Decree of January 26, 1918, 
provided that "the assets of the former private banks were to be confiscated for 
the benefit of the State bank and their shares annulled.,,21 On December 5, 1917, 
the Supreme Economic Council was established "with the widest powers of 
organising the national economy, including the power of confiscation." The 
Decree of January 26 nationalised the merchant navy and introduced a State 
17 K. Katzarov, Theory of Nation ali sat ion, Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague (1964) at 34. 
II! C. Parry, "Some Considerations upon the Protection of the Individuals in International Law", 
90 Hague Reclleil (1956-11) 635 at 660. 
19 For the classification of nationalisation measures in this chapter, I have benefited from Piran, 
op. cit., at 14-59. 
20 Katzarov, op. cit., at 34. 
21 Friedman, op. cit., at 17. 
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monopoly in matters affecting merchant shipping. The same Decree also 
nationalised all large companies, including the railways.22 Finally, the 
nationalisation of insurance undertakings was effected by the Decree of the 28th 
of November. In fact, before 1920, complete nationalisation had been achieved, 
although it has been said that the decrees were not always carefully drawn up, 
and were often obscure.23 The public debt had been repudiated, and "no 
compensation was granted for any of this legislation which made no distinction 
between nationals and foreigners. ,,24 
The Russian nationalisation measures were the subject of diplomatic 
protests. In February, 1918, the then United States Ambassador in Petrograd 
presented to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs a Note on behalf of the 
United States and all the other States, allied and neutral. The Note reads in part 
as follows: 
In order to avoid any misunderstandings in future, the representatives 
at Petro grad of all the foreign powers declare that they view the 
decrees relating to the repudiation of the Russian State loans, the 
confiscation of property and all sorts and the analogous measures as 
without effect in so far as their nationals are concerned.25 
In order to settle the various claims and counter-claims, several conferences 
were held. The first one involved only the principal Western Powers and took 
place in Cannes in January, 1922. These powers decided to invite Russia to 
attend the next conference. The only result of the Cannes conference "was the 
recognition of the sovereign right of every State freely to regulate the system and 
form of property within its own borders." At the other conferences which were 
held at Genoa in April, and at the Hague in June-July, 1922, there was a complete 
failure to reach a possible settlement on the issue?6 
24 
25 
26 
Katzarov, op. cit., at 34-35. 
Wortley, op. cit., at 61. 
Friedman, op. cit., at 18. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., at 19-20. 
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After the failure of these two conferences, the Powers began to conclude 
bilateral trade agreements with Russia. In the case of Great Britain, a Treaty was 
reached on August 8, 1924, whereby "Great Britain agreed in principle to the 
Russian counter-claims based on the intervention and recognised the possibility 
of setting them off against claims by British nationals in respect of the Russian 
confiscations", and she also "promised a loan." Russia, for her part, undertook to 
negotiate with British interested parties. However, this Treaty never came into 
force as the British Conservative Government then came to power.27 
Likewise, in 1925, a separate agreement was reached between the Russian 
Government and the Lena Goldfields company, a British mining undertaking 
which operated in Russia before the revolution, in which Lena's properties were 
nationalised. Under the agreement, the company "renounced its claims in return 
for a concession of its former properties.,,28 However, the conduct of business 
for the Lena company, like other foreign undertakings, became impracticable. 
Consequently, the company instituted legal proceedings against Russia, and 
eventually the dispute was referred to arbitration.29 An award was rendered by 
the arbitral tribunal in favour of the company, and it is often quoted for its 
statement concerning the legal basis for the payment of compensation (the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment) which will be considered in chapter four. 
It is interesting to note that the Russian Government gradually, even de 
jure, was recognised by some States, and further that one after another they 
"ceased to press their claims arising out of the Russian nationalisation 
measures. ,,30 As regards the recognition of the new Government of Russia 
(former Soviet Union) and its connection with the Russian nationalisation 
measures, the Luther v. Sagar case3 ! is worthy of mention. In 1920, the 
defendant company purchased a quantity of timber from the new Russian 
27 Ibid.,at21-22. 
2R Ibid., at 22. 
29 Wortley, op. cit., at 61-62. 
30 Friedman, op. cit., at 22-23. 
31 D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Lml' (5th ed.), Sweet & Maxwell, London 
(1998) at 169-172. 
18 
Government. The Russian company, which was the plaintiff, claimed title to the 
timber in England, on the ground that it had come from a factory in Russia that 
had been owned by it before being nationalised by the Russian Government. The 
company argued that the Russian nationalisation should be ignored before the 
English courts, since the United Kingdom had not recognised the Russian 
Government. The lower court agreed with this contention and the case was 
referred to the Court of Appeal. In the meantime the United Kingdom recognised 
de facto the Russian Government and the Foreign Office informed the Court of 
Appeal of this in writing. The result was that the higher court was bound to take 
note of the Russian nationalisation and accordingly the plaintiff lost the case, 
since a court must give effect to the legislation of a recognised State or 
government. It was also ruled that the fact that the Russian Government was 
recognised de facto and not de jure did not affect the issue. 
2.2 The Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (1922) 32 
In this case, fifteen Norwegian nationals entered into contracts with 
shipyards in the United States for the building of ships to be used by Norway in 
World War I. After the United States declared war on Germany in 1917 it 
adopted emergency measures authorising the requisitioning of these ships in its 
own war effort against Germany. The claims of nationals affected by these 
measures were taken up by their government and after diplomatic negotiation a 
special agreement, a so-called compromise, was signed on June 30, 1921, 
whereby Norway and the United States referred the dispute to the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration at the Hague. The arbitral tribunal rendered its award on 13 
October 1922 in Norway's favour. The award is often cited for its statement , , 
regarding the standard of compensation. 
32 Notl,vegian Shipowners' Claims (Norwa)' v. The United States). Pennanent Court of 
International Arbitration, Award of 13 October. 1922, 1 R.I.A.A. (1948) 307-346. The award 
also reprinted in 17 A.1.I.L. (1923) at 362-399. 
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2.3 The Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia Case (1928) 33 
Although the facts of the case are very complex, they may be summarised 
as follows: a German company, Bayerische Stickstoffwerke, established a nitrate 
factory at Chorzow in Upper Silesia following an agreement it concluded with 
the German Government in 1915. Four years later, the land and the factory were 
sold by the German Government to another German company, Oberschlesische 
Stickstoffwerke. The control and management of the factory remained in the 
hands of the first company. Upper Silesia passed into Polish hands, in 
accordance with the Treaty of Versailles which concluded after World War I 
(1919). Under Article 297 of the Treaty, property, rights and interests of German 
nationals were not liquidated by the Polish Government except in certain 
conditions. Moreover, in accordance with Article 6 of the Geneva Convention of 
1922 between Germany and Poland, the latter was given the right, subject to the 
provisions of the Versailles Treaty, to expropriate major industries in Polish 
Upper Silesia, but again with the exception of property of German nationals or of 
companies controlled by them. Despite these limitations, in 1922, a Polish court 
declared the registration of the Oberschlesische company to be null and void, and 
ordered the land on which the factory was situated to be transferred to the Polish 
Treasury. Also, under a Polish ministerial decree, the management of the factory 
was given to a Polish official. 
In 1925, an application was submitted by the German Government to the 
PCD, claiming that the expropriation of the Chorzow factory by Poland 
constituted a violation of the Geneva Convention. The Court rendered its 
judgment in this case in favour of Germany. As in the Norwegian case, the 
judgment has been referred to extensively in the context of compensation, 
particularly when advocating the standard of full compensation. 
33 German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia and the Factory at Chorzow (Germany \'. Poland} 
(1928) (Merits), Permanent Court ofIntemational Justice, Series A, No. 17, 1. 
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2.4 The Mexican Oil Nationalisation of 1938 
Although the new attitudes adopted towards private property in Mexico 
differed in several aspects from those in Russia, "one finds underlying these 
superficially different events the same ideological motives, namely the desire to 
implement the long maturing principle of the transformation of property.,,34 
During the nineteenth century, while Mexico experienced economIC 
development, the conditions of the peasant class got worse. The benefits of 
industrial progress accrued mostly to foreigners, who controlled a large part of 
Mexico's industrial wealth. In Friedman's view, "these circumstances gave rise 
to a dual aspiration; agrarian reform and oil nationalisation. ,,35 By the new 
Constitution of 1917, the Mexican Government assumed ownership of all 
national lands and waters to ensure private use of these resources to conform to 
the needs of the general welfare. The Alien Land Law of 1925 also limited the 
ownership of land by foreigners. These measures mainly affected the nationals of 
the United States. The latter raised no objection in principle but merely criticised 
the rate of compensation. Eventually, a settlement was made with the United 
States on the issue in 1941.36 
As regards oil nationalisation, it is significant to note that before Mexico 
resorted to this measure more than 95% of its petroleum and mining industries 
were foreign-dominated. 37 The oil controversy followed three steps. The first 
move against private oil rights was carried out in the Constitution of 1917, where 
in Article 27 it was stipulated "that the nation has direct ownership of petroleum 
and all solid, liquid, or gaseous hydrocarbons.,,38 Thus, the article raised the 
question of oil rights acquired by foreigners prior to 191 7 under the mining laws 
of 1884, 1892 and 1909. It led to "legal and diplomatic conflict involving 
34 Katzarov, op. cit., at 34. 
JS Friedman, op. cit., at 23. 
36 Ibid., at 24. 
37 E. N. Baklanoff, Expropriation of us Investments in Cuba, Mexico. and Chile, Praeger, New 
York (1975) at 53. 
3R Ibid., at 50. See also L. H. Woosley, "The Expropriation of Oil Properties by Mexico", 32 
A.l.LL. (1938) 519. 
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Mexico, the foreign-controlled oil companies, and the Governments of the United 
States and Britain. ,,39 In 1921, the Mexican Supreme Court held that the 191 7 
Constitution was not retroactive with respect to petroleum rights acquired prior to 
the adoption of the Constitution. Following this decision, after considerable 
negotiation a compromise was made.4o 
The second step took place in December, 1925, when the Mexican 
Congress enacted the petroleum law, which required "the foreign oil companies 
to exchange their sub-soil titles of unlimited duration for 50-year concessions.,,41. 
The US Government protested, and two years later the law in question was 
declared unconstitutional by the Mexican Supreme Court. Eventually, extended 
negotiations again led to an amicable settlement of the conflict. 42 
The last move was initiated with the Expropriation Law of 1936, "in 
conjunction with new labor legislation, enabled the Cardenas administration to 
exert the necessary pressure to create a 'labor squeeze' on foreign-owned 
petroleum, mining and agricultural enterprises.,,43 In 1936, the Syndicate of Oil 
Workers demanded a collective labour contract together with an increase in 
wages, but the demand was rejected by the oil companies. Then, on request of 
the Syndicate, the Mexican Labour Board appointed a committee of experts to 
investigate the companies' economic capacity to pay the workers' claims. In 
1937, the Board made a decision on the dispute in favour of the Syndicate. The 
oil companies, claiming inability to comply with the decision, appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Mexico. In 1938, the decision of the Board was upheld by the 
Supreme Court, and the oil companies gave notice of their inability to comply 
with the Supreme Court's rulings. The Labour Board then officially terminated 
the contract between the oil companies and the workers. In these circumstances, 
on 18 March, 1938, President Cardenas issued the nationalisation decree.44 
39 Ibid. 
·w Ibid., at 51. 
-II Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., at 52. 
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It is interesting to note that Mexican agrarian reform and oil nationalisation 
gave rise to an extensive diplomatic exchange between Mexico and the United 
States.45 There the latter had the opportunity to articulate the 'Hull formula' on 
the standard of compensation, which will be referred to in appropriate occasions 
in this thesis. The notes reveal that the two governments were in agreement on 
several issues, including the right of a sovereign State to expropriate the property 
of aliens within its border, and that the expropriations must be for public purpose. 
However, the real controversy centred on the issue of compensation under 
international law. The United States contended that Mexico could not lawfully 
take alien property except upon payment, in advance, in a "prompt, adequate and 
effective" manner.46 Mexico argued that: 
There is in international law no rule universally accepted in theory 
nor carried out in practice, which makes obligatory the payment of 
immediate compensation, nor even of deferred compensation, for 
expropriations of a general and impersonal character like those which 
Mexico has carried out for the purpose of redistribution of the land.47 
Thus Mexico, while admitting a general obligation to pay compensation, 
under its municipal law, claimed that the time, amount and manner of such 
payment could be determined only in accordance with her own laws. It further 
argued that a distinction should be drawn between the rules governing large-scale 
expropriation, i.e. nationalisation, and expropriation of isolated items of property. 
The dispute between Mexico and the United States over the oil 
nationalisation was settled by agreement between the two governments in 1942, 
after abundant diplomatic exchange as indicated above. Since British 
shareholders had a majority interest in the expropriated oil companies, the 
settlement of claims became much more difficult. However, after prolonged 
negotiations, settlements were made in 1947.48 
45 G. H. Hackworth, Digest of international Law, Vol. 3, Government Printing Office, 
Washington D.C. (1942) at 655-561. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
4R Wortley, op. cit., at 66 
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3. Post World War II N ationalisation Measures 
Having discussed expropriation and nationalisation measures carried out in 
the inter-war period, this sub-section will deal with those measures which took 
place after World War II. In this period vast nationalisations occurred in a wide 
variety of geographical, political and ideological regions throughout the world, 
even in Western Europe (for example, France and the United Kingdom). The 
wave of nationalisation spread far from its centre in Europe, to reach a number of 
other countries, such as Peru, Iran, Egypt, Chile, and Indonesia. While many of 
the nationalisation measures prior to World War II were aimed primarily at 
foreigners, post-war measures usually affected nationals and foreigners alike.49 
In the following sections, therefore, we shall consider: 
- nationalisations in the European countries, including Eastern and Western 
Europe; 
- Third World countries' nationalisations; 
- nationalisations in Latin American countries; and 
- OPEC countries' take-overs. 
3.1 East European Nationalisations 
After World War II several East European countries enacted nationalisation 
laws affecting both nationals and foreigners, and permitting the taking of mines, 
branches of industry, transportation and communication facilities, commercial 
enterprises, banks and insurance companies as well as other properties. While 
these measures were motivated by political, economic and social reasons,50 they 
"do not in principle reject either private property, the right of inheritance or 
private enterprise.,,51 Similarly, lump-sum compensation agreements were 
concluded between East European countries and their creditors countries which 
showed several features which are worthy of mention. Firstly, in all cases, 
49 
50 
51 
Doman, op. cit., at 1140. 
See, e.g., Friedman. op. cit., at 30-31, and White, op. cit., at 18-31. 
Katzarov, op. cit., at 53. 
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compensation was paid for the property or undertakings nationalised. An 
exception was made in the cases of persons who had collaborated with the 
enemy. Secondly, the compensation did not cover, as a rule, the total value of the 
property or undertakings and sometimes was less than half the estimated value. 
Thirdly, with few exceptions, payments were normally made in the form of 
public bonds which were redeemable on different days. Fourthly, none of the 
enactments made distinctions on the basis of the nationality of the persons 
affected and some even provided for preferential treatment of aliens affected by 
the nationalisation measures. 
3.1.1 Czechoslovakia 
In Czechoslovakia the nationalisation of economic life followed two steps. 
The first step took place in 1945, when the National Front Government was in 
power. The Nationalisation Law of October 24, 1945 went into effect on the 
27th of October, 1945. By the law, "the Czechoslovak State acquired ownership 
of the nationalised enterprises induding all of their property, assets and rights.,,52 
Among these enterprises were the mines, banks, the insurance companies, and 
certain industrial enterprises. 'National' enterprises were established out of the 
nationalised enterprises. The national enterprises succeeded to the liabilities of 
the nationalised enterprises. The new national enterprises had the status of an 
independent legal person. For instance, they were subject to the provisions of 
commercial law, tax laws, and were registered in the register of firms kept by the 
District Court of appropriate jurisdictions. Although the surplus earnings of the 
national enterprises were handed over to the State, it was not responsible for their 
debts. 53 
Compensation was provided for nationalised property, "except in the case 
of property owned by German or Hungarian, public or private corporations or 
persons of German or Hungarian nationality, and persons who were engaged in 
52 A. R. Rado, "Czechoslovak Nationalization Decrees: Some International Aspects", 41 
A.J.I.L. (1947) 795. See also Doman, op. cit., at 1143-1146; Friedman, op. cit., at 39-42. and 
Katzarov, op. cit., at 56-57. 
53 Ibid., at 796. 
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certain activities against the Czechoslovak State.,,54 The amount of 
compensation was based on "the official prices prevailing on October 27, 1945, 
after deducting all liabilities. ,,55 In cases where there were no official prices, the 
quantum of compensation was calculated on the basis of an official valuation by 
the Government. The Nationalisation Law listed three possible methods of 
payment of compensation: "(a) securities, (b) cash or (c) in other value.,,56 For 
the purposes of compensation payments, a 'Nationalised Economy Fund', an 
independent legal person, was established in Prague. Interestingly, compensation 
claims in the case of conflict were decided by administrative and not by judicial 
tribunals. 57 
The second step occurred when the Communist Government took power in 
1948. There "the 1945 nationalization decrees were amended [with retroactive 
effect] and some sectors of the economic life not covered by the previous law 
were subjected to nationalisation.,,58 
As to compensation claims, settlements were made with Belgium, France, 
Switzerland and the United States. A lump-sum agreement was also concluded 
by Czechoslovakia with the United Kingdom.59 
3.1.2 Poland 
The Polish nationalisations were effected by a Law of January 3, 1946 
which nationalised the principal sectors of the economy. These measures were 
the result not only of the de facto situation which existed immediately after 
World War II in all East European countries, but also of two other factors. 6o 
Firstly, the State took an appreciable part in economic life even before World 
War II, through "State owned or consisted of undertakings in which the State had 
share." Secondly, "the extent of foreign investments in Poland which seemed to 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
5!l Doman, op. cit., at 1145. 
59 Wortley, op. cit., at 68. 
60 Friedman, op. cit., at 32. See also Doman. op. cit., at 1146-1149, and Katzarov, op. cit., at 
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render illusory a political sovereignty unaccompanied by economIC 
independence. " Poland nationalised industry, banking, mInes, transport, 
insurance, and commercial enterprises. 
The nationalisation law divided nationalisation into two broad categories, 
one of which involved the payment of compensation, and the other did not. The 
absence of compensation depended both on the identity of the owner, and on the 
nature of the subject matter. "No compensation was payable in respect of the 
nationalisation of industrial, mining, banking, commercial, transport or insurance 
undertakings formerly belonging to Germany or the Free City of Danzig, or to 
persons who entered the service of the enemy.,,61 
Article 7 of the Nationalisation Law laid down the compensation procedure 
for those cases to which it applied. As in the case of Czechoslovakia, under the 
Polish Law compensation was payable; (a) in securities (bonds), (b) in cash or (c) 
in other values. In Polish Nationalisation Law, there was a provision, not found 
in the laws of most of the other Eastern European States, which provided for "a 
special commission to determine the amount of compensation. ,,62 In the 
determination of compensation, the following were taken into account: 
61 
62 
63 
(1) general decrease in value of the national wealth; 
(2) net value of the assets of the undertaking on the day of its transfer 
to the State; 
(3) decrease in value of the undertaking as a result of war losses and 
losses suffered in connection with the war and occupation in the 
period between 1 September 1939, and the time of transfer to the 
State; 
(4) the amount of investments made after 1 September 1939; 
(5) special factors affecting the value of the undertaking (duration of 
. l' ) 63 conceSSIons, Icences, etc .. 
Katzarov, op. cit., at 58. 
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Separate Mixed Commissions, both with the United Kingdom and the 
United States, were set up to fix the amount of compensation due. "The presence 
of Polish gold and other assets in the United Kingdom and the United States may 
have assisted the negotiations for compensation.,,64 Lump-sum agreements were 
also concluded with Belgium, France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
3.1.3 Former Yugoslavia 
The interference with private property or enterprise followed two steps in 
the former Yugoslavia. The first step took place when a large number of 
industrial enterprises were placed under State control, or, on the basis of the 
National Council decree directed against collaboration with the enemy issued on 
November 24, 1944, were expropriated by various court decisions. These 
measures also affected foreign property or property of persons who fled the 
country during or after the war.65 
In the second step, the Nationalisation Law of December 5, 1946 was 
introduced, which nationalised all the essential undertakings of the whole 
country. 
Provisions were made for the payment of compensation (Article 8 of the 
Law of December 5, 1946), except where the property nationalised was used for 
humanitarian, social, cultural or similar purposes (Article 14).66 Compensation 
was paid to the owners of nationalised undertakings for the nationalised property 
"on the basis of its net value on the day of nationalisation.,,67 Under Articles 10 
and 11 of the Nationalisation Law, "payment was to be paid in State bonds and, 
. . . h ,,68 In certain cases, III cas . 
A lump-sum settlement with the United Kingdom was reached, and similar 
settlements were also made with Switzerland and the United States.69 In the case 
M Wortley, at 67. 
05 Doman, at 1149. 
00 Katzarov, op. cit., at 59. 
67 Doman, op. cit., at 1150. 
6R Friedman, op. cit., at 44. 
69 Wortley, op. cit.. at 68. 
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of the latter, the question of compensation involved so much disagreement that 
"relations between the two countries were put to a severe test." 70 The United 
States began to block former Yugoslav assets in the United States which had 
been transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank during the German occupation. 
Eventually, an agreement between the two Governments was concluded on July 
19, 1948. 
3.1.4 Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria 
After W orId War II Hungary adopted nationalisation measures and carried 
out an agrarian reform. 71 By the Decree of March 15, 1945, the State distributed 
large estates among landless and small landowners. The decree provided for 
compensation, except in the cases of traitors, the heads of the Fascist parties, war 
criminals, and Germans deprived of Hungarian nationality. The nationalisation 
of key economic sectors was carried out as from 1946, when the principal heavy 
industries were placed under State control. A year later, the Hungarian National 
Bank and other large credit establishments were nationalised. Various industrial 
undertakings were also effected by a Law of May 8, 1948. The outstanding 
feature of the Hungarian nationalisation law was its favourable treatment of 
foreigners, which, in Doman's VIew, was exceptional in the history of 
expropriatory legislation.72 
In Rumania nationalisation was introduced in 1946. However, the main 
nationalisation measures were carried out when Rumania adopted a new 
Constitution in 1948. Under the new Constitution, the natural resources of the 
soil and the sub-soil were vested in the State. These principles were "applied 
under the Bill of 'Nationalization of Industrial, Banking, Insurance, Mining and 
Transport Enterprises' of June 11, 1948.,,73 In principle, nationalisation was 
effected subject to compensation, but no compensation was payable (a) to those 
70 
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enriched in an unlawful manner; and (b) to those who left the country 
unlawfully.74 
Similar measures were adopted by Bulgaria. A Law of March 6, 1946, 
ordered the confiscation of property acquired illegally or through speculation, i.e. 
"by means of an activity which had disproportionality increased the fortune of the 
person exercising it at a time of difficulty for the State." 75 However, the most 
important nationalisation was effected by the Law of 24th December, 1947, 
which nationalised private industrial and mining enterprises. This Law 
specifically referred to the power conferred on the State by Article 10 of the new 
Constitution, which became effective on December 6, 1947, to nationalise certain 
branches of industry.76 The whole banking system was also nationalised. The 
owners of nationalised enterprises were given compensation "in the form of 
interest-bearing State bonds." No compensation was granted to those who served 
or helped the enemies of the Bulgarian regime. 77 
Likewise, these countries were under treaty obligations: the Peace Treaties 
concluded with the defeated Powers, to restore to the United Nations and United 
Nations' nationals property they owned before W orId War 11.78 
Commenting on Bulgarian nationalisation measures, Doman maintains that 
the measures were "more unfavorable to foreign property owners than any of the 
other decrees discussed above." Equally[At the same time], he observes that 
foreign property rights were less substantial in Bulgaria than in any of the other 
. 79 East European countnes. 
3.2 Nationalisations in Western Europe 
As indicated above, after W orId War II not only the countries of Eastern 
Europe adopted laws nationalising the major portions of industry; Western 
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European countries also resorted to nationalisation. The measures of 
nationalisation in the latter countries were much milder than those of Eastern 
European countries, and since few of them directly affected aliens, they led to 
few problems of international law. Nonetheless, their significance should not be 
underestimated. In the following section, nationalisations carried out in France 
and the United Kingdom will be examined in tum. 
3.2.1 France 
France experienced three waves of nationalisations.8o The first one 
occurred before World War II, when two sectors of the French economy, namely 
the war-related industries and the rail-roads, were nationalised. These measures 
were effected under the Law of 16th August, 1936. It was stipulated that 
compensation must be fixed by mutual agreement or, in the absence of such an 
agreement, by an arbitrator. 81 
The second wave took place immediately after World War II, and was of 
greater importance. 82 First a few industrial undertakings, such as the Renault 
motor company, were confiscated because their owners were accused of 
collaboration with the Germans. In 1945, all private airlines were merged in the 
State-owned Air France. Moreover, four other large sectors were nationalised, 
they include: (1) the Banque de France and the four large deposit banks; (2) the 
gas and electricity industries; (3) the coal industry; and two-thirds of the leading 
. . Insurance companIes. 
The owners of nationalised undertakings were given compensation in the 
form of interest-bearing State securities or bonds. The amount of compensation 
was based on "market quotations of shares in designated periods during 1944 and 
1945 or on valuations made by special committees based on the market value of 
h f h . ,,83 t e assets 0 t e compames. F or the purpose of paying compensation "a 
80 D. Borde and W. Eggleston, "The French Nationalizations", 68 A.B.A.J. (1982) 422. 
81 Friedman, op. cit., at 57. 
82 See generally Doman, op. cit., at 1141-1143; Friedman, op. cit., at 58-63; Wortley, op. cit., 
at 118-120, and Katzarov, op. cit., at 42-45. 
83 Doman, op. cit., at 1141. 
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distinction was made between French nationals and foreigners, the latter being 
more favourably treated than the former.,,84 In Friedman's view, this policy was 
based on such non-legal considerations as: (a) foreign shareholders in France 
were not extensive; and (b) France was anxious to maintain the right of the far 
more numerous French shareholders affected by the measures of nationalisation 
which took place in Eastern Europe.85 Thus, there were no significant 
international agreements concluded as a result of the French nationalisations. 
The last wave of nationalisations was carried out in 1982, after President 
Mitterrand took power in 1981. The Nationalisation Law was promulgated on 
February 11, 1982, and it embraced four titles. 86 Under title I, all of the shares of 
five important companies were transferred to the State. Title II of the law 
required the nationalisation of all banks in France which had deposits equal to or 
more than one billion francs, except industrial or real estate banks, and foreign-
controlled banks. Title III of the law nationalised "two major banking and 
investment groups." The last title of the Nationalisation Law related to: (1) the 
status of employees of the nationalised concerns; (2) the tax treatment of the 
shares nationalised; and (3) transactions in the bonds issued in exchange for 
shares.87 
In the Mitterrand nationalisations, as In the preceding French 
nationalisations, provision was made for compensation. The shareholders of the 
nationalised enterprises were granted compensation in the form of interest-
bearing State bonds issued by the National Industrial Fund. In order to assess the 
value of each share nationalised, the Nationalisation Law stipulated a tripartite 
method of determining the total value of all shares of any nationalised industry.88 
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3.2.2 The United Kingdom 
After World War II, the United Kingdom, like France, sought a solution to 
the grave problems of reconstructing certain sectors of her economy.89 Following 
the 1945 General Election, Nationalisation was introduced by the new Labour 
Government, implementing an essential part of the party's manifesto.9o 
Thus, various measures of nationalisation were adopted. 91 By the Civil 
Aviation, and the Cables and Wireless Acts, 1946, those activities connected 
with communications between various parts of the country were nationalised. 
The Bank of England was effected, in order to strength State control over the 
nation's finances. The nationalisation measures also affected various "sectors of 
the national economy in which antiquated methods of production and the disorder 
of individual activity threatened to compromise the work of reconstruction.,,92 
They included: the coal industry, by the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946, 
enterprises engaged in the production and distribution of electricity, by the 
Electricity Act, 1947, and rail communications, the docks, inland waterways, 
lighterage, by the Transport Act, 1947. 
Throughout the whole scheme of nationalisation in Britain, compensation 
was the constant concomitant of the measures, and it "was sometimes calculated 
on a generous scale.,,93 In Scammell's view, however, "the reasons prompting 
the inclusion in the nationalising statutes of provisions for compensation were 
social and economic rather than legal. ,,94 He argues that "since ... there is no 
constitutional requirement that expropriation shall be attended by 
t · ,,95 compensa Ion. The amount of compensation was based on "the average 
89 E. H. Scammell, "Nationalisation in Legal Perspective", 5 c.L.P. (1952) 30. 
90 Note that even long before World War II, there were many examples of State interference 
with economic life. On the issue, see Katzarov, op. cit., at 46-47. 
91 See C. M. Schmitthoff, "The Nationalization of Basic Industries in Great Britain", 16 L.& 
c.P. (1951) 557; Friedman, op. cit., at 63-65, and Katzarov, op. cit., at 47-52. 
92 Friedman, op. cit., at 63-64. 
93 Ibid., at 64. Note that in compensating the shareholders of the Bank of England, the 
government was generous. Ibid. 
l).j Scammell, op. cit., at 37. 
95 Ibid., at 37-38. 
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quotation of the shares on the Stock Exchange for the first week of November, 
1946, or, in the case of the nationalisation of electricity and transport, for six 
months preceding the General Election.,,96 In the cases of the coal mines and 
telecommunications, an arbitration procedure was provided to fix the quantum of 
compensation. 
The United Kingdom also adopted a measure of nationalisation when, in 
1977, the Labour Government passed the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries 
Act.97 Under the Act, 31 companies' shares passed into the ownership of two 
State-owned companies: British Aerospace and British Shipbuilders. Provision 
was made for compensation. It was stipulated that "securities quoted on the 
Stock Exchange were to be valued at their average price during a six-month 
period ending on 28 February 1974 ... whilst unquoted securities were to be 
valued, by agreement or arbitration, as if they had been quoted during the same 
reference period.,,98 So-called 'Stockholders' Representatives' were appointed to 
represent the interests of the former shareholders. Their duty was to negotiate 
with the Government as to the value of the shares taken. 
Eventually, all of the Representatives accepted the compensation offered by 
the Government, except in some cases in which the shareholders were 
dissatisfied with the measure of compensation provided under the Nationalisation 
Act. Consequently, proceedings were instituted by seven companies under the 
European Convention on Human Rights,99 on the grounds of inadequate 
compensation. The European Court of Human Rights considered the dispute, 
under the label the 'Lithgow case', and on 8 July 1986, rendered its decision in 
the British Government's favour. The decision is often cited for its statement 
regarding nationalisation, and particularly the standard of compensation. 
96 Friedman, op. cit., at 64. 
97 M. Mendelson, "The United Kingdom Nationalization Cases and the European Convention 
on Human Rights", 57 B.Y.I.L. (1986) 35. 
9R Ibid., at 34. 
99 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
signed on November 1950, Vol. 213, U.N.T.S., at 22l. 
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It should be noted that the other countries of Western Europe did not adopt 
significant nationalisation measures which merit discussion. For instance, in 
1945, the Netherlands temporarily nationalised the war-wrecked mining 
industries. Otherwise, she refrained from nationalisation on a large scale. 100 
3.3 Nationalisations in the Third World Countries 
Although after World War II the most important nationalisation measures 
occurred in the Eastern and Western European countries, as indicated above, 
these were not the only examples which can be mentioned. Some of the 
developing countries for political, financial and nationalistic reasons also resorted 
to nationalisation. Among them may be cited Iran, Egypt and Indonesia. In the 
mid-twentieth century, in order to combat economic difficulties which arose after 
World War II as well as to satisfy nationalistic elements in the Iranian population, 
the Iranian Government in the early 1950s, nationalised its oil industry. In the 
late 1950's, as a link in President Nasser's attempt to stabilise his regime and 
maintain the independence of Egypt from the Western World, the Suez Canal 
was nationalised. In 1959, in the context of the struggle for liberation of West-
Irian, Indonesia also took measures against Dutch interests. Thus, the following 
section will deal with nationalisations in these countries. 
3.3.1 Iran 
The history of Iran (then called Persia) was largely a history of Great Power 
competition. During the past two centuries Iran became the battleground in the 
political rivalry of the Great Powers, particularly Britain and Russia. The 
competition for concessions was intense, and by the end of the nineteenth century 
the number of concessions was so great that in practice all of the country's 
resources were in the hands of foreigners. 101 As Ford observes: 
The oil resources of Iran are closely connected with the Great Power 
struggle between Britain and Russia in Iran. The competition 
100 Doman, op. cit., at 1142. 
101 For an excellent account of the political and economic history of Iran in the first half of the 
twentieth century, see A. W. Ford, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-1952: A Study of the 
Role of Law in the Relations of States, University of California Press, Los Angles (1954) at 1-40. 
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between the two nations for concessions to exploit Iranian oil 
resources has continued for half a century. 102 
In 1901, William K. D' Arcy, an Australian financier, was granted an oil 
concession for a sixty-year term. Under the concession, D' Arcy agreed to 
establish one or more companies for oil exploitation. In 1909, the first 
exploitation company, namely the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was established. 
Thus, the D' Arcy interests were transferred to the new Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, when in 1935 the name of country 
changed from 'Persia' to 'Iran' - hereinafter 'the Company'). 103 
Following controversies over royalties to be paid by the conCeSSIOnaire 
company, in November 1932, the Persian Government notified the Company that 
the concession was annulled. The British Government reacted immediately, and 
her warships appeared in the Persian Gulf, as they were again to appear in 1951. 
Protests and requests for arbitration by the Company were not successful. 104 The 
British Government submitted the dispute to the Council of the League of 
Nations. The latter suspended proceedings when direct negotiations between the 
Persian Government and the Company were begun in February, 1933. 105 The 
negotiations led to the granting of a new concession to the Company on April 29, 
1933, for a sixty-year period. 
The new concession granted the Company "the exclusive right to extract 
and process petroleum in a clearly defined concession area and also certain other 
rights.,,106 In Article 21 of the concession it was stipulated that it could only be 
annulled before the expiration date, i.e. 1993, under certain conditions, and that 
arbitration provided for any disputes between the parties (Article 22).107 
In 1949, the Iranian Government demanded increased royalties from the 
Company. After some negotiation, a Supplementary Agreement was reached, but 
102 Ibid., at 14. 
103 Ibid., at 15. The Company is today called 'British Petroleum'. 
104 Ibid., at 14-20. 
105 1. Frankel, "The Anglo-Iranian Dispute", 6 Y.B.W.A. (1952) 59. 
106 W. W. Bishop, '"The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case", 45 A.J.I.L. (1951) 749 at 750. 
107 Ibid., at 751. 
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never ratified by the Majlis. I08 On March 15, 1951, the Majlis passed a 'Single 
Article' enunciating the principle of nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry, 
and it was approved by the Senate. 109 Moreover, the Single Article Law was 
implemented by the Iranian Oil Nationalization Law of May 1,1951. Article 1 of 
the latter Law provided for a board of five Senators, five Deputies, and the 
Iranian Finance Minister, "under whose supervision immediate nationalization 
and dispossession of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was to be carried OUt.,,110 It 
was also stipulated that "the entire revenue derived from oil and its products is 
indisputably due to the Persian nation."!!! 
Provision was made for compensation. Under Article 2 of the 
Nationalization Law, "the Government was bound to examine the rightful claims 
of the Government as well as those of the Company", and to submit its proposals 
to the Iranian Parliament. 1!2 
In May, 1951, the Company, In pursuance of Article 22 of the 1933 
concession, requested arbitration. The Iranian Finance Minister replied and 
rejected the Company's suggestions on the grounds that: (1) "the nationalization 
of industries is based on the right of the sovereignty of nations, and the British 
Government itself nationalised her basic industries"; (2) "the nationalization of 
the Iranian oil industry was not referable to arbitration"; and (3) "no international 
authority had competence to deal with the matter, because it was entirely and 
solely within the purview of the Iranian Government.,,1!3 Attempts to reach an 
amicable settlement, even through a special representative of President Truman, 
between Iran and the United Kingdom were unsuccessful. l !4 
On May 26, 1951, the British Government submitted the dispute to the 
International Court of Justice (hereinafter the 'ICJ'). Two days later, the Iranian 
lOR Ford, op. cit., at 48-51. Note that the Iranian Parliament is called 'the Majlis'. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. For the full text ofIranian Nationalisation Law, see ibid., Appendix IV, at 268. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
IU Ibid., at 58. 
114 Bishop, op. cit., at 752. 
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Foreign Minister informed the Court that the Iranian Government did not 
recognise its competence in this matter. 115 In these situations, the British 
Government, by sending troops into the Persian Gulf and to the Shatt-al-Arab 
River was prepared to take military action; however, she did not take it. 116 
On June 22, 1951, the British Government applied again to the ICJ, this 
time for interim measures of protection, and the Court on July 5, 1951 issued an 
order. I 17 Iran based its objection to the jurisdiction of the ICJ on the "legal 
incompetence of the complaint" and on "the fact that the exercise of sovereignty 
is not subject to complaint.,,118 As a result, it refused to comply with the 
measures. 
The ICJ considered the United Kingdom's application, under the name 
'Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case', and on July 22, 1951, it was dismissed on the 
ground of lack of jurisdiction. I 19 The Court based its decision on "the 
interpretation of the declaration, ratified on September 19, 1932, by which Iran 
accepted the jurisdiction of the PCIJ according to Article 36 (2) of the PCIJ 
Statute.,,120 The British Government argued that "the Court had jurisdiction in all 
disputes which arose after the ratification of the Iranian declaration but which 
related to the application of treaties in force at any time.,,121 The Iranian 
Government took the view that "the treaties on which disputes should be based 
were limited to those signed after September 19, 1932.,,122 However, the ICJ 
concluded that no treaty or convention between the two countries resulted from 
h d· 123 t ese procee lngs. It held that "it had no jurisdiction to consider the 
115 Ford, op. cit., at 75. 
116 Two reasons have been advanced for the avoidance of military action by the British: (1) the 
United States probably opposed British military action, since the former State wished to avoid 
repercussions likely to affect its own extensive oil interests in the Middle East; and (2) British 
intervention would bring about Russian occupation of North Iran. Frankel, op. cit., at 66-67. 
117 Ibid., at 67. For the full text of the 'interim measures of protection', see 45 A.l.LL. (1951) at 
793-794. 
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Publications, Amsterdam (1985) 15. 
120 Ibid., at 16. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ford, op. cit., at 175. 
38 
application of the United Kingdom of May 26, 1951, and indicated that its order 
of July 5, 1951, indicating interim measures of protection, consequently ceased to 
be operative.,,124 Also, the British Government called upon the UN Security 
Council to intervene in the Anglo-Iranian dispute, but it was quite futile. 125 
By 1953, a financial crisis caused by British blockades and the severance of 
diplomatic relations led to the collapse of the Mossadegh government. Thus, the 
dispute between Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Company was not ended until 
political changes occurred in the country. Eventually, the dispute was resolved in 
1954 by an agreement establishing an international consortium to market the oil 
and operate the industry as agents of the Iranian Government and the new 
National Iranian Oil Company. The second part of the agreement was related to 
the question of compensation. 126 
Besides the measure of nationalisation adopted in the middle of this 
century, Iran carried out more nationalisations after the Islamic Revolution of 
1979. 127 The new Government was anxious to reduce foreign influence in Iran, 
and wanted to obtain complete control over the Iranian vital industries, including 
banks, insurance, and oil and gas. By the Nationalisation Laws of 7 June, and of 
25 June, 1979 the banking and insurance industries were nationalised, 
respectively. 
As indicated above, the oil industry was nationalised long before the 
Revolution, i.e. in 1951, and due to political changes in Iran, in 1954 an 
agreement was reached with an international oil consortium. However, the new 
Government of Iran after the Revolution regarded the 1954 agreement, which 
replaced the concession granted to the Anglo-Iranian Company in 1933, in 
violation of the 1951 nationalisation of the oil industry in Iran. As Piran 
observes: 
124 Ibid., at 176. 
125 Franklin, op. cit., at 70. . . . 
126 A. Fannanfanna, "The Oil Agreement Between Iran and the InternatIOnal OIl ConsortIUm: 
the Law Controlling", 34 Tex.L.R. (1955) 259. . 
127 For a general survey of Iran's post-revolution era nationalisation measures, see Plran. op. 
cit., at 145-148. 
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The new Government regarded the 1954 agreement as the American 
backed coup d' etat' s reward for the Western oil companies and a 
mockery to the 1951 nationalisation of the oil industry in Iran. 128 
Thus, under a Law of January 8, 1980, a special commission was 
established. The commission's particular function was to consider all oil 
agreements concluded by the previous regime and to nullify those found as 
contrary to the Nationalisation Law of 1951. This amounted to the nullification 
of numerous oil agreements with foreign companies, including the 1954 
agreement with an international oil consortium. 
The Iranian post-revolution era nationalisation measures mostly affected 
American nationals. The latter brought their claims before the tribunal, viz., the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which was established for this purpose. The 
awards of the Tribunal on expropriation and the relevant issues constitute a rich 
body of material in this branch of international law, and reference will be made to 
them in this thesis. 
3.3.2 Egypt 
By a Law of July 26, 1956, the Government of Egypt nationalised the 
Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company.129 Under the Law, all rights and 
obligations of the company were transferred to the State, and: 
All organisations and committees now operating the company are 
dissolved. Shareholders and holders of constituent shares shall be 
compensated in accordance to the value of the shares on the Paris 
Stock Market on the day preceding the enforcement of this law. 
Payment of compensation shall take place immediately the State 
f h . l' d 130 receives all the assets and property 0 t e natlona Ise company. 
12l! H. Piran, "Indirect Expropriation in the Case Law of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal", F.Y.I.L. (1995) 140 at 152. 
129 See generally R. Delson, "Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company: Issues of P~blic and 
Private International law," 57 Col.L.R. (1957), 754; T. T. F. Huang, "Some InternatlOnal and 
Legal Effects of the Suez Canal Question", 51 AJ.I.L. (1957) 277, and Katzarov,.op. cit., at 68. 
130 Article 1 of the Nationalisation Law. For the full text of the law, see Wlllte Paper on the 
Nationalisation of the Suez Maritime Canal Company, Government Press, Cairo (1959). 
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In order to ensure passage through the Suez Canal, Article 2 of the 
Nationalisation Law provided for the establishment of an independent body with 
separate legal personality but responsible to the Ministry of Commerce. 
Moreover, it was also stipulated that Canal employees were to continue in their 
posts, resignation was not allowed without the permission of the independent 
body.131 
The motives of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal were "financial - to 
obtain resources for the Aswan High Dam project, and political; with the desire 
to eliminate foreign capital and gain control of the operation of the Canal playing 
a subsidiary role.,,132 On August 2, 1956, the Governments of France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States made a statement to foreign governments using 
the Canal, of which Paragraph 2 reads: 
They [the three Governments] do not question the right of Egypt to 
enjoy and exercise all the powers of a fully sovereign and 
independent nation, including the generally recognised right, under 
appropriate conditions, to nationalise assets, not imposed with an 
international interest, which are subject to its political authority. 133 
Similarly, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal resulted in a conflict in 
1956, in which Britain, France and Israel were involved. 134 The British were 
willing to respond with force to the measure of nationalisation. To a British 
writer, they had numerous reasons for doing so, including the great importance of 
Canal for the passage of their vessels, and the fact that President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser appeared to threaten what remained of the British Empire. Due to 
Nasser's support of the Algerian rebels, the French wished to overthrow his 
regIme. In addition, America took the position "that the Canal was of an 
international nature and its control not be vested in one nation only", however, it 
opposed the use of force. 135 On 16 August 1956, the eighteen nations which used 
131 Ibid., Article 4. 
132 White, op. cit., at 26. 
133 Quoted in ibid., at 36. 
134 K. Scott, "Commentary on Suez: Forty Years on", lA.CL. Vol. L No.2 (1996) 205. 
135 Ibid., at 207. 
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the canal most heavily met in London, where they held a maritime conference 
"with the aim of negotiating free passage through the Canal.,,136 However, it was 
ineffecti ve. 
In September 1956, the dispute was referred to the Security Council of the 
United Nations. This body developed the so-called Six Principles, but they were 
vetoed by Russia. 
A month later, Britain, France and Israel concluded a secret agreement in 
which they agreed to capture the Canal by force. Israel put the first phase of this 
agreement into effect on 29 October, when it attacked Egypt. For the second 
time, the conflict was raised in the Security Council. This time the resulting 
Security Council resolution was vetoed by Britain and France. Following an 
agreement of November 2, between the United States and Russia, the matter was 
submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The latter adopted a 
resolution calling for a cease-fire, and Britain and France agreed to it. 137 
Eventually, "by a subsequent negotiated Heads of Agreement on April 29, 
1958, the United Arab Republic agreed to relinquish all claims to all Company 
assets located abroad and to pay ... to the foreign shareholders of the Suez Canal 
Company.,,138 
3.3.3 Indonesia 
Prior to W orId War II the Kingdom of the Netherlands possessed vast 
colonies in South East Asia, then known as the Netherlands Indies, and now 
referred to as Indonesia. They comprised many islands, including Sumatra. 139 In 
West Sumatra, the independence movement, and consequently the intervention of 
the Indonesian Government, in order to restore order, led to the taking over of 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid., at 211. 
13& Dawson and Weston, op. cit., at 748. 
139 A. Sastroamidjojo and R. Delson. "The Status of the Republic of Indonesia in International 
Law", 49 Col.L.R. (1949) 344. 
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Dutch enterprises. 140 An administrative body was established to carry out this 
government control. On December 27, 1958, the Nationalization of Dutch 
Enterprises Act was passed by the State and it was promulgated on December 
31. 141 Under Article 1 of the Act, Dutch-owned enterprises in Indonesia were 
nationalised, and declared as full and free property of the State. Provision was 
made for compensation. In Article 2 it was stipulated that compensation "be 
determined by the committee whose members are appointed by the Government." 
Moreover, the amount, mode and time of payment "will be further regulated in a 
separate ACt.,,142 
On February 28, 1959, the Dutch Government made protest on the 
following grounds: 
(l) '" the measures are not based on the general interest ... but have 
been taken for the purpose of exerting pressure in a political dispute; 
(2) the measures are only directed against Dutch-owned enterprises 
and are therefore discriminatory ... ; and 
(3) the measures are further of a confiscatory nature, since there is no 
question of any prompt payment of an adequate and effective 
. 143 
compensatIOn. 
It should be noted that the validity of the Indonesian Nationalisation 
measures was challenged before domestic courts. Two Dutch-owned enterprises, 
whose tobacco plantations in Indonesia were nationalised, claimed title to the 
tobacco harvest of 1958, which was shipped to Bremen, Germany. Both German 
courts, Bremen District and Appeals Courts, took the position that "Indonesian 
nationalization measures were to be recognized abroad." 144 In similar 
proceedings, the District and Appellate Courts of Amsterdam, "though refrained 
140 See generally Lord McNair, "The Seizure of Property and Enterprises in Indonesia", 6 
N.LL.R. (1959) 218; M. Domke, "Indonesian Nationalization Measures before Foreign Courts", 
54 A.l.LL. (1960) 305, and Katzarov, op. cit., at 68-69. 
141 N . . 220 Mc aIr, op. Clt., at . 
142 Ibid. 
143 For the full texts of exchange note between the two Governments, see. 54 AJ.LL. (1960) at 
484-490. 
144 Domke, op. cit., at 307. 
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from determining the validity of the acts of a foreign state", took a contrary 
position. 145 The rulings of German and Dutch courts on the issue were the 
b· f db' 146 su ~ect 0 a e ate In the pages of the American Journal of International Law. 
Reference to the debate will be made in due course. 
3.4 Nationalisations in Latin America 
As alluded to earlier, the massive penetration of the Mexican economy by 
American, British and other foreign investors before the 1910 Revolution 
culminated in a strong nationalist reaction which eventually entailed agrarian 
reform in 1937 and nationalisation of petroleum in 1938. Other Latin American 
countries which sought economic independence, notably Cuba, Chile, Peru and 
Bolivia, also adopted the measures of nationalisation. 
It is worth noting that besides ideological, political and financial causes, 
there are numerous other reasons why Latin American countries resorted to 
expropriate foreign properties. 147 Firstly, these countries may have been 
concerned about the effect which foreign businesses had upon their national 
culture. Secondly, they felt that foreign-controlled enterprises presented unfair 
competition to local business concerns. Thirdly, the leaders of these countries 
may have believed, along with some Roman Catholic bishops, that international 
capitalism was one of the factors which contributed to their economic 
backwardness. Finally, many thinkers in the region believed that multinational 
corporations decapitalise the host country through the balance of international 
payments. In 1969 at an official ceremony at the White House, which Latin 
American ambassadors attended, the president of the Special Latin American 
Coordinating Commission remarked: 
Private foreign investments have meant, and mean today for Latin 
America that the amounts that leave our Continent are many times 
higher than those that are invested in it. Our potential capital is 
145 Ibid., at 308. 
146 On the issue, see Domke, op. cit. (note 140), and H. W. Baade, "Indonesian Nationalization 
Measures before Foreign Courts - A Reply", 54 A.l.l.L. (1960) 801. 
147 ff· 6 Baklano ,op. CIt., at . 
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diminishing while the profits of the invested capital grow and 
multiply at enormous rate, not in our countries, but abroad. 148 
In Cuba and Chile a fundamental change in ideology and internal power 
formed new policies towards foreign-controlled companies that resulted in the 
expropriation of foreign properties, particularly American investments, on a large 
scale. Thus, during 1959 and 1960 the Cuban Government of Fidel Castro 
nationalised US corporate and individually-owned property. Similarly, in 1970 
the nationalisation of the US-copper mining enterprises in Chile, under the 
Allende administration, were effected. 
Likewise, in 1968 Peru and Bolivia, within about a year of each other, took 
action against Standard Oil's Peruvian subsidiary as well as the International 
Petroleum Company, and the Bolivian Gulf Oil Company by nationalising the 
companies' properties, respectively. It should be noted that among Peruvian and 
Bolivian nationalisation measures, the expropriation of the International 
Petroleum Company will be considered. Since: (I) its controversy in Peru was 
one of much greater substance and complexity than that of the Gulf Oil Company 
in Bolivia; (2) the Bolivian nationalisation measure was characterised as a simple 
political manoeuvre, and there was no disagreement over the compensation 
question with the Bolivian Government. 
Therefore, in addition to Mexican nationalisation measures considered 
earlier in this chapter, the following section will deal with the measures of 
nationalisation in three more Latin American countries: Cuba, Chile and Peru. 
Venezuelan nationalisation measures will be examined later under the heading of 
the OPEC members take-overs. 
3.4.1 Cuba 
After World War II Cuba's investment climate was one of the most 
favourable among the 20 nations of Latin America. This was because the Cuban 
Constitution of 1940 guaranteed the protection of property rights, and these rights 
148 Ibid. 
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were applied equally to Cubans and foreigners. The United States experienced 
the highest level of investments in Cuba. 149 
When the Marxist regime of Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba in 1959, 
after the overthrow of the Batista regime, it started to nationalise the properties of 
US and other foreign nationals on the island. ISO The process began with the 
expropriation of agricultural and cattle farms under the Agrarian Reform Law of 
June 3, 1959. Nationalisation reached its peak with the largest of the 
expropriations in the second half of 1960. Therefore, on July 6, 1960, Law No. 
851, which was entitled 'the Nationalisation Law', ordered the taking of US 
nationals' property in Cuba. In Article 1 of the Law it was stipulated that: 
The President of the Republic and the Prime Minister are authorized 
to order jointly by means of resolutions, whenever they may deem it 
convenient in defence of national interest, the nationalization through 
expropriation of the properties or concerns belonging to natural or 
juridical persons nationals of the United States of America or the 
concerns In which said persons have a majority interest or 
participation even through they be organized under the laws of 
Cuba. lSI 
Thus, the Nationalisation Law was carried out through three resolutions, 
which were issued by the Cuban President and Prime Minister. 1s2 These 
resolutions were aimed primarily at the nationalisation of specific American-
owned property, although other foreign nationals' properties were also taken. By 
Resolution No. 1 of August 6, 1960, 26 companies, mainly in the fields of public 
interest, oil, and sugar were nationalised. Three American-owned banks were 
effected by Resolution No.2 of September 17, 1960. Finally, Resolution No.3 
of October 24, 1960 ordered the nationalisation of 166 further businesses owned 
in whole or in part by the United States nationals. 
149 Ibid., at 113. 
150 See generally Baklanoff, op. cit., at 12-30; M. M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, 
Vol. 8, Department of State Publications, Washington D.C. (1967) at 1041-1047, and M. F. 
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In addition, the process of nationalisation continued through 1963, when 
the last US corporations that were still in private hands were taken. It should be 
noted that in a parallel process, the properties of Cuban nationals were also 
expropriated during 1959-1968. 153 The Nationalisation Law authorised the State 
to provide compensation to the dispossessed owners. Moreover, it provided for 
the provision of compensation in thirty-year bonds with 2 percent interest. 154 
However, in almost all cases, no compensation was paid. 155 
Following the nationalisation of most American-owned property in Cuba in 
July 1960, the US Government cancelled "Cuba's huge sugar contract with the 
US. For decades, this contract had been Cuba's leading income source." When 
Cuba failed to pay compensation, according to America's estimation 
corresponding to $1.8 billion, "Cuban-American relations plummeted to rock 
bottom." Nearly four decades after the nationalisation measures, a strictly 
enforced economic blockade and embargo against Cuba, which began in 1961 
under the Kennedy administration, still continues. 156 
Besides those measures indicated above, on March 12, 1996, the US 
Congress passed a law, entitled 'Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act' 
(popularly known as the Helms-Burton Bill).157 The Act provides that "any 
individual or company (whether British ... or of any other nationality) doing 
business on, or through property nationalised by the Castro government is 
potentially subject, as a so-called 'trafficker in expropriated property', to a range 
of stiff US legal sanctions.,,158 
153 Travieso-Diaz, op. cit., at 66l. 
154 Baklanoff, op. cit., at 134. 
155 Note that in his recent article. Story concludes that: 
"A detailed examination of how US property was acquired and protected in pre-1959 Cuba 
suggests that, on equitable and legal grounds, 'appropriate' level of compensation is no 
compensation." A. Story, "Property in International Law: Need Cuba Compensate US 
Titleholders for Nationalising their Property?", 1.Pol.Phil. (1998), Vol. 6 (No.3), 306 at 333. 
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Following the passage of the Helms-Burton Bill many countries, such as 
the European Union (hereinafter the 'EU'), Canada, Mexico and Russia made 
strong protests. For example, the EU submitted two critical demarches to the US 
Department of State in this regard. In these demarches the Vice-President of the 
Commission expressed the EU's concerns, namely: its extraterritorial reach; its 
impact on trade interests in the EU; the legal chaos that will result from 
expanding the United States' jurisdiction over the expropriation claims of 
American nationals and its incompatibility with the World Trade Organisation. 159 
Moreover, "the European Union announced that it will ask the WTO to issue a 
ruling on Helms-Burton. Washington has stated it will disregard any 
unfavourable WTO rulings.,,160 
To the present author's best knowledge, on April 12, 1997, the European 
Commission and the United States reached an agreement in principle aimed at 
resolving the dispute over the Helms-Burton ACt. 161 
As indicated above, although the bulk of the nationalisations involved 
American-owned properties, the Cuban Government also nationalised the 
property of nationals from other countries. Thus, settlement agreements were 
made by Cuba with Canada, France, Spain and Switzerland. "Claims have been 
settled at a fraction of the assessed value of the expropriated assets.,,162 
3.4.2 Chile 
In the nineteenth century, copper was the most important commodity in 
Chile, and to a large extent her economy depended upon the export of this single 
primary item. The copper industry remained in Chilean hands until the last years 
of the nineteenth century, and foreign economic control was limited to marketing. 
Since the beginning of this century to the late 1960s, two US-owned companies, 
159 I.L.M. (1996) at 357-397. 
160 Story, op. cit., at 309. 
161 The Financial Times, April 12, 1997. 
16~ Travieso-Diaz, op. cit., at 664. 
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the Anaconda Company and the Kennecott Copper Corporation, dominated 
Chile's copper mining industry. 163 
The experience of Anaconda and Kennecott in Chile may be divided into 
two periods. The first period extends from the beginning of this century to the 
late 1960s, and the second period under examination is that of Allende's term in 
power. This study will concern the second period, the time of the nationalisation 
of the US copper mining enterprises under the Allende administration. 
Nonetheless, the outstanding features of the first period are: 164 (1) the passage of 
the 'New Deal' Law in May 1955, which eliminated the discriminatory exchange 
rate on the US-owned companies, returned control over sales to them, and 
allowed them to receive the full sales price on copper produced; (2) 
'Chileanization' or partnership policy in the mid-1960s, whereby the Chilean 
Government took its first step towards recovering control by acquiring majority 
holdings in the mining companies; (3) the conclusion of an investment guarantee 
treaty between Chile and the United States, under which the US Government 
insured a major share of the new investments of the US enterprises against 
expropriation; and (4) the conclusion of two 20-year tax stabilisation agreements 
with the US copper companies in 1955 and 1967. 
Following the Chilean presidential election of 1970, the late President 
Salvador Allende took power for a six-year term. On December 22, 1970, 
Allende submitted to the Chilean Congress a "Constitutional Amendment 
Concerning Natural Resources and Their Nationalization.,,165 The purpose of the 
amendment was to alter Article 10 of the Constitution, which concerned the 
rights of property ownership. As originally proposed, the amendment would 
establish State ownership over all mineral resources, nationalise the large copper 
companies and provide for compensation. However, it would lay down 
restrictive conditions for assessing compensation. Moreover, the compensation 
163 See generally G. M. Ingram, Expropriation of us Property in South America -
Nationalization of Oil and Copper Companies in Peru. Bolivia. and Chile. Praeger, New York 
(1974) at 211-321, and Baklanoff, op. cit., at 63-106. 
164 BaklanotI op. cit., at 72-83. 
165 The full text of the Chilean Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. (1971) 1067. 
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would be reduced by the amount of excess profits earned by the companies since 
1955, with payment to be made in 3D-year bonds at an interest rate of 3 percent 
annually. Appeal could be made to a five-man Special Copper Tribunal set up 
for this purpose. 166 
On 11 July 1971, the amendment bill was ratified by the Congress, and five 
days later, following the President's signature, the bill became law. Decree No. 
92 of the Ministry of Mines establishes the rationale for the 'excess profits' 
deduction. Under the Decree, the Head of State was authorised to make a series 
of deductions from the value of compensation, including 'excess profits' 
obtained by the foreign companies. It stipulated, in particular, that in making 
'excess profits' reduction from the value of compensation due to the foreign 
companies, the President should take into consideration "the spiritual and the 
historical-political inspiration" of the Constitutional Amendment. 167 
Thus, the US copper mines were assessed by the Chilean comptroller 
general as of the end of 1970 at $664 million. Further, according to the 
President's calculations, the amount of 'excess profits' that would be deducted 
from compensation to be paid to the companies was at $774 million. 168 To 
Francioni, Allende's assumption in tendering compensation in a reduced form 
was that: 
The foreign investors had been doing business in Chile under 
particularly privileged conditions provided by previous governments 
which allowed a considerably higher rate of profit when compared 
with the average rate of return enjoyed by the same or similar 
companies in other parts of the world. 169 
The deduction of 'excess profits' became the centre of a dispute between 
the Chilean Government and the US companies. The latter brought actions in the 
Special Copper Tribunal seeking compensation for properties taken by Chile. 
However, in August 1972, the Special Tribunal denied the petitions and declared 
166 Ibid., at 1069. 
167 Baklanoff, op. cit., at 90. 
16R Ibid., at 90-91. 
169 FrancionL op. cit., at 279-280. 
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that it was incompetent to question the amount of excess profits fixed In a 
discretionary manner by the Head of State. 170 
As in the case of Indonesian nationalisation measures, the validity of the 
Chilean nationalisation was challenged before domestic courtS. I7I When 
compensation provisions were applied to Kennecott's single Chilean subsidiary, 
the Braden Copper Company, it was not only refused any compensation but was 
held to owe the Chilean Government a sum of money. The Company brought 
actions in the courts of Paris and Hamburg to obtain recognition of its rights over 
Chilean copper imported by French and German companies. The decision of the 
French court upon the validity under international law of the Chilean 
nationalisation was not altogether clear-cut. However, the German court not only 
explicitly refused to rule on the issue under international law, but even under 
German law it found that the German defendant had a processing contract 
relationship with the copper delivered to it, not as ownership relationship. Thus, 
it held that since there was no significant contacts with the forum, it could not 
refuse to apply the Chilean nationalisation law. 
The compensation dispute between Chile and the American companies was 
not resolved until political changes occurred in Chile. After the overthrow of the 
Allende Government on 11 September 1973, Agreements of July 24 and October 
24, 1974 were reached with the US companies. Thus ending all pending legal 
proceedings. l72 To some, the overthrow of Allende's constitutional Government: 
Does not in any way affect the validity of this thesis ['excess profits' 
reduction], despite the strong probability that the new political policy 
of the new regime will favour more generous compensation for the 
. l' d A ., ,,173 nationa Ise mencan Interests. 
170 Baklanoff, op. cit., at 114. 
171 See F. O. Vicuna, "Some International Law Problems Posed by the Nationalization of the 
Copper Industry by Chile", 67 A.J.I.L. (1973) 711; I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, "Chilea~ Copper 
Nationalization Cases before German Courts", 69 A.J.I.L. (1975) 110, and P. Well and P. 
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3.4.3 Peru 
Furnish observes that those who wish to understand Peru's programme of 
expropriation without compensation should take the history and laws of that 
country into consideration. 174 In the nineteenth century the majority of foreign 
investment in Peru was European, but toward the end of the century the United 
States replaced its European competitors as the most important foreign influence 
on both political and economic issues. In the 1920s under Peru's liberal 
investment laws, American investors were actually able to take over whole 
sectors of the economy. By 1926 among the three largest American companies, 
the International Petroleum Company (hereinafter IPC) "accounted for 70 percent 
of the petroleum production and 90 percent of the petroleum exports of Peru." 
Thus, the United States succeeded not only in dominating sections of the 
Peruvian economy but also in exercising influence in its Government. Moreover, 
by 1960 IPC controlled 98 percent of the petroleum industry. 175 
For the creation and growth of anti-US sentiments in Peru in the early 
1930s, which resulted finally in the expropriation of IPC in 1968, several reasons 
have been mentioned: (1) most of the population of Peru became aware of the 
American dominance over key sectors of the economy; (2) the possibility of 
alternative sources of control; (3) the close co-operation between both the US 
Government and the business community with the various oppressive regimes 
during the first half of the twentieth century; and (4) the dependence of the 
Peruvian economy on the US economy during World War II, by exports of raw 
materials to America and the severe decline in export earnings after the war and 
. f'C h p. 176 Its elects on t e eruvIan economy. 
It is interesting to note that in Peruvian law, like that of most Latin 
American countries, there is a rule which stipulates that "all mineral wealth 
17-1 D. B. Furnish, "Petroleum Expropriation in Peru and Bolivia", in R. B. Lillich (ed.), The 
Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law, Vol. II, University Press of Virginia, 
Charlottesville (1973) 55 at 57-58. 
175 Ingram, op. cit., at 19-29. 
176 Ibid., at 30-32. 
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belongs to the State and may be exploited only under concession agreement." In 
fact, the core of the controversy between the Peruvian Government and IPe was 
over the ownership of the La Brea y Parinas oil fields, where the company 
operated; IPe claimed special rights of private ownership in the sub-soil 
resources. 177 
In 1963 President Fernando Belaunde Terry took office. He vowed to bring 
the IPe controversy to a close within ninety days. After five years heated 
negotiations, on August 12, 1968, an agreement was reached with the company. 
Since the agreement was unfair to Peru, it rapidly became the target of strong 
criticism. 178 
On October 3, 1968, a military junta headed by Juan Velasco Alvarado 
took control of the Government. On October 9, designated a Day of National 
Dignity, the new Government decreed the nationalisation of the La Brea y 
Parinas oilfields and of the Talara refinery complex, and ordered the military to 
take over IPe' s properties. In his speech to the nation, President Velasco stated: 
For more than 50 years, like a painful wound, the problem of La Brea 
y Parinas has been a chapter of ignominy and of shame for our 
Republic, representing an insult to the dignity, honour and 
. f h . 179 sovereIgnty 0 t e nation. 
The nationalisation decree explained that the oil fields were taken over 
because they belonged to the State, and that the Talara refinery was taken over 
because of debts owed by IPe. On February 6, 1969, the company was directed 
to pay to the State the sum of $690,524,283 as restitution for illegal exploitation 
since 1924, the year it took possession of the disputed field. As a result of the 
claim for restitution, IPe received no monetary compensation for its nationalised 
properties. Interestingly, the Peruvian Government recognised its duty to pay 
177 Furnish, op. cit., at 62. Note that this rule originated from the colonisation of the Southern 
American countries by Spain in the 1250s, when the Spanish brought with them their laws and 
customs. Ingram, op. cit., at 34. 
17R Ingram, op. cit., at 44-59. 
179 Ibid., at 60. 
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compensation for IPC' s properties which were nationalised, "but charged such 
compensation off against its own claim for restitution." 180 
Therefore, IPC made juridical and administrative appeals against the 
Peruvian military regime. In the Peruvian courts, the company based its 
arguments on: (1) the agreement dated August 12, 1968, which required the 
complete and definite solution of the matters pending in the La Brea y Parinas 
controversy; and (2) since the Peruvian Government's action was taken by 
executive decree rather than through the courts, it was unconstitutional. 
Likewise, in an administrative appeal to the Ministry of Energy and Mines, it 
petitioned for the reconsideration of the declared debt of $690 million to the 
State. 181 However, the courts, including the Superior Court of Lima, held that 
"the laws of the military junta prevailed over the Constitution", thereby "leaving 
IPC with no legal recourse to protest the debt." 182 
In 1969, when the controversy reached its peak, the US Government 
became an active participant on behalf of the company. America declared that it 
recognised Peru's right to expropriate foreign property, provided that Peru met 
the obligation to offer prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Moreover, 
the US Government retained the right to extend diplomatic protection to its 
nationals. 183 The Peruvian Government's position may be summarised as 
follows: (1) the company was a Canadian and not a US national; (2) the 
controversy over IPC was an internal matter and would be settled in Peruvian 
courts; and (3) under Article 17 of the 1933 Peruvian Constitution, in a State 
contract with foreigners, the latter cannot seek diplomatic protection (referred to 
as the Calvo Doctrine, which will be considered in due course). 184 
IRO Furnish, op. cit., at 63. 
IRI Ibid., at 64-65. 
IR2 Ingram, op. cit., at 63. 
IR3 Ibid., at 64. 
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In late 1968 the US Government threatened the implementation of the 
Hickenlooper Amendment 185 if Peru did not compensate or undertake 
negotiations to produce compensation for the nationalisation of IPC. However, 
in practice, the Nixon administration refrained from the application of the 
Hickenlooper Amendment against Peru. In the passage of time, the US press and 
Government attention with regard to the IPC controversy declined, but "such was 
not the case, in Peru, where resentment against IPC remained high." Thus, the 
company was given time to pay the debt. However, since the value of IPC's 
assets were far less than the debt, IPC did not comply with the order of the 
Peruvian Government. As a result, the Government intervened in the remainder 
of IPC's operations. "By the middle of 1969 the issue was no longer 
compensation for the IPC's expropriated assets but its debts of $690 million; and, 
when the company failed to pay the sum, Peruvian law provided that its property 
be expropriated." While the United States' defence of IPC damaged its relations 
with other Latin American countries and threatened the security of American 
investments in the region, Peru received considerable verbal support from her 
neighbours. In these circumstances, even if the US Government had invoked the 
Hickenlooper Amendment, the effect on Peru would not have been great. As far 
as Peruvians were concerned, all the steps which were taken against IPC' s assets 
were legal. 186 As Ingram observes: 
It might be possible to find a few who would admit that the basis of 
the $690 million debt was shaky and that perhaps certain of the 
decrees of the military regime and its intimidation of the courts had 
deprived IPC of due process of law, but none who would fault such 
occurrences in light of foreign pressure that IPC had brought to bear 
on Peru in obtaining the Arbitral Award of 1922 and in light of the 
profits the company had reaped through half a century of 
IR5 Among "several [American] Congressional measures aimed at either punishing or preventing 
discriminatory action against U.S. business interests - including amendments affecting foreign aid, 
the sugar quota, and military assistance", the Hickenlooper Amendment was the fir~t. me~sure ~o 
the 1962 foreign aid act, "that came to symbolize all such measures and became a cntIcal Issue m 
US-Latin American relations in the late 1960s." Ibid., at 368-369 
11<6 Ibid., at 64-68. 
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monopolizing the petroleum industry and draining the economy of 
Peru (emphasis added).187 
3.5 OPEC Countries Take-overs 
Following the Baghdad Conference on September 14, 1960, the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (hereinafter 'OPEC') was 
established. Originally it comprised only five members: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and Venezuela. Other countries, such as Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Ecuador, 
Gabon,188 Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria and Qatar joined later. The organisation's 
"principal aim was to be the unification of petroleum policies ... and the 
determination of the best means for safeguarding the interests of Member 
Countries individually and collectively." I 89 
At the time of the establishment of OPEC the oil industry of its member 
countries was in the control of foreign companies. During the first decade of the 
organisation's existence, the main preoccupation of its member States was to 
increase tax revenues from foreign oil companies which operated on their 
territories under a concessionary system. However, "with the increasing political 
strength of member countries, and of Third World countries in general during the 
1960s, the concern for taxation gave way towards the end of the decade to 
demands for equity participation in the concessions."I90 
To this end, in its Sixteenth Conference held in Vienna in June 1968, the 
organisation adopted a resolution, titled the 'declaratory statement of petroleum 
b t " 191 policy in mem er coun nes . In the preamble of the resolution it was 
stipulated that "hydrocarbon resources in Member Countries are one of the 
principal sources of their revenues and foreign exchange", and that these 
IR7 Ibid., at 68. 
IRR Gabon was first accepted as an associate member, viz., with no voting rights. However, with 
its admission as a full member later, the organisation now acquired 13 full member States. See I. 
F. L Shihata, "Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries", Vol. 5, Encycl. P.LL., at 224-
228. 
IR9 Ibid., at 225. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Resolution 90 (XVI), was adopted on 24 and 25 June, 1968, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. (1968) 
1183. 
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resources "are limited and exhaustible". Referring to the General Assembly of 
the United Nations Resolution 2158 of November 25, 1966, it further provided 
that the State's right over its natural resources is inalienable and pennanent. The 
resolution also recommended numerous principles to be pursued by the member 
countries. Among these recommendations may be recalled: 
1. Member Governments shall endeavour ... to explore for and 
develop their hydrocarbon resources directly ... ; 
2. However, when a Member Government is not capable of 
developing its hydrocarbon resources directly, it may enter into 
contracts of various types ... Under such an arrangement, the 
Government shall seek to retain the greatest measure possible of 
participation in and control over all aspects of operations; 
3. In any event, the tenns and conditions of such contracts shall be 
open to revision at predetennined intervals, as justified by changing 
circumstances. Such changing circumstances should call for the 
revision of existing concession agreements. 
The member countries tried to render operational the principles contained 
in the resolution. For doing so, some of them, like Iran, with its oil industry 
already nationalised, attempted to modify their contracts with foreign oil 
companIes. Others, such as Iraq, Libya and Venezuela, resorted to 
nationalisation of their oil industries. 192 Therefore, the examination of such 
measures in these three countries will be our next task. 
3.5.1 Iraq 
Iraq was a part of the territory of the Ottoman Empire until the signing of 
the Lausanne Treaty on July 24, 1923. Britain then, under the League of Nations' 
mandatory system, accepted a mandate over Iraq. Eventually, it gained 
independence at the end of World War II. Britain and Gennany were the first 
countries which attempted to obtain concessions from Turkey in relation to Iraq. 
Early in the 19l0s, there were four groups: the Gennan-Deutsche Bank; British-
192 It has been suggested that OPEC recommendations could not be regarded as the sole reason 
for such measures. See Piran, op. cit., at. 55. 
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D' Arcy (the Anglo-Persian Oil Company); Dutch-Anglo Saxon Oil Company; 
and American-Chester group, all of which sought concessions in the oil fields of 
Mesopotamia. The first three groups determined to unite themselves and to keep 
the Americans out. 193 
In 1912 a British joint stock company, the Turkish Petroleum Company 
(hereinafter 'TPC'), was formed by a British subject, "for the purpose of 
acquiring all claims to the Mesopotamian oil fields, as well as prospecting for oil 
in other parts of the Ottoman Empire." Two years later, after some negotiations 
between these groups (with the exception of the Americans), an agreement 
(referred to as the Foreign Office Agreement) was reached. The agreement 
united all the European interests in the Mesopotamian oil concessions, and 
conferred upon the British absolute control. It should be noted that in 1909 an 
American subject, Admiral Chester, was granted a concession for mineral rights, 
including oil, but it was never ratified by the Turkish Parliament. Consequently, 
the US State Department began to question the legality of TPC concession. In 
1923 the American companies finally opened direct negotiations with the 
partners of TPC. In fact, this was in a sense a recognition of TPC by the US 
Government and companies. In these negotiations, "the question of self-denial 
clause, in which the participating companies obligated themselves not to seek oil 
concessions in the territories of the Ottoman Empire except through TPC" was 
one of the dominant difficulties. In the meantime, in 1925 TPC was granted a 
concession for seventy-five years by the Iraq Government. Eventually, in 1927 
the US State Department announced that it would not object to the self-denial 
formula. 194 
Moreover, "on July 31, 1928 all the participants [including the American 
group] in TPC signed the Group agreement which limited the activities of each 
participant in the specified area, which was marked out on a map attached to the 
Agreement by a red line" (known as the 'red line agreement'). Subsequently, 
193 B. Shwadran. The Middle East. Oil and the Great Powers (3d ed.), Israel Universities Press, 
Jerusalem (1973) at 195. 
194 Ibid., at 196-209. 
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TPC's name was changed to the Iraq Petroleum Company (hereinafter 'IPC'). 
On March 24, 1931, the Red Line Agreement was revised and "the new 
concession gave the Company [IPC] the sole right to exploit all lands situated to 
the east of the Tigris River" and it further provided that "royalties to be paid to 
Iraq were four shillings (gold) per metric ton." Under the agreement, IPC 
enjoyed tax exemption, subject of course to the production. 195 
It is worthy of note that the relations between IPC and the Iraq Government 
were best when the country was closely guided by the British. However, the 
dispute began when the Iraq Government asked IPC for an increase in royalties 
from four to six shillings (gold) per metric ton in 1948. Prolonged negotiations 
were undertaken, but no agreement was reached. In the meantime, two important 
events occurred in the neighbouring countries of Iraq: (1) as indicated above, in 
1951 the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was nationalised; and (2) in the same year 
Saudi Arabia concluded an agreement with Aramco, the Arabian American Oil 
Company, with a 50-50 royalties formula. Then the Iraqis, who were dissatisfied 
with the existing royalties, insisted on increasing royalty payments to levels 
similar to those received by neighbouring countries. Finally, on February 3, 
1952, a new agreement was signed between the Government of Iraq and the 
Company, and two weeks later it was approved by the Iraq Parliament. Thus, the 
Iraqis were able to insert a fifty-fifty profit basis clause in the new agreement. 196 
Likewise, Iraq sought higher royalties, a higher percentage of the taxes, a 
reduction of the concession areas, and a higher participation in management. 
Therefore, from the late 1950s to the early 1970s the relations between the 
Company and the Government of Iraq became worse, which resulted in the 
nationalisation of IPC in 1972. After the revolution of 1958, led by Abd al-
Karim Qasim, "the Ports Authority ruled IPC was not entitled to specific 
exemption from the regular port dues and proposed to raise the duties to the level 
imposed on other exports." In return, IPC threatened to reduce production. The 
195 Ibid., at 237-238. 
196 Ibid., at 245-257. 
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revolutionary leader, Qasim, warned the Company that if it reduced production 
he would take appropriate measures. IPC felt that due to some considerations, 
such as the drop in the price of oil in the international market, the Iraqis would 
refrain from taking severe action. The Iraqis believed that "the threat of 
nationalization, for which there was a strong sentiment among the Iraqi 
nationalists, the reduced influence of the Western nations in the Middle East and 
the consequent readiness of Russia to assist in oil and other economic problems 
would induce IPC to submit to their demands." 197 
On December 11, 1961, Law No. 80 was promulgated by the Iraq 
Government which contained seven articles and "defined all areas allocated to 
each of the petroleum companies operating in Iraq." The law also "ordered the 
companies to submit all geophysical and geological information on the territory 
covered by the concessions, as well as other engineering data." IPC objected to 
the law and called for arbitration under the provisions in its agreements. The 
Company "named a former president of the IC] as its nominee, and asked Iraq to 
appoint its arbitrator." After the passage of the 1961 law, the company continued 
discussions with the Iraq Government for a possible modification of the law, and 
the major disputed issues between them, such as marketing allowances and 
I . 198 roya ty expensIng. 
The negotiations between OPEC member States and the Middle East 
concessionaire companies led to the Tehran agreement of February 14, 1971, 
"which gave Iraq an increase of about 7 cents a barrel for oil produced in the 
southern fields and increase of 5% in the profits share." Moreover, in line with 
OPEC recommendations, Iraq requested from the Company: (1) more 
participation in IPC's management; (2) increase in annual production, and in the 
number of seats on the boards of directors for Iraqis; and (3) the removal of IPC's 
headquarters from London to Baghdad. For its part, IPC asked arbitration for 
Iraq's expropriation of its concession areas. The Government of Iraq "countered 
197 Ibid., at 272-273. 
19!! Ibid., at 276. 
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by demanding retroactive royalty payment increases." It warned the Company 
either to meet its demands or face legislation. 199 
During 1971 and early 1972, production in the northern fields dropped. In 
IPC's view, it resulted from some economic reasons, but the Government 
considered that IPC' s real intention was to force Iraq to return the oil field in 
question. In these circumstances, on June 1, 1972, the President of Iraq, Ahmad 
Hassan al-Bakr, announced the decision of the Revolutionary Command Council 
to nationalise the Iraq Petroleum Company. 200 
On June 9, 1972, at an extraordinary conference in Beirut, OPEC adopted a 
resolution "supporting Iraq's action and asked members not to allow companies 
to make up the loss in Iraqi output by increasing production.,,201 
The IPC controversy was solved through mediation. On February 28, 1973, 
the President of Iraq announced that the efforts of mediators, such as the 
Secretary-General of OPEC, resulted in a settlement. Under the settlement, "IPC 
was to pay Iraq £ 141 million for past debts and was to receive $15 million tons of 
crude oil as compensation for nationalization of its concession. ,,202 
3.5.2 Libya 
Libya was formally recognised as an independent sovereign State by the 
United Nations in 1949, and effectively became so in 1952.203 At the time of its 
independence, Libya was a very poor country with almost no known natural 
resources. Besides having only small areas of cultivable land, over 90% of the 
country is desert, and hence there was little hope for much improvement. During 
1951-1976, however, Libya experienced remarkable economic growth as a result 
of the discovery, exploitation and exportation of petroleum, and by 1969 it 
became the fourth largest petroleum exporter in the world.204 
199 Ibid., at 278. 
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In order to improve its economic conditions, to encourage foreign capital 
investment, and to insure the exploitation and protection of its natural resources, 
Libya passed the 1955 Petroleum Law. In Article 1, it was stipulated that: 
(1) All petroleum in Libya in its natural state, in strata, is the property 
of the Libyan State; 
(2) No person shall explore or prospect for, mine or produce 
petroleum, unless authorized by a permit or concession issued under 
this Law.205 
The Petroleum Law experienced two major amendments in 1961 and 1971, 
and both of them recognised the principle that the rights of the concessionaire 
could not be unilaterally changed without its consent. 206 Moreover, "within the 
framework of the Petroleum Law, approximately 133 concessions were granted 
to American, British, German, Italian and French corporations prior to 1971.,,207 
In 1968 the Royal Government of Libya, under the administration of King Idriss 
I, was overthrown by a revolutionary regime which declared that it would honour 
the concessions given by its predecessor.208 
In effect, Libya was the first OPEC member country to attempt to enforce 
the decisions of the eighteenth OPEC meeting of 1968, "including the 
establishment of a very elaborate set of controls to be applied by member 
countries to the operations of the multinational oil companies. ,,209 From late 
1971 to 1974, accordingly, the Libyan Government gradually nationalised all of 
the interests and properties of American and British companies. The 
controversies over the Libyan nationalisation measures resulted finally in the 
issuance of three well-known arbitral awards, namely BP, Texaco and Liamco. In 
these awards, the arbitrators discussed some important issues of international 
205 20 I.L.M. (1981) 1 at 9 (62 I.L.R. 140 at 151). 
206 Mehren and Kourides, op. cit., at 480. 
207 20 I.L.M. (1981) at 14 (62 I.L.R. at 156). 
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law, such as the notion of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and the 
law of contracts between States and foreigners, natural or legal persons. 
Reference to these awards will be made in this thesis on appropriate occasions. 
Thus, a brief examination of the measures taken by the Libyan Government is 
necessary. 
In 1957 Mr. Nelson Bunker Hunt, a United States national, was granted a 
single concession (Concession 65) to research for and extract oil within a 
designated area, by the Royal Government of Libya. In 1960 Mr. Hunt assigned 
to BP Exploration Company (Libya) Limited, a subsidiary of British Petroleum 
Company Limited, (hereinafter 'BP') "an undivided one half interest and title in 
and to the Concession." BP then acted as an operator on behalf of Mr. Hunt and 
itself.210 Moreover, between 1955 and 1968 the Texaco Overseas Petroleum 
Company (hereinafter 'Texaco') and the California Asiatic Oil Company 
(hereinafter 'Calasiatic '), both American companies, obtained fourteen oil 
conceSSIons from the Royal Government.21I Similarly, in 1955 the Libyan 
American Oil Company, the subsidiary of Texas Gulf, (hereinafter 'Liamco') was 
granted seven concessions, but voluntarily surrendered two, and relinquished two 
more concessions to the Libyan Ministry of Petroleum prior to the decree of 
nationalisation.212 
On December 7, 1971, the Libyan Government announced Decree No. 115 
nationalising all the interests and properties of BP in the HuntlBP concession. 
Following the BP nationalisation, Mr. Bunker Hunt was asked by the Libyan 
Government to operate the entire concession, but problems developed. 
Eventually, on June 11, 1973, the Libyan Government nationalised all of Hunt's 
. . h H tlBP . 213 Interests and property III t e un conceSSIon. 
210 53 I.L.R. at 319-324. 
211 Ibid., at. 393-398. 
212 62 ibid., at 156. 
213 Mehren and Kourides, op. cit., at 483-484. 
63 
Here, as in the case of Iraq, OPEC passed a resolution which supported the 
actions of the Libyan Government. The resolution 214 after considering the point 
that a principal aim of the organisation is to protect the interests of member 
countries individually and collectively, provided that: 
1. To express its full support to the decision taken by the Libyan 
Government in fulfilment of its sovereign right to control its natural 
resources; and 
2. That in case certain oil companies take individual or collective 
actions to hinder the implementation of the decision taken by the 
Libyan Government in the fulfilment of its sovereign right, the 
Conference shall take the appropriate measures which it deems 
necessary. 
It is significant to note that in early 1973, Libya sought direct participation, 
ranging from 51 to 100 percent, in the oil concessions, and thus demanded from 
Texaco and Liamco a higher participation. The Companies responded "with a 
variety of proposals and counterproposals, all of which were rej ected by Libya." 
In these circumstances, on September 1, 1973, Libya promulgated Decree No. 66, 
nationalising 51 percent of the interests and properties of Texaco, Calasiatic and 
Liamco. Likewise, the remaining property of the Companies was effected by 
Decree Nos. 10 and 11 of February 11, 1974?15 The Nationalisation Decree 
provided for compensation, however, the assessment of compensation was left to 
be determined by a Libyan Committee.216 
As indicated above, since there were no friendly settlements made between 
the Libyan Government and the Companies, the latter commenced arbitration 
proceedings. Despite the failure of Libya to appear in the proceedings, the 
awards were rendered in the BP, Texaco and Liamco cases. However, none of 
these awards were executed, and after the arbitration proceedings, the Companies 
214 Resolution 159 (XXXV), was adopted on September 16, 1973, reprinted in 13 LL.M. (1974) 
at 221-222. 
215 Mehren and Kourides, op. cit., at 485. 
216 Greenwood, op. cit., at 29-30. See also R. Dolzer, "Libya - Oil Companies Arbitration", 
Vol. 2, Encycl. P.LL., 168. 
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reached agreements with the Libyan Government, resolving their disputes. Put 
differently, the Companies were compensated out of arbitration. Agreements of 
November 24, 1974, September 25, 1977 and of March 1981 were concluded by 
Libya with BP, Texaco/Calasiatic, and Liamco respectively.217 
3.5.3 Venezuela 
As indicated above, in the law of almost all of the Latin American countries 
there is a concept in which the ownership of mineral deposits belongs to the 
State, and historically it originates from Spanish law. In the case of Venezuela, 
since the 1870s the concept has been firmly established in Venezuelan law and 
the State therefore holds the rights to all sub-soil deposits, including hydrocarbon 
resources.218 
During the nineteenth century, coffee was the single primary commodity in 
Venezuela and it formed 75 percent of all its exports. Due to the low price of 
coffee in the world market, it was a bankrupt and extremely dependent country, 
until oil came to its rescue. 
In the 1910s, numerous concessions to search for and extract petroleum 
within the different states and areas of Venezuela were granted to foreign 
companies. Among the concessionaires the most fortunate were the bigger 
multinational corporations, such as Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, Shell, and Texaco. 
In 1920 during Gomez's office, the first hydrocarbons law was introduced 
and Venezuela possessed the most liberal petroleum policy in Latin America. 
Thus, "to attract foreign investments, exploration and exploitation, tariffs were 
very low and the same applied to royalties ... Import duties for petroleum 
equipment were waived. ,,219 At that time coffee was still the main export from 
Venezuela, but oil rapidly became more dominant in its economy. Two general 
points are here worthy of mention: (I) as in the case of Iraq, there was political 
instability in Venezuela, and the country witnessed several coups; and (2) like 
217 Mehren and Kourides, op. cit., at 545-546. 
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Peru, both foreign enterprises and the US Government had a close relationship 
with the dictatorial governments in Venezuela, and this caused deep popular 
resentment against foreign companies. 
In 1938 the Lopez Contreras Government passed a new hydrocarbons law. 
The law "gave to the government explicit authority to create national oil 
companies." It "reduced the tax relief on imports", and "increased exploration 
and exploitation taxes." By 1938 Venezuela was no longer dependent on coffee, 
but on oil. In 1943 a further hydrocarbons law was enacted. The new law 
extended for forty more years (1983) the terms of the old concessions "but 
subject to new conditions more favourable to the government." It increased 
taxes, reinforced the principle of reversion of assets, and also introduced a fifty-
fifty profit basis clause between the Government and the oil industry. The law 
remained basically unchanged until 1975, the year of nationalisation, with only 
two partial amendments being made in 1955 and 1967.220 
In 1950 Perez Jimenez took power in a coup, and Venezuela then started to 
receive massive US military aid. "Diplomatically, militarily, and economically, 
Venezuela remained firmly within the sphere of influence of the United States." 
On the one hand, due to "the favourable climate for foreign capital, foreign 
investments in Venezuela more than doubled during the 1950s" and on the other, 
Venezuela with seven million population had became the sixth best market in the 
world for US traders. The Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons was established 
to handle all matters concerning the exploitation of hydrocarbons and 
minerals.221 
In 1954 the United States adopted a new oil imports policy, in which 
mandatory oil-import quotas were imposed on Venezuela. Its impact on the 
Venezuelan oil industry was severe. "The Venezuelan Government was 
especially worried about Mexico and Canada receiving preferential treatment 
over Venezuelan oil, since they felt that Venezuela had also special treatment 
220 Ibid., at 13-20. 
22l Ibid., at 24-25. 
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earned for many years' servIce as a reliable supplier to the United States." 
Eventually, Venezuela obtained some minor increases in the quotas, but it never 
received the desired preferential treatment. In 1960 the Venezuelan Oil 
Corporation, a fully State-owned oil company, was established "as an appendix 
of the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons to serve as an instrument of national 
oil policy.,,222 
As alluded to earlier, Libya was the first OPEC member country to start 
enforcing the recommendations of OPEC towards controlling the operations of 
the multinational oil companies. Coronel observes that "there is little doubt that 
the Libyan initiatives regarding increasing controls over the operations led the 
Venezuelan government to issue" decree 832 of December 1971, in which it took 
a further step "in the systematic administrative take-over of its oil industry.,,223 
Moreover, in December 1970 the twenty-first meeting of OPEC was held in 
Caracas, and resolved some problems. 
In August 1971 a law nationalising the gas industry was passed. Its main 
effect was that it reinforced the deeply nationalistic feelings existing in the 
country. Of much more importance was the passing of the law of reversion in 
July 1971. Under the reversion law, "all the assets, plant, equipment belonging 
to the concessionaires within or outside the concession areas would revert to the 
nation without compensation upon the expiration of the concession." Following 
the passage of this law, the foreign companies operating in Venezuela, such as 
Exxon, Shell, Texas, Mobil, Gulf and Sinclair brought actions before the 
Venezuelan Supreme Court for the nullification of the law, on the grounds that 
some of its provisions "violated their constitutional rights and were of a 
confiscatory nature." Similarly, they argued that "the law seemed to change the 
rules of the game, since the assets located outside the concession areas such as 
headquarters buildings would probably never have been built if it had been 
known that they would be taken over by the State." The Government defended 
222 Ibid., at 25-29. 
223 Ibid., at 35. 
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its action upon the basis that "all assets built or acquired by the companIes, 
directly related to the operation of the concessions, should be subject to reversion 
regardless of where they were located." 224 
The passage of the reversion law and decree 832 coincided with a notable 
reduction in the Venezuelan oil output. Several congressmen accused the foreign 
companies of retaliation. In February 1972, President Caldera in his speech to oil 
workers stated that "the production cuts were artificially provoked", and that 
"world oil demand increases every day, but Venezuelan oil output decreased last 
year." For many years the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons remained the 
passive recipient of certain financial benefits in the form of royalties and taxes, 
but by 1972 the situation had changed significantly. The new tools, namely the 
law of reversion, decree 832, the natural gas law, and the authorisation to fix the 
fiscal export prices, granted Government almost total control of the oil industry. 
In short, the strategic decisions were no longer fully in the hands of the oil 
companies.225 
In May 1974, under the supervision of President Perez, the Nationalisation 
Commission was established. Its "task force was in charge of analyzing the 
mechanisms required to allow the National Executive to take over the assets of 
the oil industry before the normal reversion year of 1983." In the meantime, 
President Nixon sent a representative, who declared the United States' policy on 
the nationalisation of American interests abroad. The US stance was that it 
"respected the sovereignty of countries to dictate their own laws." Following this 
position, an American company, Exxon, announced that it "would abide by the 
decision of the Venezuelan Government and that it "trusted the government to be 
fair and equitable.,,226 
In early 1975 there were four different drafts of a nationalisation bill: two 
In Congress, namely the draft bills submitted by the two main Venezuelan 
political parties; the third one presented to President Perez by the Nationalisation 
224 Ibid., at 38-39. 
225 Ibid., at 39-41. 
~~6 Ibid., at 53-55. 
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Commission; and the last bill prepared by the National Executive. Among them, 
the draft of the National Executive finally went into effect. It was a document 
similar to, but not identical with, the draft presented by the Nationalisation 
Commission. 
Finally, on August 29, 1975, President Perez proclaimed to the nation the 
entry into force of the Nationalisation Law. In Coronel's view,227 comparatively, 
the nationalisation of the Venezuelan oil industry was unique. He has advanced 
two reasons to explain this: (1) the model was the result of many minds coming 
together during the national debate of 1974-1975; and (2) the experience which 
the Government had obtained when it nationalised the iron industry in 1974; the 
conclusion of technical assistance and marketing contracts with the former 
concessionaires after the nationalisation. Likewise, the main characteristic of the 
oil nationalisation model was "the national industry's relationship with the 
former concessionaires, which depended on negotiations leading to a settlement, 
compensation based on net book value and payment in bonds, technical 
assistance agreements, commercial agreements, and establishment of a guaranty 
fund." Put in technical terms, the case of Venezuela freeing its oil industry from 
foreign hands was partly accomplished by negotiation, and partly through 
nationalisation.228 
Several factors enabled quick agreement with the oil companies. Firstly, 
the circumstances were ripe for nationalisation; since almost all the personnel of 
the Venezuelan oil industry were Venezuelans, there was considerable support 
for nationalisation. Secondly, following OPEC recommendations, member 
. f . l' . 229 
countries, as indicated above, had started a senes 0 natlOna Isatlons. 
227 Ibid., at 82-83. 
22R The negotiated nature of the take-over of the oil industry was stipulated by Articles 12 and 
13 of the Nationalisation Law. Article 12 in part reads: 
Within 45 ... days following the promulgation of this law, the National Executive ... will p~e~ent 
to the concessionaires a formal offer of compensation to be calculated pursuant to the prOVIsIOns 
of article 15 of the present law." Article 13 concerned an expropriation mechanism in a case 
when an agreement with the concessionaires was not reached. 
229 Coronel, op. cit., at 72-73. 
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Article 15 of the Nationalisation Law concerned the issue of compensation. 
Under the article, "the amount of compensation of the expropriated assets cannot 
be higher than the net value covering properties, plants, and equipment." It 
further provided that "payment of compensation could be deferred for up to 10 
years and could be made in bonds of the public debt, which would earn an 
interest no greater than 6 percent per annum. ,,230 
4. Conclusion 
As is apparent from the above survey, the measures of expropriation were 
mostly carried out in the form of nationalisation (expropriation on a large-scale). 
Therefore, the following conclusions mainly concern the concept of 
nationalisation: 
1. N ationalisation was employed as one means among many for the 
solution of economic and political problems in countries geographically 
dispersed and with widely differing political and ideological systems. 
2. From the various reasons put forward to justify the nationalisation 
measures -including social, economic and political - it appears that the main 
cause of such interference "by the State into economic life is the aspiration 
towards the socialisation of the general conditions of life.,,231 Moreover, the 
transfer to the State of the means of production and exchange, with a view to 
their utilisation in the public interest, "constitutes the real driving force of 
nationalisation in all countries. ,,232 
3. With a few exceptions, the nationalisation laws of the countries which 
have been examined recognised the right of dispossessed owners to receive 
compensation. 
4. Prior to World War I the concept of nationalisation was not recognised. 
State interference with private property took the form of expropriation in the 
public interest, and was normally directed against isolated items of property. 
230 Ibid., at 85. 
231 Katzarov, op. cit., at 74. 
232 Ibid. 
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After World War I the notion of nationalisation appeared, but it was not 
recognised as a legal concept. At that time, private ownership was still regarded 
as an absolute and exclusive right, which could only be limited by expropriation 
in the classical type. As shown above, after World War II a wave of 
nationalisation occurred in many countries throughout the world. Consequently, 
the concept of nationalisation was incorporated in the constitutions of many 
countries, and eventually gained a distinct legal status. 
5. The measures of nationalisation studied in this chapter may be classified 
into several systems, based on legal, regional and organisational similarities: 
(a) The Russian system was based on the idea of complete and radical 
socialisation of economic life. Under the system, private ownership of land and 
means of production was abolished and "the whole economic system is based on 
socialist ownership of means of production, determined and directed by the State 
economic plan. ,,233 
(b) The Eastern European system was very similar to the Russian. 
According to this system, the nationalisation measures "being designed to allow 
new achievements without thereby destroying what was already in existence. ,,234 
However, in these countries, unlike Russia, private property and private 
enterprise were not abolished, though they were restricted by laws. 
(c) As indicated above, the nationalisation measures introduced by the 
Western European countries were much milder than the Eastern European ones. 
These measures do not aim at "modifying ... the traditional content of property, 
or imposing any appreciable restrictions on private enterprise.,,235 However, the 
nationalisation effected in Western Europe entailed the transfer to the State of the 
means of production and exchange and their utilisation in the public interest. 
(d) The Latin American system was based on "the concept of social 
function of property." This concept enabled the nations of the region to 
2.,3 Ib·d t 77 1 ., a . 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid., at 78. 
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nationalise or expropriate the maIn industries. F or these countries, 
"nationalisation represents not only a new attitude towards the internal social 
structure, but also the adoption of a new attitude towards foreign economic 
influence. ,,236 
(e) Since the developing countries, such as Iran, Indonesia and Egypt in 
resorting to the measures of nationalisation were pursuing the same goals as the 
Latin Americans, their system may be classified as belonging to group (d). 
(f) The system adopted by OPEC member countries was based on freeing 
their oil industries from foreign hands. To this end, the member States tried to 
replace the concessionary system by 'participation' and finally 'ownership', a 
transition that was partly accomplished by negotiation and partly by 
nationalisation. 
236 Ibid., at 76. 
CHARTER TWO 
EXPROPRIATION AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
In the preVIOUS chapter we studied the development of concepts and 
procedures in expropriation. As we have seen, with a few exceptions, 
expropriations took place on a large-scale (so-called nationalisation), and were 
employed as one means among many for the solution of economic and political 
problems in countries from many parts of the globe, which differ widely in their 
political and ideological systems. In this chapter, the subject of expropriation 
will be considered from a legal point of view. In the first section of this chapter 
an attempt will be made to answer the question of whether, under international 
law, there is a single standard by which to measure the international t 
responsibility of the State with regard to the treatment of aliens. This will be 
followed by the examination of the sovereign right of a State to expropriate 
foreign property. We shall study the limitations on such a right, which are laid 
down by customary or treaty law. The contractual devices for foreign investment 
protection will be considered. Finally, the principle of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources and the activities of the UN General Assembly in this 
regard will be examined. 
1. Traditional International Law: The Law of State Responsibility for 
Injuries to Aliens 
The basic idea of the concept of State responsibility for injuries to aliens 
might be traced back to the teachings of the two most outstanding founding 
fathers of international law, Vitoria and Grotius. I However, a further step was 
F. V. Garcia-Amador, The Changing Law of International Claims, Vol. L Oceana 
Publications, Inc., New York (1984) at 45. See also B. Lillich (ed.), International Law of State 
Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, University Press of Virginia. Charlottesville (1983) at 1-60. 
\ 
73 
taken by Vattel, when he declared that "whoever ill-treats a citizen injures the 
State, which must protect that citizen.,,2 Thus, this approach, to be believed, led 
to the idea of 'protection of aliens abroad' (the so-called principle of diplomatic 
protection), and modem theories of State responsibility on the treatment of 
aliens.3 
Traditional international law generally recognIses that when a person 
resides in, or acquires property in, a foreign country, he is deemed to concede to 
the legislation of the host State for the protection of his person and property. The 
question which arises here is: does the emergence of the institution of State 
responsibility for injuries to aliens, and its collorary, the right of the home State 
to extend protection to its nationals abroad, mean that the status of aliens has 
ceased to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the host State? In short, does 
the status of aliens become governed, to some extent at least, by international 
law? In order to give a proper answer to the question, it is necessary to examine 
the two doctrines in this regard: the 'international minimum standard' and the 
'national treatment standard'. 
1.1 International Minimum Standard 
The doctrine of international minimum standard is also called 'international 
standard of justice' or 'minimum standard of civilisation'. It was first formulated 
E. D. Vattel, "The Law of Nations", Classics of International Law (Trans. by C. Fenwick), 
Carnegie Institution, Washington D.C. (1916), Book II, Chapter IV, at 136. 
3 Note that the law of State responsibility for injuries to aliens was the subject of severe 
criticisms and attacks by spokesmen from Latin American, Afro-Asian as well as former 
Communist countries. The Indian jurist Guha-Roy, for instance, observes that the law of 
responsibility of States for aliens is not a part of universal international law as "a custom [is] in no 
way binding on other States, unless it can be shown to have its roots in some general principles of 
law of a more or less universal character." S. N. Guha-Roy, "Is the Law of Responsibility of 
States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law?", 55 A.J.I.L. (1961) 863 at 
872. Similarly, a commentator from Russia, Tunkin, maintains that the doctrine of State 
responsibility has no validity in contemporary international law, and contravenes the basic 
principles of international law, such as "principles of respect for State sovereignty, non-
interference in internal affairs, equality of States ... good neighbourly fulfilment of international 
obligations." G. I. Tunkin, Theory of International Law (Trans. by W. E. Bulter), Harvard 
University Press, Massachusetts (1974) at 86. For a brief account on the issue, see F. W. Garcia-
Amador, "The Proposed New International Economic Order: A New Approach to the Law 
Governing Nationalisation and Compensation", 12 Lawyer of the Americans (1980) at 1-10, and 
S. K. B. Asante, "International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal", 37 r.c.L.Q. (1988) 
598 at 598-595. 
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In 1910 by the former US Secretary of State, Elihu Root. 4 However, its origin 
intertwined with the idea of diplomatic protection, and thus it may be traced back 
to the nineteenth century.5 Under this doctrine, the host States are required by 
international law to observe an international minimum standard in the treatment 
of aliens and alien property. 
This standard has been widely accepted in the past. As far as international 
jurisprudence is concerned, in the Neer case,6 the US-Mexican Claims 
Commission stated that "the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the 
test of international standards.,,7 The same Commission, in the Hopkins case,8 
took a similar position. It has also received support in legal writing.9 
Despite its extensive support, the contents or definition of the standard are 
far from clear. In the Neer case, for instance, it was held that: 
The treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international 
delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful 
neglect of duty or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far 
short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial 
man would readily recognise its insufficiency. 10 
Therefore, international minimum standard has always suffered from a 
fundamental defect, namely its vagueness and imprecision. Jurists have also 
noticed this defect. Francioni, for example, comments: 
Apart from the serious dangers of maintaining in the present stage of 
evolution of international law a concept of 'civilized nation' - given 
its originally restrictive sense and the old connotations that makes it 
closely related to such ideas as colonialism and capitulation regimes -
4 The standard was first fonnulated by the fonner US Secretary of State, Elihu Root in 1910. 
See, A. A. Akinsanya, The Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third World, Praeger 
Publishers, New York (1980) at 40-42. 
5 See generally D. F. Vagts, "Minimum Standard", Vol. 8, Encycl. P.LL., at 382-385; Garcia-
Amador (1984: 49-52); Brownlie, op. cit., at 527-528; O. E. Bring, "The Impact of Developing 
States on International Customary Law concerning Protection Foreign Property", 99 Scandinavian 
Studies in Law (1980) 99 at 103-104 and the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) on 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), Vol. 2, Section 711, 184. 
6 4 R.LA.A. (1926) 60. 
Ibid., at 61. 
R Ibid., at 47. See also the citations by Bring, op. cit., at 103 n. 10. 
9 See the citations by Bring, op. cit., at 103 n. 9. 
10 4 R.LA.A. (1926) at 61-62. 
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the doctrine of 'minimum standard' does, in fact, beg the question 
that it purports to answer. I I 
Guha-Roy made the following remarks: 
First, a national of one state, going to another in search of wealth or 
for any other purpose entirely at his own risk, may well be left to the 
consequences of his ventures ... For international law to concern itself 
with his protection in a state without that state's consent amounts to 
an infringement of that state's sovereignty. Secondly, a standard 
open only to aliens but denied to a state's own citizens inevitably 
widens the gulf between citizens and aliens and thus hampers, rather 
than helps, free intercourse among peoples of different states. 
Thirdly, the standard is rather vague and indefinite. Fourthly, the 
very introduction of an external yardstick for the internal machinery 
of justice is apt to be looked upon as an affront to the national 
system, whether or not it is below the international standard. Fifthly, 
a different standard of justice for aliens results in a twofold 
differentiation in a state where the internal standard is below the 
international standard. Its citizens as aliens in other states are entitled 
to a higher standard than their fellow citizens at home. Again, the 
citizens of other states as aliens in it are also entitled to a higher 
standard than its own citizens (emphasis added). 12 
Likewise, some argue that the doctrine never involved a definite content 
with a fixed standard, but rather a "process of decision", 13 "a process by which 
the question of whether a State was responsible under international law for an 
alien's injury could be weighed and resolved given the context and facts of a 
particular case.,,14 Nonetheless, Garcia-Amador is of the opinion that the 
standard is not nowadays formulated: 
in a way so rigid as it is in the above-transcribed text. This change in 
the traditional position seems to be a response to the increasing 
criticisms coming from different directions, including from the 
Western sources themselves. 15 
II F. Francioni, "Compensation for Nationalisation of Foreign Property: The Borderland 
Between Law and Equity", 24 I.c.L.Q. (1975) 255 at 263. 
12 Guha-Roy, op. cit., at 889. 
n M. S. McDougal et aI., "The Protection of Aliens from Discrimination and World Public 
Order: Responsibility of State conjoined with Human Rights", 70 AJ.I.L. (1976) 432 at 450. 
14 R. B. Lillich "Duties of States regarding the Civil Rights of Aliens", 161 Hague Recueil 
(1978-III) 329 at 350. 
15 Garcia-Amador (1984: 52). 
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Besides its vagueness and imprecision, the content of the international 
minimum standard in some areas, such as the expropriation of foreign property, 
is controversial. As will be shown in due course the case for the survival of the , 
traditional formula of 'prompt, adequate and effective' compensation has been 
virtually eroded. 16 
1.2 National Treatment Standard 
The abusive exercise of diplomatic protection based on international 
mInImum standard led to the enunciation of a number of doctrines in Latin 
America. 17 The most well-known one concerning the law of State responsibility 
for injuries to aliens is of the Calvo doctrine. 18 The Argentine jurist, Dr. Calvo, 
based his doctrine on two cardinal principles: (l) the 'non-intervention' principle, 
according to which a sovereign independent State, by reason of the principle of 
equality, enjoys the right to freedom from foreign interference in any form, 
whether by diplomacy or by force; and (2) the 'equality of treatment' principle, 
under which aliens could not claim any greater measure of protection than 
nationals. 19 Put differently, aliens were not entitled to any greater rights and 
privileges than those available to nationals. In Calvo's view, "the principle ... 
that foreigners merit more regard and privileges, more marked and extended than 
those accorded even to the nationals of the country where they reside ... is 
intrinsically contrary to the right of equality of nations.,,2o 
Although the principle of equality was not affirmed In the Hague 
Conference of 1930, on the 'Responsibility of States for Damages done in their 
16 Other important elements of the traditional law of State responsibility are the concept of 
vested rights, particularly the requirements with respect to expropriation of foreign property, and 
the rules governing State contracts, such as pacta sunt servanda which will be examined in 
chapter 4 and in this chapter, respectively. 
17 Such as the Drago Doctrine, for instance, whose essence was that "force should not be used 
in collecting contractual debts owed foreigners." M. Sornarajah, The pursuit of Nationalized 
Property, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1986) at 11. 
I!! Garcia-Amador (1980: 2-5). 
19 S g' ee, e ... 
_ F. W. Garcia-Amador, "Calvo Doctrine, Calvo Clause ", Vol. 8, Encycl. P.LL., at 62-65; and 
- Bring, op. cit., at 111-113. 
20 Garcia-Amador (1984: 53). 
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territories to the Persons and Properties of Foreigners', it was endorsed in the 
Seventh Latin American Conference held in Montevideo in 1933. Article 9 of 
the pertinent Convention reads, in part, as follows: 
Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the law and 
the national authorities and the foreigners may not claim rights other 
or more extensive than those of the nationals.21 
Similarly, national treatment, as a standard by which to measure the 
international responsibility of the State with regard to the treatment of aliens: 
Has support from many jurists both in Europe and Latin America 
prior to 1940, from a small number of arbitral awards, and from 
seventeen states at the Hague Codification Conference in 1930. At 
the latter twenty-one states opposed the principle, although some 
opponents had on occasions supported it in presenting claims to 
international tribunals.22 
Among the international judicial precedents referred to in this quotation, 
the Cadenhead case23 will be recalled. There, the President of the American and 
British Claims Arbitration Tribunal declared that "a foreigner within the United 
States is subject to its public law, and has no greater rights than nationals of that 
country.,,24 The principle of equality was also invoked by the United States in 
the Norwegian Shipowners' Claims. In this case, Secretary of State Hughes 
made the following reservation to the action of the tribunal: 
Due process of law applied uniformly, and without discrimination to 
nationals and aliens alike and offering to all just terms of reparation 
or reimbursement suffices to meet the requirements of international 
law (emphasis added).25 
However, the standard of national treatment has its own defects.26 They 
include: (1) given the unilateral origin of the standard, in the absence of treaties, 
21 Ibid., at 53. Latin American States enshrined the Calvo doctrine in their national 
constitutions as well as in contracts with foreign companies (the latter referred to as Calvo 
clause). 
22 Brownlie, op. cit., at 527 (footnotes omitted). 
23 Award dated May 1, 1914, cited in 8 A.l.LL. (1914) 663. 
24 Ibid., at 664-665. See also the citations by Brownlie, op. cit., at 527, n. 27. 
25 Garcia-Amador (1984: 58). 
26 Ibid., at 66. 
78 
individual fonnulations of the principle are entirely dependent upon the State's 
discretion; (2) the standard does not exclude altogether the applicability of 
international law to the treatment of aliens; and (3) that nationals suffer equally 
from the absence of essential rights and remedies or from an improper State 
conduct cannot always constitute a valid excuse to evade international 
responsibility. 
Thus, due to the respective shortcomings of the two standards, Garcia-
Amador, Special Rapporteur of the ILC on the subject of State responsibility, in 
his second report attempted to resolve the difference between the two standards. 
Since Garcia-Amador's approach on the issue will be considered in chapter 4 of 
this thesis, it is sufficient here to note that, according to his perspective, aliens are 
entitled to enjoy the same rights and the same legal guarantees as nationals. The 
treatment of nationals, in its tum, is determined by human rights principles which 
are internationally recognised. However, the approach was not welcomed by the 
Commission.27 
Additionally, some argue that the developments in the human rights sphere 
since 1945 and particularly in recent years have provided a new content for the 
international standard. Thus, human rights law may be considered "as 
establishing certain minimum standard of state behaviour with regard to civil and 
political rights.,,28 These authors refer to instruments which, instead of referring 
to nationals and aliens, are concerned with individuals within a certain 
jurisdiction without discrimination.29 
However, It has been recognised that certain sources of inequality between 
nationals and aliens are admissible.3o Put in technical terms, the rights and 
obligations of nationals and aliens are not the same in all circumstances. Thus, 
these differences will be surveyed briefly in the following sub-section. 
27 See our discussion in chapter 4, at 276-278. 
2R M. N. Shaw, International Law (4th ed.), Cambridge University Press (1997) at 57l. 
29 For instance, Article 2( 1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
adopted 1966, entered into force 1976. For the full texts of the Covenants, see 1. Brownlie, Basic 
Documents in International LaH' (3rd ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford (1991) 270. 
30 Brownlie (1998: 526). 
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2. Legal Status of Aliens in General 
Aliens, provided they entered the territory lawfully, are entitled to certain 
basic rights, including rights of contract, of acquisition of personal property or 
marriage, which are necessary to the enjoyment of ordinary private life.31 
Though the alien has access to the local courts, he may not have access to legal 
aid and may have to pay for costs.32 Apart from these rights, "internal economic 
policies and aspects of foreign policy" of the State may sometimes result in the 
"restrictions on the economic activities of aliens.,,33 Moreover, the preservation 
of national security, and the protection of public interest may require more 
restrictions upon aliens.34 In some States, for instance, the holding or inheriting 
of immovable property by aliens is banned. In many States aliens are unable to 
acquire or register in their names specific types of moveable property, such as 
aircraft, ships, and the like. Further, aliens usually do not have political rights in 
the host state/5 such as voting rights, or may be excluded from employment in 
certain professions (e.g. the diplomatic COrpS).36 
The differences between nationals and aliens are also evident in the 
admission and expulsion of aliens. A State possesses unlimited discretion in 
admitting aliens into its territory. Though some publicists assert that there is a 
certain duty of States to admit aliens, State practice shows that States' 
discretionary power in this respect is for most purposes unqualified?7 Thus, a 
State may refuse to admit aliens, or may accept them subject to certain conditions 
being fulfilled. 38 It has been stated that "In principle this is a matter of domestic 
jurisdiction: a state may choose not to admit aliens or may impose conditions on 
their admission. ,,39 
31 S. Oda, The Individual in International Law", in M. S0rensen, Manual of Public 
International Law, Macmillan, London (1968) at 483. 
32 Brownlie (1998: 527). 
33 Ibid. 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
Oda, op. cit., at 483. 
Brownlie (1998: 526). 
Shaw, op. cit., at 572. 
K. Doehring, "Aliens, Admission", Vol. 8, Encycl. P.I.L.. at 9. 
Oda, op. cit., at 481. 
Brownlie (1998: 522). 
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Expulsion of aliens, like the right to refuse admission of aliens, is attributed 
to the sovereignty of a State, and the State also enjoys a wide discretionary power 
in this regard.4o Whether the State in expelling aliens possesses the same 
discretion as it has in admitting them, is more open to doubt.41 Though the 
grounds for expulsion of an alien may be detennined by the expelling State with 
its own criteria, the right of expulsion must not be abused.42 To some, expulsion 
"must be exercised in good faith and not for an ulterior motive.,,43 Should the 
sole reason for expulsion, for instance, be to deprive the alien of his property or 
other rights, the action of the expelling State would be questionable.44 For 
justification of the action, therefore, the State must give persuasive reasons.45 
International law requires that to expel an alien, there must be justifiable grounds 
to fear that public order is in danger. 46 It must be noted that special consideration 
is given to those aliens who have been resident for a long time.47 They "have 
acquired prima facie the effective nationality of the host state", and their 
expulsion "is not a matter of discretion, since the issue of nationality places the 
right to expel in question. ,,48 
Besides the general rule of international law on expulsion, there are certain 
limitations on this right in both regional,49 and international5o human rights 
instruments. 
40 To Brownlie, "expulsion is also within the discretion of the state." Ibid., at 523. 
41 Shaw, op. cit., at 572. See also Brownlie (1998: 523). 
42 Oda, op. cit., at 482. 
43 Brownlie (1998: 523). 
44 H. Piran, Nationalization of Foreign Property in International Law and Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Liverpool, 1992) at 75. 
45 Shaw, op. cit., at 572. 
46 R. Arnold, "Aliens", Vol. 8, Encycl. P.LL., at 8. 
47 Oda, op. cit., at 482. 
4R Brownlie (1998: 523). 
49 The European Convention on Human Rights, for example, was signed in Rome on 4 
November, 1950 (U.N.T.S., Vol. 213, at 221), and entered into force on 3 September, 1953. 
Nine protocols have been attached to the Convention adding to or amending the provisions of the 
Convention. It should be noted that Article 1 of Protocol 7 of the Convention has the same effect 
as Article 13 of the Covenant. 
50 See, e.g., Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,. op. 
cit. (note 29). It is assumed that the signatory States in exercising their discretion t? expe~ alIens 
from their territory observe the provisions of this article, otherwise the expulSIOn might be 
considered wrongful. 
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It is interesting to note that among nearly 4,000 claims filed with the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal, some 1,500 were devoted to the alleged expulsion 
of American nationals by Iran during the Islamic Revolution of 1979. It was 
agreed51 that the claims for less than $ 250, 000 should be presented by the two 
governments on behalf of their nationals. Since the claims of approximately 
1,500 American nationals in principle were similar, the Tribunal did not consider 
all of them individually, instead it selected a few cases as sample cases and 
decided upon them. 
From the analysis of the awards52 of the Tribunal in those cases, the 
following rules may be emerged: (1) international law imposes certain restraints 
on the circumstances and the manner in which a State can expel aliens from its 
territory, and these limitations prohibit any arbitrary and discriminatory 
expulsions; (2) where the host State breaches its treaty obligation its 
responsibility for wrongful expulsion would be incurred; and (3) the burden of 
proof for wrongful expulsion falls upon the claimant alleging expulsion and the 
relevant rules would also apply where there is no special measure or direct action 
forcing the alien to leave the country (referred to as 'indirect expulsion'). In the 
latter case, the wrongful acts must be legally attributable to the expelling State. 
Turning to the question which has been raised at the beginning of this 
chapter, that is whether, with the emergence of the institution of State 
responsibility for injuries to aliens the exclusive jurisdiction of the host State 
51 Note that the Algiers Declarations (Accords) between the Governments of Iran and the 
United States which were signed on January 19, 1981, consisted of several agreements, including 
the General Declaration and the Claims Settlement Declaration. Under Article 111(3) of the latter 
Declaration, the agreement on small claims was made. For the text of the Declarations, see: 1 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports (hereinafter Iran-U.S. C.T.R.) (Grotius Publications, 
Cambridge); 75 A.J.LL. (1981) 418, and 20 LL.M. (1981) 224. 
52 The awards are as follows: 
_ Alfred L. W. Short and the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 312-11135-3 (4 July 1987), 
reprinted in 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 76. 
_ Jack Rankin and the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 326-10913-2 (3 November 1987), 
reprinted in 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 135. 
_ Kenneth P. Yeager and the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 324-10199-1 (2 November 
1987), reprinted in 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 92. For a critical comment on these awards, see A. 
Ghassemi, "Rules on Expulsion and their Application in the Iran-US Claims Tribunaf', 
(unpublished Master Dissertation, University of Brussels, 1989). 
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over aliens who reside in its territory would cease. The foregoing assessment 
indicates that, in the absence of treaties, while in some aspects the status of aliens 
is governed by international law, in others it continues to be governed by 
domestic law. Moreover, it would appear that there is no single standard 
regarding the treatment of aliens which enjoys universal support. Therefore, the 
international legal scene demands the formulation of new standards. 
3. The Right of a State to Expropriate Foreign Property 
Any interference by the State with private property, belonging either to 
aliens or to nationals, which is located within its jurisdiction is not prohibited by 
international law. That this embraces the right to expropriate cannot be doubted. 
The right of a State to nationalise is an attribute of its sovereignty. This right has 
been recognised in modem international law by way of various devices, including 
the relevant UN resolutions, legal writings, international decisions of courts and 
arbitral awards, as well as State practice. 
Since UN resolutions on the subject under consideration and the relevant 
issues will be dealt with separately later in this chapter, it is sufficient here to 
note that between 1952-1974, the United Nations adopted numerous resolutions 
on the issue of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the latest of which 
is Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974. Besides the resolutions which 
squarely relate to the permanent sovereignty of a State over its natural resources, 
many of them contain explicit references to the right to nationalise foreign 
property. 
Literature on the right to nationalise foreign property is abundant. 53 Juristic 
opinion is divided on the modalities of the exercise of the right to nationalise, 
53 There is an extensive literature on the issue. See inter alia: 
_ S. Friedman, Expropriation in International Law, Stevens & Sons Ltd., London (1953); 
_ 1. Foighel, Nationalization: A study in the Protection of Alien Property in International Law. 
Stevens & Sons Ltd, Copenhagen (1957); 
_ c. F. Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
(1967) at 121-169; . ., 
_ M. Somarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambndge Umversity Press 
(1994) at 277-414, and the writer's other literature. op. cit. (note 17). 
_ G. White, Nationalisation of Foreign Property. Stevens & Sons Ltd .. London (1961); 
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especially with regard to stabilisation clauses and standards of compensation. 
However, the right of a State to nationalise, in the words of White, is an attribute 
of its sovereignty in the sense of the supreme power which it possesses in relation 
to all persons and things within its jurisdiction.54 Schrijver, like Garcia-
Amador,55 took a similar view, when he observed: 
The right to expropriate or nationalise foreign investment is 
inherent in the sovereignty of each State and was generally 
recognized long before the permanent-sovereignty resolutions were 
adopted. 56 
International jurisprudence does not really throw light on the issue. As far 
as the PCIJ is concerned, the Chorzow Factory case57 is sometimes quoted as one 
of the first judgments which recognised a State's right to expropriate foreign 
property, "albeit under exceptional circumstances only.,,58 So far the 
International Court of Justice (hereinafter the 'IeJ') has not dealt with a clear-cut 
- S. C. Jain, Nationalization of Foreign Property - A Study in North-South Dialogue, Deep & 
Deep Publications, New Delhi (1983); 
- Akinsanya, op. cit. (note 4); 
- W. D. Verwey and N. J. Schrijver, "The Taking of Foreign Property under International 
Law: A New Legal Perspective", 15 N.Y.I.L. (1984) 3; 
- Brownlie (1998: 533-555); 
- E. 1. de Arechaga, "International Law in the Past Third of a Century", 159 Hague Recueil 
(1978-1) at 297-313 and the writer's other literature, "State Responsibility for Nationalization of 
Foreign Owned Property", 11 N.Y.U.J.I.L.P. (1978) 179; 
- I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1992) 
137-157 and the writer's article, "Aliens, Property", at 20-21; R. Arnold, "Aliens", 6-11, and R. 
Dolzer, "Expropriation, Nationalization", in Vol. 8, Encycl. P.I.L. (1985) at 214-217; 
- F. W. Garcia-Amador, "Responsibility of State for Injuries Caused in its Territory to Persons 
or Property of Aliens", 2 Y.B.I.L.e. (1959) at 1-36; 
- Z. A. Kronfol, Protection of Foreign Investment - A study in International Law, A. W. 
Sijthoff, Leiden (1972); 
- A. Mouri, The International Law of Expropriation as Reflected in the Work of the Iran-US. 
Claims Tribunal, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1994); and 
_ N. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Cambridge University Press (1997) at 
285-305 and 344-363. 
54 White, op. cit., at 35. 
55 Garcia-Amador (1959: 11, para. 41): 
"Traditionally this right has been regarded as a discretionary power inherent in the sovereignty 
and jurisdiction which the State exercises over all persons and things in its territory ... to further 
the welfare and economic progress of its popUlation." 
56 Schrijver, op. cit., at 285. 
57 Case Concerning the Factory at Chor::.ow, (claim for indemnity) (merits), Germany \'. 
Poland, (1928), P.C.!J. Series. A, No. 17, 1. 
51! Schrijver, op. cit., at 287. 
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nationalisation Issue. Although the well-known case of Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company, the dispute between Iran and the United Kingdom over the 
nationalisation of the company in question, as shown in chapter I, was referred to 
the Court, it declared that it had no jurisdiction on the issue.59 Moreover, the 
Court's judgment in the ELSI case60 was concerned with requisition, and only 
with the particular facts of this case and not with general conditions regarding the 
right to expropriate foreign property. 
Unlike international jurisprudence, arbitral awards have explicitly 
recognised the right of States to expropriate alien property. For instance, in the 
arbitral awards in the Texaco and Liamco 61 cases, dealing with the 
nationalisations of oil companies by Libya, this right was confirmed. In the 
former case, although the measure of nationalisation was found unlawful, 
Arbitrator Dupuy stated that the right of a State to nationalise foreign property 
should be considered as an expression of its territorial sovereignty.62 He goes on 
to say that: 
Territorial sovereignty confers upon the State an exclusive 
competence to organize as it wishes the economic structures of its 
territory and to introduce therein any forms which may seem to be 
desirable. It is an essential prerogative of sovereignty for the 
constitutionally authorized authorities of the State to choose and 
build freely an economic and social system ... just as it has the 
prerogative to determine freely its political regime and its 
constitutional institutions.63 
59 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Judgment of 22 July 1952, 
I.e.J. Rep. (1952) 93 at 114. 
60 Case Concerning Elettronica Sigula S. P. A. (ELSl) , (United States of America v. Italy), 
Judgment of20 July 1989, I.e.J. Rep. (1989) 14. . . 
61 Libyan American Oil Company (Liamco) v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Repubhc, 
Award of 12 April 1977, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. (1981) 1 at 120. 
62 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government 
of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award of 19 January 1977, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. (1978) 1 at 21. 
para. 59. . ... 
63 Ibid. For the factual details of the Libyan natlOnahsatlOn cases, including Liamco and 
Texaco, see chapter 1 of this thesis (OPEC countries take-overs). 
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In the Aminoil case,64 the tribunal held that the sovereign right of a State to 
nationalise foreign property prevailed even over an express stabilisation clause. 
A further illustration of this recognition is found in the Agip case, the arbitration 
under the auspices of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, (,ICSID'), the tribunal held that the right of a State to nationalize is 
beyond doubt today by reason of concordant and "constant international 
practice. ,,65 
Similarly, in its awards on expropriation, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal has 
explicitly endorsed States' right to nationalise foreign property. The Tribunal, 
for example, in its seminal award in the Amoco case, held that: 
As a fundamental attribute of state sovereignty, this right, commonly 
used as an important tool of economic policy by many countries, both 
developed and developing, cannot easily be considered as 
surrendered. 66 
The same Tribunal continues: 
This right is today unanimously accepted, even by states which reject 
the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
considered by a majority of states as the legal foundation of such a 
right. 67 
The ICSID tribunal, in the Amco case, also confirmed this right. There, the 
tribunal ruled that "This is the fundamental principle of a sovereign State to 
nationalize or expropriate property, including contractual rights previously 
64 The Government of Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil), Award of 24 
March 1982, reprinted in 21 LL.M. (1982) 976 at 1012 and 1025. 
65 Agip Co. v. The Republic of Congo, (ICSID), Award of 30 November 1979, reprinted in 21 
I.L.M. (1982) 726 at 735, para. 81. 
66 Amoco International Finance Corp. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran. National Iranian Oil 
Company. National Petrochemical Company. and Kharg Chemical Company Limited, Award 
No. 310-56-3 (14 July 1987), reprinted in 15 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 189 at 243, para. 179. 
67 Ibid., at 222, para. 113. See also the American International Group et at. v. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Award of 19 December 1983, reprinted in 4 ibid., 97 at 105 and. INA 
Corporation l'. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 184-161-1 (12 August 1985) reprinted 
in 8 ibid., at 373. 
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granted by itself, even if they belong to aliens, by now clearly admitted In 
national legal systems as well as in internationallaw.,,68 
It has been stated that the right to nationalise "results from customary 
international law, established as the result of general practices considered by the 
international community as being the law.,,69 Diplomatic precedents, or in a 
broader sense State practice, also affirm the right to nationalise foreign property 
subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. As indicated in chapter 1,70 soon 
after the Russian nationalisations of 191 7, the Powers which met in Cannes did 
not protest in their Declaration of 6 January 1922 the right of Russia to 
nationalise foreign property. If the nationalisation measures were considered by 
them confiscatory, it was for lack of compensation, not because Russia had no 
right to nationalise. During the Mexican Agrarian Reforms of 1937, the US 
Secretary of State Hull, in a letter on behalf of the US Government to the 
Mexican Ambassador in Washington said: 
My Government has frequently asserted the right of all countries 
freely to determine their own social, agrarian and industrial problems. 
This right includes the sovereign right of any government to 
expropriate private property within its borders ... 71 
Again the Mixed Expert Commission, which was established for the 
calculation of compensation in the course of Mexican oil nationalisations in 
1938, stated in its report of 17 April 1942 that "expropriation, and the exercise of 
the right of eminent domain ... are a recognised feature of sovereignty of all 
States."n Likewise, a British note dated April 8, 1938, to the Mexican 
Government acknowledged that "His Majesty's Government does not question 
the general right of a Government to expropriate in the public interest and on 
6R Amco Asia Corporation et al v. The Republic of Indonesia, Award of 9 December 1983, 
reprinted in 24 LL.M. (1985) 1022 at 1029, para. 188. 
69 Texaco Award, op. cit., at 21, para. 59. 
70 See chapter 1 of this thesis, at 16. 
71 Quoted by H. W. Briggs, The Law of Nations, Cases, Documents, and Notes (2nd .e~.), 
Applenton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York (1952) 556. The full text of the US letter contammg 
this statement, ibid., at 556-561, and 32 AJ.I.L. (1938), (Supplement) 181 at 182. 
T2 Quoted by Friedman, op. cit., at 28. 
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payment of adequate compensation.,,73 At any time during the proceedings of the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case before the IC}, the British Government also did 
not question in abstracto the right to nationalise.74 Another illustration of this 
recognition is found in the statement of August 2, 1956, by the Governments of 
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America regarding the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company by Egypt. 75 
In the case of the Cuban Agrarian Reforms of 1959, the Government of the 
United States recognised the right of the Cuban Government to nationalise the 
property of American nationals. 76 Additionally, both the United Kingdom and 
the United States in their protest notes to the Libyan Government regarding the 
nationalisations of American and British interests restated their recognition, as a 
matter of principle, of the right of States to take nationalisation measures. 77 
However, the two States in their notes spoke of some limitations on the right to 
nationalise, and that an act of nationalisation is not legitimate in international law 
unless it meets certain requirements. 
Besides customary law, the recognition of the right to nationalise is 
reflected in treaty law. The various regional human rights treaties which include 
the right of individuals to own property recognise the right to nationalise. 
Moreover, the regional, interregional and bilateral investment treaties confirm the 
right of a host State to nationalise foreign property. The OIC Investment 
Agreement of 1981, for example, provides that it is permissible to expropriate the 
investment, subject to certain conditions. 78 
73 Quoted by D. P. O'Connell, International Law (2nd ed.), Vol. II, Stevens & Sons Ltd., 
London (1970) at 778. 
74 Note that the British Government contended that the right to nationalise was subject to the 
requirements of international law which in its view were not satisfied in this case. See Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. case (1951) I.e.]. Pleadings (Memorial of the United Kingdom), Vol. 1, at 1-37, 
and G. Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investment and International Law, Stevens & Sons, London 
(1969) at 66-83. 
75 See Article 2 of the statement in chapter 1 of this thesis, at 40. 
76 White, op. cit., at 36-37. 
77 For the British Note, see 53 I.L.R. (1974) 297 at 317. The US Note will be found in 13 
I.L.M. (1974) 767 at 771. 
7R Article 10(2) of the Agreement for the Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investment 
among Member States of the Organisation of Islamic Conference. For the full text ?f the 
Agreement, see The Charter of the Islamic COI~rerence and Legal Framework of Economic Co-
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Finally, the ICC Guidelines,79 the ILA Seoul Declaration,80 the Draft UN 
Code of Conduct on TNCS81 and the World Bank Guidelines82 all endorse the 
host State's right to nationalise property within its jurisdiction. 
In view of the foregoing considerations, we can safely conclude that the 
right of States to expropriate or nationalise foreign property nowadays is 
unanimously accepted. This right is an attribute of sovereignty of the State, as 
well as its jurisdiction in internal matters. The controversy in the present state of 
international law between the capital-exporting States and the nationalising 
States is focused on the limitations of this right and not on the existence of the 
right itself. Thus, the examination of the limitations on the right of States to 
nationalise foreign property will be our next task. 
4. Limitations on a State's Right to Expropriate Foreign Property 
As indicated above, a State possesses the right to nationalise the property 
belonging to aliens in its territory. However, its right to do so is subject to the 
conditions laid down by international law. The nationalisation of foreign 
property will be lawful only if such a measure was for a public purpose and was 
not discriminatory. Though there is a duty in international law to pay 
compensation for the nationalisation of foreign property, the non-satisfaction of 
the duty does not put the lawfulness of the measure under question. Put 
differently, there is a general agreement that nationalisation which lacks a public 
purpose, and a discriminatory nationalisation may be unlawful in international 
law. However, in modem international law, a great majority of jurists and a 
considerable number of arbitral awards take the view that the State is the best 
operation among its Member States, H. Moinuddin, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1987), Appendix 
III, 197 at 201. 
79 Section V(3)(iv) of the ICC Guidelines for International Investment (1972). 
RO Section 5.5 of the 'Declaration on the Progressive Development of Principles of Public 
International Law Relating to a New International Economic Order' was adopted in the 62nd 
Conference of the International Law Association which was held in Seoul (24-30 August, 1986) 
(hereinafter the ILA Seoul Declaration), reprinted in 33 N.I.L.R. (1986) 326. 
Rl Para. 55 of the Draft Code, see UN Document, Economic and Social Councill1990/94, 12 
June 1990. 
R2 Section IV(1) of the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. (1992) 1363 at 1382. 
89 
judge to determine what constitutes its public interest. Accordingly, among the 
three criteria,83 the requirement of public purpose is the weakest one. With these 
reservations in mind, the public purpose and non-discriminatory requirements, as 
well as compensation form the subject-matter of our discussion in the following 
sections. 
4.1 The Public Purpose Principle 
Historically the origin of the principle was to be found in the VIew of 
'public purpose,84 as a limitation on the powers of eminent domain by Grotius.85 
This requirement has formed an essential part of the 'international minimum 
standard' and is supported by Western States. For Professor Higgins, there was 
some authority in the inter-war period that a State could only take the property of 
aliens for reasons of public purpose. Writing in 1965, she concludes that "it is 
doubtful whether the law now requires a state to show true public necessity.,,86 
As will be shown in this section, in contemporary international law, it is 
generally agreed that the requirement of public purpose is not much of a 
limitation to the nationalisation of foreign property. 
It is not clear what is meant by the phrase 'public purpose' and even 
Grotius did not offer a definition of the principle. Though the principle can be 
83 A few jurists contend that a 'due process oflaw' constitutes an additional requirement for the 
expropriation of foreign property. The notion of a 'due process of law' has been described as 
"the manner of an expropriation may not be ... lacking in just procedures." R. Higgins, Conflicts 
of Interests - International Law in a Divided World, Dufour Editions, Chester Springs, 
Pennsylvania (1965) at 56. See, also W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society, Stevens & Sons, 
London (1972) at 491-492; Verwey and Schrijver, op. cit., at 5-6, and Schrijver, op. cit., at 359-
361. However, this requirement is not considered as a condition of the legality of an 
expropriation by the overwhelming majority of authors. Among them, Schwarzenberger, the 
prominent advocate of the 'international standard', may be recalled. In his view, "so long as an 
expropriation takes place for public purpose and is accompanied by full or adequate, prompt and 
effective compensation, it is legal." Schwarzenberger, op. cit., at 4. 
84 Note that various terms may be used by the State to denote the same purpose, such as 'public 
utility', 'public necessity', 'public use', 'common good', 'general interest' and the like. 
85 White, op. cit., at 146. It has been stated that the term 'public interest' was first employed in 
the United Kingdom's protests to Greece in the Finlay's case in 1836. O'Connell, op. cit., at 778. 
Note that for the factual details of this case, see chapter 1 of this thesis, at 11. 
86 Higgins, op. cit., at 56. However, it appears that the same author has taken a contrary view 
in her lectures in 1982 at the Hague Academy "The Taking of Property by the State: Recent 
Developments in International Law", 176 Hague Recueil (1982-11) 259 at 288,291 and 299. See 
also the citations by White, op. cit., at 5-6. 
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found in most legal systems, international law does not have any special 
definition of its own.87 It has been submitted that a precise definition of these 
terms "for which an expropriation may be lawfully decided has neither been 
agreed upon in international law nor even suggested. ,,88 This has led Rafat to 
conclude that: 
As long as the international community remains composed of states 
with social systems so divergent from one another as they appear to 
be at the present time, one cannot hope for the emergence of an 
internationally agreed-upon definition of public utility.89 
However, some attempts have been made to define the principle. White, 
for example, points out that in international as in municipal law, expropriation 
for public utility purposes means: 
Expropriation the aim and result of which was to benefit the 
community as a whole rather than any particular person.90 
Jurists are divided on whether the requirement of public purpose IS a 
limitation on the right to nationalise alien property. Broadly speaking, they might 
fall into three categories. The first category composed writers, such as 
Friedman,9! Kissam and Leach,92 Amerasinghe, 93 Arsanjani, 94 and White,95 who 
totally deny that there exists such a limitation. Thus, the latter jurist observes 
that in the absence of any other element of illegality, such as discriminatory 
measures and the violation of a treaty undertaking, the mere lack of a public 
utility motive will not render an expropriation illegal. In her view: 
R7 See Friedman, op. cit., at 141, and J. H. Herz, "Expropriation of Foreign Property", 35 
A.J.I.L. (1941) 243 at 253. 
RR Amoco Award, op. cit., at 233, para. 145. 
R9 Quoted by Jain, op. cit., at 110. 
90 White, op. cit., at 146. See also the observations of Verwey and Schrijver in this regard in 
Verwey and Schrijver, op. cit., at 9. 
91 Friedman, op. cit., at 142. 
92 L. Kissam and E. K. Leach, "Sovereign Expropriation of Property and Abrogation of 
Concession Contracts", 28 Ford.L.R. (1959-60) 177 at 214. 
93 Amerasinghe, op. cit., at 137-138. 
94 M. H. Arsanjani, International Regulation of Internal Resources - A stu(~l' of Lat\, and 
Policy, University Press of Virginia. Charlottesville (1981) at 291-292. 
95 White, op. cit., at 150. 
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It is contrary to reason and to the general principles of international 
law that so grave a consequence should follow from the non-
observance of a rule whose content is as vague as that of the 
principle of public utility has been shown to be (emphasis added).96 
The second category has mostly been constituted of the older authors who 
claim that a public purpose must be present. Among them, Wortley,97 McNair,98 
Schwarzenberger99 and BishoplOO may be recalled. Having surveyed the 
publicists' views on the public purpose requirement, Jain concludes that "it 
would not be prudent to altogether discard this test in the absence of a better 
alternative."lOl The third category consists of a vast majority of authors102 who 
while considering public purpose a requirement, maintain that the nationalising 
State enjoys unlimited powers in this respect. Seidl-Hohenveldern, for instance, 
holds that the requirement of public interest is necessary for the legality of 
expropriation, since this principle serves a useful purpose as a brake to arbitrary 
acts. However, he qualified his position by stating that "as a rule, the State 
concerned will be held to be the best judge of its public interest.,,103 In the same 
vein, Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice observe that in present day international law: 
It is up to the State itself to determine what its public purpose 
requires, and such a determination is likely to be overruled by an 
international tribunal only in very exceptional circumstances. 104 
96 Ibid. 
97 B. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law, University Press, Cambridge (1959) 
at 24-25. 
9R Lord McNair, "The Seizure of Property and Enterprises in Indonesia", 6 N.I.L.R. (1959) 218 
at 243-245. 
99 Schwarzenberger, op. cit., at 4. 
100 W. W. Bishop, "General Course of Public Law", 115 Hague Recueil (1965-II) 403 at 404. 
Some modem authors in this field took a similar view. See, e.g., Jain, op. cit., at 114, and Mouri, 
op. cit., at 324-327. The latter writer considered the public purpose requirement to be less settled 
than that of non-discrimination. Ibid., at 329. 
101 J' . 114 am, op. CIt., at . 
102 See, for example, A. A. Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors, Columbia 
University Press, New York (1962) at 248; F. Wooldridge and V. Sharma, "The Expr?priation of 
the Property of the Ugandan Asians", 14 Ind. J.LL. (1974) 54 at 58-59 and. Herz .. ~p. CIt., at 253. 
103 I. Seidl-Hohenveldem, International Economic Law (2nd ed.), MartIllus NIJhoff. Dordrecht 
(1992) at 138. ... 
104 M. Pellonpaa and M. Fitzmaurice. "Taking of Property III the PractIce of the Iran-Umted 
States Claims Tribunal", 19 N.Y.I.L. (1988) 53 at 63. 
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Domke,lOS Baade,106 O'Connell,107 Kronfol,108 Bring, I 09 Asante, I 10 
Aki III B l' 112 H' . 113 114 '" nsanya, rown Ie, IggIns and Weston took a SImIlar VIew. After 
noting that "The point is not that foreign-wealth deprivations should not be taken 
in the public interest", the latter author states that "the doctrine has found scant 
support in practice as a 'rule' of international law whose violation independently 
engages international responsibility." Referring to the ALI Second 
Restatement,IIS he observes that even the doctrine's erstwhile proponents now 
concede that States' discretionary powers in this respect can hardly be 
questioned. 
The European Court of Human Rights appears to have shared the view that 
the expropriating state is the best judge in determining whether the expropriation 
in question was in the public interest or not. The Court, in the James's case, held 
that: 
Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the 
national authorities are in principle better placed than the 
international judge to appreciate what is 'in the public interest' ... The 
Court, finding it natural that the margin of appreciation available to 
the legislature in implementing social and economic policies should 
be a wide one, will respect the legislature's judgement as to what is 
105 M. Domke, "Foreign Nationalizations - Some Aspects of Contemporary International Law", 
A.l.LL. (1961) 584 at 590. 
106 This writer reached the conclusion that in the absence of specific international agreements to 
the contrary, States are free to nationalise any foreign investments in their natural resources for 
any purpose that they judge appropriate. H. W. Baade, "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Wealth and Resources", in R. S. Miller and R. 1. Stanger (eds.), Essays on Expropriations, Ohio 
State University Press (1967) 3 at 29. 
107 O'Connell, op. cit., at 779. 
108 Kronfol, op. cit., at 26. 
109 Bring, op. cit., at 107. 
110 Asante, op. cit., at 610: "An assertion by a State that its expropriatory measure is in the 
public interest is not open to challenge by another State." 
III He concludes that: 
"Foreign-owned enterprises may be expropriated on grounds or reasons of public utility ... of 
which the expropriating state is the best judge." Akinsanya, op. cit., at 19-20 and 68. 
112 Brownlie (1998: 547) observes: 
"Expropriation must be for purposes of public utility, or that it must not be 'arbitrary', only causes 
confusion. The determination of public utility is primarily a matter for individual states." 
Il3 Higgins (1982: 291). 
114 B. H. Weston, 'The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of 
Foreign-Owned Wealth", 75 A.1.I.L. (1981) 437 at 439-440. 
115 The American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) on Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States (1965), Section 185, comment b, at 553. 
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"in the public interest" unless the judgement be manifestly without 
reasonable foundation (emphasis added). I 16 
Whether the requirement of public purpose must be applied to 
nationalisation measures in the same way as to expropriation, Amerasinghe, like 
Piran, I 17 is of the opinion that "it would seem that the definition of 
nationalization presupposes a taking of property in the public interest." 118 This 
view was endorsed by the statement in the Liamco case, when the Arbitrator 
stated that there was no authority to support the application of the public purpose 
criterion to the measures of nationalisation. 119 
International jurisprudence and arbitral awards are also divided on the 
issue. Some of them supported the need for the requirement of public purpose 
and others questioned the very existence of it. In the German Interests in Polish 
Upper Silesia case, the PCIJ held that international law permits the expropriation 
of alien property for reasons of "public utility.,,12o The Court took a similar 
. . . h Ch 17 121 posItIon In t e orzow ractory case. In the Walter Smith claim, an oft-
quoted case on this issue, the arbitrator stated that the taking was not for public 
purpose but for the purpose of amusement and private profit, without any 
reference to public utility.122 Interestingly, the arbitrator in this case was 
referring to an internal requirement of Cuban law. The necessity of public 
purpose for a lawful taking was stated in the David Goldenberg case, involving 
military requisition. 123 This policy was followed by the US Circuit Court of 
116 James et al. v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 February 1986, E.C.H.Rep. (1986) 
Series A, No. 98, 9 at 32, para. 46. 
117 P' . 80 Iran, op. CIt., at : 
"It could be argued that nationalization, by this definition, has in fact done away with the rule of 
public purpose." 
llR Amerasinghe, op. cit., at 137. 
119 Liamco Award, op. cit., at 58-59. 
120 (1926) P.c.I.J. Series. A, No.7, at 22. 
121 Chorzow Factory Judgment, (1928) P.c.I.J. Series. A, No. 17 at 46-48. 
122 The Walter Smith claim (United States v. Cuba), 2 R.I.A.A. (1928) at 917. In the 
Norwegian Shipowners Arbitration, the tribunal held that courts are competent to decide inter alia 
"whether the taking is justified by public needs." Norv,'egian Shipowners' Claims (Norway v. The 
United States), Permanent Court of International Arbitration, Award of 13 October, 1922, 1 
R.I.A.A. (1948) 307 at 332 and 335. 
123 The David Goldenberg case (Romania v. Germany), 2 R.I.A.A. (1928) at 909. See also the 
arbitration between Portugal and Germany, 2 ibid., (1928) 1039. 
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Appeals, in the Sabbatino case. The Court held that the Cuban expropriation was 
unlawful since, among other things, it was not for a public purpose. 124 
Additionally, in the Agip case, the tribunal held that the Congolese State has a 
sovereign right to nationalise when "the general interest" requires. 125 
However, there are a considerable number of authoritative decisions which 
have either watered down or questioned the public purpose criterion. In the 
Shufeldt claim, which dealt with the cancellation of a concession by the 
Guatemalan Government granted to a US national, the arbitrator did not attach 
any significance to the public purpose requirement, by stating that: 
It is perfectly competent for the Government of Guatemala to enact 
any decree they like and for any reasons they see fit, and such reasons 
are no concern of this Tribunal. 126 
Similarly, the PCIJ, in the Oscar Chinn case, held that "the Belgium 
Government was the sole judge of this critical situation.,,127 The decisions of 
these two cases have been relied on by Friedman to deny the need for the public 
purpose requirement. 128 
In the Libyan nationalisation cases, the issue of public purpose was raised, 
when the arbitrators discussed the relevance of the motives in determining the 
legality of the nationalisation measures. Thus, in the Texaco case, the motives of 
the Libyan action were not examined l29 and Arbitrator Dupuy held that "it must 
regard the Libyan government as having acted in accordance with its own 
sovereign appreciation of the national interest.,,130 In the Liamco case, Arbitrator 
Mahmassani stated that there was no separate public purpose criterion in 
124 Note that the decision in this case was reversed by the Supreme Court's decision of March 
23, 1964, based on the 'act of State' doctrine. M. M. Digest of International Law, Vol. 8, 
Department of State Publications, Washington, D.C. (1967) at 1045. 
125 Agip Award, op. cit., at 734, para. 72. 
126 The Shufeldt case (United States v. Guatemala), 2 R.I.A.A. (1930) 1079 at 1095. 
127 The Oscar Chinn case (United Kingdom v. Belgium), Judgment of 12 December 1934, 
P.c.I.J. Series AlB, No. 63. 65 at 79. 
12R Friedman. op. cit., at 142. 
129 According to Harris, "it was neither thought necessary nor, in Libya's absence. appropriate 
to do." D. J. Harris, Cases and Maten'als on International Law (5th ed.), Sweet and Maxwell, 
London (1998) at 565, n. 89. 
130 Texaco Award, op. cit., at 25, para. 74. 
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international law, and motives are irrelevant to this law. The issue was treated by 
the Arbitrator in these tenus: 
As to the contention that the said measures were politically motivated 
and not in pursuance of a legitimate public purpose, it is the general 
opinion in international law theory that the public utility principle is 
not a necessary requisite for the legality of nationalisation. This 
principle was mentioned by Grotius and other publicists, but now 
there is no international authority, from a judicial or other source, to 
support its application to nationalisation. Motives are indifferent to 
international law, each state being free to judge for itself what it 
considers useful or necessary for the public good ... (emphasis 
added).131 
In the BP case, Arbitrator Lagergren found the measures of nationalisation 
unlawful on the ground that the taking "clearly violates principles of international 
law as it was made for purely extraneous political reasons and was arbitrary and 
discriminatory in character.,,132 It has been suggested that since the Libyan 
nationalisations, the public purpose requirement has gained a new lease of life in 
the claim that "where a nationalisation is motivated by way of reprisal, it would 
lack public purpose and should therefore be considered unlawful.,,133 
The Iran-US Claims Tribunal has also touched upon the issue. The most 
explicit statement in this regard can be found in its seminal award of Amoco. The 
Tribunal held that: 
It is clear that, as a result of the modem acceptance of the right to 
nationalize, this term [public purpose] is broadly interpreted, and that 
States, in practice, are granted extensive discretion. 134 
131 Liamco Award, op. cit., at 58-59. 
132 BP Exploration Company (Libya) Limited v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 
Award of 10 October 1973, reprinted in 53 I.L.R. (1974) 296 at 329. 
133 Somarajah (1994: 317-318). For a good account of the public purpose requirement and 
reprisal, see the same writer's (1986: 176-183). 
134 Amoco Award, op. cit., at 233, para. 145. Moreover, in the American International Group 
Award, op. cit., at 105: it could not hold "that the nationalization of Iran America was by itself 
unlawful ... as there is not sufficient evidence before the Tribunal to show that the nationalization 
was not carried out for a public purpose as part of a large reform programe." Also, in the INA 
Award, op. cit., at 378: "It has long been acknowledged that expropriations for a public purpose 
and subject to conditions provided for by law ... are not per se unlawful." Note that the stateme~t 
of the last award was further endorsed by Lagergren in his Separate Opinion. when he states that It 
"is generally accepted that some types of expropriation are inherently unlawful - among these one 
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Commenting on the award, Professor Harris observes that, although the 
Amoco award requires that the public purpose criterion may be necessary, "that is 
easily satisfied by virtue of a wide 'margin of appreciation' doctrine."] 35 
Moreover, it seems that the Tribunal in one other case held that the onus of 
proving lies on those alleging the nationalisation was not for a public purpose. ]36 
The public purpose requirement has also found expression in State practice. 
In the case of the Mexican oil expropriations, the British and the US 
Governments took the view that the right to expropriate foreign property was 
limited by a public purpose. However, the Mexican Government argued that 
"public interest may be determined by every State at its own discretion.,,]37 In a 
note dated December 18, 1959, following Indonesian nationalisations of Dutch-
owned enterprises, the Netherlands Government protested to Indonesia that its 
action was at variance with intemationallaw, on the ground that "the Preamble to 
the [Nationalisation] Act shows that the measures are not based on the general 
interest in connection with the use to be made of the property to be nationalized, 
but have been taken for the purpose of exerting pressure in a political dispute.,,]38 
During the nationalisations of the British and the US oil interests by Libya, these 
two governments restated their positions on this requirement. The British 
Government regarded the nationalisation of the BP assets as illegal on the 
grounds of, among other reasons, lack of public purpose. 139 
Moreover, the limitation appears in regional human rights treaties. Article 
1 of the First Protocol to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, for 
example, provides that no one shall be deprived of his possessions except in "the 
can cite cases in which foreign assets are taken on a discriminatory basis or for something other 
than a public purpose." The Separate Opinion of Judge Lagergren in the INA Award, at 385. 
135 H· . 565 
- arns, op. CIt., at . 
136 American International Group Award, op. cit., at 105. 
137 Who . t 8 lte, op. CIt., a . 
I3R The Netherlands Note of December 18, 1959, to Indonesia regarding the nationalization of 
Dutch-owned enterprises, text in 54 A.J .I.L. (1960) 484 at 485. 
139 For the British Note, see 53 I.L.R. (1974) 297 at 317. The US Note can be found in 75 
A.J.I.L. (1981) 476 at 486, and 13 I.L.M. (1974) 767, at 77l. 
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public interest.,,140 The 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of 
Foreign Property also refers to this requirement. 141 Likewise, the bilatera1142 and 
regional investment treaties, such as the ASEAN Agreement,143 the Energy 
Charter Treaty,144 NAFTAI45 and the OIC Agreement146 all state that it is 
permissible to expropriate property in the public interest. 
The requirement is incorporated in the 1962 General Assembly Resolution 
1803; the resolution provides that the taking should be for "public utility, security 
or the national interest.,,147 It has been suggested that the connection between 
national security and public utility shows that the State itself can be the judge of 
these criteria. 148 However, the 1974 Charter does not mention the public purpose 
limitation. With regard to its absence from the Charter, one commentator 
observes that the policy behind such a demand is that the taking by the State for 
public purposes should be assumed. 149 Weston took a similar view. 150 
The requirement of public purpose is also reflected in the 1961 Harvard 
Draft Convention on International Responsibility of States for Injuries to 
Aliens 151 as well as the ALI Third Restatement. However, in the latter the 
140 To the same effect, see Article 21 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, and 
Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, reprinted in 9 LL.M. (1970) at 
99 and 21 I.L.M. (1982) at 58, respectively. 
141 Article 3 (I) of the OECD Convention, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. (1968) at 128. 
142 See, e.g., Article IV of the 1954 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights 
between Iran and the United States (entered into force on 16 June 1957) provides that "Such 
property shall not be taken except for a public purpose." reprinted in U.N.T.S., Vol. 284, at 93 
and U.T.S., Vol. 8, at 899. 
143 Article VI(I) of the Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments among South-
East Asian Member States (ASEAN), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. (1988) 612. 
144 Article lO(1)(a) of the European Energy Charter Treaty, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. (1995) 391. 
145 Article 1110(1)(a) of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), reprinted in 31 
I.L.M. (1992) 1382. 
146 Article 10(2) of the Agreement, op. cit. (note 78). 
147 Article 4 of the resolution. To some, this article "would appear to be an attempt to diminish, 
rather than to increase, international-law restrictions upon nationalization by making the 
precedence of public over private interests a matter on international public policy." Baade, 
"Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources", in Miller and Stanger (eds.), op. 
cit., at 23. 
14R Sornarajah, (1986: 175-176). 
149 Arsanjani, op. cit., at 295. 
150 Weston, op. cit., at 440. 
151 Article 10 of the Convention. The full text of the Convention, and its explanatory notes can 
be found in 55 AJ.I.L. (1961) 545. 
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relevance of the requirement to the lawfulness of nationalisation waned. 
Comment to section 712( l)e of the Restatement confirms our assertion, when it 
acknowledges: 
The concept of public purpose is broad and not subject to effective 
re-examination by other states. Presumably, a seizure by a dictator or 
oligarchy for private use could be challenged under this rule. 152 
In sum, in contemporary international law there is considerable unanimity 
in doctrinal, judicial and State practice spheres that the State would be the best 
arbiter to determine what its public interest requires. It is hardly conceivable that 
such a determination can be reviewed or overruled by any judicial or arbitral 
organs. Nonetheless, if this limitation can stand in principle as a brake to 
arbitrary acts, it comes down to very little in practice. When a State nationalises 
property, its main aim is to secure economic benefits for the nation, and it is 
guided solely by public purpose. Thus, it is submitted that the test of public 
purpose to determine the legality of nationalisation measures either plays a minor 
role or none whatsoever. 
4.2 The Principle of Non-discrimination 
The second condition under traditional international law for the legality of 
expropriation is the absence of discrimination. 153 Its origin can be traced back to 
Latin America,154 the continent which gave birth to principles such as those 
embodied in the Calvo and the Drago doctrines as well as, as will be shown later 
in this chapter, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. In 
this context, discrimination consists in the differential treatment of aliens as 
152 American Law Institute (1987: 200). 
153 See inter alia: Foighel, op. cit., at 46-47; Friedman, op. cit., at 189-193; White, op. cit., at 
119-144; and the latter writer's other literature, "Expropriation of the Libyan Oil Concession -
Two Conflicting International Arbitrations", 30 r.c.L.Q. (1981) 1; Amerasinghe, op. cit., at 138-
142; Akinsanya, op. cit., at 20-25; Kronfol, op. cit., at 24-25; Sornarajah, (1986: 183-187) and 
(1994: 318-320); Verwey and Schrijver, op. cit., at 6-8; Lord McNair, op. cit., at 247-249 and O. 
Schachter "General Course of Public International Law", 178 Hague Recueil (1982-V), which 
has been' published under the heading International Law in Th~ory and Practice, ~a~inus 
Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1991). Thus, hereinafter the latter reference wIll be preferred. See, IbId., at 
315-320. 
154 Francioni, op. cit., at 269. 
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compared to nationals or of any particular group of aliens as compared to other 
aliens. I55 It has been argued that if alien property is nationalised and that of the 
national left intact, the measure is discriminatory and thus contrary to 
internationallaw. I56 The question arises as to whether there is any duty for the 
State not to discriminate between nationals and aliens. To some, the answer is in 
the negative. According to Abi-Saab, for example, it is impossible to confirm 
that the State cannot discriminate in exercising its power to nationalise between 
nationals and aliens. Referring to the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, he maintains that it is a legitimate right of the State not to leave 
its economic destiny or fundamental national interest in foreign hands. I57 
Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice seem to have shared this view, when they comment: 
While ... non-discrimination requirements are well established, a 
certain shift in favour of the State's economic sovereignty appears to 
be discernible in the way they are interpreted today. 158 
The second question is whether nationalisation measures which are 
expressly aimed at, or which in practice affect, a single and unique alien 
enterprise do constitute illegal discrimination. For White, "There is as yet no rule 
of international law which provides that a State is guilty of illegal discrimination 
if it nationalises alien property in a field where there are no national interests 
capable of being affected.,,159 Two decades later, Professor Weston reached the 
same conclusion. I60 On this view the nationalisations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company of 1951, and the Suez Canal Company of 1956 which affected a single 
and unique alien undertaking respectively, are not discriminatory. 161 The Iranian 
155 A. A. Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors, Columbia University Press, 
New York (1962) at 249. 
156 Wooldridge and Sharma, op. cit., at 61-63. 
157 G. Abi-Saab, "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and Economic Activities", in 
M. Bedjaoui (ed.), InternationalLaw: Achievements and Prospects, UNESCO/Martinus Nijhoff, 
ParislDordrecht (1991) at 609-10. 
15R Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, op. cit., at 65. 
159 White (1961: 144). 
160 Weston, op. cit., at 442. See also Baade, "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and 
Resources", in Miller and Stanger (eds.), op. cit., at 23-24. 
161 White (1961: 130-138). See also Amerasinghe, op. cit.. at 140; Kronfol, op. cit., at 24-25: 
Arsanjani, op. cit., at 297, and Verwey and Schrijver, op. cit., at 12, n. 36. 
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nationalisation was not considered a discriminatory measure by the Civil Court of 
Rome on the grounds that "'By the Oil Nationalization Law it is intended to 
protect the interests of Iran, not to attack the interests of foreign nationals as 
such.,,162 Similarly, nationalisation measures which aimed exclusively at alien 
property in a field where there are also national interests, in White's view, 
constitute illegal discrimination. 163 Weston, however, took a contrary view, and 
hence considered White's conclusion "too facile.,,164 
As mentioned above, nationalisation measures may be directed against the 
property of a particular nationality. Whether there is a duty not to discriminate 
between various classes of aliens, is an issue on which the views of publicists are 
divided. Some argue that the evaluation of the public interest depends on the 
situation of the economy of the State involved rather than on the nationality of 
the interest holders. 165 Abi-Saab illustrated his view by giving an example. If a 
State is faced with a situation where much of its economy is controlled by aliens 
of the same nationality, or they control a key sector of the economy which the 
State wishes to nationalise, in such cases the nationalisation measures, while 
affecting only one nationality, cannot be considered to violate international 
law. 166 Others maintain that differential treatment between foreigners is 
forbidden by the rules of international law .167 
State practice offers numerous examples of the acceptance of the principle 
of non-discrimination. "Developed states continue to insist that discrimination 
between or against foreigners vitiates an expropriation.,,168 In a note to Romania 
protesting the Romanian nationalisation law of June 11, 1948, exempting 
Russian enterprises from the provisions of the law, the US Government stated 
that: 
162 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd. v. S. U.P.o.R. (Unione Petrolifera per I'Orentie S.P.A.), 22 
I.L.R. (1955) 23 at 40. 
163 White (1961: 144). 
164 Weston, op. cit., at 444. . . .. " . 
165 Abi-Saab, "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and EconomIC ActIVItIes , ill 
Bedjaoui (ed.), op. cit., at 610. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Verwey and Schrijver, op. cit., at 7. 
161! Harris, op. cit., at 567. 
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While the United States' Government recognized the right of a 
sovereign power to expropriate property ... belonging to American 
nationals, the United States has likewise refused to recognize the 
validity of such expropriations in cases where they are discriminatory 
by nature and effect. 169 
Moreover, following the nationalisation of American-owned interests by 
Cuba under the Nationalization Law of July 6, 1960, in a protest note to the 
Cuban Government, the nationalisation was regarded as a discriminatory action 
on the grounds that it was applied only to Americans and the American-
controlled Cuban companies. 170 In 1951 on the nationa1isation of the Ang10-
Iranian Oil Company, the British Government challenged the legality of the 
Iranian Nationalization Act, among several reasons, on the ground that it was in 
fact directed exclusively against a particular foreign company. 171 The 
Netherlands Government protested, among other things, against the 
discriminatory character of the Indonesian nationalisation of Dutch enterprises. 172 
The non-discrimination requirement seems to have found expression in 
jurisprudence both at the international and the national level. Thus, in the Oscar 
Chinn case, the PCIJ held that: 
The form of discrimination which is forbidden is ... based on 
nationality and involving different treatment by reason of their 
nationality as between persons belonging to different national 
groups. 173 
Commenting on the judgment, White observes that the term 'forbidden' in 
this part of the judgement of the Court clearly refers to the treaty provision, and 
not to a general principle of customary international law. 174 In the Libyan 
nationalisation cases the arbitrators touched upon the non-discriminatory 
requirement. In the BP case, Arbitrator Lagergren found illegality of the 
169 Quoted by White (1961: 120). 
170 The United States Note of6 July, 1960 can be found in Whiteman, op. cit., at 1042-1043. 
171 See Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case, I.eJ. Pleadings, op. cit.. paras. 21-22. 
172 See 54 AJ.I.L. (1960) at 485. 
173 Oscar Chinn Award, op. cit.. at 87. See also the Norwegian Shipowners' Claims Award, op. 
cit., at 339. 
174 White (1961: 134). 
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nationalisation on the grounds that "it ... was arbitrary and discriminatory in 
character." 175 In the Liamco case, the nationalisation of American oi I interests 
was not held discriminatory, because Liamco was not the only American 
Company to be nationalised. 176 However, the Arbitrator held that "purely 
discriminatory nationalization is illegal and wrongful."l77 In the Texaco case, 
Arbitrator Dupuy did not rule on the issue. 
The Iran-US Claims Tribunal, as In the case of the public purpose 
requirement, faced the question of discrimination. The existence of a non-
discrimination requirement was affirmed by the Tribunal. The latter, in the 
American International Group case,178 denied the claimant's allegation that the 
nationalisation in question was unlawful, because it found that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish that the measure was discriminatory. In the Amoco case, 
it also accepted that the presence of a discriminatory act may render an 
expropriation unlawful. There, the claimant company alleged that the 
nationalisation was discriminatory on the ground that another company in the 
same position, which had different nationality, was not expropriated by the 
respondent, Iran. The Tribunal, however, found: 
it difficult, in the absence of any other evidence, to draw the 
conclusion that the expropriation of a concern was discriminatory 
only from the fact that another concern in the same economic branch 
was not expropriated. Reasons specific to the non-expropriated 
enterprise, or the expropriated one, or to both, may justify such a 
difference of treatment. 179 
Both the District and Appellate Courts of Amsterdam held that the 
Indonesian nationalisation of Dutch-owned tobacco companIes was 
discriminatory because the measures were directed against the Netherlands 
enterprises in Indonesia. 180 However, when a similar case was brought before the 
175 BP Award, op. cit., at 329. 
176 Liamco Award, op. cit., at 60. 
177 Ibid.,at59. 
178 American International Group Award, op. cit., at 105. 
179 Amoco Award, op. cit., at 232, para. 142. See also Aminoil Award, op. cit., at 1019-1020. 
IRO M. Domke, "Indonesian Nationalization Measures before Foreign Courts", 54 A.J.I.L. 
(1960) 305 at 308 and 311. 
103 
German Court, it held that the nationalisation measures were not discriminatory. 
The Court rejected the argument that the nationalisation measures were unlawful 
since they were directed only against Dutch enterprises. It referred to the Dutch 
nationals as the former colonial masters and distinguished them from other 
foreigners and stated that they had control over the Indonesian economy. The 
Court ruled that: 
The equality concept means only that equals must be treated equally 
and that the different treatment of unequals is admissible. For the 
statement to be objective, it is sufficient that the attitude of the former 
colonial people to its former colonial masters is, of course, different 
from that toward other foreigners. I 81 
It appears that Sornarajah agreed with the modification of the equality 
principle between foreigners. In his view, in the situation considered by the 
German Court, there is a justification other than racial motives involved in the 
nationalisation. 182 Arsanjani took the view that though the Indonesian 
nationalisation affected one group of foreigners more than other groups, it can be 
said that there was a basis for different treatment between the two groups. 183 
However, Amerasinghe disagrees with the reasoning of decision given by the 
German Court, when he argues that in the issue of nationalisation aliens, as 
between themselves, should be treated equally. He points out that the acceptance 
of the modification made by the German Court would amount to discrimination 
between aliens, depending on whether they are the nationals of the former 
colonial power or not. 184 Jain has this to say: 
This view is not in consonance with the changing of the international 
community which is striving to achieve international economic order 
. bl b . 185 on a more eqmta e aSls. 
Likewise, the statement of the German Court was characterised as an 
"erroneous" view by Domke. 186 The latter argues that "it would amount to an 
IRI Ibid., at 328. 
IR2 Somarajah (1994: 319). 
IR3 Arsanjani, op. cit., at 300. 
IR4 Amerasinghe, op. cit., at 140-141. 
IRS Jain, op. cit., at 168. 
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encouragement to nationalize only property of nationals and corporations of 
countries that have been the primary purveyors of foreign investments.,,187 To 
Wooldridge and Sharma, the statement of the German Court in this respect may 
not be a good law, because it could lead to injustice to ex-colonial powers. They 
reached the conclusion that the expropriations of the Asian properties in Uganda 
during the Idi Amin regime were discriminatory in character. 188 
In the Sabbatino case, both the two lower US courts, District Court and the 
Court of Appeals, recognised that the non-discriminatory principle was still a 
viable principle and applied it to the Cuban nationalisations. The former Court 
held the nationalisation measures discriminatory as "the act classifies United 
States nationals separately from all other nationals and provides no reasonable 
basis for such a classification.,,189 To some, though the Courts' statements in this 
case provide direct authority, they "cannot be regarded as impartial.,,19o 
Moreover, Fatouros goes further and states that the decisions provided no direct 
authority for the non-discrimination test. 191 
While General Assembly Resolution 1803 and the 1974 Charter are both 
silent on this issue, multilateral and bilateral investment treaties recognise the 
prohibition of discrimination in the case of expropriation. 192 Additionally, the 
requirement is reflected in various codes and guidelines concerning foreign 
investment. Thus, the ICC Guidelines call for "the avoidance of unreasonable 
d d· . . ,,193 an Iscnmlnatory measures. 
IR6 Domke (1961: 601). 
IR7 Ibid. 
IR8 Wooldridge and Shanna, op. cit., at 61-62. 
IR9 Domke (1961: 603). 
190 Sornarajah (1986: 229, n. 78). One commentator took a similar view. C. F. Murphy, 
"Limitations over the Power of a State to Detennine the Amount of Compensation Payable to an 
Alien upon Nationalization", in R. B. Lillich (ed.), The Valuation of Nationalized Property in 
International Law, Vol. III, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville (1975) 49 at 62 
191 F . 250 atouros, op. CIt., at . 
192 See, e.g.,: The OIC Investment Agreement (Article 10.2), the ASEAN Inves~ent 
Agreement (Article VI.l), NAFTA (Article IIID.l.a), and the Energy Charter Treaty (ArtIcle 
13.1). , . 
193 Section V(3)(a)(ii) of the ICC Guidelines for International Investment (1972). For SImilar 
tenns, see, inter alia: paragraph 50 of the Draft UN Code of Conduct on Tra,nsnational 
Corporations, in UN Doc. Economic and Social Counci111990194. 12 June 1990: Article 5.5 of 
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The ALI Third Restatement also affirms the need for the requirement. In 
its blackletter rules it does not define 'discrimination', but in comment to Section 
7l2(t) notes that discrimination implies: 
unreasonable distinction. Takings that invidiously single out property 
of persons of a particular nationality would be unreasonable; 
classifications, even ifbased on nationality, that are rationally related 
to the security or economic policies might not be unreasonable. 194 
The term 'invidiously' means "an unfair or offensive discrimination," and 
it is left to the decision-makers to determine what is unfair in the particular 
circumstances. 195 It seems that in the Restatement's approach to discrimination 
is not an absolute concept, but only unreasonable or unfair discriminatory 
conduct would result in the international responsibility of a State. To Professor 
Schachter, not all discrimination between nationals and foreigners constitutes 
wrongful discrimination. 196 In order to reach beyond the vague concepts of 
'reasonableness' or 'arbitrariness', he divided the causes of discrimination into 
three categories. Firstly, discrimination against foreign enterprises based upon 
their economic characteristics and transnational links with the host State. 
Secondly, discrimination against foreign business because of political actions of 
their home governments (that is, retaliation or reprisal). Thirdly, discrimination 
against foreign nationals because of group prejudices and social tensions. In his 
view, the abstract standard of 'equality of treatment' cannot be applied in the first 
category in its full sense since there are policy and factual grounds for the 
differential treatment between foreign business or particular categories of 
business. With regard to the second category, Schachter examined the Cuban 
nationalisations of American interests and apparently shares the US Court's 
statement that a difference in treatment based upon reprisal is an unreasonable 
discrimination. 197 Finally, the same writer continues: 
the ILA Seoul Declaration, op. cit. (note 80), and Section IV(l) of the 1992 World Bank 
Guidelines, op. cit. (note 82), at 1382. 
194 The ALI Third Restatement (1987: 200). 
195 Schachter, op. cit., at 316. 
196 Ibid. See also Weston, op. cit., at 440-447. 
197 For a different view, see Somarajah (1986: 176-183). 
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State action that involves ... restrictions on businesses owned by a 
particular national or ethnic group because of popular prejudice or 
group hostility should be regarded as 'discriminatory' and as a 
sufficient basis for international liability. 198 
Likewise, one may conclude that expropriation measures "taken solely for 
reasons of racial, religious, cultural, ethnic or nationality aversion or preference 
should and do constitute unlawful discriminations for being arbitrary.,,199 
That the requirement of non-discrimination is not an absolute concept has 
been confirmed by writers in different terms. Commenting on the Amoco award, 
Professor Harris observes that though the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
recognises the non-discrimination requirement, it is not an absolute principle. 
"Discrimination that is reasonably related to the public purpose that underlies the 
expropriation is not illegal. ,,200 Some authors distinguished between 'just' and 
'unjust' discrimination?OI Schwarzenberger spoke of 'lawful' and 'unlawful' 
discrimination. In his view, absolute discrimination goes beyond the 
. . I .. d d 202 lnternatlona mInImum stan ar . O'Connell also refers to 'lawful' and 
'unlawful' discrimination. For him, even if an expropriation is carried out 
without compensation, and lacks a public purpose, it cannot be taken place in a 
discriminatory manner. In his words: 
Even the writers who allow States to expropriate for any purpose and 
without compensation agree upon the one minimal rule that if an 
alien or class of aliens is singled out for expropriation this is 
203 
unlawful. 
Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, who examined the question of discrimination in 
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal's jurisprudence, observe that: 
Differential treatment of various persons, or classes of owners of 
property, does not automatically amount to prohibited discrimination 
19R Schachter, op. cit., at 320. 
199 Weston, op. cit., at 447. 
200 Harris, op. cit., at 566. 
201 J. B. Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. 6, Department of State Publications, 
Washington D.C. (1906) at 698-701. 
202 Schwarzenberger, op. cit., at 120-121. 
203 O'Connell, op. cit., at 780. 
107 
... such differentiation is wrongful only if it is unreasonable, or lacks 
some objective justification.204 
In their view, as in the case of public purpose, if the concerned State asserts 
that there is some justification for its conduct, it creates a strong presumption of 
the correctness of such an assertion.205 Moreover, one commentator has 
advanced two reasons for the whole issue of non-discrimination being unclear: 
(1) the existence of several possible meanings of the term 'discrimination'; and 
(2) some discrimination against aliens is generally recognised as internationally 
lawful. 206 Some jurists go beyond and explicitly state that the principle of non-
discrimination is not a rule of customary international law. In this respect, Baade 
comments: 
Since states are free to decide with whom to trade, they must also be 
free to decide with whom to stop dealing ... There is no support in 
law or reason for the proposition that a taking that meets other 
relevant tests of legality is illegal under international law merely 
because it is discriminatory (emphasis added).207 
In the light of the above assessment, it would appear that, compared with 
the public purpose requirement, non-discrimination is "a relatively more settled 
term and has formed a basis for finding certain acts of expropriation 
unlawful.,,208 However, it has undergone a considerable change in the field of 
international trade and investment. Restated differently, non-discrimination is 
not an absolute requirement, even from the standpoint of Western authorities. 
Some discrimination against aliens is internationally recognised as lawful, but 
only in the case of unreasonable or unfair discriminatory conduct would 
international responsibility of the State involved be incurred. Undoubtedly, the 
surrounding circumstances in each discriminatory conduct are of crucial 
importance in determining the illegality of discrimination. 
204 Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, op. cit., at 65. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Fatouros, op. cit., at 250. 
207 Baade, "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources", in Miller and Stanger 
(eds.), op. cit.. at 24. 
20R M' 't t 329 oun, op. Cl ., a . 
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4.3 The Principle of Compensation 
Of all the questions posed by nationalisation, compensation is undoubtedly 
the most important one; not only from the viewpoint of foreign investors, capital-
exporting States and capital-importing States, but also from the perspective of 
legal scholars, and national as well as international tribunals. Moreover, it is to 
be characterised as one of the most controversial areas of international law. The 
standards of compensation, therefore, merit an exhaustive examination, which 
will be carried out in chapter 4. At this point, however, a brief survey of the 
principle of compensation along with two other requirements - public purpose 
and non-discrimination - is necessary. 
It has been generally recognised that there is a duty to pay compensation for 
the expropriation of foreign property. The question arises as to whether such a 
duty is a condition of the legality of an expropriation, similar to those relating to 
public purpose and non-discriminatory requirements. Put in technical tenus, X 
does failure to meet the obligation render the expropriation illegal as such? 
Juristic opinions are divided upon the issue. Generally speaking, two main 
approaches may be identified?09 According to the first approach, a State has an 
inherent right to expropriate foreign property and compensation would be a 
subsequent and ancillary duty; failure to compensate does not affect the legality 
of expropriation (referred to as 'legality' theory). This theory is based on the 
argument that international law is a law between States and does not concern 
itself with individuals. It is also argued that an expropriating State has no duty 
towards the owner of the property, but only to its national State. "Since it may 
never make a claim, or may waive its rights and abandon a claim to 
compensation, it is concluded that the original expropriation must be valid 
independently of the question of compensation." Under the second approach, the 
legality of expropriation depends on the payment of compensation (known as 
'illegality' theory). The rationale of this theory, conversely, is that international 
209 O'Connell, op. cit., at 785-867. Note that O'Connell himself advocates the theory of 
'legality'. 
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law concerns itself with the individual and protects his rights. A violation of the 
owner's interest, accordingly, is illegal as such if the conditions for 
expropriation, including the payment of compensation, are not fulfilled. 
In the defence of the former approach, Sir Fischer Williams observes that 
In the absence of specific treaties or other contractual or quasi-contractual 
obligation to the contrary, there is no general principle of international law 
prohibiting a State from expropriating foreign property without compensation.2l0 
Friedman is of the opinion that the legality and justification of expropriation are 
not subject to the payment of compensation, but rather: 
by the fact of its being the exercise of a jurisdiction, which the State 
is recognised to possess by internationallaw.211 
Bring came to the conclusion that "The principle of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources '" implies that compensation is not a sin qua non for the 
legality of a nationalization.,,212 Foighel also speaks of the possibility that the 
nationalisation of foreign property without compensation may possibly be "a 
legitimate step justified by international law.,,213 He further states that even if 
payment may be required by international law, the failure to pay may therefore be 
"an independent breach of the law." Fatouros appears to have shared the view 
that non-payment of compensation constitutes an independent wrongful act, and 
it does not affect the legality of expropriation. In his view, if a State expropriates 
alien property and does not provide a measure of compensation "it is responsible 
for its unlawful non-payment of compensation, but the measures themselves 
remain internationally lawful.,,214 Akinsanya,215 like Baade,216 took the view that 
not the expropriation per se, but the non-payment of compensation is an 
210 1. F. Williams, "International Law and the Property of Aliens", 9 B.Y.I.L. (1928) 1 at 28. 
211 Friedman, op. cit., at 204. 
212 Bring, op. cit., at 131. 
213 Foighel, op. cit., at 40-41. 
214 Fatouros, op. cit., at 314-315. 
215 Akinsanya, op. cit., at 27 and 68 . 
.216 Baade, "Indonesian Nationalization Measures before Foreign Courts - A Reply", 54 A.1.I.L. 
(1960) 801 at 808. 
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international tort. Likewise, in his fourth report to the ILC, on the subject of 
State responsibility, Garcia-Amador has treated the issue in these terms: 
According to a generally accepted principle, an expropriation is not 
necessarily unlawful even when the action imputable to the State is 
contrary to international law ... an expropriation can only be termed 
'unlawful' in cases where the State is expressly forbidden to take 
such action under a treaty or international convention.217 
Garcia-Amador did not, accordingly, enumerate compensation as a 
condition of the legality of an expropriation. Not only do earlier authorities hold 
the proposition that expropriation is not unlawful merely on the grounds that it is 
not accompanied by adequate compensation, Sornarajah, writing in 1994, also 
maintains that the absence of compensation does not affect the legality of an 
expropriation.218 
However, advocates of the illegality approach assert that expropriation 
without adequate compensation is confiscation, and it is per se unlawful and 
contrary to international law. Thus, Hyde, one of the leading writers on 
international law, expressed the opinion that since payment of full compensation 
is a condition which must be satisfied by a requisitioning State due to its action in 
wartime, "the expropriation of alien-owned property in time of peace cannot 
lawfully be effected on lighter terms. ,,219 Kissam and Leach conclude that "The 
validity of the expropriation depends upon the ability and willingness of the 
expropriating State to pay for what it has taken", and that any State interference 
with private foreign-owned property in defiance of these principles should not be 
recognised by other States.220 
As in the public purpose and non-discrimination requirements, capital-
exporting States assert that compensation is a condition of the lawfulness of an 
expropriation. Therefore, the theory of 'illegality' has received some support in 
217 Garcia-Amador (1959: 13, para. 50). See also ibid., at 33, para. 131. 
21R Sornarajah, (1994: 315). See further Jain, op. cit., at 164, and R. Delson, "Nationalization of 
the Suez Canal Company: Issues of Public and Private International Law." 57 Col.LR. (1957) 754 
at 763-764. 
219 Quoted by Kissam and Leach, op. cit., at 192. 
220 Ibid., at 214. See also Wortley, op. cit., at 33. and Brownlie (1998: 540). 
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the practice of the United States. In the Mexican oil expropriation of 1938 the 
position was taken by the US Government that the legality of the expropriation 
depended on the payment of compensation. This point was stated explicitly by 
the US Secretary of State in a note of April 3, 1940, to the Mexican Ambassador 
at Washington. Hull said: 
The Government of the United States readily recognizes the right of a 
sovereign state to expropriate ... however '" the right to expropriate 
property is coupled with and conditioned on the obligation to make 
adequate, effective and prompt compensation. The legality of an 
expropriation is in fact dependent upon the observance of this 
requirement. 221 
Similarly, in notes to Mexico in 1938 the British Government stated that it: 
cannot but regard the failure of the Mexican Government to discharge 
even their existing obligations as in itself rendering unjustified an 
expropriation an essential condition of the validity of which would be 
the payment of full and adequate compensation ... 222 
Again, in its Memorial before the Ie] in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
case, this Government expressed its view in the following terms: 
It is clear that the nationalization of the property of foreigners, even if 
not unlawful on any other ground, becomes an unlawful confiscation 
unless provision is made for compensation which is adequate, prompt 
and effective.223 
Municipal and international tribunals have also touched upon the issue. 
National courts in capital-exporting countries have refused to recognise any 
foreign expropriation measures that fail to provide (full) compensation or are 
essentially retaliatory. The dispute of 1951 between Britain and Iran over the 
nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, was a source of some legal 
221 G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. 3, Government Printing Office, 
Washington D.C. (1942) 655. In the case of Mexican Agrarian Refonn, the United States took a 
similar position. Ibid. See also the Note of 17 February, 1962, from the United States to the 
Brazilian Government regarding the expropriation of an American Company, in Whiteman, op. 
cit., at 1090. 
222 Quoted by O'Connell, op. cit., at 787. 
223 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, I.e.l. Pleadings, op. cit., para. 30. 
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cases. Thus, in the Rose Mary case, the Supreme Court of Aden, (then a British 
colony) held that expropriation without compensation is contrary to international 
law.224 An English Court, however, disagreed with this holding. 225 The Japanese 
Civil Court in a similar case ruled that "property belonging to foreign nationals 
can only be expropriated with compensation.,,226 However, in another passage of 
the same judgement, it was held that: 
When an industrial nationalization law of a country was enforced, 
without discrimination, against nationals of the enacting State and 
aliens alike, such law would not infringe international law even if it 
did not provide for compensation unless there existed a special 
international treaty.227 
In another case, the Civil Court of Rome took a similar position. The Court 
held that "no person should be deprived of his property without payment of 
compensation.,,228 In the Indonesian nationalisation of Dutch interests, the 
Amsterdam District Court stated that the nationalisation was in violation of 
international law because of, among many reasons, the failure to provide 
d . 229 a equate compensatIon. However, the nationalisation was found legal, 
because the German Court upheld the validity of the Indonesian nationalisation, 
even though it failed to compensate.230 Finally, in the Sabbatino case, though the 
US lower courts, namely the District Court and the Court of Appeals, conceded 
that nationalisation without payment of compensation is unlawful, the Supreme 
Court took a different view. 231 
224 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd. v. Jaffrate et aI., Judgement of 9 January 1953, 20 1.L.R. (1953) 
316. 
225 Somarajah (1986: 208). 
226 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, 20 1.L.R. (1953) 305. 
227 Ibid., at 307. 
22R Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S. UP.OR. Co., 22 1.L.R. (1955) 23. 
229 Domke (1960: 318). 
230 Ibid., at 315. Note that this statement was not endorsed by the Gennan Courts which 
considered the validity of the Chilean nationalisation of the American copper mines by the 
Allende Government without the payment of compensation. See 1. Seidl-Hohenveldern, "Chilean 
Copper Nationalizations before the Gennan Courts", 69 AJ.1.L. (197~) 110. 
231 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino et al., reports of the deCISions of the lower courts may 
be found in 56 A.J.LL. (1962) at 1085-1106, and of the Supreme Court reprinted in -+ 1.L.M. 38l. 
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At the international level, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal practice, whose 
awards in fact signify the latest developments of international law on the subject 
of nationalisation, does offer that the payment of compensation is not a condition 
of the legality of an expropriation. For example, in the INA Corporation case,232 
the Tribunal explicitly made a distinction between those requirements, like public 
purpose, the absence of which renders an expropriation 'per se unlawful' and the 
obligation to pay compensation in a lawful nationalisation. Commenting on the 
Tribunal's finding, Professor Harris observes: 
The inference is that if compensation is not paid as required, the 
position simply that the obligation to pay continues, with interest to 
the time of payment; the rules as to reparation for an illegal act do 
not apply (emphasis added).233 
It appears that Harris has shared the view that non-payment of 
compensation does not transfer an expropriation into an illegal act which, as will 
be shown in due course, may require damages rather than compensation. To 
some, although non-payment of compensation does not render an expropriation 
illegal, some provision for the payment should be made at the time of 
expropriation.234 
On the question of whether compensation is a condition of the legality of 
an expropriation, the above survey shows that there is a patent lack of agreement 
among authors; some support the approach of 'legality', others advocate the 
'illegality' approach. Put briefly, juristic opinions do not firmly throw light on 
the issue in hand. Though the practice of capital-exporting States provides some 
support for the latter theory, the response of their national tribunals are almost 
contradictory. At the international level, the jurisprudence of the Iran-United 
States Tribunal, however, does uphold the former theory. The Tribunal held that 
232 INA Award, op. cit., at 378. See also Amoco Award, op. cit., at 130-13l, paras. 137-138, 
and American International Group Award. In the latter award, the Tribunal held that: 
"It is a general principle of public international law that even in a case of lawful nationalisation 
the former owner of the nationalized property is normally entitled to compensation." Ibid., at 
105. 
233 Harris, op. cit., at 572. 
234 Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, op. cit., at 70. 
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there is a duty to compensate, but the non-satisfaction of the duty does not render 
the expropriation unlawful as such. It would appear appropriate to agree with 
such a proposition that the payment of compensation cannot be characterised as a 
legal condition of the expropriation, similar to those regarding public purpose K 
and non-discrimination requirements. 
5. Expropriation in Violation of a Treaty 
In the preceding sections, we dealt with the limitations on States' sovereign 
right to expropriate alien property in customary international law. In this section, 
the question of limitation by an international agreement between the host State 
and the home State of an alien will be considered. States may enter into 
international agreements with each other for various purposes. Some of these 
treaties only create rights and obligations between the contracting States, while 
others also vest certain rights directly in the nationals of those States.235 
Such treaties may expressly prohibit one of the Contracting States to 
expropriate certain property. Stipulations of this nature were contained in some 
of the Peace Treaties entered into at the end of W orId War I, and the Geneva 
Convention of 15 May 1922 between Poland and Gennany. Under Article 6 of 
the Convention, Poland was entitled to expropriate in Polish Upper Silesia: 
in conformity with the provisions of Articles 7 to 23 ... Except as 
provided in these clauses, the property, rights and interests of German 
nationals or of companies controlled by German nationals may not be 
liquidated in Polish Upper Silesia (emphasis added). 
Poland, however, did not observe the prohibition and expropriated certain 
rural estates in Upper Silesia, including the Chorzow Factory.236 Poland's non-
compliance with the prohibition gave an opportunity to the PCIJ to rule on the 
Issue. The Court held that such illegal action was to be distinguished from 
235 The celebrated example of this category is the Agreement of 1921 between Poland and the 
City of Danzig. In this respect, the PCIJ declared that if, under this treaty, the Contracting Parties 
intended to vest direct rights in individuals, it was possible. Garcia-Amador (1959: 24, para. 95). 
236 F or the factual details, see chapter 1 of this thesis, at 19. 
115 
expropriation of foreign property under normal circumstances, that IS, in the 
absence of a treaty provision. It held that: 
The action of Poland which the Court has judged to be contrary to the 
Geneva Convention is not an expropriation - to render which lawful 
only the payment of fair compensation would have been wanting; it is 
a seizure of property, rights and interests which could not be 
expropriated even against compensation save under the exceptional 
conditions fixed by Article 7 of the said Convention.237 
This holding indicates that limitations could be placed by a treaty on the 
right of a State to nationalise property, and non-observance of such limitations 
constitutes an international wrong. The Court's statement was supported by 
many scholars, among them Garcia-Amador,238 Fatouros,239 Kronfo124o and 
White241 may be recalled. The latter writer maintains that expropriation in 
breach of a treaty is illegal even if adequate compensation is paid for the 
. l' d 242 natlona lse property. 
There are some jurists who throw doubts on the authority of the judgment 
in the said case. Thus, Sornarajah argues that since the treaty involved in this 
case brought about a compromise settlement of a territorial dispute, it: 
could be distinguished on the ground that the surrender of the right to 
nationalize was indispensable to the settlement which was imposed 
h . 243 on t e partIes. 
However, that a State may surrender its sovereign right to another State by 
international instrument, was confirmed in the Wimbledon case. It was held that 
"No doubt any convention creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction 
237 Chorzow Factory Judgment, op. cit., at 46. 
238 Garcia-Amador (1959: 25, para. 98). 
239 Fatouros, op. cit., at 222. 
240 Kronfol, op. cit., at 65. 
241 White (1961: 154). 
242 1. Murphy, "Compensation for Nationalization in International Law", 110 S.A.L.J. (1993) 79 
at 91 and 96. 
243 Sornarajah, (1986: 170). 
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upon the exercise of the sovereign rights of the State in the sense that it requires 
them to be exercised in a certain way.,,244 
As will be shown later in this chapter, the acknowledgement of the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the last five decades 
may support this argument that a State cannot surrender its sovereignty over its 
natural resources, and hence any limitation on the right to control the exploitation 
of such resources by way of nationalisation would be null and void. In his 
lectures at the Hague Academy, professor Brownlie points out that the principle 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is the assertion of: 
the acquired rights of the host State which are not defeasible by 
contract or, perhaps, even by an international agreement ... the 
concept of permanent sovereignty strikes unnecessarily at the stability 
of intergovernmental agreements on economic co-operation, the legal 
validity of which in all other respects be unchallengeable (emphasis 
added).24s 
The proposition that a State may not be able to bind itself by treaties 
relating to its natural resources has been confirmed by some authors in terms of 
the capacity of the State to deprive itself of permanent sovereignty over such 
resources. Thus, the former President of the Iel, Arechaga observed that as a 
consequence of the proclamation of the principle of permanent sovereignty "the 
territorial State can never lose its legal capacity to change the destination or the 
method of exploitation of those resources, whatever arrangements have been 
made for their exploitation and administration.,,246 
The above account may suggest that there is conflict between the impact of 
stabilisation treaties on the international community on the one hand, and 
economic independence of States on the other. One observer247 concludes that as 
far as the stability of international agreements on economic co-operation are 
244 The Wimbledon case (France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan v. Germany), Judgment of 17 
August 1923, p.e.!.J. Series A, No.1 (1923) at 25. 
2-tS I. Brownlie, "Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law: Some Aspects", 162 
Hague Recueil (1979-1) 253 at 271. 
246 Arechaga, Hague Recueil, op. cit., at 297. 
247 Somarajah (1986: 171). 
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concerned, such agreements should be considered binding. However, the 
economic independence of States demands that a contrary rule should be adopted. 
Under investment protection treaties, the host State pledges to the home 
State of the foreign investor that it will observe the agreements concluded with 
the investor (referred to as 'protection clauses'). The question arises as to 
whether the rule of the Chorzow Factory, is applicable to these treaties. Put 
differently, if the host State proceeds to attack such investment in a 
nationalisation measure, does it commit an international wrong? There is no 
consensus among writers. According to Seidl-Hohenveldern,248 who refers to 
treaties which contain such protection clauses as 'umbrella treaties', the response 
is in the positive. He goes further and argues that any unilateral impairment of 
the contract between the host State and the investor will also be an international 
wrong, since it violates this umbrella treaty. Sornarajah,249 however, points out 
that investment treaties do not interfere with the right of the State to nationalise 
foreign property but only seek to specify the manner in which such 
nationalisation should be made. He further states that because such a treaty itself, 
for any likely violations, contains a provision on compensation, the logical 
answer to the question is the application of such provision to the case. Relying 
on the practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, the same writer argues that 
despite the violation of the 1955 Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United 
States by the nationalisation of the properties of American nationals, the Tribunal 
was reluctant to characterise such nationalisations as unlawful. 250 
Based on the foregoing, it may be concluded, as a general proposition, that 
a State may legally renounce its sovereign right to nationalise foreign property by 
international agreement. This general proposition may be modified in two cases: 
firstly, where the subject-matter of a treaty relates to the surrendering of the right 
248 Seidl-Hohenveldem, op. cit., at 154. 
249 Somarajah (1994: 320-321). 
250 Somarajah (1986: 171). Also, in the ELSI case (The United States v. Italy), a Chamber of 
the ICJ pronounced on the requisition of a US company in Italy and alleged violation of the 
bilateral treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between these two countries. It le~ to an 
interesting judgment on such issues as interpretation and status of an FeN treaty, exhaustIOn of 
local remedies and compensation for damages. ELSI Judgment, op. cit. (note 60). 
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to control over natural resources, there are some doubts as to whether a State can 
renounce its sovereignty over such resources. Secondly, apart from the allegation 
of the violation of the Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United States, which 
is not our concern in this thesis, it is suggested that the correct view is that 
violation of investment protection agreements does not constitute an international 
delict, and hence the application of the standards of compensation of such treaties 
would be the proper remedy. 
6. Expropriation in Breach of State Contracts 
So far we have dealt with only expropriation of property, but in the present 
section we will examine State interference with other forms of interests held by 
aliens, viz., nationalisation of contractual rights. A State may enter into 
contractual relations with foreign nationals, individual or juridical, just as with its 
own nationals, for many purposes: contracts for purchase and sale, contracts for 
services, contracts for exploitation of natural resources and, finally, loans and 
bonds contracts. Contracts involving resource exploitation are sometimes 
described as 'concessions', 'international contracts', 'investment agreements' and 
'economic development agreements' ?51 Some wri ters insist on treating 
concessions as a special category,252 however, others observe that there is no firm 
reason for regarding these contracts as a special category of State contracts.253 
Let us begin with the question of whether concession rights are property 
rights like other proprietary rights. Friedman reached the conclusion that "cases 
of interference with a concession are outside the field of expropriation being 
mere violations of contractual obligations.,,254 Article 12 of the Harvard Draft 
Convention places the concession agreements in the category of contracts but 
does not recognise them as a property. In their explanatory notes to the said 
article, Sohn and Baxter took a similar position.255 According to this proposition, 
a concession therefore cannot be expropriated. 
251 Arsanjani, op. cit., at 179. 
252 0' Connell, op. cit., at 976-997. 
253 Brownlie (1998: 550). 
254 Friedman, op. cit., at 151-152. 
255 Reprinted in 55 A.1.I.L. (1961) 567. 
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However, the majority of jurists, among them Foighel,256 Baade,257 
Higgins,258 Akehurst,259 Bowett260 and Story261 support the view that a 
concession is like any other proprietary interest. As White remarks: 
Whatever may be the dominant feature of a concession, it is generally 
accepted that the sum total of the rights acquired under it by the 
concessionaire constitute a legal interest of a proprietary nature?62 
In his lectures at the Hague Academy, the late Judge Arechaga expressed 
the view that contractual rights are no more exempt from expropriation than a 
mine or a factory. Hence, they are subject to the eminent domain of the territorial 
State.263 
State practice has also indicated that conceSSIOn possesses a proprietary 
nature. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case, the United Kingdom stated that 
it did not dissent the proposition that: 
A State possesses the right to nationalise and, generally, to 
expropriate property belonging to foreigners in its territory ... Such 
property includes concessions granted by a State to foreign 
. I 264 natlona s. 
Moreover, the subject under discussion has received support In 
international arbitral awards. Thus, in the Liamco case, the proprietary nature of 
concession rights was explicitly recognised by Arbitrator Mahmassani. He found 
concession rights to be included under the category of incorporeal property?65 
256 Foighel, op. cit., at 74. 
257 Baade "Pennanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources", in Miller and Stanger 
(eds.), op. cit., at 20. 
25R Higgins (1982: 271). 
259 M. Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law (6th ed.), Routledge, London 
(1991)at96. 
260 D. W. Bowett, "State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation 
for Tennination or Breach", 59 B.Y.I.L. (1988) 49 at 67-69. 
261 A. Story, "Property in International Law: Need Cuba Compensate US Titleholders for 
Nationalising their Property?", lPol.Phii. (1998), Vol. 6 (No.3) 306 at 317. 
262 White (1961: 84). 
263 Arechaga, Hague Recueil, op. cit., at 307. 
264 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, I.e.1. Pleadings, op. cit., para. 7(1). 
265 Liamco Award, op. cit., at 53. 
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As the above account suggests, a concession represents a proprietary right and 
therefore can be subject to expropriation by the conceding State. 
Since questions regarding State responsibility for measures affecting 
contractual rights of an alien depend primarily on the law governing the 
particular contractual relationship between the State and the alien, the 
examination of the governing law of State contracts will be our next task. 
6.1 The Choice of Law Governing State Contracts 
There is a diversity of opinion as to what law governs conceSSIOn 
agreements. Various laws and legal principles have been suggested as being 
applicable to these agreements. Some authors, such as Foighel,266 expressed the 
view that concessions are generally governed by municipal law. The 
presumption "is in favor of the municipal law of the grantor.,,267 It was held that 
in State contracts, the law of the forum "not merely sustains but, because it 
sustains, may modify or dissolve the contractual bond. ,,268 
The most unequivocal and explicit statement to this effect can be found in 
the Serbian Loans case where the PCD ruled that "any contract which is not a 
contract between States in their capacity as subjects of international law is based 
on the municipal law of some country. ,,269 The Court in the Brazilian Loans case 
took a similar position.27o 
There is a second view, to the effect that the provisions of the contract 
itself, viz., its own lex contractus, may be chosen as the governing law. Thus, 
Verdross points out that "the lex contractus, created by a quasi-international 
agreement, is an independent legal order, regulating the relation between the 
266 Foighel, op. cit., at 74. 
267 G. Schwarzenberger, "The Protection of British Property Abroad", 5 c.L.P. (1952) 295 at 
312. 
268 Kahler v. Midland Bank, quoted by Somarajah, op. cit. (1994: 334). Of course, the parties 
may select a municipal system other than that of the contracting State, but will tend then to cause 
affront to the contracting State. 
269 France v. Kingdom of Serbs. Croats and Slovenes, P.c.!.J. (1929). Series A. Nos. 20/21, at 
41. 
270 France v. Brazil, ibid., at 121. 
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parties exhaustively.,,271 This view was upheld in the Aramco case, where the 
tribunal clearly stated that "the Concession Agreement is thus the fundamental 
law of the Parties.,,272 However, the idea that a contract can create an 
independent, exclusive and self-sufficient legal order has been criticised by some 
authorities. According to Mann, such freedom for parties may result in the 
establishment of certain rules independent of a legal order, which are "doctrinally 
so unattractive, so impractical, so subversive of public internationallaw.,,273 In 
the same vein, Asante comments: 
This is dismissed as patently untenable on the grounds that the 
validity of every agreement must be derived from some external legal 
order - be it international or municipa1.274 
The third proposition is that 'international law' may be designated as 
applicable law to the contract. Mann, who was treated as one of the pioneers of 
this idea, observes that it is possible for contracts between States and aliens to be 
subject to public international law. In his words: 
( a) According to the theory referred to, a contract could be 
'internationalized' in the sense that it would be subject to public 
international law stricto sensu; that therefore, its existence and fate 
would be immune from any encroachment by a system of municipal 
law in exactly the manner as in the case of treaty between two 
. . I 275 InternatIona persons. 
In this regard, Garcia-Amador has to say: 
By virtue of the choice-of-Iaw clauses contained in modern 
concession agreements, the contractual relationship entered into by a 
State and a foreign private person is removed, wholly or in part, from 
the domestic law of the contracting State, and is subject to a different 
and hierarchically higher order which may be either the general 
principles of law or international law as a whole. This proposition 
271 Quoted by Domke (1961: 595-596). 
272 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), Award of 23 August 1958,27 I.L.R. 
(1963) 117 at 168. 
273 F. A. Mann, "The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded by International Persons", 35 B.Y.I.L. 
(1959) 34 at 49. See also the same author's other literature, Further Studies in international Law, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford (1973) at 230-231. and J. F. Lalive, "Contracts Between a State or a 
State Agency and a Foreign Company". 13 I.c.L.Q. (1964) 987 at 998. 
274 Asante, op. cit., at 612. 
275 Mann (1959: 43). 
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can be sustained in light of arbitral precedents. Hence, the generally 
accepted view is that these clauses, in contrast to traditional ones, 
have the effect of 'internationalizing' or 'delocalizing' the contractual 
relationship (footnotes omitted)?76 
The logic behind this proposition is that concession agreements in all 
essential respects are analogous to treaties and therefore, like treaties, are 
governed primarily by international law. However, this view is not without its 
theoretical difficulties, which will be considered in this chapter. 
Likewise, it sometimes happens that parties agree on the application of so-
called 'general principles of law'. It is argued that concession agreements fall 
neither completely under the rules of international law nor under the rules of 
municipal law but somewhere in between, being governed in part by both and 
exclusively by neither. Hence, Lord McNair maintains that the system of law 
most likely to be suitable for the regulation of these agreements and the 
adjudication of disputes arising under them is "the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations.,,277 It should be noted that though McNair 
supports the application of these principles to the concession agreements, he 
distinguishes between two different situations. Firstly, the contracting State 
possesses a sufficiently developed legal system to deal with modem contracts. 
Secondly, and conversely, situations where the contracting State lacks a 
developed legal system. In his view, only in the latter case would general 
principles of law apply. Similarly, Mann casts doubt on whether such general 
principles of law constitute a law or a legal system and observes that "unless they 
are equiparated to public international law, general principles are not a legal 
system at all, and Lord McNair clearly refused so to equiparate them. ,,278 An 
example of the application of international law or general principles of law to the 
contract is found in the Libyan concessions which provided that the concession: 
276 F. W. Garcia-Amador, "State Responsibility in case of 'Stabilization' Clauses", 2 
Fla.St.UJ.Trans.L.P. (1993) 23 at 29-30, and (1959: 33, para. 131). 
277 McNair, "The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations", 33 B.Y.I.L. 
(1957) 1 at 19. 
271l Mann (1959: 45). 
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shall be governed by ... the law of Libya common to the principles of 
international law and, in the absence of such common principles, then 
by and in accordance with the general principles of law ... 279 
6.2 Internationalised Contracts 
When a State contract is governed by international law or general principles 
of law, the contract has been described by jurists280 and in arbitral awards281 as an 
'internationalised' contract. The origin of the theory of internationalisation can 
be traced back to some legal writings as well as to three arbitral awards, namely 
Abu Dhabi,282 Qatar 283 and Aramco, in which the disputes arose from oil 
concession agreements. The latter did not contain any choice of law clause and 
therefore, under private international principles, the arbitrators had to infer the 
law applicable to the agreement by looking at the State with which the contract 
had the closest link. The tribunals found that the applicable law should be the 
law of the State parties, viz., Islamic law. However, the arbitrators argued that 
this law was not developed enough to govern instruments of modem commercial 
transactions. In these circumstances, the arbitrators reached the conclusion that 
in the absence of an appropriate municipal law, they should apply 'general 
principles of law' to fill the vacuum. In the Qatar case, for instance, it was held 
that: 
This is a cogent reason for saying that such law [Islamic law] does 
not contain a body of legal principles applicable to a modem 
. f h' k' d 284 commercIal contract 0 t IS In . 
This holding was criticised by some commentators. Thus, Arsanjani states 
that the logic behind the application of general principles of law is that the parties 
279 Texaco Award, op. cit., at 14, para. 36. 
2RO See, e.g., Mann (1959: 34); R. Y. Jennings, "State Contracts in International Law", 37 
B.Y.LL. (1961) 156; Domke (1961: 595), and Garcia-Amador (1993: 30). 
2Rt See inter alia: Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 35 
I.L.R. (1967) 136; Texaco Award, op. cit. (note 62), and Liamco Award, op. cit., (note 61); and 
Revere Copper and Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Award of 24 August 
1978, reprinted in 17 LL.M. (1978) 1321. 
2R2 Petroleum Development (Tntcial Coast) Ltd. v. The Ruler of Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. (1951) 
144 (reprinted also in 1 LC.L.Q. (1952) 247). 
2R3 The Ruler of Qatar v. International "~arine Oil Company Ltd., 20 LL.R. (1953) 534. 
2R4 Ibid., at 545. 
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do not want to be bound by any single municipal law no matter how developed. 
She further observes that even if the municipal law of both parties was developed 
sufficiently the parties would not be exclusively bound by either law.285 
Moreover, the tribunal's statement that Islamic law was not developed enough to 
deal with modem commercial transactions is untenable, because: (1) the tribunal 
did not explain why such a law was not applicable; (2) today the contracting 
parties of the majority of oil contracts are countries whose law is Islamic law; 
and, more importantly, (3) while the contracting State had entered into the 
contractual relation, obtaining its competence from Islamic law, one wonders 
how the tribunal could take the position that for the settlement of disputes arising 
from the same contractual relation such a law was not applicable. 
In the Texaco award (the oft-cited award on the theory of 
internationalisation) besides 'international law' or 'general principles of law' ,286 
two more grounds, namely 'an arbitration clause,287 and 'an economic 
development agreement' ,288 were pronounced for designating a State contract as 
internationalised. Thus, a brief examination of these three grounds seems 
appropriate. In this award, Arbitrator Dupuy held that the reference to 
international law or general principles of law is sufficient criterion for the 
internationalisation of a contract. The Arbitrator took the view that State 
contracts can, under certain conditions, fall within "a special legal order - the 
order of the international law of contracts.,,289 Sornarajah,290 however, observes 
that the subjection of the contract to international law or general principles of law 
goes no further than to authorise an arbitrator to have recourse to cognate rules of 
international law or general principles of law that may be applied to the contract. 
In his view, the choice of international law may be possible, but two theoretical 
difficulties may be enumerated. Firstly, the foreign party to the State contract 
2R5 Arsanjani, op. cit., at 212. 
2R6 T (,XlI co Award, op. cit., at 15. para. 42. 
2R7 Ibid., at 16, para. 44. 
2RR Ibid., para. 45. 
2R9 Ibid., at 16, para. 44. 
290 Sornarajah (1994: 342-343). 
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does not possess sufficient personality in international law to enter into relations 
with a State or to be a holder of rights in internationallaw.291 Secondly, there is 
no body of international law on the subject of State contracts. Arechaga also 
stated that "We do not believe that there is an international law of contracts. ,,292 
The second ground of internationalisation is that the contract contains a 
provision for the settlement of disputes through arbitration on an international 
level, at least outside of the contracting State293 (referred to as 'arbitration 
clause '). The rationale of this view is that the foreign party may have doubts as 
to the impartiality of the courts of the contracting State.294 In the Texaco award, 
Dupuy concludes that the contract itself indicates that the parties intended to 
remove the dispute from the jurisdiction of the court of the contracting State or 
any other State. To reach the conclusion, the Arbitrator enumerated several 
factors: (1) the application of international law to the contract; (2) the 
appointment of the arbitrator through the international procedure, viz., by the 
President of the IC}; (3) the exclusion of municipal law for the arbitration 
procedure; and (4) the competence of the arbitrator in respect to the procedure 
and jurisdiction. Based on these grounds, Dupuy was convinced that the 
arbitration was not intended to be in the province of any municipal law. He 
further states that "one cannot accept that the institution of arbitration should 
escape the reach of all legal systems and be somehow suspended in vacuo.,,295 In 
the situations where the domestic law was excluded and the arbitration had to be 
placed within some legal order, the understanding is that it must be governed by 
international law. 
Commenting on the Texaco award in this respect, however, Professor 
Schachter concludes that the appointment of an arbitrator by an international 
291 For a contrary view, see Garcia-Amador (1993: 31-32). 
292 Arechaga, Hague Recueil, op. cit., at 308. . 
293 It has been submitted that the choice of domestic court of another State wIll not be 
appropriate, as there could be problems of sovereign immunity. Somarajah (1994: 334). 
294 Seidl-Hohenveldem, op. cit., at 152. 
295 Texaco Award, op. cit., at 8, para. 16. 
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procedure, under a contractual clause, does not necessarily require that the law 
governing arbitration should be international law. 296 
The crucial question raised here is whether in the case of the termination of 
the contract, an arbitration clause would survive. General arbitral practice shows 
that an arbitration clause survives by the termination of the contract.297 Seidl-
Hohenveldern is of the opinion that the very purpose of such a clause requires 
that it could not be abrogated unilaterally by one of the partners to the contract.298 
According to Arechaga, if the concession agreement contains an arbitration 
clause, such a clause would not be affected by the cancellation of the contract: 
in accordance with the established principle of the autonomy or 
independence of the compromissory clause of a contract. The 
arbitration clause stands on its own and is separable from the 
contract: if that were not the case the purpose of having such a clause 
in a contract would be defeated (emphasis added)?99 
Regarding the issue under discussion, Sornarajah distinguishes between a 
reference in the arbitral clause to ad hoc arbitration on one hand, and a reference 
to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes tribunal, on the 
other. While in the latter, the arbitration clause is kept alive by operation of the 
treaty provision on the subject, in the former, the answer cannot be in the 
positive. In his words: 
Unlike private contracts which are broken by the choice of private 
parties or terminated by other external events, the act which 
terminates a concession agreement is a public act of sovereignty and 
a sovereign state which decides to perform that public act will seek to 
destroy the contract, arbitral clause and all. (emphasis added).300 
Based on this statement, the same writer reached the conclusion that it 
might be too simplistic to contend that the arbitral clause inserted into a contract 
296 Schachter, op. cit., at 308. 
297 Somarajah, (1994: 336). 
29R Seidl-Hohenveldem, op. cit., at 152. 
299 Arechaga, Hague Recueil, op. cit., at 306. 
300 Somarajah (1994: 337). 
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survives the unilateral tennination of the agreement by the legislative act of the 
state.301 
International tribunals also touched on the Issue. In the Texaco award, 
Dupuy faced the contention of the Libyan Government that, by nationalising the 
enterprise concerned, the State had also tenninated the contract - including its 
arbitration clause. Hence, the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
case. To respond to this argument, the Arbitrator relied on writings of legal 
scholars and international jurisprudence, including the Losinger and Company 
case in which also the (fonner) Yugoslav Government claimed that the 
arbitration clause had lapsed following the cancellation of the contract. Libya's 
argument was rejected by Dupuy by virtue of separability of the arbitration 
clause.302 The same line of reasoning, which is based on the separability of the 
arbitration clause, was used by Arbitrator Mahmassani in the Liamco award, as 
follows: 
It is widely accepted in international law and practice that an 
arbitration clause survives the unilateral termination by the state of 
the contract in which it is inserted and continues in force even after 
that tennination. This is a logical consequence of the interpretation 
of the intention of the contracting parties ... 303 
This holding is tenable as far as private international arbitrations are 
concerned.304 As indicated above, none of the arbitrators accepted the distinction 
made by Sornarajah, and they held that the arbitration clause survives the 
tennination of the contract whether or not the arbitral tribunal is an ad hoc 
tribunal or one established by treaty. 
Turning to the internationalisation theory, its third ground is that the 
contract falls into the category of 'economic development agreements'. Once 
again, the award in Texaco is relevant in this regard. There, this category of 
contracts was considered to be internationalised by virtue of their character. 
301 Ibid. 
302 Texaco Preliminary Award, 53 I.L.R. 393 at 408-412. 
303 Liamco Award, op. cit., at 77. 
304 Somara j ah (1994: 337). 
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Arbitrator Dupuy advanced several reasons why what he called 'economic 
development agreements' should be regarded as 'internationalised'. As he stated, 
the agreements involved: (l) a broad subject-matter, viz. substantial investment; 
(2) for a long duration; and (3) associated with the State's development plans.305 
He further noted that due to the purpose of the co-operation, and the magnitude 
of the investments the investor concerned: 
must in particular be protected against legislative uncertainties, that is 
to say the risks of the municipal law of the country being modified, or 
against any government measures which would lead to an abrogation 
or recession of the contract. 306 
Therefore, the Arbitrator concludes that in these circumstances, the relevant 
law cannot only be that of the host State and it must be international law or some 
supranational system. This type of internationalisation, which infers merely from 
the nature of the contract, is considered as the extreme version of the theory of 
internationalisation.307 The other two grounds of the theory discussed above -
namely the subjection of the contract to international law or general principles of 
law, and the insertion of an arbitration clause - indicate the intention of the 
parties and are therefore considered as less extreme varieties of the theory.308 
It has been submitted that if an investor considers that it necessary to obtain 
protection against unilateral changes of the contract, it can insist on a so-called 
'stabilisation clause', which will be studied in this chapter, that attempts to 
preclude legislative changes from modifying the contract terms. Professor 
Schachter further observes that if the agreement provides that domestic law 
should apply or if it is silent on applicable law, we cannot argue that: 
The magnitude of the contract or its relation to development transfers 
it into some kind of international contract that involves obligations on 
the international level different from other contracts.309 
305 Texaco case, op. cit., at 16, para. 45. 
306 Ibid., at 17. 
307 Somarajah (1994: 346). For further arbitral awards which form the basis of this extreme 
version of the theory, see the citations in ibid., n. 63. 
30R See the citations in ibid., n. 65. 
309 Schachter, op. cit., at 310. 
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Nonetheless, he states that the impact of political and economic factors on 
the intemationalising of large-scale economic development agreements is 
indisputable. In such agreements the host State and the private enterprise are not 
the only parties interested; the home State of the enterprise is often involved. 
The latter plays a role, in many cases, by financing the company and insuring it 
against political risks and by entering into a bilateral treaty with the host State in 
this respect. Also, State practice confinns the protection of private enterprises 
and the host States tend to accept such protection as legitimate. Based on these 
arguments, Schachter observes that "In this sense, it may be said that the 
development agreements are internationalized.,,31o However, the same writer 
points out that we need to be cautious in using the tenn 'internationalised' 
contracts. One cannot say that due to such features as non-national governing 
law, non-national arbitration and international economIC and political 
significance: 
the contracts have been transposed to another legal order or that they 
have become subject to international law in the same way as a treaty 
between two States.311 
Commenting on the Texaco award, Fatouros states that none of the grounds 
mentioned by the Aribtrator can be construed as necessarily leading to the 
internationalisation of State contracts. In his view, among the reasons in this 
connection, the element of 'economic development agreement' is the "vaguest" 
one.312 Jain is of the opinion that "the award does not clarify how the outcome 
would be different if there was a breach of treaty and not ofcontract.,,313 
Besides its extreme and less extreme verSIons, the theory of 
internationalisation of State contracts has some controversial consequences. 
310 Ibid. 
311 Ibid.,at311. 
312 A. A. Fatouros, "International Law and the Internationalised Contracts", 74 AJ.I.L. (1980) 
134 at 136 and the same writer's other literature, op. cit., at 259-262. 
313 Jain, ~p. cit., at 67. For further critical comment on the 'internationalisation' theory, see 
Bowett, op. cit., at 51-52. 
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There is a great diversity of opinions among writers on this issue.314 According 
S . h 315 . to ornaraJa, the theory has two Important consequences. First, the host State 
cannot thereafter rely on its own laws to contend that the contract is a nullity. It 
has been asserted that the rationale of this view is that a foreign multinational 
corporation could not be expected to know all laws and regulations of the host 
country and this assumption would also apply to the contract. However, the 
assumption is unsound, because it is well established in all legal systems that 
aliens entering a State should abide by the laws of the State concerned, otherwise 
aliens could break the law. Why this rule must not be applied to a foreign 
multinational corporation is unclear. Second, the immutability of State contracts. 
F or the advocates of internationalisation theory, this consequence can be met by 
the absolute application of the principle of pacta sunt servanda to the contract. 
"Its application is made to rest not on the assimilation of foreign investment 
agreements to treaties '" but it is claimed that the norm is a general principle of 
law.,,316 
314 In his survey of the various views expressed by different authors on the consequences of the 
theory, Paasivirta divided them into four groups. The first group comprises those authors, such as 
Weil and Wehberg, who insist on absolute protection of private property. In fact, they advocate 
the thesis that concession agreements in all essential respects are assimilated to treaties, and that 
any acts of States which contravene contractual provisions are unlawful in accordance with the 
applicable international law. The jurists of the second group take a very different position. They 
maintain that the designation of international law, which governs relations between States, as 
proper law of the contract is inappropriate. The third group of publicists, such as Lauterpacht and 
Schwarzenberger, generally agree on the application of international law to State contracts, but do 
not insist on absolute protection of the private party. Though the views of group four are similar 
to those of the third group, these writers, such as Arechaga, emphasise international law as a 
general standard, "instead of the narrower interpretation of it as the proper law of contract." The 
common opinion of this group is that contracts are not analogous to treaties. Commenting on the 
positions of the above four groups, Paasivirta concludes that the approaches of the third and 
fourth groups of authors entail some uncertainties. As to the views of the second group. he 
observes that it seems out-moded entirely to exclude contracts from the ambit of international law 
since none of the recent arbitral tribunals felt precluded from applying international law to State 
contracts and the very existence of the ICSID system suggests the same. Finally, regarding the 
approach of the first group, he states that the views of this group are marginally reflected in 
arbitral decisions. In his view, "the idea of international law as lex contractus is thought to 
provide the most powerful means of giving effect to the individual terms of a contract." As the 
last two sentences suggest, Paasivirta himself would appear to support the approach of the first 
group. E. Paasivirta, "Internationalization and Stabilization of Contracts versus State 
Sovereignty", 60 B.Y.I.L. (1989) 315 at 316-323. 
315 Somarajah (1994: 346-348). 
316 Ibid., at 348. 
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With regard to the argument of the assimilation of State contracts to 
treaties, it will be recalled that the ICl, in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case, 
rejected Britain's argument to this effect, and explicitly confirmed that a 
concession contract could not be considered as an international agreement. The 
Court cannot accept the view that: 
the contract between the Iranian Government and the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company has a double character. It is nothing more than a 
concessIonary contract between a government and a foreign 
corporation.317 
According to Brownlie, the proposition that a choice of public international 
law by the parties places the State contract on the international plane is wrong, as 
a State contract is not a treaty.318 While accepting the application of pacta sunt 
servanda, as a principle of international law, to State contracts, Garcia-Amador 
maintains that one cannot say that there is "a total assimilation" between the 
breach of obligations emanating from an internationalised contract and that of 
treaty obligations.319 In addition, to some, the assimilation of a foreign 
investment agreement to treaty is far-fetched. 320 
The absolute applicability of the principle of pacta sunt servanda to State 
contracts is a controversial issue. There are some jurists who support the concept 
of absolute sanctity of contract. In supporting their view, they refer to several 
pertinent arbitral awards in this respect, which characterise the maxim pacta sunt 
servanda as a general principle of law, and assimilate State contracts to treaties. 
Thus, Kissam and Leach comment: 
In the area of concession agreements, States are bound to observe 
these agreements with other States. The principle of pacta sunt 
servanda should apply. Principles of acquired rights and sanctity of 
. . h' I' 321 contracts, as well as common JustIce, support t IS conc uSlOn. 
317 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, I.e.J. Rep. (1952) at 112. 
31R Brownlie (1998: 553). 
319 Garcia-Amador (1993: 33-34). 
320 Sornarajah (1994: 331). 
321 Kissam and Leach, op. cit., at 214. 
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Wehberg, after studying the origin and sanctity of the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda, concludes that "the principle is valid exactly in the same manner, 
whether it is in respect of contracts between states or in respect of contracts 
between states and private companies ... The principle of sanctity of contracts 
must always be applied.,,322 In its memorandum to the pcn in the Losinger and 
Company case, the Swiss Government contended that such a principle "must be 
applied not only to agreements directly concluded between States, but also to 
those between a State and an alien.,,323 The PCIJ, however, did not take any 
decision on the case, as it was settled out of Court. 324 
On the contrary, there are other authors who consider that no principle of 
absolute sanctity of contract exist as such. In his fairly recent study, 
Maniruzzaman concludes that: 
In a contractual relationship the presence of a sovereign State as a 
contracting party bears special significance for its people as it 
represents their interests and it has the responsibility to protect those 
interests whenever it is necessary, even against contractual 
commitments. In principle, no contract is absolutely immune from 
unilateral modification or premature termination ( emphasis 
added).32s 
Jennings has shared the view that the principle of pacta sunt servanda is 
not absolute, when he states that "Neither the principle of acquired rights nor the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda is therefore to be regarded as being necessarily 
absolute or unconditional in application. As so often in law it is a question of 
drawing limits and defining exceptions.,,326 Likewise, a rigid application of the 
322 H. Wehberg, "Pacta Sunt Servanda", 53 A. 1. I. L. (1959) 775 at 786. 
323 Switzerland v. (former) Yugoslavia, P.C.I.J. (1936), Series. C, No. 78, 10 at 32. See also the 
Certain Norwegian Loans case (France v. Norway), I.C.J. Rep. (1957) 15. 
324 However, in Czechoslovakia v. Radio Corporation of America, which involved a unilateral 
termination of a concession agreement, the tribunal dealt with the issue and applied implicitly the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda to the agreement. For the factual details, see 30 A.J.I.L. (1936) 
523 at 531. 
325 A. F. Maniruzzaman, "State Contracts with Aliens - The Question of Unilateral Change by 
the State in Contemporary International Law", 9 J.Int.Arb. (1992) 141 at 168. 
32h Jennings, op. cit., at 177. See also Sornarajah (1986: 110). 
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principle of pacta sunt servanda to State contracts "is neither warranted by 
doctrine nor sound on practical and functional grounds. ,,327 
Once again, the jurisprudence of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal is highly 
relevant on the issue. In its award in the Anaconda-Iran, Inc. case,328 the 
Tribunal stated that the doctrine pacta sunt servanda is in effect nothing "but a 
condensed expression of a group of rules of great complexity." It further noted 
that the doctrine is incorporated in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, and has a variety of applications in that field of law.329 Moreover, while 
recognising as "a rule of international law that a State has the duty to respect 
contracts freely entered into with a foreign party",330 the Tribunal, in the Amoco 
case, stressed that: 
The quoted rule, however, must not be equated with the principle 
pacta sunt servanda .. , To do so would suggest that sovereign States 
are bound by contracts with private parties exactly as they are bound 
by treaties with other sovereign States. This would be completely 
devoid of any foundation in law or equity and would go much further 
than any State has ever permitted in its own domestic law. In no 
system of law are private interests permitted to prevail over duly 
established interest, making impossible actions required for the good 
public. Rather private parties who contract with a government are 
only entitled to compensation when measures of public policy are 
implemented at the expense of their contract rights (emphasis 
added).33I 
According to Professor Higgins, this is the result of "a strategy that sought 
to tum the emphasis from pacta sunt servanda and respect for acquired rights ... 
. f . 1 ,,332 towards the new notIOn 0 permanent sovereIgnty over natura resources. 
Additionally, the principle of pacta sunt servanda "is complementary to, 
and qualified by, the principles of jus cogens and of clausula rebus sic 
327 Asante, op. cit., at 613. 
32R Anaconda-Iran, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Interlocutory Award No. 65-167-3 (10 
December 1986), reprinted in 13 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 199 
329 Ibid., at 231, para. 128. 
330 Amoco Award, op. cit., at 242, para. 177. 
331 Ibid., at 242-243, para. 178. . . 
332 Higgins (1982: 287). See also Arechaga, Hague Reclleil, op. cit., at 179, and Moun, op. CIt.. 
at313. 
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stantibus.,,333 Thus, the application of such principle by the concessionaire can 
invite the conceding State to invoke the rebu sic stantibus clause, which 
sanctions the revision of international agreements on the basis of a fundamental 
change of circumstances. As Seidl-Hohenveldern puts it: 
Whatever promises this State had made to the private party 
concerned, the principle of good faith commands that any agreement 
is subject to the clausula rebus sic stantibus. Where continued 
validity of such an agreement hurts a public interest ... recourse to the 
clausula may appear justified. 334 
Some authors go further and cast doubt on accepting pacta sunt servanda 
as a general principle of law. Thus, Somarajah argues that contractual sanctity 
has never been treated as an absolute and unqualified principle in any of the 
major legal systems. In his view, it is a common feature to these legal systems 
that State contracts "are subject to public interests and that a State may terminate 
such contracts if public interests so require it.,,335 Having surveyed the major 
legal systems of the world on the issue, Maniruzzaman concludes that "the State 
party to a public contract has exceptional prerogative powers to vary or even 
terminate the contract for the public good and in the public interest, subject only 
h d t· ,,336 to t e uty to pay compensa IOn. 
Following the change of circumstances which occurred after the sharp rise 
in oil prices in the early 1970s, both the traditional oil-producing, viz., OPEC 
countries, as well as the new producing countries, like Britain and Norway, 
readjusted the fiscal regimes in their oil concession contracts. Thus, the latter 
countries invoked the notion of 'police power' or 'eminent domain' "in 
unilaterally revising the fiscal regimes for the exploration of petroleum resources 
in the North Sea despite the financial burden such a revision imposed on foreign 
JJJ Arsanjani, op. cit., at 260. 
334 Seidl-Hohenveldem, op. cit., at 28. 
335 Somarajah (1994: 348). 
336 Maniruzzaman. op. cit., at 156. 
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companIes operating In the North Sea.,,337 International arbitral awards also 
indicate a substantial modification of the traditional notion of a rigid contractual 
mechanism for State contracts. In one of the cases before it, for example, the 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal invoked the doctrine of changed circumstances to 
justify Iran's termination of a contract under which the claimant was involved in 
expanding the Iranian Air Force's electronic intelligence-gathering system.338 In 
these circumstances, one should note that the concept of contractual sanctity 
"will have to give way to the idea of the defeasibility of State contracts in the 
public interests. ,,339 
In situations where international law is the governing law of State contract, 
if the latter conflicts with any peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens), 
the contract will be invalid. It has been suggested that, if this be so, the notion of 
immutability of contracts the most important consequence of 
internationalisation theory - will conflict with the principle of economic 
sovereignty, and hence it will be invalid. It may be argued that these contrary 
norms, viz., the norms concerning permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
are weak norms. Sornarajah further observes that "the difficulty with this 
argument is that the notion of internationalization and the extraction of pacta 
sun! servanda also rely on the weakest norms of international law [i.e. writings of 
publicists and arbitral awards].,,34o He continues: 
The notion of contractual sanctity ... depends on general principles of 
law which are also a weak source of law. A contractual system of 
investment protection constructed on the basis of weak norms which 
are contested by other weak norms cannot inspire much 
confidence.341 
1,1,7 Asante, op. cit., at 613. See also K. Hossain, "Introduction", in K. Hossain and S. R. 
Chowdhury (eds.), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in International Law, Frances 
Pinter, London (1984) at xi. 
33R Questech Inc. v. The Ministry of National Defence of Iran, Award No. 191-59-1 (20 
September 1985), reprinted in 9 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 107 at 122. 
339 Somarajah (1994: 349). 
340 Ibid., at 350. 
341 Ibid. Note that the last sentence of the statement, that the principle of pern1anent sovereignty 
over natural resources is based on the weak norms of international law, is not without its 
difficulties which will be considered in the last section of this chapter. 
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The above account suggests that the theory of 'internationalisation' is 
untenable, especially in its extreme version which is inferred from the nature of 
the agreement, because it rests on some weak norms of international law, viz., 
arbitral awards and legal writings. The notion of contractual sanctity may not be 
an absolute concept in the modem contract system, as it clashes with the well-
settled principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The principle 
of pacta sunt servanda is not absolute, and hence its rigid application to State 
contracts has been replaced by a modified version. 
6.3 State Responsibility for Breach of Contract 
Generally speaking, there are two school of thoughts as to when State 
responsibility comes into existence. Some argue that State responsibility appears 
immediately after the breach of a contract by a State. Put differently, to them a 
breach of contract by a State is a breach of international law as such. Advocates 
of this school buttress their view by referring to various doctrines, such as 
acquired rights (appropriate here to contractual sanctity), and pacta sunt 
servanda. They also use arguments based on an international law of contract.342 
According to Kissam and Leach, the unilateral abrogation of a concession 
agreement would be a violation of international law irrespective of the provisions 
of the agreement. For them, "In some respect there is less justification for 
violating a concession agreement than for violating a treaty.,,343 Carlston344 
distinguishes between a breach in claimed exercise of a contractual right, which 
should not by itself incur international responsibility, and a breach affected by an 
exercise of sovereign power, which may be held to be a violation of the 
contractual right. For Garcia-Amador,345 State contracts, in this context, may be 
divided into two categories: ordinary State contracts and modem conceSSIOn 
agreements. In the former, which are governed by the municipal law of the 
contracting State, the mere breach of the contract will not engage the State's 
342 Note that we have already dealt with the last two doctrines, and the principle of acquired 
rights will be discussed in chapter 4. 
343 Kissam and Leach, op. cit., at 212. 
344 K. S. Carlston, "Concession Agreements and Nationalization", 52 A.J.I.L. (1958) 261 at 267. 
345 Garcia-Amador (1993: 33-34). 
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international responsibility; "the concurrence of a denial of justice, or of any 
other wrongful or arbitrary state conduct, must still be required." In the latter, in 
his view, given the international character of such a relationship, "the mere 
breach of the contractual obligations was considered the only sufficient ground to 
establish international responsibility." Moreover, Jennings,346 like Dupuy, argues 
that if there is an international law of contract, then its violation by the 
contracting State would be tantamount to international wrong. 
There are those who argue, however, that a breach of a contract by a State 
is not a breach of international law per se. As shown above, they argue that since 
a concession agreement is not a treaty, its cancellation before the expiry of its 
term (e.g. as a result of nationalisation) cannot be considered a breach of an 
international agreement. Among them, Brownlie,347 Akehurst/48 Schachter,349 
Arechaga350 Akinsanya351 and Maniruzzaman352 may be recalled. After noting 
that "we disagree with jurists who try wholly to deny the competency of states for 
the unilateral termination of agreements", Arsanjani argues that due to unequal 
distribution of power and enlightenment in the present world, the State should 
possess competency to terminate agreements concerning its natural resources 
when it considers such termination is vital to the public interest. 353 Likewise, it 
has been suggested that nationalisation in defiance of a contractual obligation is 
not contrary to international law, since the same rules that apply to the 
nationalisation of property should apply to contracts. As Foighel has rightly 
stated: 
The fact that nationalization is not a breach of international law 
cannot be altered by the fact that nationalization destroys contract 
rights, for example, a concession which the nationalizing state has 
granted to a foreign company ... There is no rule in international law 
346 Jennings, op. cit. (note 280). 
347 Brownlie (1998: 550). 
34R Akehurst, op. cit., at 96. 
349 Schachter, op. cit., at 311. 
350 Arechaga, Hague Reeueil, op. cit., at 306. 
351 Akinsanya, op. cit., at 68. 
352 Maniruzzaman, op. cit. (note 325). 
353 Arsanjani, op. cit.. at 273-274. 
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that gives a greater degree of protection to rights secured by contract 
than to other rights ofproperty.354 
Fatouros maintains that "a breach of contract by a state is still not 
considered, by itself, as an internationally unlawful act.,,355 However, there are 
special circumstances in which international law may directly be infringed in the 
case of a breach of contract by a State. Put in technical terms, for a State to be 
held responsible on an international plane, it requires more factors than the mere 
breach of contract. Amerasinghe, after surveying the issue thoroughly,356 
concludes that under the following circumstances a breach of contract 
simultaneously brings about a violation of international law: (1) where express 
protection is granted to the contractual rights by international instrument, viz., by 
concluding a treaty between the contracting State and the home State of the alien; 
(2) where a breach of contract is accompanied by a violation of international law 
(the contracting State, for example, changes the contractual rights and obligations 
by legislation outside the existing legal rules governing the contractual 
relationship); and (3) where the contracting State does not provide a provision for 
adjudication on a contract for its alleged breach. The second circumstance needs 
some clarification. It is generally agreed that a State cannot fetter or hamper its 
future action, e.g. exercising its legislative and administrative authority by 
contract. However, the State "may not use these sovereign powers in an 
'arbitrary' or 'discriminatory' manner to the detriment of the private party's 
contractual rights. ,,357 The term arbitrary is defined, in this context, as State 
action without public purpose.358 Because of its vagueness, the application of the 
standard of 'arbitrariness' to the problem of legislative changes affecting 
contracts is confusing. In Schachter's view, for a State to avoid international 
responsibility, it should act in a non-discriminatory manner, pay compensation 
when due, and provide appropriate means of redress to an affected party.359 
354 Foighel, op. cit., at 74. 
355 Fatouros, op. cit., at 244. 
356 Amerasinghe, op. cit., at 119-120. 
357 Schachter, op. cit., at 312-313. See also Maniruzzaman, op. cit., at 165-167: 
35R Brownlie (1998: 551). See also the definition suggested by Schachter. op. CIt., at 313. 
359 Schachter, op. cit.. at 313. 
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The ALI Third Restatement took a similar position. Under which, a State 
IS liable for breach or repudiation of a contract only if such a breach is 
discriminatory or motivated by non-commercial considerations and compensatory 
damages are not paid, or where the foreign national is denied an adequate forum 
to determine his claim for breach or compensation for any breach deemed to have 
occurred.36o 
It is clear from the above survey that the arguments of advocates of the 
second school seem more to be logical. Thus, the mere breach of State contracts 
will not incur the international responsibility of contracting States; the breach 
does not count as a violation of international law per se. To hold the State 
responsible, the concurrence of a denial of justice or of any other wrongful or 
arbitrary State conduct, such as discrimination, is required. 
6.4 Stabilisation Clauses 
As indicated above, the theory of internationalisation as a technique which 
is capable of stabilising the relationship between a State and a private party, from 
the perspective of some writers and foreign investors, is unsuccessful. Put 
differently, it does not secure foreign investment agreements to the extent desired 
by the proponents of the theory. We have seen that a State contract is normally 
governed by the law of the contracting State. On the one hand, this law may be 
changed by the passage of time, on the other, the foreign investor tries to protect 
himself against this risk. When this is so, the issue of stabilisation clauses and 
their insertion into the contract are raised. Thus, stabilisation clauses are 
designed to freeze the future legislative power of the contracting State at the time 
of entry of the foreign investor. They are also purported to preclude unilateral 
interference with the contract by the State, e.g. not to nationalise. The former are 
called 'stabilisation clauses' (stricto sensu) and the latter 'intangibility 
clauses. ,361 
360 The ALI Third Restatement, op. cit. (note 5) at 197. 
361 Seidl-Hohenveldem, op. cit., at 239, n. 1086. Garcia-Amador (1993: 23, n. 1) also made 
such a distinction. 
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There is no consensus among publicists on the legal effect of stabilisation 
clauses. According to Paasivirta/62 three different positions may be identified 
among authors. The first position is that the existence of such a clause makes a 
contract different in type, and hence a unilateral termination of the contract 
constitutes an international wrong. Though White believes that a State is able to 
restrict its future legislative competence, she emphasises time-limits in this 
respect. In her words: 
While it may be that a State is unable to restrict its future for an 
indefinite period, there is neither principle nor authority to prevent it 
from so doingfor a limited number of years. If a State violates such 
a promise made to a foreign concessionaire ... on the international 
level it is sufficient grounds for interposition by the alien's national 
State. The nationalising State in these circumstances has infringed a 
limitation of its sovereignty voluntarily assumed by it (emphasis 
added).363 
This position was invoked by the British Government, in the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company case, before the Ie] regarding the termination of the Anglo-Iranian 
concession agreement of 1933.364 
The second approach, conversely, rests on the VIew that stabilisation 
clauses cannot render a contract different in kind as far as the question of the 
international legality of unilateral termination is concerned. Mann, for instance, 
denies any effect of such a clause on the contract. He has treated the issue in the 
following terms: 
The truth is that even in international law the express exemption from 
the efforts of future legislation is redundant. Such exemption cannot 
and ought not to preclude the genuine exercise of the State's political 
power. On the other hand, where, in substance, the State takes 
property without compensation, its international liability is engaged 
even in the absence of the [ stabilisation] clause.365 
362 Paasivirta, op. cit., at 323-331. 
363 White (1961: 178). 
364 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, l.e.J. Pleadings, op. cit.. paras. 12-18. 
365 Mann (1973: 322). 
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In the same vein, Schachter points out that the inclusion of stabilisation 
clauses does not place the contract into an international plane: 
in the sense that a State departing from the clause commits an 
international delict. If it pays the required compensation and its 
action is not otherwise unlawful (as by denial of justice or 
discrimination) it incurs no international responsibility.366 
Arechaga maintained that the proposition that stabilisation clauses deprive 
the contracting State of the power to put an end to the contract except with the 
private party's consent, runs counter to the principle of a State's sovereignty over 
its natural resources and wealth.367 This argument was invoked by Saudi Arabia, 
in the Aramco case, and Kuwait, in the Aminoil case. To some, the inclusion of 
stabilisation clauses may be considered as a derogation from the State's 
sovereignty. 368 
In the third approach, as in the second, stabilisation clauses cannot make a 
contract different in type, but can render a difference only in the amount of 
compensation. Thus, Arsanjani observes that in situations where a concession 
does not secure the common interest because of conflict with the public benefit 
of the conceding State, "its termination is inevitable." In her view, the only 
difference that stabilisation clauses might make would be in the amount of 
compensation.369 Professor Harris took a similar view. To him, when a measure 
of expropriation runs counter to such clauses, it may "be relevant to the 
determination of 'appropriate compensation. ,370 It is also interesting to note what 
the late Judge Arechaga observed in this regard: 
An anticipated cancellation in violation of a contractual stipulation of 
such a nature would give rise to a special right to compensation; the 
amount of the indemnity would have to be much higher than in 
normal cases since the existence of such a clause constitutes a most 
pertinent circumstance which must be taken into account in 
determining the appropriate cOlnpensation. For instance, there would 
366 Schachter, op. cit., at 315. 
367 Arechaga, Hague Recueil, op. cit., at 307. Somarajah (1994: 331) took a similar view. 
36R Somarajah (1986: 93). See also the ALI Third Restatement, op. cit.. at 215. 
369 Arsanjani, op. cit., at 270. 
370 Harris, op. cit., at 585. 
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be a duty to compensate also for the prospective gains (lucrum 
cessans) to be obtained by the private party during the period that the 
concession still has to run.371 
Commenting on the above-mentioned approaches, Paasivirta states that the 
third approach "seems the most attractive.,,372 
Writing in 1993 on the issue, Garcia-Amador373 is of the opinion that "the 
[stabilisation] clauses per se do not impose international commitments on the 
contracting State." In his view, "It is the choice-of-Iaw clause of the agreement 
which, by 'internationalizing' the contractual relationship as a whole makes those 
commitments internationally valid." As in the case of State responsibility, 
therefore, he has divided State contracts into two categories: ordinary State 
contracts and modem concession agreements. In the former, there will be no 
international responsibility for the mere breach of stabilisation clauses. To hold 
the State responsible, "a requirement will be a related act or omission 
constituting a breach of the State's international obligations, which includes 
prohibiting the abuse of rights." However, if such clauses are included in the 
latter category "governed by a non-municipal legal system, the mere breach of the 
clauses will give rise to State responsibility." The same author shares this part of 
the third approach that the breach of stabilisation clauses will affect the amount 
of indemni ty, albeit, he speaks of reparation, not compensation. 
In situations where an alleged breach or repudiation of a contract by the 
contracting State constitutes the subject-matter of arbitrations, the validity or 
effect of stabilisation clauses is raised. In short, international arbitral tribunals 
also touched upon the issue under consideration. Two main approaches may be 
identified among the arbitral awards in this respect. According to the first 
approach, such clauses constitute valid limitations on the legislative or executive 
powers of the contracting State irrespective of the nature or duration of such 
restraints. It is asserted that the rationale of this view is that a State may use its 
371 Arechaga, Hague Recueil, op. cit.. at 307. 
372 Paasivirta, op. cit., at 331. 
373 Garcia-Amador (1993: 48-50). 
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sovereIgn powers to Impose limitations on itself. This was the position of 
Arbitrator Dupuy In the Texaco case. There, Clause 16 of the Deeds of 
Concession between Libya and the foreign oil companies, including Texaco, 
contained a stabilisation clause under which "the contractual rights expressly 
created by this concession shall not be altered except by the mutual consent of the 
parties.,,374 The Arbitrator dismissed the possible contention that the stabilisation 
clause in the concession diminished the sovereignty of Libya, and discarded the 
nature of the clause and presumed that a generally worded stabilisation clause 
may preclude nationalisation.375 The said clause is considered, however, as an 
indirect stabilisation clause which does not have the same effect as a direct clause 
which precludes the making of any change to the contract.376 Nonetheless, the 
clause was given full effect by the Arbitrator.377 
The second approach is that stabilisation clauses are essentially 
incompatible with national sovereignty, particularly to the extent that such 
clauses designed to impose comprehensive and indefinite limitations on the 
legislative freedom of the State. The tribunal, in the Aminoil case, took such a 
position. It held that contractual limitations on a State's sovereign right (in the 
present case, Kuwait) to nationalise could not be easily understood from a 
general stabilisation clause, especially where the nationalisation involved no 
confiscatory character. While endorsing the juridical possibility of contractual 
limitations on the State's right to nationalise, the tribunal emphasised that the 
clause should not be read literally: 
what that would involve would be a particularly serious undertaking 
which would have to be expressly stipulated for, and be within the 
regulations governing the conclusion of State contracts; and it is to be 
374 Texaco Award, op. cit., at 24, para. 70. 
375 Ibid., at 24-25, para. 71. 
376 Somarajah (1994: 330). ." . 
377 For other arbitrations followed the Texaco award on the Issue of stabIlIsatIOn clauses, see 
Revere Award, at 1335, and Agip Award, op. cit., at 735, paras. 85 and 86. 
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expected that it should cover only a relatively limited period 
(emphasis added).378 
Thus, it held that the clause could not be presumed to prohibit 
nationalisation for a period of 60 years. Commenting on the award, Asante 
observes that it would seem to support the principle that: 
A general stabilisation clause does not constitute a valid restraint on 
a State's sovereign right to nationalise unless the prohibition against 
nationalisation is expressly stipulated in the clause, the prohibition 
complies with the regulations governing the conclusion of State 
contracts, and the prohibition against nationalisation covers only a 
relatively limited period o/time (emphasis added).379 
That a stabilisation clause cannot achieve the effect of fettering the 
legislative sovereignty of a State for a long period of time, was explicitly 
reflected in the 1981 report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. There, he acknowledges that 
"Long and comprehensive 'freezing' clauses seem to run counter to the principle 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.,,380 In his explanatory notes on 
stabilisation clauses, Professor Harris observes that of the two different 
approaches taken in the Texaco case and in the Aminoil case, "the more balanced 
view in the [latter] seems likely to prevail.,,381 However, the statement of the 
Aminoil case was criticised by Professor Higgins in her lectures at the Hague 
Academy. She comments: 
While this perhaps represents an imaginative method of reconciling 
the right to nationalise with stabilization provisions freely entered 
into ... the present writer confesses to finding it implausible as a 
. . f· 382 
matter of constructIOn and unpersuasive as a matter 0 reasonIng. 
Nonetheless, in the same lectures, after examining the legal effect of 
stabilisation clauses on various oil concessions, including the petroleum licences 
37R Aminoil Award, op. cit., at 1023, para. 95. 
379 Asante, op. cit., at 615. See also Seidl-Hohenveldem, op. cit., at 150. 
3RO Quoted by Paasivirta, op. cit., at 331. 
3Rl Harris, op. cit., at 584-585. 
3R2 Higgins (1982: 304). 
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concerning North Sea oil explorations given to foreign companies by the British, 
she observes that those licences were altered through later legislation by the 
United Kingdom and some of the Acts were even given retroactive effect. 
Higgins continues: 
The British Government took the view that its sovereign right to 
legislate in respect of the natural resources on its shelf was in no way 
impeded by contracts that it had previously entered into with foreign 
licensees (emphasis added).383 
While confirming the value of a stabilisation clause as a safeguard against 
arbitrary acts of the contracting State, the ICSID tribunal, in the Letco case, held 
that such a clause could not prevent the nationalisation measures, provided the 
State concerned pays full, prompt and effective compensation.384 
So far as the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal is concerned, to the 
present author's best knowledge, it dealt with the issue only on one occasion, 
viz., the Amoco case. There, the agreement between the claimant company, 
Amoco, and the respondent, the National Iranian Petrochemical Company, 
provided for limitation on the right of the other party to terminate or modify the 
agreement. The claimant asserted that Articles 30-2 and 21-2 of the 
agreement,385 combined together, constituted stabilisation clauses, under which 
the Government of Iran could not annul the agreement. The Tribunal, however, 
rej ected the assertion, and held that the agreement did not contain a stabilisation 
clause binding on the Government of Iran. It further noted that "the clauses 
3R3 Ibid., at 309, and see further 349-350. Likewise, the 1981 Canadian Oil and Gas Act 
modified the leases, granted under regulations enacted in the 1960s, so as to secure 50% Canadian 
ownership. As a result, the balance of interests previously established between the govenunental 
authorities and alien investors altered, and weakened the alien's position. R. Dolzer, "Indirect 
Expropriation of Alien Property", 1 I.C.S.I.D.L. Rev-F.I.L.1.(l986) 41 at 53-54. 
3R4 Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (Letco) v. The Republic of Liberia, Award of 31 
March, 1986, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. (1987) 647. 
3R5 Paragraph 2 of Article 30 (which deals with applicable law) reads as follows: 
"The provisions of any current laws and regulations which may be wholly or partly inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement shall, to the extent of any such inconsistency, be of no 
effect in respect of the provisions of this Agreement." Also, in paragraph 2 of Article 21 it was 
stipulated that "Measures of any nature to annul or modify the provisions of this Agreement shall 
only be made possible by the mutual consent of NPC and AMOCO." Amoco Award, op. cit.. at 
236, para. 155, and at 240, para. 168, respectively. 
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referred to by the Claimant bind only the parties to the ... Agreement, namely 
NPC and Amoco. ,,386 
Not only maya stabilisation clause be incompatible with several principles, 
such as permanent sovereignty over natural resources, but it may also conflict 
with some other theories. It has been submitted that as a matter of constitutional 
theory, it may be impossible for any State to bind itself by contract, or to fetter its 
legislative competence. The rationale of this view is that "a legislature is not 
bound by its own legislation and has the power to change it.,,387 If this 
proposition is accepted, then a legislature cannot be bound by a provision in a 
simple contract. Thus, it may fairly be stated that from the standpoint of 
constitutional theory, "the stabilisation clause may not achieve what it sets out to 
do. ,,388 Professor Harris is of the opinion that the increased bargaining power of 
oil producing countries has resulted in the majority of oil contracts being 
governed by the municipal law of the contracting State and being subject to the 
jurisdiction of its courts. If it continues, the role of stabilisation clauses may be 
diminished.389 In his comment on the Letco award, Seidl-Hohenveldern remarks 
that the relevance of such a clause is declined to a promise by the State to observe 
the clause on which, "according to international law depends the validity of a 
nationalization. ,,390 
The foregoing assessment shows that this technique, as nationalisation 
theory, does not achieve what it sets out to do, viz., to stabilise the relationship 
between the host State and foreign investors. Long-term and unlimited 
stabilisation clauses are incompatible with the principle of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources. It is submitted that the role of such clauses has been 
reduced and they no longer have absolute character. Nonetheless, this does not 
mean that stabilisation clauses have no effect whatsoever. In relatively short-
term contracts, while the present author does not share the view that the 
3R6 Ibid., at 241, para. 173. 
3R7 Somarajah (1994: 329). 
3RR Ibid. 
3R9 Harris, op. cit., at 585. 
390 Seidl-Hohenveldem, op. cit., at 150. 
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premature termination of contracts containing such clauses is an international 
delict, it is suggested that the anticipated cancellation of such contracts can give 
rise to a higher amount of compensation. 
7. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources 
As indicated above, one of the important sources in which States' right to 
nationalise or expropriate foreign-owned property has been recognised is the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. In short, the right to 
nationalise emanates from this principle. The latter has been enshrined in 
numerous UN resolutions. Thus, the survey of the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources will be our last task in this chapter. 
Although the concept of sovereignty is not a new phenomenon, the notion 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources emerged on the international 
scene in the early 1950s. Problems relating to sovereignty over natural resources 
had become important in the decolonisation period. Put differently, there is a 
close relationship between the concept of permanent sovereignty and the issue of 
decolonisation. Colonialism itself was ended by the growth of the principle of 
self-determination. In the course of decolonisation, political self-determination 
was deemed incomplete without economic self-determination. The newly 
independent States wished to be masters in their own houses and to shape their 
own fate. This movement eventually resulted in the establishment of a principle, 
under which States enjoy permanent sovereignty over the natural wealth and 
resources within their territory. As will be shown later, the principle is nowadays 
recognised as a well-established principle of internationallaw.391 
391 S' I' ee, znter a za: 
_ S. R. Chowdhury, "Pennanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources", in Hossain and 
Chowdhury (eds.), op. cit., 1-42, and Chowdhury's other literature, "Pennanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources", in de Waart et aI., International Law and Development (eds.), Martinus 
Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1988) 59-85; 
_ de Waart, P. Peters and N. 1. Schrijver, "Pennanent Sovereignty, Foreign Investment and 
State Practice", in Hossain and Chowdhury (eds.), op. cit., at 88-143; 
_ N. J. Schrijver, "Pennanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources", in Waart et al., (eds.),. op. 
cit., at 87-101, and Schrijver's other literature, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Cambndge 
University Press, 1997; 
_ Schachter, op. cit., at 301-305; and 
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Since its emergence in 1952, the principle has been extensively invoked by 
States. Thus, the newly independent States felt that the principle of permanent 
sovereignty was necessary to modify inequitable concessions and contractual 
arrangements, inherited from the colonial period, under which foreign investors 
were exploiting their natural resources. It is also invoked by States in support of 
positions and action taken by them in a variety of situations. These situations 
have arisen largely in their relations with transnational corporations involved in 
the exploitation of natural resources in their territory.392 
The evolution of the principle of permanent sovereignty owes much to UN 
resolutions. Between 1952-1974 the General Assembly of the United Nations 
and organs associated with it adopted numerous declarations and resolutions in 
this respect. Although UN resolutions have been the main device for the 
establishment of this principle, reference should also be made to other 
instruments, such as the two International Human Rights Covenants of 1966, 
which clearly contain the principle of permanent sovereignty.393 The human 
rights aspect identified the principle in relation to both the history of 
decolonisation and the principle of self-determination. 
The principle of permanent sovereignty takes root in UN General Assembly 
resolutions which, from a formal point of view, merely have the status of 
recommendations. That, under certain conditions, norms created by UN 
resolutions may become part of customary international law, is a controversial 
issue. Thus, our purpose is to examine this controversy. In the first part of this 
section the nature and content of permanent sovereignty will be studied. This 
- S. K. Banerjee, "The Concept of Pennanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources - An 
analysis", 8 Ind. J.I.L. (1968) 515. 
392 K. Hossain (ed.), Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order, Frances Pinter, 
London (1980) at 33-43. 
393 See Articles 1, paragraphs 2 of both International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted in 1966, entered into 
force 1976. Reprinted in I. Brownlie, Basic Documents in International Law (3rd ed.), 
Clarendon Press, Oxford (1991) 270. See also the other multilateral treaties, such as the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981), the two Vienna Conventions on Succession, of 
States in respect of Treaties (1978), and in respect of Property, Archives and Debts (1983), and 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). 
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will be followed by a survey of the evolution of the principle, and its relation to 
the principle of self-determination. Finally, the legal status of UN General 
Assembly resolutions on permanent sovereignty will be considered. 
7.1 The Nature and Content of Permanent Sovereignty 
The term 'sovereign' emanates from the Latin word 'supra'. 
Etymologically, it often meant one of various forms of superiority. In legal and 
political theory the sovereign is the holder of ultimate power. Nowadays it is the 
State.394 The origin of the concept of sovereignty in modem times can be traced 
back to the Middle Ages.395 Various definitions of sovereignty were suggested 
by jurists in international law. We recall some of them below. 
A Russian jurist, Levin, defines sovereignty as "the supremacy of State 
power inside the country and its independence of any other power in international 
relations. ,,396 According to Lauterpacht, sovereignty is the supreme power, 
depending on no other territorial power and presuming full independence inside 
the State and beyond its limits.397 Wildhaber holds that sovereignty has two 
aspects: one internal and the other external, the former expressing State dominion 
internally and the latter signifying independence, which excludes any 
subordination in relation to foreign States.398 To Professor Brownlie, 
"'sovereignty' characterizes powers and privileges resting on customary law and 
independent of the particular consent of another state.,,399 Moreover, in the 
Island of Palmas case, Arbitrator Max Huber suggests the following classic 
definition: 
Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. 
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to 
394 L. Wildhaber, "Sovereignty in International Law", in R. St. 1. Macdonald and D. M. 
Johnston (eds.), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy 
Doctrine and Theory. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1986) at 425-431. 
395 Seidl-Hohenveldern, op. cit., at 21. 
396 Quoted by G. Elian, The Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, Leiden (1979) at 6. 
397 Ibid., at 5. 
39R Wildhaber, op. cit., at 436-437. 
399 Brownlie (1998: 292). 
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exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a 
State.400 
The above account suggests that "in international law the most common 
meaning ascribed to sovereignty is the idea of independence.,,401 
Modern authors hold that sovereignty is a relative concept. Thus, 
according to Russian jurists, State sovereignty is one of the foremost principles of 
international law, but not an absolute concept.402 Wildhaber is of the opinion 
that "the old theory of absolute sovereignty may have fitted with the actual 
conditions of prior centuries, but it is totally incompatible with the present-day 
interdependence and solidarity of states, peoples and individuals.,,403 
Schwarzenberger expressed the view that "a sovereign state may exercise its 
sovereignty only subject to compliance with all other rules of international 
law.,,404 
The industrialised States advocate a relativist view of sovereignty. From 
the viewpoints of Third World governments and writers, State sovereignty "is 
emphasized as the very basis of international relations and as a means of 
achieving a larger share of universality, equity, solidarity and participation in the 
international decision-making process. ,,405 In stating the importance of the 
principle of State sovereignty for developing countries, Okoye comments: 
Sovereignty for the new State is a powerful instrument for shaping 
national identity, breaking the chains of subordination which are 
factors of backwardness and furthering social and economic progress 
... It provides them with a legal shield against any further domination 
or intervention by the old colonial powers and enables them to claim 
in international relations all the privileges and immunities 
traditionally associated with nation States.406 
400 The Island of Palm as case (The Netherlands v. The United States of America ), 2 R.I.A.A. 
(1928) 829 at 838. 
401 Paasivirta, op. cit., at 331. 
402 Wildhaber, op. cit., at 438. 
403 Ibid. Seidl-Hohenveldern, op. cit., at 22, took a similar view. 
404 Schwarzenberger, op. cit., at 8. 
405 Wildhaber, op. cit., at 439. 
406 Ibid. 
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International jurisprudence tends to follow the view that sovereignty is a 
relative notion. The PCD, in its Advisory Opinion regarding Nationality Decrees 
in Tunis and Morocco, held that "sovereignty is a relative notion in that, 
international society being essentially dynamic in nature, no State can exist in 
absolute isolation from all others.,,407 Moreover, in the direction of limitations 
on sovereignty, numerous restrictions or situations are conceivable.408 Among 
them, the effects of treaty obligations may be recalled. It has been argued that 
treaty obligations do not infringe upon formal sovereignty or independence of the 
parties, nor they do hamper material sovereignty.409 "All international law of 
today is made up of the limitations of sovereignty, limitations created by 
sovereignty itself.,,4Io This rule has been endorsed, in the Wimbledon case, by the 
PCIJ.411 The latter held that treaty obligations are not an abandonment of State 
sovereignty, but rather they are an attribute of it. 
Therefore, we can safely say that, irrespective of whether sovereignty is 
absolute or relative, it indicates the whole interests of a State in certain territory, 
persons and property, and is a permanent quality of States. 
Having examined the concept of sovereignty, we now come to the phrase 
'permanent sovereignty.' The General Assembly of the United Nations has 
qualified sovereignty over natural resources as 'permanent'. However, the 
precise meaning of this adjective has never been clarified. Different 
interpretations have been suggested by legal commentators: (1) that it could aim 
at protecting the sovereignty over natural resources of peoples which had not yet 
attained self-determination; (2) that it qualifies the resources as 'resources in 
situs', so that raw materials extracted would no longer be subj ect to the principle; 
and (3) that it could express that a State cannot alienate its sovereignty over 
407 Quoted by P. 1. O'Keefe, "The United Nations Pennanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources", 8 1.W.T.L. (1974) 239 at 241-242. 
408 Wildhaber, "Sovereignty in International Law". in Macdonald and Johnston (eds.), op. cit., 
at 442. 
409 Ibid. 
410 Ibid. 
411 The Wimbledon case, op. cit. (note 244). 
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natural resources.412 Among these interpretations, the last one seems closer to 
the objectives of the principle of permanent sovereignty. As Salem puts it: 
The word 'permanent' should be understood as indicating that the 
State concerned can avail itself of this sovereign right at any time.413 
Likewise, Giardina points out that if a meaning is to be attached to the term 
'permanent', that "it is the inalienable character of a State's power to use the 
natural resources in its territory as it deems fit. ,,414 In the same vein, Elian 
remarks: 
Sovereignty is inalienable and indivisible. As regards sovereignty 
over natural resources, this is no different form of sovereignty, but is 
comprised within the latter's general elements, within supremacy and 
independence.415 
As to the issue of inalienability of the right of permanent sovereignty, in his 
lectures at the Hague Academy, Arechaga commented: 
The description of this sovereignty as permanent signifies that the 
territorial State can never lose its capacity to change the destination 
or the method of exploitation of those resources, whatever 
arrangements have been made for their exploitation and 
administration.416 
He further observed that such control over its resources can be exercised by 
a State "even if a predecessor State or a previous government engaged itself, by 
treaty or contract, not to do so." For Professor Brownlie, Arechaga's "particular 
innovation" can be justified, in accordance with Article 64 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, "if and when the principle of permanent 
sovereignty emerges as a new peremptory nonn of general international law (jus 
cogens). ,,417 Brownlie himself took the view that "loosely speaking, permanent 
412 Waart et al. (1984: 90). 
413 Quoted by Seidl-Hohenveldem, op. cit., at 27-28. 
414 A. Giardina, "State Contracts: National versus International Law?", 5 I.Y.I.L. (1980-1981) 
147 at 164. 
415 Elian, op. cit., at 10-11. 
416 Arechaga, Hague Recueil, op. cit., at 297. 
417 Brownlie (1979: 267-268). There are some governments. like Libya, in its early 1970s 
nationalisation measures, and Kuwait, in the Aminoil case. as well as some jurists, such as 
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sovereignty is the assertion of the acquired rights of the host State which are not 
defeasible by a contract or perhaps even by an international agreement. ,,418 It has 
been stated that the inalienability of the right of permanent sovereignty is no 
longer a controversial matter between the developed countries and the developing 
countries.419 Besides the two adjectives of 'permanent' and 'inalienable', there is 
a third term to qualify the sovereignty, namely 'full', which also signifies an 
identical concept. 
However, some, like Nwogugu, argue that a State may exerCIse its 
sovereign right even by conferring a concession on a third person, e.g. a foreign 
oil company, and/or a promise not to nationalise for a certain period of time.42o 
In Seidl-Hohenveldern's view, "these arguments may appear too subtle to a State 
which feels compelled by overriding reasons of public interest to assert its 
sovereign rights even after having thus signed them away for the time being.,,421 
On the basis of the above discussion, we can conclude that the main 
objective of the principle of permanent sovereignty is to preserve State control 
over natural wealth and resources.422 Otherwise, it would be incompatible with 
the whole idea of State and its sovereign nature.423 Moreover, the purpose of 
such terms as 'permanent', 'inalienable' and 'full' is to emphasise that 
sovereignty is the rule and can be exercised at any time. Limitations on this rule 
are exceptions and cannot be permanent, but are limited in scope and time.424 
Since the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources has 
emanated from the principle of self-determination, the examination of the 
Arechaga, Chowdhury and Giardina, who took the view that the principle of pennanent 
sovereignty has the status of jus cogens. 
41R Ibid., at 271. 
419 P. J. I. M. de. Waart, "Pennanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources as a Cornerstone for 
International Economic Rights and Duties", 24 N.I.L.R. (1977) 304 at 312. 
420 Seidl-Hohenveldern, op. cit., at 28. See also Waart et al., "Pennanent Sovereignty, Foreign 
Investment and State Practice", in Hossain and Chowdhury (eds.), op. cit., at 88. 
421 Ibid. 
422 Paasivirta, op. cit., at 345. 
4~3 O'Keefe, op. cit., at 244. 
424 Chowdhury (1988: 62-63). 
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principle of self-determination In the context of permanent sovereignty will 
therefore be our next task. 
7.2 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Right of Self-
determination 
In his lectures at the Hague Academy in 1979, Brownlie comments: 
The concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources has its 
historical origins in the principle of self-determination.425 
The origin of the modem concept of self-determination can be traced back 
to the American independence in the eighteenth century. 426 The concept was 
given a new lease of life following the 1917 Socialist Revolution in Russia. It 
further developed and eventually became a principle of international law. As the 
Russian jurist, Tunkin, puts it: 
One of the most important generally recognized principles of 
contemporary international law is the principle of self-determination, 
which has received recognition as a result of the persistent struggle of 
the Soviet Union and other progressive forces. 427 
On the basis of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, however, Russia raised 
the right of self-determination in a new way, "in the aspect of the interests of the 
class struggle of the proletariat for the liberation of all working people. ,,428 
Likewise, the right of self-determination is stated to have been voiced in 
1918 by President Wilson of the United States in his 'fourteen points'. 429 The 
principle did not appear in the 1918 Covenant of the League of Nations, because 
at that time the principle of self-determination was a political rather than a legal 
concept. 430 
425 Brownlie (1979: 255). 
426 D. Thurer, "Self-detennination", Vol. 8, Encycl. P.LL., 470. However, to one commentator: 
"The origin of the said principle dates back to the period of the bourgeois revolutions. Under the 
banner of the 'principle of nationality', the bourgeoisie, striving to establish its predominance, 
struggled in the nineteenth century for the creation of independent national states in Europe." 
Tunkin, op. cit., at 61. 
427 Tunkin, op. cit., at 60-61. 
42R Ibid., at 8. 
429 O'Keefe, op. cit., at 243. 
430 Thurer, op. cit., at 471. 
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During World War II the principle was invoked on many occaSIons. 
Moreover, before it was formulated in the Charter of the United Nations it had , 
been proclaimed in a number of international instruments such as the Atlantic , 
Charter of 14 August 1941, the Declaration by the United Nations signed in 
Washington on 1st January 1942, and the Moscow Declaration of 1943. 431 
Eventually, the right of self-determination was formulated in several 
articles of the newly emerged UN Charter in 1945. Its Article 1(2) provides that 
the purposes of the Organisation include the development of: 
... friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination (emphasis added). 
Articles 55 of the Charter also dealt with the issue. Under this article, the 
member States shall promote the principle of self-determination of peoples and 
conditions of economic and social progress and development. Some authors 
argue that these obligations have jus cogens status for the member States. In 
their view, UN General Assembly resolutions on permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources are said to have interpreted Article 55 of the Charter with 
binding force and thus, in their tum, have become jus cogens.432 However, Seidl-
Hohenveldern took a different view. 
Prior to 1945, the majority of Western jurists asserted that the principle of 
self-determination had no legal content, being a mixture of political policy and 
morality. Since its developments in the United Nations, the position has been 
changed, and Western jurists generally accept that self-determination is a legal 
principle.433 However, some of them doubt whether the principle of self-
determination can be considered as a principle of international law. Thus, 
Visscher is of the opinion that self-determination "in its present total lack of 
precision, in no way represents a principle of law.,,434 Similarly, Eagleton in 
431 Ibid. 
432 G. Hartmann, quoted by Seidl-Hohenveldem, op. cit., at 34. 
433 Brownlie (1998: 600). 
434 Quoted by Tunkin, op. cit., at 64. 
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going through the question of self-determination as a principle of international 
law, attempted to reduce it as a moral principle.435 
The principle of self-determination was further evolved through the 
practice of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The first significant 
evolution was made on December 14, 1960, by the adoption of the 'Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.' The 
Declaration provides that "all peoples have the right to self-determination; by 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.,,436 To some, the document is a 
genuine Charter of De-Colonisation which goes one step further than the Charter 
of the United Nations. Adopted in 1960 and developed by numerous subsequent 
resolutions, the Declaration reflected the way of thinking, the expression of a 
changing world; what had been specified by the United Nations in 1945, because 
of political considerations, was achieved in 1960.437 
The principle was also incorporated in the two International Human Rights 
Covenants of 1966, and in the General Assembly 'Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. ,438 In addition, the ICl, in 
its Advisory Opinion regarding the Western Sahara, explicitly endorsed the 
validity of the principle of self-determination in the context of international 
law.439 Interestingly, the British Government, which formerly opposed the 
principle, relied on it in the cases of Gibraltar and Falklands.44o 
435 C. Eagleton, "Self-detennination in the United Nations", 47 AJ.I.L. (1953) 91 at 91-93. 
436 Resolution No. 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960. It was adopted by 89 votes; 9 abstentions 
(the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, the Union 
of South Africa, the Dominican Republic) and not one state against. The full text in Brownlie, 
Basic Documents, op. cit., at 298. 
4~7 EI· . 23 
. lan, op. CIt., at . 
43l! Resolution No. 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970. Adopted by consensus (without fonnal 
vote), and its full text can be found in Brownlie, Basic Documents, op. cit., at 35. 
439 I.e.l Rep. (1975) 12 at 31-33. 
440 Brownlie (1998: 601). 
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Thus, not only is the principle of self-determination a well-established 
principle in contemporary international law, but it has also been regarded as ajus 
cogens or peremptory norm. As Asante observes: 
The concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, which 
has been enshrined in numerous UN resolutions, is now a well-settled 
principle of international law, emanating from the jus cogens 
principle of self-determination.441 
7.3 UN General Assembly Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources 
Specific reference to the notion of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources was first made during the debates on human rights in the United 
Nations, in the early 1950s. The United Nations, specifically the General 
Assembly, the Economic and Social Council as well as the Human Rights 
Commission (hereinafter the 'Commission'), were at that time engaged in 
preparing the draft covenants on human rights in the pursuance of the General 
Assembly Resolution 545 (VI) of 5 February 1952. The issue of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources was raised in the Eighth Session of the 
Commission. There, the concepts of self-determination and permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources were proposed as a part of human rights 
covenants by Chile, in the following terms: 
The right of the peoples to self-determination shall also include 
permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources. In no 
case maya people be deprived of its own means of subsistence on the 
grounds of any rights that may be claimed by other States.442 
Despite the opposition of the Western capital-exporting States to the 
. d b h C ., 443 Th h . I' . proposal, It was adopte y t e ommiSSlOn. us, t e capIta -ImportIng 
States which felt that the right of peoples to self-determination should not be 
441 Asante, op. cit., at 594. See further Brownlie (1979: 269-270), and Chowdhury (1984: 8 and 
38). 
442 Quoted by S. K. Banetjee, "The Concept of Pennanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources -
An Analysis", 8 Ind. J.I.L. (1968) 515 at 518. 
443 In 1955 the proposal was incorporated in both the Draft Covenants on Human Rights and 
eventually appeared in Article 1 of each of the two Covenants on Human Rights of 1966. 
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regarded only from the political point of view, but should also be considered 
from the economic aspect, were able to insert the concept of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources into the draft human rights covenants. "In the 
jargon of the Commission, as well as its draft article on self-determination, this 
principle came to be known as an economic self-determination. ,,444 The concept 
of 'economic self-determination' was further elaborated by the General Assembly 
Resolution 523 (VI) of 12 February 1952. In this resolution, related to economic 
development in general and commercial agreements in particular, the General 
Assembly "considering that under-developed countries have the right to 
determine freely the use of their natural resources and that they must utilise such 
resources in order to be in a better position to further the realization of their plans 
of economic development in accordance with their national interests.,,445 
Legal commentators also noticed the significance of the concept of 
economic self-determination. As Schwarzenberger observes: 
Without a minimum of political, economic or military de facto 
. d d d' . d d . . I 446 In epen ence, e Jure In epen ence IS meanIng ess. 
After noting that the principle of self-determination is a legal principle, 
Brownlie states that the principle has three aspects, including its application in 
the different context of economic self-determination.447 The latter principle has 
been characterised as a "powerful principle. ,,448 
As alluded to earlier, between 1952-1974 the United Nations adopted a 
number of declarations and resolutions on sovereignty of States over their natural 
resources (referred to as the principle of economic self-determination). Among 
them, only the nine most important resolutions will be considered here, namely: 
626 (VII) of21 December 1952; 1314 (XIII) of 12 December 1958; 1803 (XVII) 
444 l. N. Hyde, "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources", 50 A.l.LL. (1956) 
854 at 855. 
445 Quoted by Banerjee, op. cit., at 519. . ." . 
446 G. Schwarzenberger, "The Principles of InternatIOnal EconomIC La",:, ' 117 Hague. Re~u~l,l 
(1966) 1 at 31. See also U. O. Umozurike "Owned Property and EconomIC Self-determmatIOn , 
6 East A.LJ. (1970) 79. 
447 Brownlie (1998: 601). 
44H Sornarajah (1994: 322). 
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of 14 December 1962); 2158 (XXI) of 25 November 1966; 2692 (XXV) of 11 
December 1970; 3016 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972; 3171 (XXVIII) of 17 
December 1973; 3021 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974 and 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 
1974. 
In Resolution 626 (VII) of 21 December 1952, the General Assembly 
explicitly acknowledged that "the right of peoples to exploit freely their natural 
resources and wealth is inherent in their sovereignty", and recommended 
international co-operation in the exercise of that right. It also recommended 
restraint from "acts direct and indirect, designed to impede the exercise of the 
sovereignty of State over natural resources.,,449 
It should be noted that this resolution was invoked by both State and 
municipal courts. In 1953, only a few months after the adoption of the 
resolution, Guatemala relied on it as supporting the argument for its position in 
expropriating the property of the United Fruit Company, a United States 
corporation.450 Moreover, the validity of the Iranian Oil Nationalisation Law of 
1951 was challenged in the Japanese and Italian High Courts. The two courts 
upheld the validity of such a law by referring explicitly to this resolution. Thus, 
the Italian Court held that: 
It is evident that the decisions of the United Nations at that meeting, 
taking into consideration the date when it was taken and the 
international situation to which it related, constitutes a clear 
recognition of the international lawfulness of the Persian 
Nationalization Laws.451 
A similar position was taken by the High Court of Tokyo.452 
As indicated above, in 1955 the United Nations gave more prominence to 
the principle of economic self-determination when the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly adopted a provision for inclusion in both the draft covenants 
449 Resolution No. 626 (VI) of 21 December 1952. For full text of the resolution, see Brownlie 
(1979: 311, n. 10). 
450 See Whiteman, Vol. 8, op. cit., at 1021-1022. 
451 Anglo Iranian Oil Co. v. S. Up. OR. (1955), op. cit., at 41. 
452 Anglo Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitus, op. cit., at 313. 
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on human rights. This provision eventually appeared in Article 1 of each of the 
two Covenants on human rights.453 
Similarly, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1314 (XIII) of 12 
December 1958 entitled 'Recommendations concerning International Respect for 
the Right of Peoples and Nations to self-determination. ,454 This resolution 
characterises permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources as a basic 
constituent of the right to self-determination.455 In order to clarify the extent and 
effective nature of this right, the Assembly decided to set up a commission, viz., 
the United Nations Commission on Permanent Sovereignty (hereinafter the 
'Permanent Sovereignty Commission'), to formulate recommendations aimed at 
strengthening this right. The Commission was instructed "to conduct a full 
survey of the status of permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources 
as a basic constituent of the right of self-determination" and, where necessary, to 
make recommendations for strengthening that right, having regard to the rights 
and duties of States under international law. It should be noted that before the 
two International Human Rights Covenants were opened for signature in 1966, 
the General Assembly, through a resolution, recommended "that the sovereign 
right of every State to dispose of its wealth and its natural resources should be 
respected. ,,456 
Work in the Commission on permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
and the UN Economic and Social Council culminated in the adoption of 
Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 by the General Assembly.457 This 
resolution was adopted in the form of a 'Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources' and its provisions set out in eight operative 
paragraphs.458 The Declaration reiterated that 'the sovereign right of every State 
453 See note 29 in this chapter. 
454 Resolution No. 1314 (XII) of 12 December 1958. 
-ISS Waart, op. cit., at 310. 
-IS6 Resolution No. 1515 (XV) of 15 December 1960. 
457 The full text of the resolution reprinted in 2 I.L.M. (1963) 223, and Brownlie, Basic 
Documents, op. cit., 230. 
-ISH For a full description of the process of elaboration of the resolution, see K. N. Gess, 
"Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources - An Analytical Review of the United Nations 
Declaration and its Genesis" 13 1.c.L.Q. (1964) 398, and O'Keefe, op. cit. (note 407). 
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to dispose of its natural wealth and resources should be respected', and 
recognised 'the inalienable right of all States freely to dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources in accordance with their national interest'. De Waart 
rightly states that after the adoption of this resolution, the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources was given "a more independent life.,,459 Some 
jurists characterised it as the landmark resolution.46o Although capital-exporting 
States have accepted this resolution as declaratory of standards of customary 
international law, many capital-importing States considered it as conservative in 
character.461 Also, in Akinsanya's view, the resolution "is a victory to the 
investor States.,,462 
Paragraph 4 of the resolution, which dealt with nationalisation and 
compensation, reads as follows: 
Nationalization, expropriation or requIsItIOning shall be based on 
grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest ... 
In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in 
accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures 
in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international 
law. In any case where the question of compensation ... the national 
jurisdiction of the State taking such measures shall be exhausted. 
However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other parties 
concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made through 
arbitration or international adjudication. 
To Friedmann, the resolution was a compromise between capital-exporting 
and capital-importing States. In his words: 
Neither endorses the claim for 'prompt, full and adequate' 
compensation usually made by Western lawyers nor the claim made 
by some representatives of the less-developed countries that 
compensation is purely a matter of internal discretion and not an 
bl ' . f' . 11 463 o Igatlon 0 InternatIOna aw. 
459 . 310 Waart, op. CIt., at . 
460 Hossain, "Introduction", in Hossain and Chowdhury (eds.), op. cit., at ix, and Chowdhury 
(1984: 2). 
461 Brownlie (1979: 261). 
462 Akinsanya, op. cit., at 54. 
463 W. Friedmann, The Changing Stntcture of International Law, Stevens & Sons, London 
(1964) at 138. 
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Resolution 1803 was invoked in the disputes between the host States and 
foreign investors, and has been accepted as reflecting customary international law 
in a number of arbitration awards, such as the Texaco and Liamco arbitrations, 
which will be examined in this section. 
Resolution 2158 (XXI) was adopted by the General Assembly on 25 
December 1966.464 There, the Assembly reaffirmed the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources with particular reference to developing 
countries with a view to securing for them greater participation in exploiting 
natural resources. This is the resolution in which Brownlie finds the historical 
origin of the New International Economic Order.465 
In Resolution 88 (XII) of 19 October 1972, the Trade and Development 
Board of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (the 
'UNCT AD,)466 restated "the sovereign right of all countries freely to dispose of 
their natural resources for the benefit of their national development, and 
reiterated that: 
in the application of this principle, such measures of nationalization 
as States may adopt in order to recover their natural resources are the 
expression of a sovereign power in virtue of which it is for each State 
to fix the amount of compensation and the procedure for these 
measures, and any dispute which may arise in that connection falls 
within the sole jurisdiction of its courts, without prejudice to what is 
set forth in General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) (emphasis 
added).467 
The resolution as originally drafted did not make any reference to 
international law, but in the revised draft this phrase "without prejudice to ... 
1803 (XVII)" was added to meet the objections of those countries that had seen a 
contlict between the original draft and Resolution 1803.468 
464 The full text of the resolution reprinted in 6 I.L.M. (1967) 147. 
465 Brownlie (1979: 262). 
466 UNCTAD is an organ of the General Assembly set up in 1964. 
467 The full text of the resolution reprinted in 11 I.L.M. (1972) 1474. 
46R Garcia-Amador (1980: 31). 
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A significant development occurred when Resolution 31 71 (XXVIII) of 17 
December 1973 was adopted by the General Assembly. In contrast to Resolution 
1803, this resolution did not strike any kind of balance between different 
interests. In the resolution, the Assembly made the following affirmation: 
3. Affirms that the application of the principle of nationalisation 
carried out by States as an expression of their sovereignty in order to 
safeguard their natural resources, implies that each State is entitled to 
determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode of 
payment, and that any disputes which might arise should be settled in 
accordance with the national legislation of each State carrying out 
such measures (emphasis added).469 
A comparison of this paragraph with the pertinent provisions of Resolution 
1803, shows that regarding the question of compensation as well as the 
settlement of disputes a new approach was taken in Resolution 3171. To 
some,470 the new position is as an expression of the host State's sovereignty. 
Garcia-Amador, however, observes that the new position was the starting point of 
the radical departure from what was perceived to be the standards of international 
law by developed States.471 
Also, Resolution 3171 (XXVIII) was followed in quick succeSSlOn by 
Resolution 3201 (S-VI). It was a Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order. 4 72 The Declaration was accompanied by a 
programme, viz., Resolution 3202 (S-VI). It acknowledged that the New 
International Economic Order should be founded on 20 principles, the most 
important for the present discussion being paragraph 4( e), which reads as 
follows: 
469 F or the full text of the resolution, see 68 A.J.I.L. (1974) 381. 
470 Chowdhury (1984: 4). 
471 He has mentioned three factors for this departure: (1) increased membership of the United 
Nations by a considerable number of newly emerged developing countries: (2) profound 
departure of the Latin American nations from their traditional position; and (3) ~e effect of ~e 
well-known Economic Declaration adopted by the Algiers Conference of Non-Ahgned CountrIes 
just a couple of months earlier. Garcia-Amador (1980: 30-32). . 
472 Resolution No. 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 197-l was adopted by consensus (WIthout formal vote). 
For the full text of the resolution, see 13 I.L.M. 097-l) 715. 
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Full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources 
and economic activities. In order to safeguard these resources, each 
State is entitled to exercise effective control over them and their 
exploitation with means suitable to its own situation, including the 
right to nationalization of transfer of ownership to its nationals, this 
right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the 
States. No State may be subjected to economic, political or any type 
of coercion to prevent the free and full exercise of this inalienable 
right (emphasis added). 
This process ultimately culminated in the inclusion of the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States (hereinafter the 'Charter') which was approved by the 
General Assembly as part of Resolution 3281 (XXIX).473 As in the case of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the idea of such a Charter was 
proposed by a Latin American nation, Mexico.474 The Charter was adopted by a 
roll-call vote of 120 in favour, 6 against with 10 abstentions.475 Its substantive 
provisions are contained in four chapters. The Charter includes fundamental 
principles in different spheres of international economic relations. Among the 
areas covered are: international trade, transnational corporations, nationalisation, 
international economic co-operation, development of natural resources, transfer 
of technology, and the exploitation of natural resources of the seabed. The 
fundamental principles which are set out in the Charter include: equity, sovereign 
equality, interdependence, common interest and co-operation among all States, 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the common heritage of 
mankind. Its Article 2 provides that: 
1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent 
sovereignty, including possession, use, and disposal, over all its 
wealth, natural resources and economic activities. 
2. Each State has the right: 
473 Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974. For the full text of the resolution, see 14 
I.L.M. (1975) 251, and Brownlie, Basic Documents, op. cit., 235. 
474 E-U. Petersmann, "Charter of Economic Right and Duties", Vol. 8. Encycl. P.I.L., 71 at 71. 
475 The States voting against the Charter were Belgium. Denmark, the F. R. Germany, 
Luxembourg, the UK and the US The abstaining States were Austria, Canada. France, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain. 
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( c) To nationalise, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign 
property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by 
the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant 
laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers 
pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise 
to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the 
nationalising State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and 
mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be 
sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in 
accordance with the principle of free choice of means (emphasis 
added). 
Regarding Article 2(1), two points are worth noting.476 In the first place, 
there is an argument that "sovereignty of a State concerning its natural wealth 
could be limited by the fact that such wealth may be sorely needed in other parts 
of the world." However, to some, the word 'full' which is incorporated in Article 
2(1) of the Charter refutes the aforesaid idea. Secondly, Resolution 1803 was 
criticised for restricting State sovereignty only to 'natural wealth and resources'. 
Thus, Katzarov suggests that it should be extended to 'all economic activities'. 
As shown above, the Charter rectified this omission. In UN General Assembly 
resolutions, such as Article 1 (2) of the 'Declaration on the Right to 
Development' of 1986, 477 and other legal instruments478 , however, the coverage 
of pennanent sovereignty over natural resources is again confined to 'natural 
weal th and resources'. 
The 'appropriate compensation' fonnula was reintroduced in the Charter. 
Thus, in Article 2(2)( c) it was stipulated that appropriate compensation should be 
paid by the State adopting nationalisation or expropriation measures, "taking into 
account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State 
considers pertinent." 
476 See Seidl-Hohenveldem, op. cit., at 27-28. 
477 Resolution 411128 of 4 December 1986, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. (1986). 
47R For example, the two Vienna Conventions on Succession of States in respect of Treaties 
(1978), and in respect of Property, Archives and Debts (1983). 
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Through the above-mentioned resolutions, the situation concernIng 
sovereignty over natural resources located within a State or territory has become 
satisfactorily settled. However, there are other problems connected with natural 
resources. Natural resources located outside the borders of individual States have 
created legal interests in the last two decades. This is mainly due to the series of 
events leading to the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter 
'UNCLOS II!'). Sovereignty over natural resources has become a topic of 
special interest in so far as the legal status of the seabed and subsoil is concerned. 
The proposals for UNCLOS contained various separate parts, on the territorial 
sea, on the continental shelf, on the new concept of the exclusive economic zone, 
and on the deep seabed. Part V of the 1982 Convention479 relates to the 
exclusive economic zone. Article 55 of the Convention acknowledges the 
economic exclusive zone as "an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea ... " 
which "shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." Article 56(l)(a) of the Convention 
gives the coastal State sovereign rights over all the economic resources of the sea, 
seabed and subsoil in its exclusive economic zone; this includes not only fish, but 
also minerals beneath the seabed. 
Since the days of Grotius, international law has developed the idea of the 
freedom of the high seas. Prior to 1945 the freedom of the high seas meant that 
every State had the right to exploit the seabed and subsoil of the high seas. This 
right was shared with all other States; no State could claim an exclusive right to 
any part of the seabed or subsoil of the high seas. 480 
However, the law began to change when it became technologically and 
economically possible to exploit oil deposits beneath the sea by means of 
offshore oil wells. On 28 September of 1945, President Truman of the United 
States issued a proclamation under which "the USA had the exclusive right to 
exploit the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf of the coasts of the 
479 For the full text of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, see 21 I.L.M. (1982) 
1261. 
480 Akehurst, op. cit., at 188. 
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USA.,,481 President Truman's proclamation was copied by certain other States, 
and offshore drilling for oil and natural gas became common in the Persian Gulf 
and the Caribbean. In fact, the action of the US created a precedent which other 
States followed.482 Before 1958 customary law on the continental shelf was 
vague and controversial; the Geneva Convention added more precision and detail 
to the rules (Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention). Thus, Article 76(1) of the 1982 
Convention, which differs considerably from Article 1 of the Geneva 
Convention, defines the continental shelf as follows: 
The continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the sea-bed and 
sub-soil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer 
edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not 
extend up to that distance. 
Under the 1982 Convention, the coastal State's rights are exclusive, and 
exploration and exploitation activities may not be undertaken without the consent 
of the coastal State. Natural resources are defined as the mineral and other non-
living resources of the seabed and subsoil, together with living organisms 
belonging to sedentary species. 
Moreover, the General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 
1970,483 declares that the deep sea bed was the common heritage of mankind, and 
laid down numerous principles to govern the future exploitation of its resources. 
This idea has been expressed in Article 136 of the 1982 Convention, under which 
the Area and its resources are the 'common heritage of mankind. ,484 The 
significance of this principle to the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea 
becomes evident through Article 311 (6) which provides that there will be no 
amendments to the basic principle relating to the common heritage of mankind 
481 For the full text of Truman Proclamation, see M. M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, 
Vol. 4, Department of State Publication, Washington D.C. (1965) 756. 
482 Akehurst, op. cit., at 188-189. 
483 For the full text of the resolution, see Brownlie, Basic Documents, op. cit., at 122. 
484 The principles which are set forth in the resolution elaborated in detail in Articles 133-199 
and Annexes III and IV of the 1982 Convention. 
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set forth in Article 136. However, the advanced industrial States that have the 
potential capability to exploit the sea bed expressed reservations about the legal 
basis of the concept of common heritage of mankind. 
We now come to the crucial question: what effects do the principles and 
formulations, incorporated in the above-mentioned resolutions, have on 
customary international law? Put in technical terms, are United Nations 
resolutions concerning permanent sovereignty over natural resources binding on 
its members? The legal status of General Assembly resolutions is a highly 
controversial issue. Thus, the examination of this controversy will be our task in 
the following sections. 
7.4 Legal Status of UN General Assembly Resolutions 
The object of the present and the following sub-sections is to inquire into 
the legal validity of resolutions on pennanent sovereignty over natural resources 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. For doing so, it is 
proposed to consider, first, the legal relevance and weight of General Assembly 
resolutions as a genus, and then the legal validity of the most two significance 
resolutions, namely Resolution 1803 and the 1974 Charter. 
It is to be regretted that the Charter of the United Nations contains no 
provisions on the status of General Assembly resolutions. Perhaps that would 
have been impracticable or undesirable.485 However, this general question of the 
legal validity of UN resolutions has been widely discussed by jurists. 486 
The processes of law-making in the international community have never 
been very clearly understood by international lawyers. It has been traditional to 
associate the creation of international law with the sources of international law 
485 O. Asamoah, "The Legal Effect of the Resolutions of the General Assembly", 3-4 Col.1.T.L. 
(1964-66) 210 at 211. 
486 See on the issue generally: 
- Arechaga, Hague Recueil, op. cit., 30-34; 
_ F. B. Sloan, "The Binding Force of a 'Recommendation' of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations", 25 B.Y.I.L. (1948) 1-34; 
- Schachter, op. cit., 84-104; and . 
_ D. H. N. Johnson, "The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the UnIted 
Nations", 32 B.Y.I.L. (1955-56) 97-122. 
169 
contained in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICI These sources include 
conventions, international customs and the general principles of law recognised 
by civilised nations as primary sources, as well as judicial decisions and 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
Apparently no express provision was made for General Assembly 
resolutions as a source of international law. However, this does not mean that 
such resolutions have no legal effect. 487 According to Article 13 (1 )( a), the 
General Assembly has the function of initiating studies and making 
recommendations for the progressive development of international law and its 
codification. It may be argued that General Assembly resolutions are 
'recommendations' only and as such cannot be the source of legal rights and 
duties. This argument was upheld to some extent by the Joint Opinion of seven 
of the judges of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case, when they stated that, "having 
regard to the normal meaning of the word 'recommendation,' a recommendation 
of the Security Council that Britain and Albania refer their dispute to the Court, 
was not sufficient to establish the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in the 
absence of the consent of both parties.,,488 To some, this argument is "singularly 
unconvincing" because the fact that the form "recommendation" was used, is not 
d .. h h 489 eClslve one way or t e ot er. 
It is true that in most cases the Assembly's power of decision is only one of 
making recommendations. However, it is not true of all cases. The Assembly 
does and can make binding decisions. As the late Judge Lauterpacht, in his 
Separate Opinion in the Voting Procedure case,490 observed: 
In some matters - such as the election of the Secretary-General, 
election of the Economic and Social Council and of some members 
of the Trusteeship Council, the adoption of rules of procedure, 
admission to, suspension from and termination of membership, and 
4R7 Asamoah, op. cit., at 210. 
4RR Quoted by Asamoah in ibid., at 216. 
4R9 Johnson, op. cit., at 108. 
490 Advisory Opinion on Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports and Petitions 
concerning the Territory o/South-West A/rica, I.e.l. Rep. (1955) 67. 
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approval of the budget and the apportionment of expenses - the full 
legal effects of the Resolutions of the General Assembly are 
undeniable (emphasis added).491 
Johnson took a similar view,492 and added some more matters to those 
which Lauterpacht enumerated.493 In another passage of the Separate Opinion, 
Lauterpacht emphasised that: 
It would be wholly inconsistent with the sound principles of 
interpretation as well as with high international interests, which can 
never be legally irrelevant, to reduce the value of the Resolutions of 
the General Assembly - one of the principal instrumentalities of the 
formation of the collective will and judgement of the community of 
nations represented by the United Nations - and to treat them, for the 
purpose of this Opinion and otherwise, as nominal, insignificant and 
as having no claim to influence the conduct of the Members. 
International interest demands that no Judicial support, however 
indirect, be given to any such conception of the Resolutions of the 
General Assembly as being of no consequence.494 
According to Professor Brownlie, it is misleading and a "capital error" to 
characterise such resolutions as non-binding simply on the basis that General 
Assembly resolutions are not binding.495 Dolzer attributes to General Assembly 
resolutions, if not the power to establish new rules of customary international 
law, at least the power to demolish the existing rules.496 After noting that 
General Assembly "resolutions are not a formal source of law within the explicit 
categories of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ", and that "under the UN 
Charter the General Assembly does not have the legal power to make law or to 
adopt binding decisions" Schachter remarks: 
491 Ibid., at 115. 
492 Johnson, op. cit., at 121. Note that resolutions on organisational matters are also called 
'house-keeping resolutions'. M. Mendelson, "The Legal Character of General Assembly 
Resolutions: Some Consideration of Principles", in K. Hossain (ed.), op. cit., 95 at 96. 
493 They include, inter alia: Articles 22, 23, 60, 63, 87, 93, 96 (l )(2), 101, 108, 109 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, and Article 8 of the Statute of the ICJ. Ibid., at 101-102. 
494 Voting Procedure case, op. cit., at 122. 
495 Brownlie (1979: 260). 
496 R. Dolzer, "New Foundation of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property". 75 A.1.I.L. 
(1981) 553 at 564. 
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Yet few would deny that General Assembly resolutions have had a 
formative influence in the development of international law in 
matters of considerable importance to national States.497 
Wildhaber goes further and observes that since modem international law 
has expanded and become more ambitious in the course of the twentieth century, 
its sources have also extended. Thus "Resolutions and the secondary law of 
international organizations ... have become essential as sources of international 
law, as have treaties, custom and general principles of law.,,498 While accepting 
UN General Assembly resolutions are only recommendations and therefore not 
binding on member States, Akinsanya emphasised that: 
However, such resolutions dealing with legal matters constitute 
strong evidence of state practice, and the principles embodied in such 
resolutions may well acquire the character of customary international 
law.499 
Likewise, Brownlie states that General Assembly resolutions "are vehicles 
for the evolution of state practice and each must be weighed in evidential terms 
according to its merits."soo In his lectures at the Hague Academy, he continues: 
The fact that in principle resolutions as a class are not binding has led 
to no little confusion and it is sometimes said that General Assembly 
resolutions 'have no legislative effect'. In one sense this is correct: as 
such the resolutions do not make new law. However, if it is inferred 
that such resolutions can have no effect on the shaping of 
international law this is a capital error. The circumstances in which a 
particular resolution is adopted, the statements of delegations in the 
debate, the voting, the explanation of votes and the content of the 
resolution itself, are all indicators of the evidential significance of the 
individual resolution. The key to the problem is the fact that the 
proceedings of the General Assembly, as of any international 
conference, are a vehicle for the formulation and expression of the 
practice of States in matters pertaining to international law. Thus the 
497 S h h . t 85 C ac tee op. CIt., a . 
498 Wildhaber, "Sovereignty in International Law", in Macdonald and Johnson (eds.), op. cit., at 
438. 
499 Akinsanya, op. cit., at 49. 
500 Brownlie (1998: 545). 
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proceedings and the resolution themselves, constitute evidence of the 
formation of rules of customary (or general) international law. 501 
Almost two decades later, Brownlie restates his view on the issue. After 
noting that UN General Assembly resolutions are not binding on member States, 
he observes: 
But, when they are concerned with general norms of international 
law, then acceptance by a majority vote constitutes evidence of the 
opinions of the governments in the widest forum for the expression of 
such opinions. Even when they are framed as general principles, 
resolutions of this kind provide a basis for the progressive 
development of the law and the speedy consolidation of customary 
rules. 502 
To appraise the legal value of General Assembly resolutions, the same 
author enumerated several factors which include, inter alia, the circumstances in 
which a particular resolution is adopted; the statements of the delegations; the 
voting patterns; and the content of the resolution itself. He further observes that 
the practice of States subsequent to the adoption of the resolution should be 
considered. In the same vein, the late Judge Arechaga commented: 
In the exercise of its power under the [United Nations] Charter, the 
General Assembly may not legislate for the world ... But, as the 
"town meeting of the world" it is a centre where States may express 
their consensus on an existing or emerging rule of international law 
or provide the basis and the starting point for a progressive 
development of that law through the uniform conduct of States. 503 
Similarly, Mendelson states that "in certain very limited circumstances a 
General Assembly resolution may constitute, or bring about the birth of, a 
principle of international law.,,504 In Bring's view, "today, customary law is 
created not only by concrete acts of States but also by the legal conscience and 
conviction of nations as expressed in the various fora of modem international 
501 Brownlie (1979: 260). 
502 Brownlie (1998: 14). 
503 Arechaga, Hague Recueil, op. cit., at 34. .. . 
504 Mendelson, 'The Legal Character of General Assembly ResolutIOns: Some ConsIderatIOns 
of Principle", in Hossain (ed.), op. cit., at 103. 
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life."sos Asamoah distinguishes between the "binding nature" and the "legal 
effect" of General Assembly resolutions. In his view, resolutions may have a 
legal effect though they are not regarded by States as binding upon them. Thus, 
the scope of legal effect is wider than that of legally binding.so6 To him, the 
significance to be attributed to a resolution may depend on certain factors which 
have been termed as "value determinants or variants. "S07 
While considering the role of quasi-legislative competence of the General 
Assembly a complicated task, Falkso8 suggests some general directions in this 
respect. For doing so, the language of the resolution, the objectives pursued by 
those who supported or opposed the resolution, and the circumstances 
surrounding the vote should be taken into account. Having surveyed the opinions 
of numerous writers on the issue, Johnson concludes that there is a fair amount of 
support for the view that although a recommendation of the General Assembly 
may be without true legal effects, it may have effects of a moral or political 
character.so9 However, in his view "the term 'moral effect', has no meaning in 
connection with resolutions of the General Assembly and is often wrongly used 
to convey the meaning of 'political effect."slo The same author argues that 
General Assembly resolutions cannot be a source of law but are only a subsidiary 
means for the determination of law within the meaning of Article 38(l)(d) of the 
Statute of the ICJ.S11 In Asamoah's view, Johnson was distinguishing 'formal 
form' from 'material' source of law. However, he disregarded the fact that the 
decisions of international organisations are made by States which are members, 
and that if the practice of States is a formal source of law, the decisions of 
international organisations which are the collective acts of States are capable of 
505 Bring, op. cit., at 127. 
506 Asamoah, op. cit., at 220. 
507 For such factors, see ibid., at 228-229. 
50R R. A. Falk, "On the Quasi-legislative Competence of the General Assembly", 60 A.J.I.L. 
(1966) 782 at 786-787. 
509 Johnson, op. cit., at 107. 
510 Ibid.,atI21. 
511 Ibid., at 116. 
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b . -C'. 512 elng a lormal source of law. Moreover, Johnson has himself accepted that 
there is nothing to prevent "members incurring binding legal obligations by the 
act of voting for Resolutions in the General Assembly, provided there is a clear 
intention to be so bound. ,,513 
As mentioned above, to assess the juridical value of a resolution, its 
language is relevant. As Brownlie observes: 
Moreover, the language of the resolution itself is significant since this 
indicates the extent to which the resolution is concerned with the 
legal aspects of the subject-matter in the first place. For example, a 
resolution may on its face be declaratory of existing legal principles 
and standards or have the status of an agreed interpretation of the 
Charter of the United Nations (emphasis added.)514 
Professor Higgins emphasises the extent to which an appreciation of the 
legal status of General Assembly resolutions is associated with the over-all 
process of law-making applicable to customary international law. In her words: 
Resolutions of the Assembly are not per se binding: though those 
rules of general international law which they may embody are binding 
on member states, with or without the help of the resolutions. But the 
body of resolutions as a whole, taken as indications of a general 
customary law, undoubtedly provide a rich source of evidence.515 
She also noticed the inherent discretion enabling the drafters of a resolution 
to develop new rules of law in the form of declaring old rules. 
The relevance of the language of the resolution raises the question: what 
will be the effect of a resolution being expressed in the form of a declaration? 
According to Asamoah, various opinions exist on the nature of General 
Assembly declarations. One group see them "as a vehicle for the reformulation 
and adaptation of traditional principles of international law or the development of 
'new' law to take account of the diversity of interests generated by increasing of 
512 O. Asamoah, The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague (1966) at 15 . 
.513 Johnson. op. cit., at 121. 
514 Brownlie (1979: 260) 
.515 R. Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the 
United Nations. Oxford University Press, London (1963) at 5. 
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statehood." Thus, Arechaga516 pointed out that General Assembly resolutions 
"aimed at formulating principles and rules of law for the conduct of States 
normally appear under the title of Declarations." He further noted that "in United 
Nations practice, a declaration is a formal and solemn instrument suitable for , 
rare occasions when principles of general and lasting importance are being 
enumerated." The same author listed three possible effects they could be given 
with respect to developing customary international law: 
Thus in a General Assembly declaration rules of customary law may 
be recognized as pre-existing norms and declared to be so; an 
emerging rule of customary law in status nascendi may crystallize 
thanks to a unanimously adopted General Assembly declaration; a 
resolution by the General Assembly which clearly de lege ferendae 
may however provide the basis for a subsequent and concordant 
practice of States which will transform the resolution into a rule of 
customary international law . 
However, Arechaga stated that the determination of when each effect 
occurs reqUIres careful analysis of all the provisions of a resolution and the 
circumstances surrounding its passage, such as "the drafting of the text; the 
voting strength it obtained; the statements made by members during the process 
of deliberation and the subsequent conduct of States in respect of each 
resolution." Castaneda took a similar view, when he comments: 
The basic foundation for the binding force of rules or principles that 
are 'declared', 'recognized' or 'confirmed' by a resolution rests, in 
the final analysis, on the fact that they are customary rules or general 
principles of law. But the declaratory resolution that incorporates and 
formulates them as a fully probative legal value. As Jessup states 
concerning the Nuremberg principles and the crime of genocide, the 
declarations in which the principles 'are embodied are persuasive 
evidence of the existence of the rules of law which they enunciate.517 
In this regard, Falk observes: 
516 Arechaga, Hague Recuei/, op. cit., at 31. . 
517 Quoted in the Dissenting Opinion of Ameli in INA Corporation v. The Islamic Repub/tc of 
Iran, Award No. 184-161-1 (12 August 1985) reprinted in 8 Iran -U.S. C.T.R. 403 at 408. 
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If declaratory language is used in the resolution, then the problem of 
acknowledging the formal absence of legislative competence of [the 
General Assembly] is more or less solved (emphasis added).518 
The other group, those writers who are interested in emphasising the 
absence of legislative competence in the Assembly, is quite pessimistic and argue 
that "resolutions of the Assembly, whether declarations or not, have nothing 
beyond a moral value." However, Asamoah has himself taken the view that 
sometimes declarations are of more weight than ordinary resolutions.519 To 
appreciate the Assembly's declarations, it is necessary to examine the 
circumstances of their adoption. Thus, no general statement can explain the 
significance of all the declarations adopted. 520 The third group of authors 
consider that the adoption of a General Assembly resolution in the 'declaratory' 
form has additional psychological significance.521 
International tribunals also touched upon the issue. Arbitrator Dupuy, in 
the Texaco case, took the view that without doubt "the United Nations' activities 
have had a significant influence on the content of contemporary international 
law.,,522 The Arbitrator suggests two criteria to determine the legal validity of 
General Assembly resolutions, namely voting patterns and the analysis of the 
provisions concerned. The latter factor might be understood to mean that of the 
content of the resolution. 
After noting that such resolutions "are not directly binding" and "are not 
evidence of customary law", the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, in the Sedco case, held 
that: 
It is generally accepted that such resolutions in certain specified 
circumstances may be regarded as evidence of customary 
.' 'b h . f hi 523 InternatIonal law or can contn ute ... to t e creatIon 0 suc aw. 
518 Falk, op. cit., at 786. 
519 Asamoah, The Legal Significance of the Declarations, op. cit., at 23. 
520 Ibid., at 24-25. 
521 D. P. O'Connell, International Law, Vol. I, Stevens & Sons Ltd., London (1970) at 26. 
522 Texaco Award, op. cit., at 28, para. 83. 
523 Sedco Inc. l'. National Iranian Oil Company et aI., Interlocutory Award No. 59-129-3 (27 
March 1986) reprinted in 10 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 180 at 186. 
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From the above survey, the following conclusions may be drawn: 
(1) to assess the legal weight of General Assembly resolutions, the type of 
resolution and the circumstances surrounding its adoption - including the voting 
pattern, whether the resolution is of a declaratory nature, the statements made by 
member States in the deliberations and post-adoption State practices - should be 
taken into consideration; 
(2) the full legal value and authority of General Assembly resolutions on 
organisational matters are undeniable; 
(3) since the General Assembly is a principal organ of the United Nations 
and a forum where almost all States meet and where these States may express 
their views and their collective will with respect to principles and rules of law for 
the conduct of States, it is reasonable to assume that a legal act of the Assembly 
has legal validity. This view was given the stamp of authority by the late Judge 
Arechaga's statement: "whenever it appears that all nations constituting the 
international community are in agreement as regards the acceptance or the 
application in their mutual relations of a specific rule of conduct, this rule 
b f . . I I ,,524 d ecomes part 0 Internatlona aw. ; an 
(4) if our assumption is correct and General Assembly resolutions have 
some degree of legal weight, those which are adopted in the 'declaratory' form 
are of special priority. 
Having appreciated the juridical value of General Assembly resolutions in 
general, the resolutions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources, which 
have been recalled above, may now be assessed individually from a legal point of 
view. Thus, in the following sub-section, two of the resolutions which have 
created the most controversy at international level will be considered. 
524 Arechaga, Hague Recuei I. op. cit., at 31. 
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7.4.1 Legal Status of Resolution 1803 
As indicated above, Resolution 1803 has been invoked in many disputes 
between the host States and foreign investors. As a result, it has been accepted in 
numerous international arbitral awards as reflecting customary international law. 
Thus, in the Texaco case, involving the nationalisation of concessions of foreign 
oil companies by Libya, Arbitrator Dupuy devoted some 11 paragraphs to the 
examination of the resolutions concerning natural resources and wealth.525 After 
applying two criteria, namely the conditions governing the vote which adopted it, 
and the degree of precision of its terms, to Resolution 1803, Dupuy reached the 
conclusion that: 
On the basis of the circumstances of adoption ... and by expressing an 
opinio juris communis, Resolution 1803 (XVII) seems to this 
Tribunal to reflect the state of customary law existing in this field. 
(emphasis added).526 
In another Libyan nationalisation case, Liamco, Arbitrator Mahmassani 
took the view that: 
In this connection, the Arbitral Tribunal has reached the conclusion 
that the said Resolutions [including Resolution 1803 (XVII)], if not a 
unanimous source of law, are evidence of the recent dominant trend 
of international opinion concerning the sovereign right of States over 
their natural resources (emphasis added).527 
In the Aminoil case, the tribunal held that: 
The most general formulation of the rules applicable for a lawful 
nationalisation was contained in ... Resolution No. 1803 ... This text 
which obtained a unanimous vote in the General Assembly, codifies 
. . ., I ( h' dd d) 528 POSItIve prmcIp es ... emp aSls a e . 
525 Texaco Award, op. cit., at 27-31, paras. 80-91. It was the first time that in an international 
decision the concept of pennanent sovereignty over natural resources was considered in light of a 
new international economic order. 
526 Ibid., at 30, para. 87. 
527 Liamco Award, op. cit., at 103. 
528 Aminoil Award, op. cit., at 1032, para. 143. 
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The same tribunal ruled that this resolution "is to be regarded, by reason of 
the circumstances of its adoption, as reflecting the then state of international 
law.,,529 
Additionally, The Iran-US Claims Tribunal, in the Sedco case, held that: 
There is considerable unanimity in international arbitral practice and 
scholarly opinion that of the resolutions cited above, it is Resolution 
1803 ... which at least reflects, if it does not evidence, current 
international law (emphasis added).530 
After noting that "a few recent resolutions of international bodies or 
conferences, including the General Assembly of the United Nations have cast 
doubts on the existence of an international rule to this effect", the same Tribunal, 
in the Amoco case, ruled that: 
Other less controversial resolutions, such as G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII) ... 
confirm the existence of the rule [relating to the determination of 
. ] 531 compensatIon . 
Legal scholars took a similar view. After dealing with the evolution of UN 
work on permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the context of this 
resolution, Gess concludes that: 
The General Assembly intended to set forth, within the solemn 
vehicle of a declaration, the basic principles and modalities of the 
exercise of permanent sovereignty over natural resources ... 
(emphasis added).532 
In the same vein, Banerjee comments: 
The very adoption of a resolution [i.e. Resolution 1803] by a majority 
of the Members reflects a large degree of consensus and is indicative 
l·.c: d . 533 of common be leIS an practIce. 
529 Ibid., at 1021-1022, para. 90. 
530 Sedco Award, op. cit., at 186. 
531 Amoco Award, op. cit., at 223, para. 116. 
532 Gess, op. cit., at 411. See also Asamoah, The Legal Sign~ficance of the Declarations. op. 
cit., at 100. 
533 Banerjee, op. cit., at 542. 
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Moreover, some writers regarded Resolution 1803 as an important example 
of law-making resolutions of the General Assembly. Among them, Friedmann534 
and Brownlie535 may be recalled. 
Based on the foregoing, it would seem clear that Resolution 1803 has been 
accepted as being declaratory of international law on the issues of expropriation 
and of compensation. 
7.4.2 Legal Status of the Charter 
Having evaluated Resolution 1803, the appreciation of the Charter will be 
our task in this sub-section. As indicated above, its substantive provisions are 
contained in four chapters. The most significant for the present discussion is 
Chapter II, bears the heading 'Economic Rights and Duties of States'. It sets out 
rights, such as the sovereign right of each State to choose its own political, 
economic, social and cultural system, without outside interference, coercion or 
threat (Article 1). Its Article 2 sets forth permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, and the right to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment 
within its national jurisdiction. 
The legal status of the Charter as a whole, and especially Article 2 of 
Chapter II, and particularly sub-paragraph (c) of the said article, IS a very 
. I' . . 536 
controversla questIon among Junsts. Some authors see in the Charter a 
hopeful trend. Thus, to one observer, though Article 2(2) was rejected by the 
major Western countries, "the Charter is at least significant as a declaration by 
the overwhelming majority of States of their concept of international law.,,537 
534 W. Friedmann, op. cit., at 138. 
535 Brownlie (1998: 14). 
536 See on the Charter generally: 
- Garcia-Amador (1980: 1-58); 
- E-U. Petersmann, op. cit. (note 474); 
- Weston, op. cit. (note 114); 
_ A. Rozental, "The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the New 
International Economic Order", 16 Virgo lI.L. (1976) 309; 
_ G. White, "A New International Economic Order", 16 Virgo lI.L. (1976) 323; and 
_ C. N. Brower and J. B. Tepe, "The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A 
Reflection or Rejection ofInternational Law?", 9 Int. Lawyer (1975) 295. 
537 Asante, op. cit., at 609. 
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After noting that in the case of the Charter there was a consensus among the 
developing States as regards the question of compensation, Bring concludes that 
"this consensus amounts to an opinio juris in the sense that the principle 
embraced is regarded as part of existing law, or as a necessary part of future 
law.,,538 Chowdhury took the view that "Some of the principles laid down in the 
Charter undoubtedly represent the recognized legal norms under existing 
international law while others indicate emerging norms or directives principles 
relating to economic relations. ,,539 In his view, the principles contained in 
paragraphs 1 and sub-paragraphs ( a) and (b) of paragraph 2 of Article 2 are 
definitely legal in character.54o Likewise, Professor Weston541 has advanced four 
arguments for the proposition that the Charter is law: (l) the Charter was 
intended to place its articulated principles on 'a firm legal footing'; (2) the 
provisions are framed by such weighty and solemn preambular imagery as to at 
least imply binding legal effect; (3) the Charter is no ordinary resolution and 
hence, unlike other General Assembly resolutions, is more prescriptive than 
recommendatory; and (4) the Charter, having won the overwhelming 
endorsement of UN membership (by a vote of 120-6-10), reflects mature legal 
concepts and expectations that go beyond pious expressions of morality. 
While stating that good intentions and weighty imagery are not enough to 
make law, with regard to the third and fourth propositions, Murphy comments:542 
It is not enough to insist that General Assembly resolutions have only 
recommendatory force. The Charter is no ordinary resolution. One 
could ... argue that the Charter enjoys a juridical status akin to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which, although it originally 
did not intend to create binding obligations in international law, today 
has come to do so. The process leading to the elevation of the 
Declaration to jus cogens signifies as crucial the consistency of state 
practice in invoking its provisions as evidence of the content of 
international law. Post-adoption state practices in the final analysis 
will be decisive. And herein lies the nub of the issue. 
53!! Bring, op. cit., at 127. 
539 Chowdhury (1984: 6). 
540 Ibid. See also Brownlie (1979: 266-267), and Garcia-Amador (1980: 24-25). 
541 Weston, op. cit., at 451. 
542 Murphy, op. cit., at 91. 
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Thus, he concludes that at best Article 2 of the Charter "may be the start of 
a fresh practice ultimately aimed at the creation of new law." Weston reached 
the same conclusion, albeit as to Article 2(2)( c), when he observes that the said 
article "may be the start of a fresh practice whose impact on the law, although 
currently without immediate binding force, could be substantial in the future.,,543 
Similarly, Arbitrator Mahmassani, in the Liamco case, took the position that the 
resolutions which were invoked by Libya, including the Charter "if not a 
unanImous source of law, are evidence of the recent dominant trend of 
international opinion concerning the sovereign right of States over their natural 
resources. ,,544 Arechaga went further and treated Article 2 as a source of 
contemporary internationallaw.545 In this regard, Baxter remarks: 
So far as the dissenters and abstainers are concerned, the Charter 
could be taken as binding only if it were declaratory of the existing 
customary international law, which the dissenters contended it was 
not. But as among those who voted in favour of the Charter, the 
understanding inter se approaches the level of legal effectiveness that 
a treaty has. It is no answer to say that the provisions on 
nationalization have materially less weight than if they had been 
incorporated in a treaty, because the question of a treaty on this 
. I b' h d . 546 partlcu ar su ~ect a never ansen. 
Other authors are quite pessimistic and consider that the Charter is not law. 
For instance, Arbitrator Dupuy, in the Texaco case, considered Article 2 of the 
I ) 547 Charter as "de lege ferenda", and not as a statement of current law (lex ata . 
While accepting that "the Charter does not purport to be a declaration of pre-
existing principles and overall it has a strong programmatic, political and didactic 
flavour",548 Professor Brownlie argues that Arbitrator Dupuy's "view IS 
contradicted by evidence that Article 2(2)( c) is regarded by many States as 
. . 1 l' bl ,,549 emergent pnnclp e, app Ica e ex nunc. To support his proposition, he 
543 Weston, op. cit., at 455. 
544 DarneD Award, op. cit., at 103. 
545 Arechaga, Hague Recueil, op. cit., at 297-310. 
546 R. R. Baxter, "Intemationallaw in her Infinite Variety", 29 1.c.L.Q. (1980) 549 at 564. 
547 Texaco Award, op. cit., at 30, para. 87. 
54R Brownlie (1979: 268). 
549 Brownlie (1998: 545). 
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identifies two arguments. In the first place, the language of this article harks 
back to paragraph 4 of 1962 Declaration. Secondly, "the attitude of States 
opposed to Article 2 indicates all too clearly that governments are aware of the 
need to 'contract out' of such formulations by reservations of position either by 
explanations of negative votes and abstentions or by the making of specific 
reservations after adoption of a resolution by consensus.,,550 The same author 
points out that the following consequences will emerge if one assumes that the 
provisions of Article 2 of the Charter are assessed as evidence of new customary 
law: 
(1) the concept of permanent sovereignty reinforces the existing 
principle that taking for public purposes is lawful; (2) the 
compensation principle is not, as such, denied and recent comment 
has neglected to notice that, if the term compensation has an 
objective content, then failure by the local courts to provide 
compensation would be contrary to the principle of Article 2; (3) it is 
also clear that liability for denial of justice may arise if certain 
standards are not observed; (4) expropriation contrary to treaty, or 
any breach of an independent principle of customary law (e.g. the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of race or religion) will 
continue to be unlawful; and (5) although it has been stated on 
occasion that the reference to the domestic law of the nationalising 
state is entitled to give general recognition to the Calvo doctrine, in 
fact the reference to the domestic law occurs exclusively in relation to 
compensation and this is by no means a reference to domestic law 
willy-nilly (numbers added).551 
That Article 2 of Chapter II of the Charter deals with principles of 
international law cannot be disputed. However, controversy arises as to its 
inconsistency with what are assumed to be some of the existing rules of 
international law. In short, it has been asserted that in some respects the 
provisions of Article 2 are incompatible with some of the established principles 
recognised in Resolution 1803. A comparative study of the pertinent paragraphs 
of Resolution 1803 and of the Charter indicates that there are several 
controversial points, including the principles of public purpose, non-
550 Ibid. 
551 Brownlie (1979: 268-269) and (1998: 545-546). 
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discrimination and compensation. Also, there is an assertion that international 
law has been "utterly rejected" by the Charter. Finally, controversy about the 
question of jurisdiction in the event of compensation disputes. Thus, in the 
remaining discussion of this sub-section, the examination of these Issues, 
respectively, will be our next task. 
As far as the principle of public purpose is concerned, it has been argued 
that while Article 4 of Resolution 1803 recognises the right of a State to 
expropriate foreign property "on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or 
the national interest", the right to expropriate is not qualified under Article 
2(2)( c) of the Charter. 552 Put in technical terms, the public purpose requirement, 
contained in 1962 resolution, has been omitted in the Charter. However, this 
omission may be justified on several grounds: (1) as shown above,553 among the 
traditional principles governing the expropriation of foreign property, the public 
purpose requirement is the weakest one; and (2) today the overwhelming view is 
that the State would be the best arbiter to determine what its public interest 
requires. It is hardly conceivable that such a determination can be reviewed or 
overruled by any judicial or arbitral organs. 
Garcia-Amador554 contends that while paragraph 4 of Resolution 1803 
expressly subjects domestic and foreign interests to the same measures of 
nationalisation, Article 2(2)( c) of the Charter authorises a State to exclude its 
nationals from the application of any measures it adopts, and hence the 
possibility of the violation of the traditional principle of non-discrimination 
between foreigners and nationals may arise. Moreover, some argue that whereas 
in Article 2(2)(a) of the Charter stipulated that "No State shall be compelled to 
grant preferential treatment to foreign investment", it "fails to include the natural 
collorary of non-discrimination.,,555 However, these arguments are not without 
difficulty. First, Chowdhury maintains that as much as all that paragraph 4 of 
552 See, e.g., Garcia-Amador (1980: 28), Brower and Tepe, op. cit.. at 305. 
553 See our discussion on the public purpose requirement in this chapter, at 89-98. 
554 Garcia-Amador (1980: 27-28). 
555 Brower and Tepe, op. cit., at 306. 
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resolution 1803 provides is that "the public purpose of nationalization overrides 
private interests, both domestic and foreign, and not that the same standards of 
nationalization shall apply to both domestic and foreign interests. ,,556 Second, 
even if Garcia-Amador's argument is correct, as discussed earlier,557 there is no 
international duty to treat foreign property and domestic property identically, as 
Garcia-Amador has himself accepted. The same writer has recognised that the 
departure of the Charter from the national treatment "conforms with one of the 
basic postulates of New International Economic Order, i.e. the claim to 
preferential treatment in favor of developing countries." 
As regards the principle of compensation, the controversy is whether the 
payment of compensation constitutes a legal duty under the Charter. In support 
of the assertion that there is no such duty under the Charter, Garcia-Amador558 
has advanced three arguments: (1) while paragraph 4 of Resolution 1803 
provides that the dispossessed owner "shall be paid appropriate compensation", 
Article 2(2)( c) of the Charter stipulates that "appropriate compensation should be 
paid." He contends that the use of should in lieu of shall clearly indicates that 
under the Charter the payment of compensation ceased to be a legal duty; 
whether compensation is to be paid is left to the discretion of the nationalising 
State. Thus, Garcia-Amador concludes that the Charter has departed from a well-
established principle of customary international law; (2) while Resolution 1803 
provides for the payment of appropriate compensation "in accordance with the 
rules in force in the State taking such measures ... and in accordance with 
international law", the Charter specifies that the dispossessed owner should be 
paid "appropriate compensation ... by the State adopting such measures taking 
into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State 
considers pertinent." It has been contended that this is certainly a departure from 
the principle contained in Resolution 1803, according to which the determination 
of the appropriateness of compensation is not left entirely to the discretion of the 
556 Chowdhury (1984: 9-10). 
557 See our discussion on the principle of non-discrimination in this chapter. at 98-108. 
S5R Garcia-Amador (1980: 28-32). 
186 
expropriating State. He further argued that this prOVISIOn of the Charter 
obviously gives the State exclusive jurisdiction for the detennination of 
compensation; and (3) the legislative history of the Charter shows that there is 
not an international obligation to pay compensation. 
Garcia-Amador's first and second arguments were expressed in another 
way by other commentators. F or instance, the absence of any reference to 
international law in Article 2 of the Charter is described as "utter rej ection of 
international law" in respect of nationalisation or expropriation measures. 
Brower and Tepe559 maintain that "the only obligation, prefaced with the 
precatory rather than mandatory 'should', is to grant such compensation, if any, 
as is subjectively thought to be 'appropriate', considering only local law and 
'circumstances' to which intemationallaw is not necessarily 'pertinent'." 
However, the mere use of the word 'should' instead of 'shall' does not 
necessarily exclude the duty to pay compensation. "When read in the context of 
the entire Article 2 and other pertinent provisions of the Charter, the mandatory 
obligation to pay compensation cannot be disputed."s6o Murphy took the view 
that Article 2(2)( c) of the Charter "does not repudiate compensation in its entirety 
but instead seeks to remove the requirement from international jurisdiction.,,561 
Moreover, in response to the criticism about the exclusive reference to domestic 
jurisdiction and the possibility of arbitrary exercise of power of the host State, 
Arechaga had this to say: 
It must be recognized that Article 2, paragraph 2, the result of 
differing views, is so vague and ambiguous as to lend support to such 
an understanding of the provision. However, a reading of the entire 
article in relation to other parts of the instrument and basic principles 
of international law, compels a different interpretation. It is true that 
Article 2, paragraph 2( c) does not include the provision of ... 
Resolution 1803 requInng, in cases of nationalization or 
expropnatIon, the payment of appropriate compensation 'in 
accordance with rules in force in the State taking such measure in the 
exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law. ' 
559 Brower and Tepe, op. cit., at 305. 
560 Chowdhury (1984: 10). 
561 Murphy, op. cit., at 89. 
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The developed countries continuously asserted that customary 
international law provided for 'prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation.' The phrase 'in accordance with international law' 
was eliminated because of Third W orId countries' 'suspicions as to 
what Western countries expect from international law. ,562 However, 
once it is established that the alleged customary rule of 'prompt, 
adequate and effective' compensation is no longer accepted by the 
vast majority of the international community, the reference to 
international law lost the meaning intended by the developed 
countries (two footnotes omitted).563 
The late Judge continued: 
The travaux preparatoires of the Charter also show that the provision 
of paragraph 2( c) is not based on a position which denies the 
existence of any obligation to pay compensation. This position 
originally adopted by the working group which drafted the Charter, 
was abandoned during discussion of the instrument. 564 
Likewise, as will be shown in due course, the negative position IS 
incompatible with State practice. 
Thus, the foregoing examination indicates that not only does the Charter 
impose the duty to pay (appropriate) compensation, but also that it provides that 
such compensation shall be determined by "taking into account ... all 
circumstances that the State considers pertinent." It should be noted that the last 
words "all circumstances that the State considers pertinent" have been the subject 
of controversy.565 While some consider them as an attempt "to re-establish a 
claim to absolute sovereignty", others interpret it "as a reference to international 
law." However, for Chowdhury, "the standard of pertinent circumstances limits 
the scope of arbitrariness in the subjective determination of the quantum of 
compensation by the host State." He goes on to say that: 
The guidelines for the formulation of pertinent circumstances must be 
found within the parameters of the concept that nationalization is a 
562 W . 313 aart, op. CIt., at . 
563 Arechaga, "State Responsibility for Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property", op. cit., at 
186. 
S()4 Ibid., at 184. 
565 Seidl-Hohenveldem, op. cit., at 28-29. 
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legitimate exercise of the right of permanent sovereignty on the one 
hand, and the obligation of equitable restitution on the other. 566 
Therefore, the same writer suggests various circumstances which should be 
considered as pertinent. 567 
Having dealt with the above-mentioned criticisms against the Charter, 
Arechaga concluded that: 
It is not entirely accurate to say that international law has been utterly 
rej ected by the Charter ... Though expelled through the door because 
of its alleged identification with the doctrine of 'prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation', it has come back through the window in 
the garb of an equitable principle which takes into account the 
specific circumstances of each case.568 
The last controversial point relates to the issue of jurisdiction in the event 
of compensation disputes. 569 In this respect, Article 4 of Resolution 1803 
provides that: 
... the national jurisdiction of the State taking such measures shall be 
exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other 
parties concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made through 
arbitration or international adjUdication 
It has been argued that preference was given to arbitration or international 
adjUdication, which always favours the deprived alien owners, since more often 
international tribunals apply principles of public international law, rather than the 
566 Chowdhury (1984: 16). 
567 They include: (1) the nationalising State's financial capacity to pay; (2) the period during 
which the nationalised undertaking has exploited a public service or the nationalised resources; 
(3) whether or not the nationalised undertaking has recovered its initial investment; (4) whether or 
not the profits received have been excessive; (5) whether or not there has been any undue 
enrichment as a result of a colonial situation; (6) the contribution of the nationalised undertaking 
to the economic and social development of the host country and its respect for labour laws of that 
country; (7) the reinvestment policies of the nationalised undertaking; and (8) the loss of future 
earnings of the nationalised undertaking due to cancellation in spite of a stabilisation clause Ibid., 
at 16-17. See also Arechaga, Hague Reeueil, op. cit., at 301-302. 
568 Arechaga, "State Responsibility for the Nationalisation of Foreign-Owned Property", op. cit., 
at 188. 
569 Since the settlement of compensation disputes are not our concern in this thesis, therefore, 
we confine ourselves only to state the differences between Resolution 1803 and the Charter from 
this aspect. See on the issue: Arechaga, Hague Reeueil, op. cit.. at 304-305; Garcia-Amador 
(1980: 40-43), and Chowdhury (1984: 17-23). 
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law of the State concerned.57o However, regarding the dispute settlement 
mechanism, Article 2(2)( c) of the Charter stipulates that: 
In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a 
controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the 
nationalising State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and 
mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be 
sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in 
accordance with the principle of free choice of means. 
These provisions differ in two aspects from Article 4 of Resolution 1803. 
First, under the Charter, instead of exhausting local remedies and then proceeding 
to arbitration or international adjudication as embodied in Resolution 1803, 
national courts are the final arbiters in compensation disputes. Second, any resort 
to 'other peaceful means' must be between 'States concerned' rather than 'upon 
agreement by sovereign States and other parties concerned' as set forth in 
Resolution 1803. 
Based on the above analysis, the present author shares the view that some 
of the principles embodied in the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States ''undoubtedly represent the recognised legal norms under existing 
international law while others indicate emerging norms or directive principles 
relating to economic relations. ,,571 
Additionally, from the foregoing survey of the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, the conclusion may be drawn that the 
principle of permanent sovereignty has emerged as a principal economic factor in 
completing political self-determination. It is now a well-established principle of 
international law, and, again to the present writer, is one of the candidate rules 
which may have the special status of jus cogens. The main objective of the \ 
principle is to preserve State control over natural wealth and resources. This may 
come close to what Professor Schachter has observed: 
On the international level, the principle of permanent sovereignty has 
become the focal normative conception used by States to justify their 
570 Akinsanya, op. cit., at 65. 
571 Chowdhury (1984: 6). 
/' 
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right to exercise control over production and distribution 
arrangements without being hampered by the international law of 
States responsibility as it had been traditionally interpreted by the 
capital-exporting countries '" It would be a mistake to consider the 
idea of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as 
anachronistic rhetoric. It should be viewed as a fresh manifestation 
of present aspirations for self-rule and greater equity (emphasis 
added).572 
8. Conclusion 
As seen in this chapter, for any single issue, the relevant conclusion was 
drawn immediately after its examination. Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to 
summarise these conclusions. 
1) Due to the shortcomings of the two standards, viz., the 'international 
minimum standard' and 'national treatment', neither of them can be used as a 
standard by which to measure the international responsibility of the State with 
regard to the treatment of aliens. To the same effect is the argument that there 
are several human rights instruments which, instead of referring to nationals or 
'\......-
aliens, are concerned with 'individuals' within a certain jurisdiction without 
discrimination. As shown above, the rights and obligations of nationals and 
aliens are not the same in all circumstances. In short, there is no single standard 
regarding the treatment of aliens which enjoys universal support. Thus, the 
international legal scene demands the formulation of new standards. 
2) A State has the right to expropriate the property belonging to aliens in its 
territory. However, its right to do so is subject to the conditions laid down by 
international law. The expropriation of foreign property will be lawful only if 
such a measure was for a public purpose and was not discriminatory. Though 
there is a duty in international law to pay compensation for the nationalisation of 
foreign property, the non-satisfaction of such a duty does not render the measure 
unlawful. Moreover, among the three criteria, the public purpose requirement is 
the weakest one. 
572 O. Schachter, Sharing the World's Resources. Columbia University Press. New York (1977) 
at 172. 
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3) One of the important sources in which the right to expropriate foreign 
property has been endorsed is the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources. The principle has been enshrined in numerous UN resolutions, and is 
now a well-settled principle of international law. This conclusion comes close to 
what the Iran-US Claims Tribunal stated that the right to nationalise foreign 
property is "today unanimously recognized, even by States which reject the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, considered by a 
majority of States as the legal foundation of such a right."s73 
573 Amoco Award, op. cit., at 222, para. 113. 
CHARTER THREE 
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION 
1. Introduction 
Broadly speaking, the international 'law of expropriation' consists of three 
main distinct branches, namely the rules relating to the definition of the subject-
matter of expropriation (i.e. the concept of property), the identification of 
expropriation and the question of compensation. In the last chapter we have seen 
that not only tangible but intangible property, including contractual rights, can be 
subjected to expropriation or nationalisation. As far as the rules governing 
compensation are concerned, the issue of compensation for nationalisation of 
foreign property is a well-known cause of controversy among authors in 
international law. Thus, the next chapter is devoted to consideration of this issue. 
The second branch of rules governing expropriation, that is the 
identification of expropriation, constitutes the whole discussion of the present 
chapter. As shown in chapter 1, in pursuance of its economic programmes, a 
State may nationalise foreign-owned property by legislation. When this happens, 
it results in an immediate and outright vesting of the property in the hands of the 
State or a State entity created for this purpose. There is no particular legal 
problem in identifying such measures. Attempts have also been made to narrow 
the definition of expropriation to outright expropriations accomplished by 
legislation. 1 Moreover, in the Biloume case, the tribunal held that no distinction 
should be made between direct and creeping expropriations.2 
See M. Somarajah, The International Lml' on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University 
Press (1994) at 282. 
2 Quoted in ibid., at 283. 
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In addition to direct expropriation, however, it is evident that there could be 
other instances of interferences with property rights which could amount to 
expropriation of foreign property for which the State may be responsible. Hence, 
they constitute the subject for the discussion of the law of expropriation. 
Although there is a substantial body of literature, such as legal writings and 
international arbitral awards on expropriation and its components, the sources 
relating to this category of expropriation are quite few. This has been explained 
by Dolzer in the following terms: 
Historically, State measures affecting property rights in an indirect 
manner have not been as prominent in State practice as they are now 
in the modem interventionist type of State.3 
In modem literature and arbitral awards, however, the subject under 
discussion has received special attention. Several facts contributed to this. 
Firstly, in contrast to a laissez fa ire State, the imperatives of welfare States have 
led them to interfere frequently with the property rights of private persons, 
including aliens. But often such interference or action falls short of direct 
expropriation. Secondly, under certain circumstances, States can diminish 
property rights without affecting direct ownership of the investment. For 
instance, when the management of a company is taken over, the company, its 
assets and shares are not affected but the foreign investors' interests are 
decreased. 
It is worth noting that most expropriation cases brought to the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal are related to claims that fall short of direct expropriation.4 In 
those cases, Iran denies any encroachment of the rights of ownership of American 
nationals in their property so as to constitute an expropriation. This could cause 
Iran to incur responsibility, and since ownership of the property remains with US 
3 R. Dolzer "Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property", 1 I.C.S.I.D. Rev-F.I.L.1. (1986) 41 at 
42. 
4 This has been explained by one writer in the following terms: 
"The reason for this lies in the actions of the Revolutionary Government and its economic policies 
after the Revolution of 1979." H. Piran, "Indirect Expropriation in the Case Law of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal", F.Y.I.L. (1995) 140 at 151. 
194 
nationals, the latter consider themselves to have been deprived of the rights of 
use, enjoyment and control of the property. Thus, they claimed that their 
property was expropriated. In these circumstances, the preliminary task of the 
Tribunal is the identification of expropriation. Put in technical terms, it must 
decide whether an expropriation has occurred, despite the fact that the foreigner 
still maintains ownership. Hence, the awards of the Tribunal in those cases 
constitute a fruitful source for the present subject. However, to some,5 the 
awards of this Tribunal must be used cautiously as it deals with expropriations in 
the context of the revolutionary situation of 1979 in Iran, and its constituent 
documents gave the Tribunal power to deal not only with direct expropriations of 
physical assets but "all [sic] measures affecting property rights. ,,6 It is true that 
such a wide definition of expropriation will not be tenable in international law, 
simply because all governmental interferences with property rights, such as 
taxation and the like, will not amount to expropriation so as to give rise to 
international concern. The amount of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal's awards, 
however, based on "other measures affecting property rights" in comparison with 
other awards in this respect could be negligible. Therefore, it is submitted that 
they constitute a rich source on the present topic. As Piran puts it: 
This is a unique situation in which so many cases on this subject have 
been decided by an international tribunal, and it undoubtedly should 
enrich the resources in this branch ofinternational1aw.7 
Thus, in all our discussions in this chapter, special attention will be paid to 
the awards of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. 
Before embarking upon the subject, one must clarify the terminology. 
Authors often refer to this practice by terms such as 'indirect expropriation,8, 
5 Sornarajah, op. cit., at 282-283 and 307-308. See also R. Higgins, "The Taking of Property 
by the State: Recent Developments in International Law", 176 Hague Recueil (l982-lI) 267 at 
329. 
6 Article lI(I) of the Claims Settlement Declaration. For the text of the Declaration, see 1 Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal Reports (hereinafter Iran-U.S. C.T.R.) (Grotius Publications. 
Cambridge) and 20 I.L.M. (1981) 224. . . 
7 Piran, op. cit., at 243. See also G. H. Aldrich, "What Constitutes a Compensable Takmg of 
Property? The Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 88 A.1.I.L. (1994) 585 at 
586. 
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'creeping expropriation,9, 'disguised expropriation'lO, 'constructive taking' 11, 'de 
f: t . . ,12 
ac 0 expropnatIon. The same words have been employed in arbitral 
decisions. 
Terms such as 'creeping', 'disguised' or 'constructive' expropriation, while 
providing a label for expropriations outside the obvious situation of formal 
expropriations of physical property, do little to help in the identification of 
indirect expropriations which will attract the application of international law on 
expropriation. 13 Likewise, these terms suggest a deliberate strategy on the part of 
the host State to deprive the alien, which could happen in some circumstances, 
but is not the case in all instances. 14 Thus, the term 'indirect expropriation' is 
preferred here. Although we must bear in mind the above-mentioned defects, it 
is important to consider the neutrality of the term, which is helpful in any 
analysis. 
R See, e.g., K. C. Kotecha, "Comparative Analysis of Nationalization Laws: Objectives and 
Techniques", 8 CLL.J.S.A. (1975) 87 at 92. Note that the author used the term 'indirect seizure'; 
Higgins, op. cit., at 322; S. C Jain, Nationalization of Foreign Property - A Study in North-South 
Dialogue, Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi (1983) at 34; Dolzer, op. cit., at 44; Sornarajah, 
op. cit., at 282, and Piran, op. cit., at 140. 
9 See, inter alia, B. H. Weston, "Constructive Takings under International Law: A Modest 
Foray into the Problem of Creeping Expropriation", 16 Virgo ll.L. (1975-76) 103 and The ALI 
Third Restatement US Foreign Relations Law (1987), Vol. 2, Section 712, 196 at 200. 
10 The Separate Opinion of Judge Sir G. Fitzmaurice in the Barcelona Traction Light and 
Power Company, Ltd., case, (Belgium v. Spain), I.CJ. Rep. (1970) 65 at 106; the case of 
Elettronica Sigula S.P.A. (ELSJ), (United States of America v. Italy), Award of 20 July 1989, 
I.C.J. Rep. (1989) 14 at 69, (para. 116), 70 (para. 118) and 71 (para. 119), and M. Akehurst, A 
Modern Introduction to International Law (6th ed.), Routledge, London (1987) at 95. 
II Weston, op. cit., at 103; I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law, Martinus 
Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1992) at 155, and the latter writer's other literature, "Aliens, Property", Vol. 
8, Encycl. P.I.L., 20 at 21. 
12 See e.g., N. R. Doman, "Post War Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe". 48 
Col.L.R. (1948) 1125 at 1129, and Vernie R. Pointon et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Award No. 516-322-1 (23 July 1991), reprinted in 27 Iran-U.S. CT.R. 49 at 59, para. 32, and at 
61, para. 36. 
13 Sornarajah, op. cit., at 282. 
14 Piran, op. cit., at 140. n. 1. 
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2. Definition of the Subject 
Though the concept of 'indirect expropriation' is not a new phenomenon, 15 
its definition is by no means settled. Put differently, there is no generally-agreed 
definition of the concept. It could be argued that any type of governmental 
interferences with deprivation of alien property which has not taken place as a 
result of direct legislation or executive action amounts to an indirect 
expropriation. To the same effect, it could be contended that all governmental 
interferences with the peaceful rights of use, enjoyment and control of property 
by aliens do not constitute expropriation incurring the responsibility of the host 
State, and hence do not attract the concern of international law. Thus, there are 
some problems in offering a precise definition which clearly identifies all 
governmental interferences. One commentator recognised the difficulty of 
delimiting the subject and observes that it is nearly impossible to define with 
precision the meaning of indirect expropriation. 16 It has been suggested that "the 
complexity of the situations and endless possibilities of State intervention in the 
property rights of private persons make it impossible to give a straightforward 
defini tion of the subj ect. 17 
To avoid the problem, Sornarajah18 observes that in a sense expropriations 
may be divided into two categories, namely 'compensable expropriations' and 
'regulatory expropriations'. It is more appropriate to identify the types of 
expropriations that are considered as 'compensable expropriations' than to devise 
a criterion for the category of interferences which do not amount to 
expropriation, and hence engage the responsibility of the State, referred to as 
'regulatory expropriations'. 
15 During the 1917 Mexican Agrarian Refonns, a United States' Note to Mexico stated that the 
US Government could not acquiesce in any direct and indirect confiscation of foreign-owned 
properties in Mexico. See further, Jain, op. cit., at 34. 
16 S. D. Metzger, "Multinational Conventions for the Protection of Private Foreign 
Investment", 9 J.P.L. (1960) 157. 
17 Piran, op. cit., at 143. 
IR Somarajah, op. cit., at 283. 
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Nevertheless, some attempts have been made to define the concept of 
indirect expropriation. For example, in efforts at codification of international law 
relating to expropriation of alien property, attention has been paid to the issue of 
indirect deprivation or expropriation. Article 10(3 )( a) of the 1961 Harvard Draft 
Convention on International Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (sometimes 
referred to as the Sohn-Baxter Draft Convention) defines a taking of property as 
including: 
not only an outright taking of property, but also any such 
unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment or disposal of 
property as to justify an interference that the owner will not be able to 
use, enjoy or dispose of the property within a reasonable period of 
time after the inception of such interference. 19 
In their explanatory note to this article, Sohn and Baxter stressed that the 
duration of an interference with the use, enjoyment and disposal is the main 
factor in a determination of whether an expropriation has taken place or not, and 
the adjudicator of the claim possesses a considerable power in this respect. 20 The 
issue of indirect expropriation, entitled 'creeping expropriation', is also identified 
in the ALI Third Restatement. Section 712(l)(g) of its commentary reads: 
A state is responsible as for an expropriation of property ... when it 
subjects alien property to taxation, regulation, or other action that is 
confiscatory, or that prevents, unreasonably interferes with, or unduly 
delays, effective enjoyment of an alien's property or its removal from 
the state's territory. Depriving an alien of control of his property, as 
by an order freezing his assets, might become a taking if it is long 
extended.21 
As far as treaty law is concerned, Article 3 of the 1967 OECD Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property provides that "No Party shall 
take any measures depriving, directly or indirectly, of his property a national of 
another Party unless the following conditions are complied with.,,22 
19 Reprinted in 55 A.1.I.L. (1961) 545 at 553. 
20 Ibid., at 559. 
21 The ALI Third Restatement, op. cit., at 200-20l. 
22 Article 3(1) of the OECD Convention, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. (1968) 128. See also Abs-
Shawcross Draft Convention (Article 3), reprinted in 9 J.P.L. (1960) 116. 
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Bilateral investment treaties also allocate some provisions to expropriation 
of investments, including the issue of indirect expropriation, although there is no 
general formula. In short, the terms used are varied, and they include: 'measures 
having effect equivalent to nationalisation', 'indirectly to nationalise' and the 
like. Thus, Article 5( 1) of the India-United Kingdom Treaty stipulates that: 
Investments of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be 
nationalised, expropriated or SUbjected to measures having effect 
equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation.23 
A similar formula emerges in the W orId Bank Guidelines on the treatment 
of Foreign Direct Investment. Article IV(I) thereof in part reads: 
A state may not expropriate or otherwise take in whole or in part a 
foreign private investment in its territory, or make measures which 
have similar effects.24 
Similarly, the North American Free Trade Agreement (between Canada, 
Mexico and the United States) explicitly referred to indirect expropriation. 
Article 1110 of the Agreement provides that: 
No party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an 
investment of an investor of another party in its territory or take a 
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an 
. 25 Investment ... 
Another source in which the definition of indirect expropriation can be 
found is investment insurance contracts. Since investments in developing 
countries run risks of a non-commercial nature, for instance, civil war, 
nationalisation (either outright or indirect), etc., investors desire to obtain 
23 Treaty signed on 14 March 1994, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. (1995) 935 at 941. For the same 
formula, see the 'Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments' 
between Korea and Russia, which was signed on 14 December 1990, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 
(1991) 762. 
24 Reprinted in 311. L. M. (1992) 1366 at 1382. 
25 Reprinted in 32 I.L.M. (1993) 605 at 641. A similar formula emerges in the 1985 !urkey-
United States Treaty, where Article lII( 1) provides: "Investments shall not be expropnated or 
nationalized either directly or indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or 
nationalization ... ", reprinted in 25 I.L.M. (1986) 85 at 92. 
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Insurance covering these risks.26 The major capital-exporting countries have 
introduced schemes to grant such insurance. The provisions of these insurance 
schemes also contain definitions of the concept of indirect expropriation. Here, 
as in the case of bilateral investment agreements there is no general formula. In 
addition, to cover against outright expropriation, the German standard contract, 
for example, insures against actions by which: 
such a large part of the commercial value of the enterprise, the 
establishment or the plant is transferred or destroyed so as to make it 
impossible to continue the operation of the enterprise, the 
establishment or the plant in the long run without economic loss and 
consequently the participation to the capital involved must be deemed 
as lost or the claim resulting from the participation, the claim 
resulting from the participation-like credit or the claim relating to the 
profits wholly or in part be recovered or enforced.27 
Moreover, the American insurance agency, the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) and its British counterpart, the Export Credits Guarantee 
Department, offer a definition of indirect expropriation in their policies?8 
Authors have also expressed views on this issue, and some of them 
specifically have suggested definitions. Explaining the meaning of indirect 
measures, Jain29 has offered several criteria to test any given situation. They 
include: (1) character of the State interference; (2) nature of the object of rights or 
property affected; (3) extent of the gain to the State and/or loss to the affected 
person; (4) the link between the State's action and person's loss; (5) loss of 
control and/or ownership; and (6) duration of interference or control. 
According to Fatouros, indirect measures of expropriation "would 
presumably include regulatory government action which affects foreign investors 
but falls short of an outright taking.,,3o In his recent penetrating and thoughtful 
26 I. Seidl-Hohenveldem, International Economic Law, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1992) at 
155. 
n Quoted by Dolzer, op. cit., at 56. 
2R Ibid., at 56-57. 
29 Jain, op. cit., at 39-40. 
:\0 Quoted by Jain, at 38-39. 
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article on indirect expropriation In the jurisprudence of the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, Piran has suggested a definition, whereby indirect expropriation means: 
Any unreasonable and intentional interference by a government 
towards a particular property, with the use, enjoyment or disposal of 
such property for a long time, so that it could reasonably be inferred 
that the owner is perpetually deprived of the use, enjoyment or 
disposal of his property (emphasis added).31 
As indicated above, considerable efforts have been made to define and 
delimit the subject under discussion. On the one hand, as the possibilities of 
State interference with the property rights of private persons are endless, the 
above definitions can cover only some aspects of the concept. On the other hand, 
it is a well established rule that a definition must cover the relevant aspects and 
exclude the irrelevant ones. Having these in mind, if one intends to give a 
definition of the concept of indirect expropriation, it cannot be a precise one. 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to suggest a test or a combination of tests, as 
shown below, which might be useful for this purpose: 
(1) Attribution of an action or omission to the State. 
(2) The State's intention to interfere with alien property. 
(3) Character of the State interference, for example, unreasonableness of 
the interference. 
(4) Duration of State interference. 
(5) Extent of the gain to the State and/or loss to the affected person. 
Having examined the terminology and the definition of the subject, it is 
timely now to consider the crucial questions of attributability and intention. 
3. The Question of Attribution 
Article 3 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility provides that: 
31 Piran, op. cit., at 146. 
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There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when (a) conduct 
consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the State under 
internationallaw.32 
Unlike direct expropriation, in an indirect expropriation the attributability 
test plays a significant role in establishing State responsibility. Put in technical 
terms, unless the conduct is directly or indirectly attributable to the State, the 
expropriation cannot involve the State in responsibility. International tribunals 
have paid due attention to the significance of the issue, and it has been treated as 
a vital condition for a taking. For example, in the Amco case,33 a dispute between 
Indonesia and a foreign investor over the expropriation of investment and the 
withdrawal of an investment licence, the tribunal, under the auspices of 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ('ICSID') held 
that: 
As a conditio sine qua non there shall exist a taking of private 
property and that such taking shall have been executed or instigated 
by a government, on behalf of a government or by an act which 
otherwise is attributable to a government (emphasis added).34 
Furthermore, having examined the record, the tribunal reached the 
conclusion that the take-over in question was affected by the Indonesian army, 
and this act was therefore attributable to the Government of Indonesia.35 It 
follows that where the armed forces of a State are involved in an expropriation of 
property the attribution of the act to the State concerned is clear, provided that 
they act on behalf of the government. 
The Iran-US Claims Tribunal also dealt with the question of attribution. 
The latter test has been considered as an essential prerequisite for any indirect 
expropriation. In the Otis Elevator case, for instance, the Tribunal stated that: 
32 2 Y.B.LL.e. (1980) part 2, at 30. 
33 Amco Asia Corporation et al v. The Republic of Indonesia (Award of the merits), Award of9 
December 1983, reprinted in 24 LL.M. (1985) 1022. 
_,4 Ibid., at 1025, para. 158. 
35 Ibid., at 1027, para. 172. 
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The Tribunal must ... examine the acts of interference Otis complains 
of and determine whether any or all are attributable to the 
Government of Iran and whether any or all, by themselves or 
collectively, constitute a sufficient degree of interference to warrant a 
finding that a deprivation of property has occurred (emphasis 
added).36 
The same Tribunal, in the Petrolane case,37 held that although the claimant 
lost control of its equipment, office and fixed assets, it was not established that 
such a loss was attributable to the Government of Iran. Likewise, the United 
States Foreign Claims Commission, in the processing of the Iranian claims, 
followed the same principle. The Commission, in a case before it, ruled that a 
claim for expropriation of property would be admissible only if there was enough 
evidence showing that an individual or individuals or an entity acting for the 
government have expropriated the property.38 
The relevant nonns of international law on attributability draw a distinction 
between public and private acts. 39 A State has no responsibility for the acts of 
private individuals, except in special circumstances. It is, however, liable for its 
own acts and omissions; in this context, the State is identified with its 
governmental apparatus. It includes the legislature and the judiciary, as well as 
the executive.4o 
The legislative arm of a State may cause liability for the State. According 
to Brownlie, the affected alien "must establish damage consequent on the 
implementation of legislation or the omission to legislate.,,41 The judicial organs, 
36 Otis Elevator Company v. The Islamic Republic of Iran and Bank Mellat, Award No. 304-
282-2 (29 April 1987), reprinted in 14 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 283 at 293, para. 29. 
37 Petrolane Inc. et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Award No. 518-131-2 (14 
August, 1991), reprinted in 27 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 64 at 92, para. 83. The Tribunal, in Pointon 
Award, op. cit. (note 12), held that "In order to meet their burden of proof the Claimants must 
establish two distinct elements ... second, that an expropriation or other measures affecting their 
property rights, attributable to Iran, took place." Ibid., at 59, para. 30. 
3!! See Piran, op. cit., at 157, n. 53. 
39 See Chapter II entitled 'The Act of the State under International Law' of the ILC Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility (http://www.un.orgllawlilc/reportsI1996/96repfra.htm). 
40 Akehurst, op. cit., at 89. 
41 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Lmt' (5th ed. ), Clarendon Press, Oxford 
(1998) at 452. 
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i.e. courts of justice of a State, may also bring about responsibility for the State 
through their judgments. The Iran-US Claims Tribunal, in the Oil Field of Texas 
case, confinned that the decision of a court may amount to expropriation. It was 
held that: 
It is well established in international law that the decision of a court 
in fact depriving an owner of the use and benefit of his property may 
amount to an expropriation of such property that is attributable to the 
State of the court (emphasis added).42 
After the Revolution in Iran, as far as the executive branch of a State is 
concerned, several institutions, including the Revolutionary Guards, the 
Revolutionary Committees and the Workers' Councils were created, in addition 
to the traditional organs, such as anny and police. Since their real legal status 
was unclear, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal was faced with the establishment of a 
link between the acts of those institutions and the newly emerged Government. 
As to the Revolutionary Guards and Committees, the Tribunal considered 
them as State organs whose acts are imputable to the Government of Iran, and the 
latter is liable for their actions. In the William Pereira case,43 for instance, the 
claimant alleged that his assets were expropriated by the Revolutionary Guards, 
and as a result Iran was liable for them. After examining the case, the Tribunal 
held that the Government of Iran was responsible for the acts of the 
Revolutionary Guards. In the same vein, the Tribunal in the Sola Tiles case ruled 
that "it is well-settled that the Revolutionary Committees are among those organs 
whose acts are attributable to the Government of Iran, which is responsible for 
them as a matter of law. ,,44 
In some indirect expropriation cases presented to the same Tribunal, 
claimants contended that their properties were expropriated by the Government 
42 Oil Field of Texas inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran and National Iranian Oil Company, 
Award No. 285-43-1 (8 October 1986), reprinted in 12 Iran-U.S. CT.R. 308 at 318, para. 42. 
43 William L. Pereira Associates. Iran v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 116-1-3 (17 
March 1984), reprinted in 5 Iran-U.S. CT.R. 198 at 226-227. 
44 Sola Tiles Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 298-317-1 (22 April 1987), 
reprinted in 14 Iran-U.S. CT.R. 223 at 233, para. 40. 
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of Iran through the Workers' Councils. For example, in the Schering case, the 
claimant alleged that the property belonging to its subsidiary was expropriated by 
the Workers' Council of the company. In examining whether such a council 
could be characterised as a State organ and its actions could be attributable to 
Iran, the Tribunal held that: 
The Constitutional and regulatory framework for the creation of 
Workers' Councils do not indicate that the Councils were to have 
other duties than basically representing the workers' interests ... That 
the formation of the Councils was initiated by the State does not itself 
imply that the Councils were to function as part of the State 
machinery.45 
With regard to this statement, the Tribunal held no liability for the 
Government of Iran for the actions of the Council, and hence dismissed the case. 
It is worth noting that Aldrich, the American arbitrator to the Tribunal, lends 
support to the Tribunal's finding on the issue. In his comment on the award in 
this context, he observes that "it seems clear that the Tribunal correctly held that 
the acts of workers and workers' councils by themselves were not attributable to 
the Government of Iran.,,46 
The last point about the question of attribution, in the practice of the Iran-
DS Claims Tribunal, relates to State owned commercial entities which possess 
separate legal personality, for instance, banks. The question raised is whether the 
actions of such entities are attributable to the Government of Iran and whether 
Iran is liable. In the International Technical Products case,47 the issue was 
alleged expropriation of a building belonging to the claimant by Bank Tejarat, a 
government-owned bank, for which the Government of Iran was responsible. 
45 Schering Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 122-38-3 (16 April 184), 
reprinted in 5 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 361 at 370. See also the Tribunal's Awards in the Eastman 
Kodak Company et al v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Award No. 329-227112384-3 (11 
November 1987), reprinted in 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 153, and the Otis Elevator Award, op. cit., at 
294, para. 33. 
46 Aldrich. op. cit., at 602-603. 
47 International Technical Products Corporation et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al., 
Award No. 196-302-3 (24 October 1985), reprinted in 9 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 206. See also the 
Tribunal's award in Flexi-Van Leasing Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 259-36-1 
(13 October 1986), reprinted in 12 ibid., 335. 
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The Tribunal ruled that in becoming the owner of the claimant's building the 
Bank acted in its commercial capacity, not as a governmental organ. The action, 
therefore, was not attributable to the Government of Iran. It was also held that 
the mere fact of State control over a commercial entity is not sufficient to hold 
the State concerned liable for the acts of such entities. Rather it would be 
required to establish that the acts are clearly attributable to the government. 
The above survey of the case law of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal and 
others indicates that for the purpose of State responsibility, the test of attribution 
is of decisive importance. Also, for attribution, the status of the organ to whose 
direct acts deprivatory events can be ascribed plays a significant role. 
4. The Question of Intent 
In the previous section we have seen that, in order to establish liability for 
expropriation, it is necessary that the acts or omissions which resulted in 
depriving the alien of his property should be attributed to the State. We now 
come to the question of whether the intention of a government is also relevant in 
establishing its responsibility for an indirect expropriation. Jurists are divided on 
the issue. Some deny that such an intention is a necessary factor in establishing 
State responsibility. Among them, Aldrich, Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice may be 
recalled. Having surveyed the Iran-US Claims Tribunal's case law in this regard, 
Aldrich concludes that "Liability is not affected by the intent or absence of intent 
attributable to the state. ,,48 Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, writers on this Tribunal, 
qualify their position, however, by stating that: 
This ... does not preclude the possibility of intention being a 
condition for responsibility in the sense of primary rules of conduct 
defining specific cause of action (e.g. taking), as distinct from general 
rules of State responsibility.49 
48 Aldrich, op. cit., at 609. .., 
49 M. Pellonpaa and M. Fitzmaurice, "Taking of Property In the PractIce of the Iran-Umted 
States Claims Tribunal", 19 N.Y.I.L. (1988) 53 at 80. 
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Others, such as Piran,50 after studying the issue in the practice of the same 
Tribunal, maintain that the element of intention plays an important role in 
detennining whether an indirect expropriation has occurred. He has drawn a 
distinction between two types of intentions. First, the intention to expropriate 
property through indirect methods. Second, the intention in acts and 
interferences which when combined and continued over time would potentially 
tum into a situation in which the occurrence of an expropriation can be assumed. 
With regard to the fonner, the same writer observes that the intention of the 
government is not a prerequisite for liability for indirect expropriation, since 
nonnally either there is no such intention at first, or if there were, it could be 
denied before the judge. As to the latter, Piran states that the acts and 
interferences must be deliberate before one can conclude that an indirect 
expropriation has taken place. He further noted that it seems unreasonable if one 
assumes that a government is liable for a deprivation in which no deliberate act is 
attributed to it. To him, this assumption: 
would mean that the only criterion for finding of expropriation is the 
deprivation of the owner in a State's domain, no matter whether the 
State has done anything on purpose or that what happened to the 
property was accidental or the like.51 
The same author points out that "total disregard of intention would lead to 
absolute responsibility, which is prescribed only in exceptional circumstances as 
for some ultra hazardous activity.,,52 
The European Court of Human Rights, in the Sporrong and Lonnroth case 
(an oft-quoted case in this context) endorsed the significance of intention. Thus, 
the Court held that "the expropriation pennits were not intended to limit or 
control such use. ,,53 
50 Piran, op. cit., at 172-174. 
51 Ibid., at 174. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Sporrong and Lonnroth v. The Government of Sweden, Judgment of 23 September 1982, 
E.C.H.R. (1982), Series A, No. 52, 7 at 25, para. 65. 
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The question of intent was also discussed in several cases of the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal. It appears that the Tribunal has in some cases denied that 
intention to expropriate is a condition for liability. In the Starrett case, for 
example, it was held that: 
It is recognized in international law that measures taken by a State 
can interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights 
are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been 
expropriated, even though the State does not purport to have 
expropriated them. 54 
The most explicit statement on the issue can be found in the Tippetts case. 
There the Tribunal stated that: 
The intent of the government is less important than the effects of the 
measures on the owner, and the form of the measure of control or 
interference is less important than the reality of their impact. 55 
The Tribunal, in the Sea-Land case, however, confirmed that a finding of 
expropriation requires a finding that the State concerned intended to expropriate 
the property. The Tribunal ruled that: 
A finding of expropriation would require, at the very least, that the 
Tribunal be satisfied that there was deliberate governmental 
interference with the conduct of Sea-Land's operation, the effect of 
which was to deprive Sea-Land of the use and benefit of its 
investment (emphasis added). 56 
For some,57 there was contradiction between the Tribunal's findings in the 
Tippetts case and in the Sea-Land case, particularly between the above-quoted 
statements. Piran58 has also noticed the confusion and suggested a solution. He 
referred to the distinction correctly made, as discussed above, between the 
54 Starrett Housing Corporation et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Award No. 
Interlocutory 32-24-1 (19 December 1983), reprinted in 4 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 122 at 154. 
55 Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFF A Consulting Engineers of Iran et al., 
Award No. 141-7-2 (29 June 1984). reprinted in 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 219 at 225. 
56 Sea-Land Services Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Award No. 135-33-1 (20 June 
1984), reprinted in 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 149 at 166. 
57 Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, op. cit., at 80-85. 
5R Piran, op. cit., at 176. 
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intention to expropriate and the intention in acts and interferences which lead to 
the conclusion of an indirect expropriation. The same writer further noted that 
the Tribunal's holding in the Tippetts case, that the intention of the government is 
less important than the effects of the measures on the owner refers to the initial , 
intention to expropriate. In the Sea-land case, however, the reference to the 
requirement of deliberate action by the government concerns the interferences 
and actions which could amount to a conclusion of an indirect expropriation. 
Piran goes on to say: 
No need to say that the Tribunal in the Tippetts Award states that the 
intention of the government is less important; it does not say that it is 
not important. 59 
It would be incautious of us to assume that the Tribunal's jurisprudence 
indicates that intention is a necessary element of the primary rule defining an 
expropriation. Bearing in mind Piran's proposition, however, which seems 
logical, one can say that intention at least plays a significant role in determining 
whether an indirect expropriation occurred. 
5. What Acts of the State Constitute Indirect Expropriation? 
Having examined questions of attributability and intention, we have, in 
fact, studied the subjective aspect of State responsibility regarding an indirect 
expropriation. Now we must assess the objective aspect of this matter.60 Put in 
technical terms, the issue under discussion in this section is whether the 
encroachment, imputable to the State, in the property rights of an alien is 
sufficient to be characterised as an indirect expropriation. The types of acts and 
interferences which amount to expropriation and which attract the concern of 
international law, are by no means settled. The reasons, as shown above, go back 
to the very diverse possibilities of State intervention in the property rights of 
private persons, and hence the absence of generally recognised criteria for 
indirect expropriation. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Note that the discussion on the objective and/or subjective theories of State responsibility is 
not our concern in this thesis. 
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Despite this fact, some commentators have taken a general approach to the 
subject. Among older legal writings, Doman's article is worth noting. He has 
treated the issue in these terms: 
The nationalization acts, being de jure expropnatlons, have made 
conspicuous the gaps in the existing categories and devices of 
international law. Exorbitant taxation, interference with corporate 
powers, expulsion of managers delegated by stockholders, are 
examples of de facto expropriations against which the arsenal of 
international law has not yet found defenses. 61 
Writing in 1962, Christie, in his well-known analysis of the state of 
international law on this question, observes that although interference with an 
alien's property may constitute expropriation, legal title to the property remains 
with the owner. He continues: 
... even though the respondent State may specifically disclaim any 
such intention. But, while the principle may be clear, its application 
to particular situations of fact is not. There will, of course, be some 
easy cases, but there will be many difficult cases as well. 62 
Schwarzenberger63 is of the opinion that interference with foreign property, 
through measures such as taxation or devaluation of the national currency, 
normally does not constitute an expropriation. Under particular circumstances, 
however, such action, as well as other forms of interference, may amount to 
creeping nationalisation. Akehurst64 took a similar view and referred to 
additional governmental acts, including exchange controls, restrictions on the 
remittance of profits, refusal to issue export licences and so on. He further states 
that these measures are normally permitted by international law, provided that 
they are not done for an improper motive. Having examined the issue, one 
commentator concludes that "Liability does not arise from actions that are non-
discriminatory and are within the commonly accepted taxation and police powers 
61 Doman, op. cit., at 1129. 
62 G. C. Christie, "What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law", 38 
B.Y.I.L. (1962) 305 at 309. 
63 G. Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and International Law. Stevens & Sons, London 
(1969) at 4. 
64 Akehurst, op. cit., at 96. 
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of states. ,,65 Writing In 1994, Sornarajah has also noticed the difficulty of 
formulating a single principle that identifies all types of governmental 
interferences which could amount to expropriation and which could incur the 
responsibility of the host State. In his words: 
Though it is clear that there are categories of takings outside the 
outright acts of nationalisation, the problem lies in formulating a 
single general principle that identifies all these takings. If one 
general criteria is to be attempted, it will have to involve some broad 
notion of governmental interference with the peaceful enjoyment of 
the rights, enjoyment and control of the property by the alien. But it 
is clear that not all such interferences amount to taking which attracts 
the concern of international law. 66 
One author observes that although actions short of direct possession of the 
property may be accepted as an expropriation, "only a total and permanent 
deprivation of the owner may cause a claim for expropriation. ,,67 Piran further 
noted that "State actions which might have a partial, ephemeral or diminishing 
effect on the property and its value is not considered expropriation.,,68 A similar 
thought has been expressed in the writings of other scholars, such as Weston,69 
Higgins/o Jain/' Dolzer72 and Shaw.73 
National and regional courts, foreign claims commissions and international 
courts and tribunals have also touched upon the issue. Their decisions and 
awards suggest criteria which may be useful for identification of indirect 
expropriation. 
On the national level, an award of an American tribunal in the Revere 
case 74 is significant in this context. The dispute was over the interpretation of an 
65 Aldrich, op. cit., at 609. 
66 Sornarajah, op. cit., at 282. 
67 Piran, op. cit., at 148. 
6R Ibid. 
69 Weston, op. cit. (note 9). 
70 Higgins, op. cit. (note 5). 
71 Jain, op. cit. (note 8). 
72 R. Dolzer, "Expropriation and Nationalization", in Vol. 8, Encycl. P.LL., 214. 
73 M. N. Shaw, International Law (4th ed.), Cambridge University Press (1997) at 573. 
74 Revere Copper and Brass. Inc. v. Ol'erseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Arbitral 
Award of August 24, 1978, reprinted in 56 LL.R. 258 
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investment Insurance contract. The claimant had entered into a 25 year 
concession agreement for the mining of bauxite with the Jamaican Government 
in 1967. The agreement contained a stabilisation clause that taxes and royalties 
would remain fixed for the agreed duration. A few years later, the Government 
of Jamaica increased the royalties on the ground of changed circumstances. The 
claimant company closed down its plants and claimed compensation under its 
Insurance contract. It is obvious that there was no direct expropriation by 
Jamaica. The tribunal, in a two to three award, held that the conduct of the 
Jamaican Government constituted a taking. It ruled that: 
In our view the effects of the Jamaican Government's actions in 
repudiating its long-term commitments ... have substantially the same 
impact on effective control over use and operation ... 75 
Dissenting Arbitrator Bergan, however, observes that "by any reasonable 
standard the bauxite levy which Revere treats as expropriatory is within the range 
of the proper taxing power of the Jamaican nation.,,76 The authority of the award 
was denied on the ground that the tribunal was a domestic one.77 
The judgment of the European Court of Human rights in the Sporrong and 
Lonnroth case is highly relevant to the question. In this case, the claimants 
contended that through long-term expropriation permits and prohibitions on 
construction over their real property by the Stockholm authorities, they were 
effectively deprived of the enjoyment and disposition of their property. They 
further claimed that by this action the Swedish Government in fact expropriated 
their property for which indemnification was due. Since the legal title of the 
property still remained in the hands of the claimants, the Court did not find that 
the measures in question were expropriatory in nature. Thus, it was held that: 
75 
76 
77 
In the Court's opinion, all the effects complained of ... stemmed from 
the reduction of the possibility of disposing of the properties 
concerned. Those effects were occasioned by limitations imposed on 
the right, which right had become precarious, and from the 
Ibid., at 291. 
Bergan's Dissenting Opinion (the Minority Opinion), in ibid., 312 at 320. 
Somarajah, op. cit., at 301. 
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consequences of those limitations on the value of the premises. 
However, although the right in question lost some of its substance, it 
did not disappear. The effects of the measures involved are not such 
that they can be assimilated to a deprivation of possessions. The 
Court observes in this connection that the applicants could continue 
to utilize their possessions and that, although it became more difficult 
to sell properties in Stockholm affected by expropriation permits and 
prohibition on construction, the possibility of selling subsisted ... 78 
The United States Claims Commission, In the processmg of 
Czechoslovakian claims, was asked whether the placing of property, real or 
personal, under 'national administration' constituted a taking of property. The 
Commission expressed the view that it did not, unless the administrator was 
specifically appointed to liquidate the property in question. Its view was based 
on the fact that the decree in question states that the action was only a temporary 
measure. In the case of substantial interference with personal property, such as 
the refusal to grant an export license for jewellery or to permit the transfer of 
funds abroad, as well as the suspension of payment of interest upon bonds, the 
same Commission also found that these acts did not amount to an expropriation 
which involves the responsibility of the State concerned.79 
Among older international judicial decisions and arbitral awards, three 
cases are more relevant to the present context. The first is the Chorzow Factory 
case,80 in which the PCD rendered one of its most celebrated judgments. The 
decision is often cited for its statement concerning rules of compensation, but it 
also contains remarks on indirect expropriation. The Court in this case ruled that 
by seizing the factory and its machinery, Poland also expropriated the patents and 
contract rights of the management company, even though the Polish Government 
did not intend to expropriate these particular items of property. 
7R Sporrong and Lonnroth Decision, op. cit., at 24-25, para. 63. 
79 Christie, op. cit., at 316 and 318. 
110 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland), Judgment No.7 (25 May. 
1926), P.c.I.J. Series A, No.7. 
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The second case is the Norwegian Shipowners' Claims case8l in which 
there was a similar situation to the previously-mentioned case. Apart from 
considering the context of the award, i.e. compensation, it also dealt with the 
issue in hand. In essence, the case arose from the requisition by the United States 
Government of partially constructed ships which belonged to Norwegians. The 
tribunal found that the United States, by requisitioning the partially constructed 
ships, had, in fact, expropriated the shipbuilding contracts themselves. 
The third case to have touched on the issue, the Oscar Chinn case,82 was 
also decided by the PCIJ. The case related to the loss caused to Oscar Chinn, a 
British national who operated transport services on the River Congo, by a 
measure of the Belgian Government, which controlled the Congo at that time. 
The measure was the reduction of the freight charges of the Unatra, a private firm 
in which the Government was a majority shareholder. This resulted in the 
creation of a monopoly in favour of the Unatra to the detriment of Chinn who, in 
fact, was the only other operator on the River. Chinn came to the conclusion that 
he could no longer compete, and he therefore, shut down the business. The 
United Kingdom took up the case and, on behalf of its national, brought 
proceedings in the PCIJ against Belgium. The British Government argued that 
the Belgian measure constituted an expropriation of Chinn's property rights for 
which Belgium was liable, based both on treaties between the two States and on 
customary international law. The Court, however, dismissed the British 
argument and ruled that the Belgian measure did not amount to an expropriation. 
Moreover, a fairly old case which may be relevant to our discussion is the 
Sapphire case. 83 In 1958, a concession agreement was entered into between 
Sapphire, a Canadian corporation, and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC 
_ a State entity). The latter was constantly interfering with the operations of the 
RI The Norwegian Shipowners' Claims case (Norway v. United States), Award of 13 October, 
1922, 1 R.I.A.A. (1922) 307. 
R2 Oscar Chinn case (United Kingdom v. Belgium), Judgment of 12 December 1934, P.c.!.J. 
Series AlB, No. 63, 65. 
R3 Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company, Award of March 
15, 1963, !.L.R. (1967) 136. 
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former. While the claimant, resorting to the agreement, contended that it had the 
'full exclusive and effective management and control' of the operation, the 
respondent claimed that under the contract, their consent was required for the 
operations. The respondent insisted on the right of veto over all aspects of the 
operation. The dispute over the interpretation of the agreement was referred to 
arbitration. The NIOC actions were considered to constitute an expropriation by 
Sole Arbitrator Cavin. Commenting on the award, however, Sornarajah 
observes: 
But in the changed structure of the petroleum industry in modem 
times, control of operations by the state oil corporation have become 
so commonplace that such interference can hardly be said to be a 
taking if the foreign oil company packs up and leaves as the oil 
company in the Sapphire Arbitration did.84 
As to recent international decisions, several awards including in particular 
the Iran-US Claims Tribunal's, are highly relevant in the present context, and will 
be dealt with in the remainder of this chapter. In the Barcelona Traction case the 
question of indirect expropriation was also raised, but the International Court of 
Justice (hereinafter the 'ICl') did not examine it. 85 
The types of governmental acts and interferences which could amount to 
indirect expropriations and which involve the host State's responsibility, have 
been identified in legal writings and in judicial decisions and arbitral awards. 
For convenience of discussion they may be grouped as follows: 
(1) physical seizure of property; 
(2) forced sale of property; 
(3) indigenisation measures; 
( 4) refusal to return property and failure to assist its export; 
(5) exercising management control over property; and 
84 Somarajah, op. cit., at 301. 
85 However, see the Separate Opinions of Judge Sir G. Fitzmaurice at 106, and Judge A. Gros 
at 256 in the Barcelona Traction case, op. cit. (note 10). 
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(6) expropriation and regulation; 
(6.1) regulatory measures to prohibit repatriation of funds; 
(6.2) withdrawal of permits and licenses; 
(6.3) confiscatory taxation. 
5.1 Physical Seizure of Property 
Under this heading, cases involving seizure of tangible property and real 
property will be considered. In principle, where property is physically seized, 
two tests, namely attribution and intention, must be applied. Thus, the mere 
physical seizure of property with no intention to confiscate it, is not sufficient for 
establishing the responsibility of the offending State for its wrongful act. 86 It 
may be that private property is seized by the State temporarily, for various 
reasons, but whether it ripens into indirect expropriation depends upon the 
State's subsequent attitudes towards the property in question.87 
As to cases involving physical seizure of tangible property, the awards of 
the Iran-US Claims Tribunal are relevant to the issue. In the Computer Sciences 
case,88 the claimant contended that office equipment and furniture belonging to 
its Tehran subsidiary were expropriated by the representatives of the 
Revolutionary Committee who entered the office and ordered all employees to 
leave and remove nothing. The Tribunal, after examining the claimant's 
affidavit, held that: 
that: 
This evidence has not been rebutted, and the Tribunal is satisfied that 
CSCSI [the Claimant's subsidiary] was thus denied the use of its 
office equipment and that it was thereafter denied access to the 
. 89 
eqUIpment. 
In another similar case, the Dames and Moore case, the Tribunal ruled 
R6 Piran, op. cit., at 177. 
R7 Christie, op. cit., at 322. 
RR Computer Sciences Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Award No. 221-65-1 
(16 April 1986), reprinted in 10 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 269. 
R9 Ibid., at 303. 
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The unilateral taking of possession of property and the denial of its use to 
the rightful owners may amount to an expropriation even without a formal 
decree regarding title to the property.90 
Besides office equipment and the like, cash and personal items, such as 
watches were also the subject-matter of claimants' contentions before this 
Tribuna1.91 
Regarding real property, a very useful analysis of some cases is given by 
Christie in his valuable article.92 In the Jonas King case,93 the Government of 
Greece interfered with the claimant's two tracts of land. Though the ownership 
of land remained with King, he was deprived of the free use of it. The dispute 
was settled through negotiation, and the claimant was paid compensation. In the 
De SabIa case,94 in pursuance of land reforms, the Panamanian Government 
transferred portions of the claimant's land, a United States citizen, to its 
nationals. The case was decided by a United States-Panama Commission. 
Panama argued that as the claimant did not intervene in the required proceedings 
to protect her title, she, in fact, waived her rights in this regard. The 
Commission dismissed Panama's argument and stated that the Panamanian 
authorities had knowledge of her title. It therefore held that the portion of her 
land over which there was conflicting registered titles must be treated as taken. 
A similar case was the Jeno Hartmann case95 which was decided by the 
United States Foreign Claims Commission. There the claimant's land was taken 
by the Hungarian Government. The latter argued that title to the land did not 
convey State ownership. The Commission nevertheless ruled that the claimant's 
90 Dames and Moore v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Award No. 97-54-3 (20 December 
1983), reprinted in 4 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 212 at 223. 
91 See, for example, the Tribunal's Awards in (The United States on behalf oj) Kenneth P. 
Yeager v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 324-10199-1 (2 November 1987), reprinted 
in 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 92 (The United States on behalf oj) Leonard and Mavis Daley v. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran , Award No. 360-10514-1 (20 April 1988), reprinted in 18 ibid., 232. 
92 Christie, op. cit., at 312-316. 
93 See Moore's Digest of International Law, Vol. 6, Government Printing Office, Washington 
D.C. (1906) at 262-264. 
94 The De Sabia case (United States v. Panama), Award of 29 June, 1933, 6 R.I.A.A. 358, 
reprinted also in 28 A.1.I.L. (1934) 602. 
95 Christie, op. cit., at 313-314. 
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property had been expropriated. Its finding was based on the fact that the 
"claimant could not use or enjoy the property as he saw fit, nor could he alienate 
it.,,96 
The last case mentioned by Christie was the Albert Bela Reet case.97 It 
involved the alleged expropriation of the claimant's property by the Hungarian 
Government, through several measures, namely the prohibition of sale, the 
placing of liens upon, or the occupancy of a house in which the claimant had an 
interest. The same Commission held that "the claimant was precluded from the 
free and unrestricted use of his property,,98 and the fact that the title remained 
with the Claimant was of little moment. 
Likewise, in cases before the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, the issue was also 
raised. It should be noted that under Iranian laws and regulations, aliens may not 
own immovable property in Iran. US nationals were not exempted from this 
rule, therefore there is no claim by them for expropriation of real property. 
Individuals, however, who possess dual nationality of Iran and the United States 
could bring such claims before the Tribuna1.99 
5.2 Forced Sale of Property 
The general view on the phenomenon is that an 'involuntary sale' IS a 
compensatable event if there is an inadequate or unrealistic purchase price. This 
proposition was endorsed by Weston, in his more extensive article on indirect 
expropriation. He comments: 
96 
97 
911 
99 
What has just been said in connection with transfers made under 
threat of 'expropriation' ... should apply to 'involuntary sales' 
generally. Assuming they are price-deficient, 'involuntary sales' of 
foreign wealth should be considered the functional equivalent of 
deprivation giving rise to compensatory responsibility. 100 
Commenting on the cases in this context, Professor Higgins observes: 
Ibid., at 314. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
See further Piran, op. cit., at 213-218. 
100 Weston, op. cit., at 148. 
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They do not seem to affirm that forced sales at unrealistic values 
properly give rise to claims that there has been a property deprivation, 
for which a claim for reparation is appropriate. 101 
Likewise, having examined the concept of indirect expropriation, Christie 
concludes that: 
Where a State compels an alien to sell his property for less than its 
true value either to the State or to a third party, a compensatable 
claim arises. 102 
Explaining the meaning of inadequate or unrealistic purchase price, the 
same writer states that "the price received must have been such a mere pittance 
that it would shock the minds of reasonable men." 1 03 Burden of proof rests on a 
claimant who alleges that he sold his property for a ridiculously low price. 
Somarajah104 points out that the host State is not responsible if, during 
civil unrest, the alien has to flee the State and is forced to sell off his property 
cheaply. This is the case if the property is abandoned by the alien. However, the 
State would be liable when it had itself brought about the circumstances that led 
to aliens, as a class, leaving the State in a hurry. His statement regarding the 
abandonment of the property has been explicitly confirmed by the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal. The latter, in the Painting case,105 held that a State is not 
responsible if the property had been abandoned by the alien unless there is some 
contractual obligation on the part of the State to protect the property. If, 
however, the forced sales of the alien's property are accompanied by threats to 
his physical security through the State's agents, there is an expropriation by the 
State for which it is liable. 106 
101 Higgins, op. cit., at 326. 
102 Christie, op. cit., at 338. 
103 Ibid., at 328. 
104 Somarajah, op. cit. (note 1), at 285. 
105 (The United States on behalf oj) United Painting Company Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Award No. 458-11286-3 (20 December 1989), reprinted in 23 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 351 at 366-
370. 
106 Christie, op. cit., at 329. 
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There are many cases in this context in Weston's article. It seems useful to 
discuss them briefly. In a very old case, Gowen and Copeland,107 (1854) two US 
nationals, Gowen and Copeland, discovered guano deposits in the islands near 
the Venezuelan coast. In the following year they were ordered by the 
Venezuelan Government to leave the islands. They refused to do so, however, 
on the grounds that Venezuela had failed to give prior notice of its claim over 
the islands. Meanwhile, the Philadelphia Guano Company, a private company, 
obtained a lease on the islands from the Venezuelan Government. The 
machinery, buildings and materials belonging to Gowen and Copeland were 
seized by Venezuelan soldiers. Eventually, the claimants entered into a contract 
with the Philadelphia Company. Under the contract, they were permitted to 
continue the work for a specific period of time, provided the claimants' 
installations were to be transferred to the Philadelphia Company. This was 
characterised by the Commission as being "in the nature of a forced sale, which 
under the circumstances was a substantial appropriation of the property.,,108 
There is a similarity in the Ellermann case. 109 In 1921 the claimant 
Ellermann, a German subject, was notified by the Polish authorities that his land 
was placed under liquidation and that he had to sell it within three months. He 
received no offers acceptable to him. In 1923 when he was ordered to leave the 
country, his receiver-agent (the person he appointed to administer the land sales) 
was expelled. The case was decided by a mixed tribunal, which held that the 
claimant was effectively deprived of his land as of the date when his receiver-
agent was expelled from Poland. 
Moreover, there are several forced sale cases which arose out of World 
War II. This is why some writers 1 10 are of the opinion that much of the authority 
in this context originates from situations where there had been racial 
discrimination. Thus, the expropriation would have been an international wrong 
107 Weston, op. cit., at 134-135. 
lOR Ibid., at 135. 
109 Ibid., at 136. 
110 Sornarajah, op. cit., at 285. 
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independently of the forced nature of the sale. Put briefly, this category of cases 
involved claims arising from expulsion motivated by racism. III 
A fairly recent case which may be relevant to the issue in hand is the ELSI 
case.
112 The dispute arose out of the requisition by the Italian Government of the 
plant and related assets of Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (hereinafter 'ELSI'), an 
Italian company, wholly-owned by two United States corporations. The 
company went bankrupt. Under Italian law, where a company is facing 
bankruptcy, it should be dissolved. Similarly, the facts of the case demonstrated 
that the failure of the company had affected employment in an already 
economically depressed part of Italy, i.e. Sicily, and led to unrest. These 
situations resulted in interference by the Italian Government with the company's 
affairs; it was dissolved and its assets sold. The forced dissolution of ELSI and 
the sales of its assets were not considered expropriation by the IC] for which the 
Italian Government bore responsibility. 
The question of involuntary sales was also considered, albeit in a very few 
cases, by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. In the American Bell International 
case,113 the claimant, American Bell International Inc. (ABII) , left some money 
in the Rail, the Iranian currency, in a bank for the settlement of its outstanding 
obligations. After the settlement, ABU requested the release of the balance of 
the funds. Instead, the Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI), a State 
entity and the Respondent, demanded the transfer of the balance of the funds to 
its account. The ABU's representative reported that he was informed that: 
Non-compliance with the payment request would have serious 
personal consequences for [him] and would in any case not stop TCI 
obtaining access to ABII's funds. I 14 
Given the facts of the case, the Tribunal was able to conclude that: 
III See further ibid., and Christie, op. cit., at 326-327. 
112 ELSI Judgment, op. cit. (note 10). 
113 American Bell International In. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Award No. 255-48-3 
(19 September 1986), reprinted in 12 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 170. 
114 Ibid., at 214, para. 148. 
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Where, as here, both the purpose and effect of the acts are totally to 
deprive one of funds without one's voluntarily given consent, the 
finding of a compensable taking or appropriation under any 
applicable law - international or domestic - is inevitable unless there , 
is clear justification for the seizure (emphasis added). I IS 
In the International Technical Products case, the Tribunal also addressed 
the Issue. The dispute, as indicated earlier in this chapter,116 was over the 
allegation of the forced sale of the claimant's building in Iran. After examining 
the case, the Tribunal arrived at the conclusion that the loss of property did not 
happen before 19 January, 1981 - the Tribunal's jurisdictional deadline. In the 
circumstances of this case there was no need to discuss the question of forced 
sale. In reaching the conclusion, however, it briefly dealt with the issue. In 
essence, the Tribunal was divided on the question. While the majority were not 
persuaded that the sale was forced, Arbitrator Browerl17 took a different view 
and accepted the claimant's contention that the sale was forced. In their 
comment on the award, it seems that Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice 118 lent support 
to the majority view. 
Writing on the subject, Sornarajah referred to forced sale of shares. I 19 He 
raised the question of whether, under international law, there is direct protection 
for the shareholders of a company whose shares have been destroyed as a result 
of State intervention. Having examined the judgment of the Barcelona Traction 
case, the same author concludes that: 
In the two decades that have passed since the judgment there has been 
no evolution of international law which entitles the shareholders in a 
foreign company incorporated in a third state to receive protection 
directly from the state of which they are nationals except through 
treaty laws. 
115 Ibid., para. 150. 
116 International Technical Products case, op. cit. (note 47). 
117 The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Judge C. N. Brower in ibid., at 243-247. 
IIR Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, op. cit., at 90. 
119 Sornarajah, op. cit., at 286-290. 
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5.3 Indigenisation Measures 
A similar technique to the forced sale of property may be said to be 
indigenisation measures. 120 The measures involve "a progressive transfer of 
ownership from foreign interests into the hands of the local shareholders.,,121 A 
number of Latin American as well as many newly independent African and Asian 
countries, seeking to ensure that the tennination of political control also meant 
the tennination of economic control, resorted to these measures. 122 As 
previously indicated, in fonnal or direct expropriation, the expropriating State 
takes over a foreign company and runs it itself or through the State entity. Put 
briefly, title of a foreign company is transferred to the State. Although in both 
direct expropriation and indigenisation measures (albeit progressively in the 
latter) the ownership of a foreign company is transferred to the State, they differ 
from each other. 
Two factors have been mentioned to distinguish such measures from direct 
expropriation. 123 Firstly, there is no vesting of any property in the hands of the 
State or the State organ. In other words, there is no direct or even indirect 
enrichment of the government as a result of the measures. However, some 
writers took the view that there may be property deprivation without any taking 
by the State. 124 Secondly, there may be no change in management control 
effected by indigenisation measures. Unlike direct expropriation in which 
management control of the business in question nonnally transfers to the State or 
the State agent, the control may remain in the hands of the foreign investor. It 
120 Since the transfer of the title is involuntary and the timing of the transfer of the shares in the 
foreign-owned company is not left to its owner, there is a resemblance to forced sale in 
indigenisation measures. Ibid., at 292. 
121 Ibid., at 291. 
122 For the Nigerian case, see T. J. Biersteker, "Multinationals, the State and Control of the 
Nigerian Economy", Princeton University Press, New Jersey (1987). 
123 Ibid., at 291-292. 
124 B. H. Weston, "The New International Economic Order and the Deprivation of Foreign 
Proprietary Wealth: Reflections upon the Contemporary International Law Debate", in R .. B. 
Lillich (ed.), International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, CharlottesvIlle, 
University Press of Virginia (1983) 89. 
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may also be desired that the foreign investor's management run the company, due 
to the lack of skills of the local shareholders, particularly in the initial stages. 
Sornarajah further noted that when, eventually, foreign managers are 
replaced by local shareholders, the replacement will be carried out under "the 
corporate laws of the host State and not through any governmental fiat.,,125 
Unlike forced sale, which may be, if there is an attributable unrealistic 
purchase price to the State, judged as an indirect expropriation, indigenisation 
measures do not constitute an expropriation for which the State would be liable. 
As Sornarajah puts it: 
As such, it falls within the regulatory controls [that] a state takes in 
pursuance of its sovereign rights over economic matters rather than 
into the category of taking for which the state had to pay 
compensation. 126 
The question of indigenisation was raised in the Barcelona Traction case. 
In this case there was an allegation that the intention of Spain in interfering with 
the company's affairs was to transfer the shares into the hands of the local 
shareholders. Judge Tanaka, who ruled in favour of Belgium, spoke of 
'hispanicisation' of the Barcelona Traction company. In his words: 
The Belgian Government also contends that individual judicial and 
administrative measures which constitute separate subjects of 
complaint, were combined into an integral whole to bring about the 
'hispanicization' of a prosperous foreign enterprise. 127 
Nonetheless, he did not think that the technique employed by Spain was a 
clear violation of international law. 
There was a similar situation In the ELSI case. 128 In this case, as 
previously indicated, as a result of the sale in bankruptcy, the shares of ELSI, an 
American-owned company, were transferred into the hands of Italian 
125 Sornarajah, op. cit., at 292. 
126 Ibid., at 293. 
127 The Separate Opinion of Judge K. Tanaka in the Barcelona Traction case, op. cit., 115 at 
15l. 
128 ELSI Judgment, op. cit. (note 10). 
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shareholders. The United States Government objected to the process by which 
the transfer of shares was carried out. It argued that the requisition of ELSI by 
the Italian Government led to the bankruptcy, and subsequent sale of the 
company. The ICl, however, did not hold that the requisition of the company 
constituted indirect expropriation. The Court relied on the fact that "ELSI, if not 
already insolvent in Italian law before the requisition, was in so precarious a 
state that bankruptcy was inevitable.,,129 
5.4 Refusal to Return Property or Failure to Assist its Export 
The preceding sub-sections have been concerned with cases involving 
involuntary transfer of the property from its lawful owner or possessor. Here we 
deal with situations in which property is either temporarily under the control of 
the State or a State agency, (for example through a lease contract), but is not 
returned to its owner on the agreed date, or there is a failure on the part of the 
party concerned to assist in its export. There is some authority for the view that 
there could be an indirect expropriation in such situations. 130 
The Iran-US Claims Tribunal had the opportunity to address these 
questions. To the best knowledge of the present author, the Tribunal's awards 
may constitute the only source on the issue. In the Oil Field of Texas case, the 
claimant contended that certain oil production equipment which had been leased 
to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC - a government-owned company) 
was not returned to it by the latter. Additionally, under an Iranian court order, 
NIOC was prevented from either paying rental or returning the equipment to the 
claimant. Thus, the Tribunal held that there was an indirect expropriation for 
which the Government of Iran bore responsibility. 131 
Another case which may be relevant to the issue was case No. Bl (4).132 
There the claimant, the Government of Iran, requested the release of its military 
129 Ibid., at 71, para. 119. 
130 See, inter alia, Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, op. cit., at 90; Aldrich, op. cit., at 600-601 and 
Piran, op. cit., at 184. 
131 Oil Field Award, op. cit., at 319, para. 43. 
\32 The Islamic Republic of Iran v. The United States of America, Partial Award No. 382-81-FT 
(31 August 1988), reprinted in 19 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 273. 
225 
assets held by the United States after the Revolution in Iran. While the 
respondent, the United States, relied on the President's decree to the effect that 
defence articles were not exportable to Iran, the Tribunal, having concluded that 
the United States' refusal to release the assets amounted to a complete 
deprivation of their use, went on to say that: 
Even if the United States never expressed its intention to appropriate 
this property and never attempted to dispose of it without Iran's 
authorization ... Such deprivation, undoubtedly, entails for Iran 
prejudicial consequences similar to those which would have been the 
result of an expropriation. Under international law the State 
responsible for such deprivation is liable to compensate ... 133 
As regards failure to assist in the export of property, the Tribunal has taken 
a similar view. In the Sedco case,134 the claimant contended that six of its 
drilling rigs were left with the Respondent, the National Iranian Oil Company, 
after the Revolution. The claimant further alleged that, despite its demand to the 
Respondent to assist in exportation of the rigs from Iran, it failed to do so. The 
Tribunal ruled that the equipment was unreasonably held and NIOC should pay 
compensation. 
However, in another case against the National Iranian Oil Company, the 
Houston case,135 the Tribunal stated that the claimant failed to prove that the 
Revolutionary Committee, a State organ, refused to permit the export from Iran 
of the equipment owned by the claimant. 
In the Seismograph case,l36 the imposition of unwarranted and 
unreasonable conditions by the Iranian authorities upon the export of the 
claimant's property was not found to be an expropriation. The Tribunal relied for 
its finding on the fact that although the claimant was unable to exercise one of its 
133 Ibid., at 295, para. 70. 
134 Sedco Inc. et al. v. National Iranian Oil Company et al., Award No. 309-129-3 (7 July 
1987), reprinted in 15 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 23. 
135 Houston Contracting Company v. National Iranian Oil Company et al .. Award No. 378-
173-3 (22 July 1988), reprinted in 20 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 3. 
136 Seismograph Services Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al .. Award No. 420-
443-3 (3 March 1989), reprinted in 22 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 3. 
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contractual options regarding the disposal of its property, it remained able to sell 
the equipment in Iran. 137 
5.5 Exercising Management Control over Property 
The discussion relating to this sub-section begins with the proposition that 
an owner is entitled to control and manage his property as he wishes. Any 
interference, therefore, with the control and management of the property, usually 
a proprietary interest in a company, constitutes an indirect expropriation. 138 This 
general rule, however, is qualified, or even undermined, by the view that, under 
particular circumstances, a State may interfere with the control and management 
of private property, without incurring international responsibility. As in the 
national context, in international law the regulatory power of a sovereign State 
could include taking over the management of property, including that of 
foreigners. It is well established that, in situations of crisis, governments enjoy 
broader powers to regulate the economic life of individuals and corporations. 139 
An explicit statement to this effect was voiced by Sornarajah. In his view, the 
State's interference: 
With management rights of foreigners in order to protect its own 
economic interests is exercising a purely regulatory function for 
which the State need not pay compensation. 140 
Having examined the cases on this issue, Christie reached the conclusion 
that the right which seems to be least subject to successful interference is the 
right of the owner to manage his enterprise. At the same time, however, he 
observes: 
And yet, here one cannot be dogmatic. The fact that an alien 
employer is suddenly forced to take nationals of the local State on to 
his board of directors would not seem, by itself, to amount to 
137 Ibid., at 79, para. 301. 
13R However, Sornarajah, op. cit., at 306, took the view that: 
The statement that an interference with management and control of a foreign-controlled company 
is a taking is only a generalisation that provides a starting point for discussion and is nothing 
more. 
139 R. Khan, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal - Controversies. Cases and Contribution, 
Martinus N ijhoff, Dordrecht (1990) at 180-181. 
140 Sornarajah, op. cit., at 309. 
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expropriation. Nor would it seem to be expropriation if the alien 
owner were forced to take representatives of his labour force on to his 
board. There might even be circumstances where operating control 
over the enterprise might be completely taken from the alien owner 
without rendering the State liable even for 'damages' for use 
(emphasis added). 141 
Christie goes on to say that: 
Suppose a State took over certain foreign enterprises and operated 
them prudently, paying a fair return, perhaps the actual profits of the 
enterprise, to the owners. Presumably after a sufficient passage of 
time such action would amount to an expropriation, but how long this 
period might be one would not wish to hazard a guess. If the State 
announced in advance that the taking would be for the duration of 
the 'present economic emergency' but 'in no event' longer than, say, 
'five years', it would seem doubtful whether an alien could complain 
that this property had been expropriated (emphasis added). 142 
After a close examination of the issue, Weston reached a similar 
conclusion: 
One is left to conclude that the 'State administration' of private 
wealth is by itself to be regarded not as a compensable event but as a 
temporary custodial action not amounting to a 'constructive 
taking' .143 
He further noted that "genuinely conservatory 'State administrations' are 
not to be regarded as deprivations such as will engage international 
'b'l' ,,144 responSl 1 lty. 
The question of State administration of private foreign property was also 
examined by claims commissions and international tribunals. Thus, the United 
States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, as indicated before,145 took the 
view that the appointment of a 'national administration' by Czechoslovakia did 
not constitute an expropriation, since it was a temporary measure to be 
141 Christie, op. cit., at 333-334. 
142 Ibid., at 334. 
143 Weston, op. cit., at 165. 
144 Ibid., at 169. 
145 See our discussion in this chapter, at 213. 
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terminated after the Government had ascertained whether such property should 
be returned to the original owner or confiscated, nationalised, or disposed of in 
some other manner. The Commission, however, held that where a 'national 
administration' was specifically appointed to liquidate the business, then the 
placing of such property under public administration would be considered to be 
an expropriation. 
A more relevant case in this context, is the ICrs judgment in the £LS1 
case. Broadly speaking, there was a dispute over the extent of the regulatory 
power of the host State and the rights of the foreign company. The host State 
maintained that it had interests to protect as far as the operation of the company 
was concerned. As previously shown, ELSI, 146 the American-owned company in 
Italy which was the subject of a dispute between the United States and Italy went 
bankrupt and its property was sold. Due to the dismissal of some 800 workers, 
and to ensure that the dismissals did not affect employment in the already 
economically depressed area in which the company operated, the Italian 
Government sought to intervene in the affairs of the company.147 Put briefly, the 
need for the protection of such interests entitled Italy to interfere with the 
management control of ELSI. The dispute was addressed by a Chamber of the 
ICI The interference with the management control of the company by the Italian 
Government was held to be justifiable, and hence it did not constitute an indirect 
expropriation. Given the facts of the case, the Court was able to conclude that: 
It is simply not possible to say that the ultimate result was the 
consequence of the acts or omissions of the Italian authorities, yet at 
the same time to ignore the most important factor, namely ELSI's 
financial situation ... the municipal courts considered that ELSI, if 
not already insolvent in Italian law before the requisition, was in so 
precarious a state that bankruptcy was inevitable ... even if it were 
possible to see the requisition as having been designed to bring about 
bankruptcy, as a step towards disguised expropriation, then, if ELSI 
was already under an obligation to file a petition of bankruptcy, or in 
such a financial state that such a petition could not be long delayed, 
the requisition was an act of supererogation ... Furthermore, this 
146 ELSI Judgment, op. cit. (note 10). 
147 Ibid., at 65, para. 108. 
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requisition '" being by its terms for a limited period, and liable to be 
overturned by administrative appeal, could not, in the Chamber's 
view, amount to a 'taking'(emphasis added). 148 
This statement was explicitly endorsed by Sornarajah. The latter made a 
distinction between interference with a failing company or a company deserted 
by its manager in the course of revolutionary unrest, and a successful company. 
In the former, interference may seem justified by the economic interests of the 
host State. In the latter, however, interference could cause the State to incur 
responsibility, unless it can demonstrate a clear and overwhelming regulatory 
interest. 149 Commenting on the ELSI case, Sornarajah 150 observes that "The state 
[Italy] had a compelling interest in ensuring that the impact on its economy of the 
failure of the company was reduced or eliminated." In his view, the measures 
used by the State to "achieve this objective cannot be considered to be such an 
interference with the foreign investor's management rights as to amount to a 
compensable taking." 
Similarly, in several cases before it, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal dealt with 
this issue. These cases involved the taking over of companies whose managers 
abandoned their positions and fled the country as a result of the revolutionary 
events in Iran. Thus, the latter enacted laws to deal with companies that were left 
. h f'.C· 151 WIt out electIve management. The laws permitted the appointment of 
managers to companies whose managerial staff had fled the country. Under these 
laws, as under the pre-Revolutionary code, the Government of Iran had then 
appointed managers for such companies in order to meet an economic emergency 
which was created by mass disruptions in business life during the 1979 
Revolution. The Iranian Government's arguments in these cases may be 
summarised as follows: (l) to avoid total collapse of the projects in question and 
to prevent the shut-down of such companies and financial disaster; (2) the above-
14R Ibid., at 71, para. 119. 
149 See further Somarajah, op. cit., at 310. 
150 Ibid., at 307. 
151 On the issue, see Khan, op. cit., at 189-193; Piran, op. cit., at 153-155 and at 186-187, and 
Aldrich, op. cit., at 588, n. 14. 
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mentioned laws were not expropriatory in nature; and (3) the appointment of 
managers was 'provisional' in character and in some cases such as Starrett and , 
Motorola, as will be shown in this sub-section, the original managements were 
even invited to resume the projects in question. 
In some cases, including Starrett, Sedco, Tippetts and Phelps Dodge, the 
Tribunal considered the appointment of managers by Iran as an expropriation. In 
others, such as Otis Elevator, Motorola and Eastman Kodak, however, the 
Tribunal did not find that the alleged expropriation had actually taken place. Put 
in technical terms, the appointment of managers in these cases was not construed 
as an expropriation. Let us begin with the first category. 
In the Starrett case,152 the claimant, which was engaged in housing proj ects 
in Tehran, contended, inter alia, that the Government of Iran by appointing a 
temporary manager for its Iranian subsidiary on 31 January 1980, in fact 
expropriated the company. It was also alleged that some events, which were 
attributable to the Government of Iran, had the cumulative effect of depriving the 
claimant of its property interests so as to amount to an expropriation. These 
events included: harassment of Starrett's personnel and consequently reduction of 
the work force, strikes and shortages of goods, the collapse of the banking system 
and the freezing of its bank accounts. However, the Tribunal stated that such 
events, though they led to loss of control by the claimant, were not expropriatory 
in nature. It held that: 
Investors in Iran, like investors in all other countries, have to assume 
a risk that the country might experience strikes, lockouts, 
disturbances ... and even revolution. That any of these risks 
materialized, does not necessarily mean that property rights affected 
by such events can be deemed to have been taken. A revolution as 
such does not entitle investors to compensation under international 
I 153 aw. 
Regarding the appointment of the temporary manager argument, the 
Tribunal did recognise that: 
152 Starrett Award, op. cit. (note 54). 
153 Ibid., at 156. 
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Assumption of control over property does not automatically and 
immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by 
the government, thus requiring compensation under international 
law. 154 
It did also concede that Starrett was invited to return to Iran to resume the 
Project. Nonetheless, the Tribunal took the position that the appointment of the 
temporary manager for Starrett's subsidiary by the Government of Iran rendered 
its property rights "so useless that they must be deemed to have been taken." I 55 
Rejecting Starrett's argument that prior revolutionary events justified an 
earlier date, the Tribunal construed the date of the appointment of the temporary 
manager as the date of the expropriation. 
This statement of the Tribunal has been criticised by some commentators. 
Thus, Piran 156 suggests that the reasoning of the Tribunal in this respect is not 
convincing. Referring to the fact that the manager was appointed temporarily and 
in a time of crisis, when the original managers abandoned their positions, he 
states that it is hard to understand how the Tribunal construed this act as an 
expropriation of property rights. The same author reminded the authorities of 
these facts, and the Tribunal's award in the case at hand in particular, which 
stated explicitly that the appointment of a government manager by itself is not 
considered as expropriation, unless such assumption of control turns into a 
permanent deprivation. He goes on to say that: 
In this case, the Tribunal ... takes notice that Starrett was invited to 
return and assume the Proj ect. The fact that because of the 
Revolution certain of its managers could not return to Iran is also 
noted by the Tribunal as commercial risk. In such a situation, 
holding a government responsible for the expropriation seems 
unjustified and without legal ground. 157 
154 Ibid., at 155. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Piran, op. cit., at 190-192. See also Khan, op. cit., at 195. 
157 Ibid., at 192. 
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In view of the facts discussed above and the weight of the authority in this 
respect, as well as Piran's comment, one may conclude that the Tribunal's 
finding on the date of expropriation in this case is untenable. 
In the Sedco case, I 58 the Tribunal reached a similar conclusion to that of 
Starrett. The claimant, which was involved in oil drilling, claimed that the 
Government of Iran, by appointing temporary managers for its Iranian 
subsidiary, Sediran, on 22 November 1979, expropriated its shareholding 
interests, for which Iran bore responsibility. By virtue of the above-mentioned 
law, which authorised the nationa1isation of companies whose debts to banks 
exceeded their net assets, the title to Sediran was transferred to the Government 
of Iran on 2 August 1980. The Tribunal construed this action of the respondent, 
Iran, as a taking. I 59 As in the case of Starrett, in this case the Tribunal 
designated the date of the appointment of the temporary managers, i.e. 22 
November 1979, as the date of taking. 
Piran 160 correctly observes that the Tribunal's reasoning and finding of the 
expropriation in the present case seems confusing. In fact, by means of two 
different methods, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that Sediran, Starrett's 
subsidiary, was expropriated. It was taken through the transfer of its title to the 
Government of Iran on 2 August 1980. As indicated above, the appointment of 
managers, which took place on 22 November 1979, was also construed as an 
expropriation. To Piran, if the appointment of managers means expropriation, 
there was no need for the Tribunal to discuss the law, whereby the title to 
Sediran was transferred to the Respondent. He further states the view that if the 
application of the law in question was the ground for the finding of 
expropriation, the date of its application and transfer of title should logically be 
considered as the date of taking. 
15H Sedco Inc. et al. v. National Iranian Oil Co mpa11}' et al., Interlocutory Award No. 55-129-3 
(October 28, 1985), reprinted in 9 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 248. 
159 Ibid., at 275. 
160 Piran. op. cit., at 197. 
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Another case in which the Tribunal construed the appointment of 
managers by the Iranian Government as an expropriation was the Tippetts 
case.
161 The issue was the alleged expropriation of the claimant's 500/0 shares in 
an engineering and architectural consulting partnership. The contention was 
based on the fact that the Government's appointment of a manager resulted in 
the deprivation of the claimant's enjoyment of the benefits of its shares, for 
which compensation was due. On 24 July 1979, the Government of Iran 
appointed a temporary manager to run the affairs of the partnership. The 
appointed manager had the power to sign cheques and make personnel and other 
decisions without consulting the partnership. The Tribunal held that the 
claimant was deprived of its property rights in its partnership and that the 
Government of Iran was responsible for that deprivation. 162 
Contrary to the two preceding cases, Starrett and Sedco, in this case the 
Tribunal did not consider the date of the appointment of the manager as the date 
of expropriation. Until November 1979 - the date of the seizure of the American 
Embassy in Tehran - the manager was co-operating with the partnership. 
However, without any explanation, 1 March 1980 was designated as the date of 
expropriation by the Tribunal. 
Likewise, the Tribunal, in the Tippetts case, articulated a wide proposition 
as to what amounts to an expropriation, which was reiterated several times in 
subsequent awards, in the following terms: 
A deprivation or taking of property may occur under international law 
through interferences by a State in the use of that property or with the 
enjoyment of its benefits, even where the legal control over property 
is not affected. While assumption of control over property by a 
government does not automatically and immediately justify a 
conclusion that the property has been taken by the government, thus 
requiring compensation under international law, such a conclusion is 
warranted whenever events demonstrate that the owner was deprived 
of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this 
deprivation is not merely ephemeral. The intent of the government is 
less important than the effects of the measures on the owner and the 
161 Tippetts Award, op. cit. (note 55). 
162 Ibid., at 225. 
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form of the measures of control or interference is less important than 
the reality of their impact. 163 
The last case of those in which the Iran-US Claims Tribunal construed the 
appointment of government managers as an expropriation was the Phelps Dodge 
case.
164 There the claimant, Phelps Dodge, owned some 20% of the shares in an 
Iranian firm, Sicab, which was engaged in the manufacturing and selling of wire 
and cable products. By virtue of a pre-Revolutionary law, designed to prevent 
the closure of insolvent factories, ensuring payments due to the workers and 
protecting any debts owed to the Government, Sicab' s management was 
transferred to two governmental entities on 15 November 1980. The Tribunal 
considered this action as an expropriation and designated the last-mentioned date 
as the date of expropriation. Having enumerated the features of the said law, the 
Tribunal conceded that it "fully understands the reasons why the Respondent" 
resorted to this action. Also, it "understands the financial, economic and social 
concerns that inspired the law" in question. 165 At the same time, however, the 
Tribunal held that: 
But those reasons and concerns cannot relieve the Respondent [the 
Government of Iran] of the obligation to compensate Phelps Dodge 
.c. . 1 166 lor Its oss. 
To some, "it is hard to reconcile this understanding of a government's 
action and the financial situation of a company for which a government is forced 
to act, and the condemning [of] the same government to pay compensation to 
former owners." In support of his statement, Piran167 referred to the situation in 
the ELSI case, previously discussed, in which the American-owned company was 
in a similar situation to that of Phelps Dodge. The host State's interference with 
163 Ibid., at 225-226. 
164 Phelps Dodge Corporation and Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) v. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran , Award No. 217-99-2 (19 March 1986), reprinted in 10 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 121. 
165 Ibid., at 130, para. 22. 
166 Ibid. See also the Tribunal's Awards, such as James M. Saghi et at. v. The Islamic Republic 
of Iran, Award No. 544-298-2 (22 January 1993) (unprinted), and Harold Birnbaum v. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 549-967-2 (6 July 1994) (unprinted). 
167 Piran, op. cit., at 201. 
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the management control of the company in question, however, was held to be 
justifiable by the W orId Court. 
Having examined cases in which the appointment of government managers 
meant an expropriation, it is timely now to consider cases in which the Tribunal 
did not construe the appointment of managers by the Government of Iran as a 
taking. In the Otis Elevator case,168 the claimant held ownership interest in two 
companies in Iran, namely Otis Iran and Iran Elevator - 600/0 in the former 
company and 400/0 in the latter. It should be noted that the Iran Elevator company 
never became active. The claimant alleged that, because of the appointment of a 
financial supervisor for both companies by the Iranian Government, it was 
deprived of its property rights in Iran Elevator for which Iran bore responsibility. 
In dismissing the claim, the Tribunal held that two factors distinguished this case 
from the others in which such appointments were considered an expropriation of 
property. First, the managing director, who was appointed by the shareholders, 
asked the Government to appoint a supervisor. Second, there was not sufficient 
evidence that the appointed supervisor assumed real control of Iran Elevator's 
operations. On the balance of evidence before it, the Tribunal ruled that: 
A multiplicity of factors affected the Claimant's enjoyment of its 
property rights in Iran Elevator, among them its position as a minority 
shareholder in an inactive company and the changed circumstances of 
the Iranian elevator market (emphasis added). 169 
Another case in which the Iran-US Claims Tribunal did not find an 
expropriation even though a temporary manager was appointed, was the 
Motorola case. 170 The claimant, Motorola, in order to create a market in Iran, 
established a branch office (called 'Mi1com'). The latter's employees left the 
country in the wake of the Revolution and its local manager, an Iranian, was 
arrested by Iranian agents. In April 1979, the Revolutionary Attorney General of 
the Islamic Republic appointed a temporary manager for Mi1com. The claimant 
168 Otis Elevator Award, op. cit. (note 45). 
169 Ibid., at 299, para. 47. 
170 Motorola Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al .. Award No.3 73-481-3 (28 June 1988), 
reprinted in 19 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 73. 
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asserted that such action in fact resulted in the expropriation of the company's 
branch in Iran. The Tribunal, however, held that the appointment of the 
temporary manager did not constitute an expropriation. The Tribunal relied on 
the fact that Motorola, as in Starrett, was invited to return to Iran and had even 
been requested by Iran to appoint a new external manager. 171 
Moreover, in the Eastman Kodak case, 172 the appointment of a government 
manager did not result in the expropriation of the company in question. There, 
the claimant, Kodak, alleged that the Government of Iran, by appointing a 
supervisor in December 1979 for its wholly-owned Iranian subsidiary, Rangiran, 
in fact expropriated the company. The Tribunal, after examining the case, did 
not find any evidence to that effect. Therefore, the expropriation claim was 
dismissed. The Tribunal relied on the fact that the role of the appointed 
supervisor "was minor and temporary" 173, and that Kodak was able to take 
necessary steps to liquidate Rangiran. 174 
The Foremost case 175 contemplates another category of management 
control where, through expropriation, a government became the holder of a 
majority share in a company, but its assumption of control did not amount to an 
expropriation. In this case the claimants group, Foremost, held ownership 
interest of 31 % in an Iranian dairy company. As a result of the expropriation of 
various private Iranian shareholdings, several government-controlled entities 
obtained a majority of shares in the dairy. The claimant contended that by this 
171 Ibid., at 85, para. 59. 
172 Eastman Kodak Company et al v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Award No. 514-227-3 
(1 July 1991), reprinted in 27 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 3. 
173 Ibid., at 13, para. 30. To the same effect, see the Partial Award of this case, op. cit. (note 
45), at 168, para. 42. 
174 Ibid., at 15, para. 37. See also the Partial Award, op. cit., at 168, para. 58. Note that 
although the Tribunal did not construe the appointment of temporary manager as an 
expropriation, it found that the governmental interference with the claimant's property rights 
caused damages to it. Thus, the Tribunal awarded compensation based on Article II(l) ( ... 
expropriations or other measures affecting property rights) of the Claims Settlement Declaration. 
175 Foremost Tehran et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Award No. 220-37/23-1 (10 
April 1986) reprinted in 10 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 228. See also the Tribunal's Awards in the Golpira 
case: "Golpira as a small expatriate shareholder, never had any role in the management or 
direction of the company." Attaollah Golpira v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 32-
211-2 (29 March 1983), reprinted in 2 ibid., 171 at 176, and in Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. et al. v. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 519-394-1 (19 August 1991), reprinted in 2 ibid .. 122. 
237 
action the Government in fact expropriated its shareholdings. In denying such a 
claim, the Tribunal held that Foremost, as a minority shareholder, was not 
entitled to playa dominant role in the management of the company. 176 
After surveying the Iran-US Claims Tribunal's case law on the subject and 
having a close examination of the authorities 177 invoked by the Tribunal, Khan 
concludes that none of them supported the Tribunal's ruling that the appointment 
of managers amounted to an expropriation. He further noted that "in light of this 
authority, one wonders how the Tribunal could take the position that appointment 
of managers led to taking.,,178 
One observer on the Tribunal reached the same conclusion that the 
appointment of the temporary managers was "given more weight than it really 
deserves." In support of his statement, Piran 179 referred to the fact that none of 
the companies for which temporary managers were appointed were in a good 
financial situation, and that the only consideration in the appointment of such 
managers was to prevent the companies from total collapse. In his view, the 
Tribunal's holding in some cases that the appointment of managers immediately 
means an indirect expropriation, "is an over-simplification of the issue." 
Aldrich, however, came to a different conclusion, in which he states that 
provisional or temporary assumption of control of private foreign property by 
State action gives rise to its responsibility, unless the deprivation is merely 
'ephemeral' .180 'Ephemerality' has been considered as an important element that 
distinguishes permissible interferences from compensable expropriations. As 
Somarajah puts it: 
Ephemerality and specificity of economic and public interest 
objectives are the hallmarks that distinguish such regulatory 
interferences from compensable takings (emphasis added).181 
176 Foremost Award in ibid., at 247. 
m The authorities include: an often-cited excerpt from Christie, op. cit., at 333-334, and the 
Judgment of the Sporrong and Lonnroth case, op. cit. (note 53). 
17R Khan, op. cit., at 197-202. 
179 Piran, op. cit., at 243. 
IRO Aldrich, op. cit., at 609. 
IRI Somarajah. op. cit., at 310. 
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In this sub-section we have dealt with the main subject, i.e. interference 
through managerial control. The date of expropriation, as an ancillary subject, 
has been touched upon briefly as well. Since the determination of the date of 
expropriation, for various reasons, is more relevant to the question of indirect 
expropriation, it therefore deserves an extensive discussion. Hence, a digression 
into the date of expropriation here seems appropriate. 
5.5.1 The Date of Expropriation 
As alluded to earlier, in direct expropriation the measure is applied through 
the legislation or decree, and in such a situation the determination of the date of 
taking raises no particular legal problem, as the date of the legislation or decree 
should be used as the date of expropriation. In contrast with direct expropriation, 
an indirect expropriation occurs and evolves over a period of time. In these 
circumstances, when a series of measures are cited as cumulatively constituting 
expropriation, the determination of the actual date of expropriation will become 
as important as the finding of an expropriation. Its significance lies in the fact 
that the valuation of the expropriated property and the computation of interest are 
based on that date. Thus, when an alleged indirect expropriation is at stake, the 
adjudicator must decide when the actual expropriation has taken place, and 
whether the date of expropriation is the date on which the initial interference with 
the property commenced or the date on which those interferences ultimately 
ripened into a total and permanent deprivation. 
On the doctrinal standpoint, most writers are of the opinion that in these 
circumstances the date of expropriation should commence as of the date the 
interferences are determined to have ripened into a taking. Thus, Christie 
remarks: 
When a seizure which is not originally deemed to be an expropriation 
ripens into one, the date of taking should not be held to go back to the 
time when the property was initially seized but the taking should 
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rather date from the time at which it is determined that there was no 
reasonable prospect that the property would be returned. 182 
Weston took a somewhat different approach. In response to the question of 
when the temporary administration of property becomes an expropriation, he 
suggests that: 
As for the date upon which a taking might be found to transpire in 
any of these specific cases and from which compensation therefore 
would be calculated, deference should be given to the original intent 
of the administrating government and, thus, to the broad regulatory 
competence that States traditionally have enjoyed under international 
law. If the State administration measure is one that originally was 
conceived as only temporary ... then the diacritical date should 
commence as of the time the measure is determined to have ripened 
into a taking. If, however, the State administration measure is one 
that originally was conceived as but a first step toward liquidation ... 
then the key date should be at least presumed to commence as of the 
time the measure was instituted (emphasis added). 183 
One commentator held a totally different approach. Holtzmann,184 the 
American Arbitrator to the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, for instance, maintains that 
should a series of events, as in the Starrett case, be involved in the shaping of an 
expropriation, the date of taking should be fixed at the commencement of the 
events in question. Interestingly, those events enumerated by the Arbitrator were 
correctly construed by the Tribunal as inherent risks of foreign investment, 
except for the appointment of a temporary manager which has already been 
discussed. 
The Iran-US Claims Tribunal's practice indicates that in most of the cases 
where the Tribunal found expropriation, the issue regarding the date of 
expropriation became a bone of contention, especially for the American 
arbitrators. Besides those cases in which the Tribunal found expropriation based 
on the appointment of temporary managers, as studied previously, the Tribunal 
IR2 Christie, op. cit., at 337 and 324. To some, Christie's statement is a well-established 
principle. See, e.g. Piran, op. cit., at 220, n. 246. 
lR3 . 170 Weston. op. CIt., at . 
lR4 The Concurring Opinion of Judge H. M. Holtzmann in the Starrett Award. op. cit.. (note 54) 
at 159-182. 
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took a similar approach on the question. An explicit statement in this regard was 
expressed for the first time, in the International Technical Products case. The 
Tribunal held that: 
A claim for a taking is outstanding on the day of the taking of 
property. Where the alleged expropriation is carried out by way of a 
series of interferences in the enjoyment of the property, the breach 
forming the cause of action is deemed to take place on the day when 
the interference has ripened into more or less irreversible deprivation 
of the property rather than on the beginning date of the events. 185 
Seven years later, in the Malek case l86 concerning alleged expropriation of 
real property through a cumulation of acts, the Tribunal confirmed this position 
and reiterated exactly the same words that were expressed in the last-mentioned 
case. 
In appreciating the authority of the Tribunal's jurisprudence on the issue, 
Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice observe that since the legal situation in this regard is 
somewhat unclear, "the Tribunal's case law means a significant clarification." I 87 
In the practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal there were several cases 
where the Tribunal did not find expropriation, though there was substantial 
encroachment on the owner's rights. Those cases failed, not because the 
interferences did not ripen into total deprivation, or for lack of proof, but for 
another reason. Under the mandate of the Algiers Declarations, the Tribunal is 
not authorised to examine events which occurred after 19 January 1981, the 
Tribunal's jurisdictional deadline. 188 Among those cases, the International 
Technical Products case l89 will be recalled, in which there was an allegation of 
expropriation through a series of events. The Tribunal finally reached the 
conclusion that loss of property did not occur until after 19 January 1981, and 
185 International Technical Products Corporation Award, op. cit. (note 47) at 15. 
186 Reza Said Malek v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 534-193-3 (11 August 1992), 
reprinted in 28 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 246, para. 114. 
187 Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, op. cit., at 10 1. 
188 Article II(I) of the Claims Settlement Declaration, op. cit. (note 6). 
189 International Technical Products Corporation Award, op. cit. (note 47). See also the 
Foremost Tehran Inc. case, op. cit. (note 175); Norman Gabay (ANA Noorollah) v. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran , Award No. 515-771-2 (10 July 1991), reprinted in 27 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 40. 
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hence the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction. 190 Thus, the claim of expropriation was 
dismissed. 
6. Expropriation and Regulation 
6.1 General Remarks 
There is a principle in international law that for the purpose of economic 
and financial regulation, interferences with property are possible without the 
regulating State incurring responsibility. Thus, Christie is of the opinion that the 
exercise of a State's police power normally will not create a right to 
compensation. 191 In her comprehensive analysis of indirect expropriation, 
Professor Higgins observes that "interferences with property for economic and 
financial regulatory purposes are tolerated to a significant degree." 192 
Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice take a similar view on the issue and state that: 
F or the purpose of economic and financial regulation, rather heavy 
interferences with the owner's right to utilize his property have been 
tolerated without making the regulating State liable under 
. . 11 193 Internatlona aw. 
While accepting that the regulatory measures could interfere with the 
property rights, Sornarajah points out that they "are a feature of modem 
government and their legality, both in municipal and international law cannot be 
doubted." I 94 This recognition of bona fide economic regulation is in harmony 
with judicial precedents. In the Emanuel Too case, for example, where the 
claimant sought compensation for the expropriation of his liquor license by the 
US Internal Revenue Service, the Court held that: 
A State is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic 
disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation or any other 
190 Ibid., at 241. 
191 Christie, op. cit., at 335 and 338. 
192 Higgins, op. cit., at 331. 
193 Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, op. cit., at 91. 
194 Somarajah, op. cit., at 312. 
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action that is commonly accepted as within the police power of States 
195 
On an international level, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal has recognised the 
principle. The Tribunal, in the Sedco case, ruled that: 
It is also an accepted principle of international law that a State is not 
liable for economic injury which is a consequence of bona fide 
regulation within the accepted police power of States. 196 
Moreover, Article 2(2)(b) of the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States provides that each State has the right to regulate and supervise 
the activities of transnational corporations within its jurisdiction. However, 
unlike nationalisation, expropriation or transfer of ownership of foreign property, 
in which provision for appropriate compensation has been made, there is no 
indication that supervision or regulation of foreign property is tantamount to a 
taking for which the State concerned should compensate the foreign investor. 
6.2 Regulatory Measures to Prohibit Repatriation of Funds 
In one of the preceding sub-sections we have dealt with the imposition of 
restrictions upon the export of goods by foreigners. Under this heading, the 
imposition of restrictions upon repatriation of funds will be considered. It is 
universally recognised that matters pertaining to currency are inherently within 
the jurisdiction of the State. The PCD, in the Serbian and Brazilian Loans cases, 
ruled that "It is indeed a generally accepted principle that a State is entitled to 
I . ,,197 regu ate Its own currency. Referring to the Court's statement, Mann 
comments: 
Money, like tariffs ... is one of those matters which prima facie must 
be considered as falling essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
States ... It follows that, subject to such exceptions as customary 
international law or treaties have grafted upon the rule, the municipal 
195 Emanuel Too v. The United States et al., Award No. 460-880-2 (29 December 1989), 
reprinted in 23 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 378, para. 26. See also the ALI Third Restatement, op. cit., 
Section 712, Comment (g), at 201. 
196 Sedco Award, op. cit. (note 158) at 275. 
197 France)'. Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and France \'. Bra::.il, P.c.!.J. (1929), 
Series A, Nos. 20/21, at 44. 
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legislator is free to define the currency of his country ... to impose 
exchange control ... affecting monetary relations. Customary 
international law does not normally fetter the municipal legislator's 
discretion in these matters or characterize his measures as an 
international wrong for which he could be held responsible. 198 
Thus, exchange controls and similar restrictions fall within the police 
power of the State. The imposition of these restrictions upon the repatriation of 
funds is tolerated to a significant degree. As Wortley puts it: 
When currency control is a defensive measure to protect the national 
currency, it operates like taxation and may be treated as such, and 
although it may cause considerable indirect loss, it will not, if made 
bona fide, be unlawful in internationallaw. 199 
In the same vein, Mann observes: 
Since exchange control is designed to protect a State's exchange 
resources, the mere refusal to allow the transfer of funds abroad can 
hardly ever be such misuse of discretion as to be unfair and 
. . bl 200 Inequita e. 
Piran took a similar view and states that principally the right of a State to 
prohibit the transfer abroad of money or goods is undisputed.201 Dolzer reached 
the conclusion that: 
Export restrictions are acceptable for good cause and will have to be 
qualified as indirect expropriations when taken as arbitrary measures. 
This would seem to be in accordance ... with the broad scheme 
contained in the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund.202 
This approach has been followed by international commISSIons and 
tribunals. Thus, the United States Foreign Claims Commission, in the processing 
of the Czechoslovakian claims, stated that: 
198 F. A. Mann, The Legal Aspect olMoney (5th ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford (1992) at 461. 
199 B. A. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge (1959) at 49. 
200 M . 477 ann, op. CIt., at . 
201 Piran, op. cit., at 203. 
202 Dolzer, op. cit. (note 3), at 64. 
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The record in this claim discloses that [the] claimant attempted to 
import the jewellery in question from Czechoslovakia to the United 
States. However, the Government of Czechoslovakia refused to grant 
an export license pursuant to the foreign exchange regulations in 
effect in that country. 203 
The Commission then found that: 
The enactment of such regulations and the refusal by the Government 
... to grant an export license for the shipment of gold and silver 
jewelry does not constitute nationalization or taking of property since 
it is generally accepted that a state has the sovereign right to impose 
such restrictions.204 
Having examined the same Commission's practice, Christie concludes that: 
The refusal to give permission in advance for the transfer abroad of 
operating profits, or other funds, does not by itself amount to 
expropriation.205 
In the Anton and Frances Tabar case, the expropriation allegedly took 
place through the refusal of the Government of (the former) Yugoslavia to permit 
the repatriation of the claimants' bank deposits to the United States. The US 
Foreign Claims Commission rejected the contention and held that: 
Exchange controls usually follow a general pattern whereby residents, 
nationals as well as non-nationals, must surrender their foreign 
exchange, gold and foreign securities; foreign currency must not be 
exported, and domestic currency must not be exported or imported; 
non-resident creditors cannot have the sum owed transferred, 
irrespective of the currency involved; and rates for foreign exchange 
and gold are fixed by government decree ... International law and the 
usual commercial treaties are no bar to exchange restrictions. So 
long as the control measures are not discriminatory, no principle of 
. . 11 . . 1 d 206 Internatlona aw IS VIO ate . 
203 Quoted by M. M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 8, Department of State 
Publication, Washington D.C. (1967) at 988. 
20..1 Ibid., See also Christie, op. cit., at 318. 
205 Christie. op. cit., at 337. 
206 Quoted by Whiteman, op. cit., at 989. 
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The Iran-US Claims Tribunal has also dealt with the issue. Taken as a 
whole, the jurisprudence of the Tribunal is in accord with the pattern described 
above. In several cases before the Tribunal, the American claimants asserted that 
through the application of exchange controls by the Government of Iran they 
were unable to withdraw and repatriate money from their accounts in Iranian 
banks. They contended that this action amounted to expropriation of their 
deposits for which they were entitled to indemnification. 
It is worthy of mention that in some of those cases the Tribunal had to 
examine the Iranian exchange control regulations and their conformity with the 
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter 'IMF'). 
However, the Tribunal attempted, as far as possible, to avoid this examination,207 
since the burden of proof is normally on the claimant and the benefit of doubt is 
given to the regulating State. 
In the Sea-Land case, the expropriation allegedly occurred through the 
refusal of the Iranian Central Bank to give permission to convert a Rial account 
into dollars and transfer them out of Iran. While accepting that several attempts 
were made by Sea-Land to transfer its Rial account into dollars, the Tribunal 
denied the claim, based on the fact that "the account remains in existence and 
available, in Rials, at Sea-Land's disposal.,,208 
The next case under examination is the Hood case, where the Iranian 
exchange controls and their conformity with the IMF requirements were raised. 
There the claimant contended that it was unable to repatriate its funds, because of 
the exchange controls imposed by the Government of Iran after the Revolution. 
The claimant further asserted that such measures were in violation of the Iranian 
Foreign Investments Law then in force and the IMF Agreement, and it also 
amounted to an expropriation for which compensation was due.209 As to the said 
207 In the Schering case, for example, the question was raised, but the majority of the Chamber 
avoided discussing it. Schering Award, op. cit., at 367. 
20R Sea-Land Award, op. cit., at 167. 
209 Hood Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al.. Award No. 142-100-3 (13 July 
1984), reprinted in 7 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 36 at 40. 
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law, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the claimant was entitled to transfer its 
deposits by virtue of the Foreign Investments Law. The Tribunal examined the 
Iranian foreign exchange regulations and their conformity with the rules of the 
IMF, and found that those regulations were in harmony with the rules of the IMP 
Agreement. In principle, the latter agreement gives member States freedom to 
exercise exchange controls with regard to so called 'capital transfers' which are 
distinct from 'current transfers'. Put briefly, under Article VI ( Section 3) of the 
Agreement, member States are allowed to impose restrictions upon 'capital 
transfers' to a significant degree. The Tribunal found that the transfer in question 
was for the transfer of capital, and hence the refusal of the Iranian Central Bank 
to transfer was not also contrary to the IMF Agreement.2lo 
In the Dallal case, where the claimant sought compensation for the 
dishonour of two cheques, the Tribunal also reached the conclusion that the 
transaction in question was for the transfer of capital. It held that: 
The two cheques must be assumed to have been issued as part of a 
capital transfer, intended merely to exchange Rials for Dollars and to 
transfer the dollar amount to the United States.2lt 
Thus, the Tribunal was able to reject the claim. After examInIng the 
Tribunal's case law in this context, Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice conclude that: 
Taken as a whole, the practice of the Tribunal can thus be described 
as being along traditional lines as regards regulation of the type 
represented by exchange controls (emphasis added).212 
Piran213 also came to the conclusion that the Tribunal followed the 
traditional lines on the issue and its approach was in accord with the past 
precedent and legal writings. In his view, the Iranian Government "had a right to 
impose exchange control regulations." He further noted that "in the absence of 
210 Ibid., at 44-46. 
~II Dallal v. Iran and Bank Mellat, Award No. 53-149-1 (10 June 1983), reprinted in 3 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R. 10 at 17. 
212 Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, op. cit., at 93-94. 
213 Piran, op. cit., at 207-208. 
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an explicit international commitment to the contrary, such action could not cause 
responsibility for the Government." 
In view of the weight of the authority and legal precedent on the issue of 
exchange control regulations discussed above, it is submitted that undoubtedly 
these measures fall within the police power of States. In principle, States enjoy 
far-reaching freedom to exercise these measures. As regards the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal's approach to the matter, given the post-revolutionary situation of Iran, 
the Tribunal correctly adopted the view that Iran as a sovereign State had a right 
to impose such restrictions. Additionally, since the measures in question did not 
apply in a discriminatory manner, as the records indicated, the Government of 
Iran was not held liable. 
6.3 Withdrawal of Permits and Licenses 
The preceding sub-sections have been concerned with cases involving the 
refusal of the host State to give license or permission for the transfer of goods or 
funds. Here we deal with situations in which a license or permission which has 
already been granted to the foreign investor is cancelled, and hence his ability to 
conduct business is affected. The question which arises here is whether 
cancellation may amount to an indirect expropriation and therefore could render 
the State concerned responsible. 
It may be argued that the cancellation of permits or licenses constitutes 
expropriation even if it does not affect the ability of the foreign investor to 
continue with the activity, or in any way affect the title of the property of the 
foreign investor.214 At the same level, one may contend that since measures 
regarding licenses and permits are normally associated with economic regulation, 
the withdrawal of such measures must be subject to the same consideration as 
measures involving economic regulation. 21S Proponents of the latter approach 
observe that, technically, granting a license involves the conferment of a privilege 
214 Murphyores Ltd. v. The Commom ... ealth of Australia, 136 Commonwealth Law Review 
(1977) 1 at 9. 
11~ ·h· 311 
- - SomaraJa, op. CIt., at . 
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and it does not entail vesting of any right in the foreign investor. In the case 
where the privilege is revoked, the State is not benefited in any sense. They 
further stated the view that "it is difficult to say that there had been a taking by 
the state in situations where there is a withdrawal of a license.,,216 
However, in the Amco case,217 in which there was a cancellation of license 
of the foreign investor, the host State was held liable for its action. In 1968 the 
claimants, the Amco group, American nationals, entered into an agreement with 
the Government of Indonesia for the construction and management of a hotel 
complex. Amco, in order to perform the agreement, was granted an investment 
license for a period of thirty years. The claimants contended that in 1980 the 
Indonesian army seized the hotel and their investment license was unjustifiably 
revoked. The Government of Indonesia argued that the revocation took place due 
to the failure on the part of the claimants to fulfil the commitments they had 
undertaken prior to entry. The dispute was considered by a tribunal, under the 
auspices of ICSID. 
In this case, the tribunal did not enter into the argument of whether the 
revocation of the license constituted an expropriation. Instead, the award relied 
on the procedure before the revocation. The tribunal held that: 
Accordingly, the revocation has been decided definitively, and the 
investor has been definitively deprived of its right to operate and to 
exploit the enterprise that it had been authorized to set up ... The 
nature of its rights was changed against its will, and such change has 
been decided upon without its being granted due process, and the 
decision to withdraw the authorization cannot be remedied by the 
b · I d 218 ar ltra proce ure. 
The Tribunal went on to say that: 
These acquired rights could not be withdrawn by the Republic 
(Indonesia), except by observing the legal requisites of procedural 
conditions established by law ... In fact, the Republic did withdraw 
216 Ibid. 
217 Amco Award, op. cit. (note 33). 
218 Ibid., at 1032, para. 202. 
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such rights, not observing the legal requisites of procedure, and for 
reasons which ... did not justify the said withdrawa1.219 
The lack of procedural safeguards were construed as a denial of justice, and 
hence the Government of Indonesia was held responsible. 
Commenting on the award, Somarajah220 raised several relevant points. 
The first one is that there could be interference with property rights of a foreign 
investor in accordance with the law of the host State, particularly in 
circumstances where the foreign investor had undertaken commitments prior to 
entry, but did not fulfil them. While accepting that minimum procedural 
safeguards must be followed before finding a non-satisfaction of the 
commitments, the same author observes that the cancellation of the license was 
in the nature of a sanction against breaking commitments. The rationale of this 
proposition was that the foreign investor had committed a transgression which 
could have been avoided by honouring its commitments. 
The second point is that though violation of property rights are generally 
expected to be preceded by hearings, "the situation may well be different where 
there is a rescission of a license for non-satisfaction of a condition. This is 
because in these circumstances no right could have arisen without the satisfaction 
of the condition." The questions that arise here are: could a lesser type of 
procedural safeguard be sufficient in these circumstances? Could procedural 
safeguards be dispensed with where there is a clear failure to satisfy the 
condition? In Somarajah's view, the Amco award enveloped the whole area of 
procedural safeguards in the formula of 'denial of justice' which is 
unsatisfactory. In support of his suggestion, he referred to Judge Tanaka's 
statement in the Barcelona Traction case, to the effect that "It is an extremely 
serious matter to make a charge of denial of justice vis-a-vis a state.,,221 The 
same writer further noted that whether the concept of denial of justice could be 
219 Ibid., at 1032-1034, para. 248. 
220 Somarajah, op. cit., at 304-305. 
221 The Separate Opinion of Judge K. Tanaka in the Barcelona Traction case, op. cit. (note 10) 
115at160. 
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satisfactorily extended to the subject in hand, the administrative measures, IS 
doubtful. 
The last point is that In certain circumstances, the sanctions which are 
imposed on the foreign investor for non-satisfaction of conditions are punitive in 
nature, and: 
It is well established that the imposition of punitive sanctions do not 
amount to a taking by a state. The cancellation of a license for non-
satisfaction of a condition does, arguably, have the necessary punitive 
element (emphasis added).222 
As indicated above, the ICSID tribunal avoided entering into the argument 
of whether the revocation of the license could constitute an expropriation, as it 
seemed to realise that on that basis it would not be able to render a convincing 
award. Therefore, the tribunal relied on the concept of denial of justice which, 
keeping in mind the facts of the case and Sornarajah's comment, was untenable. 
The Murphyores case223 contemplates another category of the cancellation 
of the license. Where the regulatory measures are carried out on environmental 
grounds, the measures in question, the withdrawal of the license, do not amount 
to an indirect expropriation. In this case, the claimants, two American 
companies, were granted mining licenses by the State of Queensland to explore 
and develop Fraser Island, for mineral sands. Zircon and rutile were produced for 
which the principal markets were overseas. In essence, there was not a local 
market for the minerals and they had to be exported. Under the 1974 
Environmental Protection Act, the Minister concerned ordered an inquiry into the 
export of minerals from Fraser Island. The inquiry demonstrated that the 
sandmining was threatening the ecological environment of the Island. Thus, the 
Government of Australia refused to give export licenses for the export of the 
minerals. Since the business of the claimants depended on their ability to export 
the minerals, as mentioned, the claimants had to shut down their activities as a 
result of this action of the Australian Government. The dispute was referred to 
222 Somarajah, op. cit., at 305. 
223 Murphyores Award, op. cit., at 1-27. 
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the Australian High Court. The latter did not find that an indirect expropriation 
had taken place?24 Therefore, the claim for compensation was dismissed. 
6.4 Confiscatory Taxation 
The question for consideration here is whether taxation could amount to an 
indirect expropriation, and may incur the responsibility of the regulating State. 
Taxation, like currency, is within the sovereign power of a State. Put briefly, the 
State can levy tax on subjects which are in its territory, including aliens. This 
right was characterised as a general rule by Albrecht. In his words: 
According to the doctrine of the sovereign right of taxation, and in 
the absence of special treaty provisions, there would seem to be no 
basis in international law for objections to the exercise by a State of 
its right to tax where there is no discrimination against aliens.225 
To some, "In principle, taxation is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of any sovereign State.,,226 In this context, Mann had this to say: 
Taxation ... is one of those matters which prima facie must be 
considered as falling essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
States.227 
A similar VIew was expressed by the European Commission on 
Human Rights: 
It is undoubtedly within the sovereign power of a State to enact 
legislation for the purpose of imposing taxes or other contributions 
the proceeds of which are to be appropriated to public purposes.228 
The above account suggests, in principle, that taxation cannot be construed 
as an expropriation calling for compensation. As Schwarzenberger puts it: 
224 For a contrary view, see Higgins, op. cit., at 339-340. 
125 A. R. Albrecht, "The Taxation of Aliens under International Law", 29 B.Y.I.L. (1952) 145 at 
172. 
226 Schwarzenberger, op. cit., at 92. Doman, op. cit., at 1129, is of the opinion that "Taxation is 
one of the principal attributes of the sovereign state." 
))7 • 461 
-- Mann, op. CIt., at . 
22R Gudmundsson v. Iceland (Application No. 511/59), Decision of 20 December 1960, 
Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague (1960) 
394 at 422 (30 I.L.R. 253 at 265). 
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Interference with foreign property by taxation '" on a footing of de 
facto and de jure equality, does not constitute an interference 
amounting to expropriation and calling for compensation.229 
In the same vein, Kaeckenbeek comments: 
... it is clear that what in most civilized systems of municipal law is 
not deemed to require compensation, such as the exercise by the State 
of its police taxation power whatever sacrifice it may impose on 
individuals, requires no compensation according to the international 
law standard.230 
Professor Brownlie took a similar view.23I 
International case law also indicates that taxation is not in itself capable of 
being expropriation. In the Kugele case,232 for instance, the claimant owned a 
brewery in Polish Upper Silesia. As a result of a series of license fees imposed 
by the Government of Poland, he was forced to close the business. In rejecting 
the claim, the Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal argued that: 
The increase of the license fee was not in itself capable of taking 
away or impairing the rights of the plaintiff ... The increase of the tax 
cannot be regarded as a taking away or impairment of the right to 
engage in a trade, for such taxation may render the trade less 
remunerative or altogether unremunerative. However, there is an 
essential difference between the maintenance of a certain rate of 
profit in an undertaking and the legal and factual possibility of 
continuing the undertaking. The trader may feel compelled to close 
his business because of the new tax ... But this does not mean that he 
has lost the right to engage in the trade. For had he paid the tax, he 
would be entitled to go on with his business.233 
Similarly, in the Revere case, dissenting Arbitrator Bergan reached the 
conclusion that the introduction of a new tax by the Jamaican Government did 
not cause a loss of effective control of the company in question. In his 
229 Schwarzenberger, op. cit., at 4. See also Wortley, op. cit., at 49 and Akehurst, op. cit., at 94. 
230 G. Kaeckenbeeck, "The Protection of Vested Rights in International Law", 17 B.Y.I.L. 
(1936) 1 at 16. 
~11 l' . 535 
-. Brown Ie, op. CIt., at . 
232 Kiigele v. The Government of Poland, 6 Annual Digest and Reports of Public International 
Law Cases (ed. by H. Lauterpacht), (hereinafter referred to as A.D.) (1931-32) 69. 
233 Ibid., at 69. 
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Dissenting Opinion, the Arbitrator referred to United States and European 
Community case law that tax measures do not amount to expropriation.234 
Although there is no rule in international law that limits the power of a 
State to impose taxes within its jurisdiction, excessive and exorbitant tax 
measures may have a confiscatory effect and could constitute indirect 
expropriation.235 In this regard, Albrecht remarks: 
Nevertheless, an exception must be made in the case of confiscatory 
taxation, for it is a rule of international law that confiscation or 
expropriation without compensation, is illega1.236 There is little 
difference in the practical effects of confiscation and confiscatory 
taxation .. , A State may tax aliens without unfair discrimination under 
international law only so long as the taxation is not confiscatory. 
When taxation becomes confiscatory, it becomes illega1.237 
In the same manner, Article 10(5) of the Harvard Draft Convention on 
Responsibility of States provides, in part: 
An uncompensated taking of property of an alien or a deprivation of 
the use or enjoyment of property of an alien which results from the 
execution of the tax laws ... or is otherwise incident to the normal 
operation of the laws of the State shall not be considered as wrongful, 
provided: 
(a) ... (b) ... (c) ... and (d) it is not an abuse of the powers specified in this 
fd .. l' fh' 238 paragraph for the purpose 0 epnv1ng an a len 0 IS property. 
Additionally, the comment on this paragraph states that: 
This sub-paragraph 5( d) would preclude taxes raised to confiscatory 
levels from being used as a means of securing the property of an alien 
. h . h' .c- • 239 WIt out payIng 1m lor It. 
234 Revere Award, op. cit. (note 74) at 312-327. 
235 Somarajah, op. cit., at 314. . . 
236 As shown above, the payment of compensation is not the legal condItIOn for an 
expropriation. See our discussion on the issue in chapter 2 of this thesis, at 108-114. 
2.,7 Albrecht, op. cit., at 172-173. 
23R 55 A.1.I.L. (1961) at 553-554. 
239 Ibid., at 562. 
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The issue is referred to in the W orId Bank Guidelines. Article 38 thereof 
reads in part as follows: 
The provisions in the bilateral investment treaties and multilateral 
instruments also often explicitly cover not only outright 
expropriations but also measures, such as excessive and repetitive tax 
or regulatory measures, that have a de facto confiscatory effect ... 240 
Not only can the State levy tax on the subjects which are in its territory, but 
also it has the power to increase the level of tax whenever it wishes. A uniform 
increase in taxation by itself cannot have a confiscatory effect. It has been 
observed, however, that where aliens are singled out and subjected to heavy 
taxation, a clear situation of expropriation can be said to exist. 24 I Nevertheless, 
an exception may be made where sufficient justification for different treatment 
exists. In the Ptasysnki case,242 for example, taxation of the oil industry for 
windfall profits resulting from a sharp price rise, without constituting an 
expropriation, was recognised. In 1979, then US President Carter announced a 
new oil programme, whereby price controls on domestic oil were removed. The 
President realised that deregulating oil prices would produce substantial windfall 
gains for some producers. The sharp rise in oil prices on the world market had 
strengthened this anticipation. Accordingly, the President proposed that 
Congress place an excise tax on the additional revenues resulting from decontrol. 
Congress enacted the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980. The Act 
divided domestic crude oil into various classes and gave more favourable 
treatment to some of them. Several months later, independent oil producers and 
royalty owners instituted proceedings in the Wyoming District Court, seeking a 
refund for taxes paid under the Act. The Court held that the Act violated the 
Uniformity Clause concerned. However, on appeal, the US Supreme Court 
adopted a different view. 
240 World Banle Report to the Development Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment of 
Foreign Direct Investment, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. (1992) 1363 at 1375. 
241 Somarajah, op. cit., at 315. 
242 The United States v. Har!)! Ptasysnki et al., Decision of 6 June 1983,462 US Supreme Court 
Reports, Vol. 74, 427. 
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The question anses as to what level of tax constitutes confiscatory or 
excessive taxation. There is no precise level of taxation which can be said to be 
excessive. Thus, reference to decisions taken in this context may be useful at this 
point. In the Corn Products Refining claim,243 the Government of (the former) 
Yugoslavia imposed two mortgages upon the claimant company's land. One of 
them, for 39,000,000 dinars, was imposed for war profits taxes. The United 
States Foreign Claims Commission considered the case. The Commission held 
that: 
With respect to the mortgage of 39,000,000 dinars for taxes for war 
profits, this encumbrance clearly represents a confiscatory measure 
adopted by the Government ... prior to the nationalization of the 
enterprise ... It is not necessary to point out that the amount of 
39,000,000 dinars is out of any proportion with respect to the alleged 
war profits, because the aforestated figures disclose that the plant had 
an average earning of not more than 3,000,000 dinars per year. 
However, should we assume that the profits were much higher during 
the war, we never would arrive at the amount of 39,000,000 dinars, 
because this amount represents approximately three times the prewar 
value of the plant and a taxation of such an extent is nothing else but 
1 fi . f h· 244 a tot a con IscatlOn 0 t e entIre property. 
In the Gudmundsson case,245 the claimant asserted that the imposition of 
certain taxes by the Government of Iceland was contrary to the provision in 
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights.246 
In considering the case, the European Commission on Human Rights only dealt 
with the compatibility of taxes in relation to the Convention, and did not enter 
into the issue from the perspective of international law. 
243 22 I.L.R. (1955) 333. 
244 Ibid., at 334. See also the same Commission's decisions, in the processing of the 
Czechoslovakian and Hungarian claims, under section (5) and sub-section (5.1) of this chapter, 
respectively. . 
245 Gudmundsson Award, op. cit. (note 228). The European Court was not prepared to admIt a 
25% tax as confiscatory. 
246 Article 1 reads in part: 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
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The Supreme Court of Argentina in the In re Bunge case, held that a 
succession surtax of 500/0 upon the property of a non-resident alien was 
confiscatory. 247 
In 1964, following the imposition of taxation by the Burmese Government 
upon some British companies, a question was raised in the House of Commons 
on the effective percentage rates of such taxation. The British Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury replied that such profits were taxed up to 99% on 
profits exceeding £22,500. The Secretary was of the opinion that such taxation 
was excessive and amounted to de facto confiscation.248 
7. Conclusion 
From the above survey of the phenomenon of indirect expropriation, these 
conclusions may be drawn: 
1) Due to the endless possibilities of State interference with the property 
rights of private persons, it is very difficult to give a definition of the subject 
which covers all governmental interferences. Therefore, we can say that in a 
sense expropriations may be divided into two categories, namely 'compensable 
expropriations' and 'regulatory expropriations'. It is more convenient to identify 
the types of expropriations that are considered as 'compensable expropriations' 
than to devise a criterion for the category of interferences which do not amount to 
expropriation. Nonetheless, a test or a combination of tests, as enumerated 
above, which might be useful for this purpose, are suggested. They include: (I) 
attribution of an action or omission to the State; (II) the State's intention to 
interfere with alien property; (III) character of the State interference, for example, 
unreasonableness of the interference; (IV) duration of State interference; and (V) 
extent of the gain to the State and/or loss to the affected person. 
2) The awards of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal regarding the two tests of 
attribution and intention are generally tenable. While the Tribunal's 
247 A.D. (1938-40) at 380. In another case, In re Gallina, a tax of 34.25% was held 
confiscatory. Ibid., at 382. 
24R House of Commons Debates (1964), Vol. 704. column. 1036. 
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jurisprudence does not suggest that intention is a necessary element of the 
primary rule defining an expropriation, it indicates that the test of attribution is 
decisive. Moreover, for attribution the status of the organ to whose direct acts 
deprivatory events can be ascribed plays an important role. 
3) Some of the awards of this Tribunal concerning the issue of the 
appointment of temporary managers are not without difficulty. There, the 
Tribunal ruled that the appointment of such managers by the Government of Iran 
amounted to an indirect expropriation. However, to some authors, it was "given 
more weight than it really deserves. ,,249 Although an owner is entitled to control 
and manage his property as he wishes, under particular circumstances a State may 
interfere with the control and management of private property, including that of 
foreigners, without incurring international responsibility. It is well established 
that, in situations of crisis, governments enjoy broader powers to regulate the 
economic life of individuals and corporations. Also, one should distinguish 
between interference with a failing company or a company deserted by its 
manager in the course of revolutionary unrest and a successful company. In the 
case of Iran, none of the companies for which temporary managers were 
appointed were in a good financial situation, and in some cases, the original 
managers were even invited to resume the projects in question.25o In view of this 
authority, one wonders how the Tribunal could take the position that the 
appointment of managers led to an expropriation. 
4) As in the national context, in international law the regulatory power of a 
sovereign State could include taxation, exchange controls, the cancellation of 
licenses and so forth. This conclusion comes close to what the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal held, that: "It is also an accepted principle of international law that a 
249· . 243 Plran, op. Cit., at . 
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State is not liable for economIC injury which is a consequence of bona fide 
regulation within the accepted police power ofStates.,,251 
250 See, e.g., the Starrett case, and the Motorola case, op. cit. (note 54), and (note 170), 
respectively. 
251 Sedco Award, op. cit. (note 158), at 275. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
COMPENSATION 
1. Introduction 
As promised earlier, this chapter focuses solely on the issue of 
compensation, which is one of the most controversial areas in international law. 
Decision-makers, on both national and international levels, appreciate this point. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in its much cited 
opinion in the Banco National case, stated that there are several strongly held 
views on the standard of compensation, and that international law is far from 
clear. 1 In the Aminoil case, it was held that "The determination of an 
indemnification has always presented technical difficulties.,,2 Similarly, the most 
explicit statement on this issue can be found in the Iran-US Claims Tribunal's 
celebrated award rendered by its Chamber Three, chaired by the late Professor 
Virally, in the Amoco case. The Tribunal acknowledged that: 
The rules of customary international law relating to the determination 
of the nature and amount of the compensation to be paid, as well as 
the conditions of its payment, are less well settled. They were and 
still are, the object of heated controversies, the outcome of which is 
rather confused (emphasis added).3 
Legal scholars also shared this view. In his editorial comment, Professor 
Schachter, for example, observes that apart from the use of force, no subject of 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 at 887-893 (2d Cir. 
1981), reprinted in 66 I.L.R. 421. 
2 Arbitration between Kuwait and the American Independent Oil Company (Aminoi/) Award 
of24 March 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. (1982) 967 at 1031, para. 138. 
3 Amoco International Finance Corp. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
National Iranian Oil Company, National Petrochemical Company. and Kharg Chemical 
Company Ltd., Award No. 310-56-3 (14 July 1987), reprinted in 15 Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal Reports (hereinafter Iran-U.S. C.T.R.) (Grotius Publications, Cambridge) 189 at 223-
22·-l, para. 117. 
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international law seems to have aroused as much debate as the question of the 
standard of compensation.4 
However, opinions on this issue are deeply divided. There are two main 
schools of thought. While adherents to the first school advocate 'full' or 
'adequate' compensation, proponents of the second school believe that 
'appropriate', (,equitable', 'just' or 'fair') compensation is the appropriate 
remedy in cases of expropriation under customary international law. 
In the first section of this chapter an attempt will be made to show that, 
nowadays, indemnification of damages resulting from expropriation or 
nationalisation measures has been generally recognised. This will be followed by 
an investigation of the relevant theories, such as acquired rights, unjust 
enrichment, damage (loss) and human rights. Likewise, whether a different 
standard should be applied to lawful and unlawful expropriation will be 
considered. Then, this chapter will deal with the question of whether 
nationalisation, as a separate legal institution, requires different treatment from 
the viewpoint of the standard of compensation. We shall examine the standard of 
compensation in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, State practice, 
decisions of international courts and tribunals and writings of legal scholars. We 
will determine which of the two previously discussed schools of thought is 
actually used by States in contemporary international law. At the end of this 
chapter, there will be a brief discussion of the valuation of nationalised property. 
2. Legal Foundations for the Payment of Compensation 
2.1 Duty to Compensate Aliens 
This sub-section begins with the premise that there seems to be little room 
for doubt that under international law the State has a duty to compensate the 
4 O. Schachter, "Compensation for Expropriation", 78 A.1.I.L. (1984) 121 at 121. See inter 
alia: D. 1. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (5th ed.), Sweet & Maxwell, London 
(1998) 568; A. Mouri, The International Law of Expropriation as Reflected in the Work of the 
Iran-US. Claims Tribunal, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1994) 294, and M. Somarajah, The 
International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press (1994) at 357. 359 and 
374. 
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dispossessed foreign owner. 5 Despite some attempts made to weaken or even 
negate the payment of compensation, one may conclude that most of the relevant 
resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations recognise the 
obligation to pay compensation in the case of expropriation or nationalisation. 
As shown in chapter 2, in the 1962 Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty, which 
obtained the overwhelming support of developed and developing countries, it 
was stipulated that "appropriate compensation" be paid "in accordance with the 
rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty 
and in accordance with international law.,,6 While Resolution 3171 spoke of 
"possible compensation,,7, under the 1974 Charter, to fix "appropriate 
compensation" the expropriating State will take "into account its relevant laws 
and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent.,,8 
However, the Declaration on the Establishment of aNew International Economic 
Order9 while recognising the right of States to nationalise natural resources in 
exercise of permanent sovereignty makes no mention of a corresponding duty to 
pay compensation. 
The juristic literature also confirms that compensation is due in the event of 
expropriation or nationalisation. For some, as seen in chapter 2,10 the payment of 
compensation is a condition of the legality of the measures concerned. To others, 
However, for some, property or interest which were acquired under colonial rule may be 
expropriated without paying compensation. See, for example, S. C. Jain, Nationalization of 
Foreign Property - A Study in North-South Dialogue, Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi 
(1983) 164; N. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Cambridge University Press 
(1997) at 358. Also, for the exceptions on the principle of compensation see: 1. Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law (5th ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford (1998) at 535, and A. 
Story, "Property in International Law: Need Cuba Compensate US Titleholders for Nationalising 
their Property?", 1.Pol.Phil. (1998), Vol. 6 (No.3) 306 at 325-327. 
6 Paragraph 4 of the General Assembly Resolution No. 1803 (XVII), adopted on 14 
December, 1962, reprinted in 2 I.L.M. (1963) 223, and I. Brownlie, Basic Documents in 
International Law (3rd ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford (1991) 230. 
7 Paragraph 3 of the General Assembly Resolution 3171 (XXVIII) of 17 December 1973, 
reprinted in 68 AJ.I.L. (1974) 381. 
8 Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (General Assembly 
Resolution 3281 (XXIX), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. (1975) 251, and Brownlie, Basic Documents, op. 
cit., at 235 
9 General Assembly Resolution No. 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, reprinted in 13 LL.M. (1974) 
715. 
10 See chapter 2 of this thesis, at 108-114. 
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including those who categorically advocate the above-mentioned resolutions, II it 
is required as a product of lawful expropriation and, a fortiori, of an unlawful 
expropriation. Thus, Fatouros observes that compensation is "a legal duty arising 
out of related measures, not as a condition precedent to the lawfulness of the 
measures.,,12 Having examined the compensation agreements since World War II 
up to 1963, the late Judge Arechaga concluded that all the: 
'en bloc' compensation agreements, taken together, constitute a 
recognition by the various legal systems of the civilized world that 
the State which nationalizes foreign-owned property has, under 
general international law, a duty to compensate the State of 
nationality of those foreign owners. 13 
Some 25 years later after evaluating the traditional principles governIng 
expropriation of foreign property, Asante reached a similar conclusion. While 
noting that there is no consensus on the applicable standards, he observes that 
contemporary developments support the principle that "A State is required to pay 
compensation to the owner of the affected property.,,14 Schrijver l5 , writing in 
1997, like Mouri 16 and Garcia-Amador17, took the view that there is no doubt that 
obligation to pay compensation for expropriation or nationalisation is generally 
accepted. 
II See, e.g., E. J. de Arechaga, "The Duty to Compensate for the Nationalization of Foreign 
Property", 2 Y.B.I.L.c. (1963) 237 and the author's other literature, "State Responsibility for 
Nationalization of Foreign Owned Property", 11 N.Y.U.J.I.L.P. (1978) 179. 
12 A. A. Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors, Columbia University Press, 
New York (1962) at 314. In the same vein, one commentator remarks that in the light of the 
principle of unjust enrichment, it is possible "to reconcile the inherent legality of an act of 
nationalisation with its necessary consequences as to the payment of compensation." F. 
Francioni, "Compensation for Nationalisation of Foreign Property: The Borderland Between Law 
and Equity", 24 1.c.L.Q. (1975) 255 at 272. 
13 Arechaga (1963: 240, para. 28). 
14 S. K. B. Asante, "International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal", 37 1.c.L.Q. 
(1988) 588 at 610. 
15 Schrijver, op. cit., at 292-297 and 350-359. 
16 Mouri, op. cit. at 310 and 332. 
17 F. V. Garcia-Amador, Fourth Report to the ILC on the subject of the "Responsibility of State 
for Injuries caused in its territory to the Persons or Property of Aliens", reprinted in 2 Y.B.I.L.c. 
(1959) 1 at 18, para. 70, and the same writer's other literature, The Changing Law of 
international Claims, Vol. 1, Oceana Publications, Inc., New York (1984) at 294. 
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As far as international jurisprudence and arbitral awards are concerned, 
reference can be made first to the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(hereinafter the 'PCIJ'), which recognised this obligation in some of its 
. d 18 JU gments. Although so far, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter the 
'ICJ') has not dealt with clear-cut nationalisation or compensation issues, it has 
declared the compensation obligation in the Temple of Preah Vihear case. 19 
Likewise, an obligation to pay compensation can be found in the individual 
opinions of judges of the ICJ. In the Barcelona Traction case, for example, 
Judge Gros made the statement that "any nationalization of a regular kind would 
have been accompanied by compensation. ,,20 Earlier21 and recent arbitral awards 
also confirm this obligation. The arbitral awards in the three Libyan oil 
nationalisation cases, BP,22 Texaco 23 and Liamco,24 as well as in the Aminoil 
case explicitly endorsed it. Additionally, the case law of the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal suggests that compensation is due in the cases concerned. In its first 
award on a compensation case, American International Group Inc., the Tribunal 
recognised that: 
18 See, e.g., Case Concerning Mavrommattis Jerusalem Concessions, in P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 
5 (1925) 51; The German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case, P.C.I.J. Series A, No.7 (1926) 
32 and Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, (claim for indemnity) (merits), Germany v. 
Poland, (1928), P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 17, 1 at 42. 
19 Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), I.e.J. Rep. (1962) 6 
at 36-37. Similarly, the World Court, in its fairly recent judgment in the ELSI case, dealt with 
some aspects of compensation. See the case concerning Elettronica Sigula S.P.A. (ELSJ) , 
(United States of America v.Italy), Judgment of20 July 1989, I.C.J. Rep. (1989) 14. 
20 The Separate Opinion of Judge A. Gros in the Barcelona Traction Light and Power 
Company, Ltd., case (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment of 5 February, I.C.J. Rep. (1970) 268 at 274. 
21 See, e.g., the Delagoa Bay case, (Britain and United States v. Portugal), in M. M. 
Whiteman, Damages in International Law, Vol. 3, Government Printing Office, Washington D.e. 
(1943) at 1694-1703; The Shufeldt claim (United States v. Guatemala), 2 R.I.A.A. (1930) 1079, 
and the Lena Goldfields case (Lena Goldfields Ltd. v. The Soviet Government), Award of 3 
September, 1930, 3 Annual Digest of Public International Law( edited by H. Lauterpacht) 
(hereinafter A.D.) (1929-30), Case No.1 London (1935) at 3-4, reprinted in A. Nussbaum, "The 
Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Government", 36 Cornell L.Q. 
(1950) 31. 
22 BP Exploration Company (Libya) Limited v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 
Award of 10 October 1973, reprinted in 53 I.L.R. (1974) 297. 
23 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government 
of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award of 19 January 1977, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. (1978) 1. 
24 Libvan American Oil Company (Liamco) v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 
Award ~f 12 April, 1977, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. (1981) 1. 
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It is a principle of public international law that even in a case of 
~awful nationalization the former owner of the nationalized property 
IS normally entitled to compensation ... 25 
In its 1994 award in the Ebrahimi case, the same Tribunal reaffirmed that 
"international law undoubtedly sets forth an obligation to provide compensation 
for property taken. ,,26 
The ICC Guidelines,27 the Draft UN Code of Conduct on TNCs 28 the ILA , 
Seoul Declaration,29 the World Bank Guidelines30 and the ALI Third 
Restatement31 all require that compensation is paid in cases of expropriation and 
nationalisation. 
Similarly, the recognition of this obligation may be found in foreign 
investment codes. In such codes, the State concerned promises to pay 
compensation in the event of nationalisation. The Indonesian code, for instance, 
recognises the State's right to nationalise, but promises to pay compensation "in 
accordance with the rules of international law. ,,32 
2.2 Theoretical Basis 
In the preceding sub-section we have seen that there is a general obligation 
for the expropriating State to pay compensation to aliens whose property was 
taken. We now come to the crucial question: upon what legal foundations is the 
duty to compensate based? Four main theories have evolved in this area: 
25 American International Group Inc. et at. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (Bimeh Markazi 
Iran), Award No. 93-2-3, (19 December 1983), reprinted in 4 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 105. 
26 Shahin Shaine Ebrahimi et at. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 560-44/46/47-3, 
para. 88 (12 October 1994) (unprinted). 
27 Section V(3)(iv) of the ICC Guidelines for International Investment (1972). 
28 Para. 55 of the Draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, see UN Doc. 
Economic and Social CouncilI1990/94, 12 June 1990. 
29 Article 5.5 of the 'Declaration on the Progressive Development of Principles of Public 
International Law relating to a New International Economic Order' was adopted in the 62nd 
Conference of the International Law Association which was held in Seoul (24-30 August, 1986) 
(hereinafter the ILA Seoul Declaration), reprinted in 33 N.I.L.R. (1986) 326. 
30 Section IV(1) of the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. (1992) 1363 at 1382. 
31 The American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) on Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States (1987), Vol. 2, 196. 
32 Quoted by Sornarajah, op. cit., at 373-374. 
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acquired rights, unjust enrichment, human rights, and damage (loss). Each of 
these four theories will now be considered in turn. 33 
2.2.1 Acquired Rights 
The doctrine of vested or acquired rights (droits acquis) has its origin in 
municipal law and, more precisely, intertemporal law and private international 
law. There it has been employed as a basis for solving conflicts of laws in 
respect of time. Put in technical terms, it is merely another aspect of the 
generally recognised principle that laws should not have a retroactive effect (i.e. 
the principle of non-retroactivity). 34 
The traditional view, which was that the doctrine or principle of acquired 
rights to constitute the basis for liability to pay compensation, is no longer 
tenable, has been seriously challenged in modem international law. Although the 
PCIJ in the German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case,35 (an oft-quoted case 
in this context) stated that the principle of respect for vested rights forms a part of 
general international law, Professor Francioni observes 36 that the case is strictly 
confined to a situation in which a treaty was involved. Commenting on the 
judgment of this case, White37 points out that the principle of respect for acquired 
rights is limited only to cases of cession of territory. In her view, a more general 
rule of respect for vested rights is not applicable where no transfer is involved. 
In his most recent article, Story reached the conclusion that "What emerges 
is the essential sophistry at the core of the notion of 'vested rights' either as a 
legal category or as a useful adjudicative starting point. For him, the concept "is 
less legal than political and sociological. ,,38 Having examined the doctrine in the 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal's practice, Mouri concludes that "What these 
33 Two more theories, 'good faith' and 'abuse of rights', have also been mentioned by writers. 
See M. H. Arsanjani, International Regulation of Internal Resources - A study of Law and Policy, 
University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville (1981) 302, and Jain, op. cit., at 115. 
34 G. Kaeckenbeeck, "The Protection of Vested Rights in International Law", 17 B.Y.I.L. 
(1936) 1 at 2-4. 
35 The Decision of the German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case, op. cit., at 42. 
36 Francioni, op. cit., at 260. 
37 G. White, Nationalisation of Foreign Property. Stevens & Sons Ltd .. London (1961) at 10. 
38 Story, op. cit.. at 316. 
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developments show is that such [acquired] rights are no longer given emphasis as 
a basis for States' liability to compensate" for the taking of foreign property.39 In 
h · d 40 IS memoran urn to the ILC, Arechaga observed that although respect for 
acquired rights was referred to in some arbitral awards and judicial decisions, 
they belong to the period when "liberal economy [laissez fa ire ] was the only 
recognised economic system." Thus, in his view, the doctrine of acquired rights 
does not enjoy "the degree of generality required to constitute an international 
law rule." Elsewhere the same jurist stated that: 
The very basis of this traditional doctrine, which is predicated on the 
existence of an unlawful act, is removed once it is realized that the 
acquired rights to private property, in particular private ownership of 
the means of industrial production, is no longer protected by 
contemporary international law (emphasis added).41 
Likewise, Sornaraj ah casts doubt as to whether the doctrine of acquired 
rights is a part of international law.42 Friedman43 also took the view that the 
doctrine has no authority in international law. To some, the principle provides no 
reliable guidance.44 
Broadly speaking, the doctrine of acquired rights may be applied in three 
sets of situations: (1) when certain rights have been acquired by an alien under 
treaty provisions; (2) rights available to him under municipal law of the host 
State; and (3) in cases of State succession, i.e. rights obtained under a 
39 Mouri, op. cit., at 311 and 314. 
40 Arechaga (1963: 241). In the same manner, Francioni points out that there is no doubt that 
the value of the doctrine of acquired rights "remains limited to a time when private ownership was 
the only conceivable postulate of socio-economic organisation." Francioni, op. cit., at 262. 
41 Arechaga (1978: 181). Professors D. P. O'Connell, International Law (2nd ed.),Vol. I, 
Stevens & Sons Ltd., London (1970), at 305, and R. Higgins, "The Taking of Property by the 
State: Recent Developments in International Law", 176 Hague Recueil (1982-11) 259 at 288, 
however, took a contrary view. The latter author states that there "has been considerable support 
in the past for the view that acquired rights are specially protected by international law." 
42 Sornarajah, op. cit., at 367, and the writer's other literature: The Pursuit of Nationalized 
Property, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1986) at 212-213, and "The Compensation for 
Expropriation: the Emergence of New Standards", 13 J.W.T.L. (1979) 108 at 120-121. 
·13 S. Friedman, Expropriation in International Law, Stevens & Sons Ltd., London (1953) at 
121. 
44 Brownlie (1998: 546), and the same jurist's other literature, "Legal Status of Natural 
Resources in International Law: Some Aspects", 162 Hague Recueil (1979-1) 253 at 270. 
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predecessor State but no longer recognised by the successor State. under the 
traditional view, the rights acquired in all three situations must be respected. 
Wortley is of the opinion, however, that a right acquired under a treaty is an 
"acquired right that is stronger than the ordinary right of property.,,45 As regards 
acquired rights identified in categories (2) and (3), it is paradoxically "claimed 
that a State is not free to change or modify these rights under the same law 
without paying compensation.,,46 As Professor Borchard observes: 
It becomes somewhat dangerous to be too dogmatic and to assert that 
a particular right is immune to restriction, because of some superior 
principle involving the protection of vested rights. 47 
Moreover, Francioni has aptly expressed the view that: 
A State, after having recognised through its law individual positions 
of interest as legal rights, is not bound to maintain them in existence 
in perpetuity ... Foreign property rights are not vested with a 
'sanctity' and 'permanence' greater than that which may be enjoyed 
by nationals (emphasis added).48 
Kaeckenbeeck goes further and points out that when a State admits aliens 
into its territory it "does not become their insurer against losses accruing to them 
on account of changes of policy or legislation.,,49 In his view, the alleged 
principle of immunity of acquired rights against legislation has no place In 
international law. Therefore, he reached the conclusion that suppression of 
vested rights need not entail compensation in all cases. According to Jain, the 
doctrine of acquired rights is "totally inadequate and powerless to solve the 
problems of nationalization. ,,50 
45 B. A. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law, University Press, Cambridge 
(1959) at 35. In his view, however, treaties are the mere basis of international law. Ibid., at 36. 
46 Jain, op. cit., at 118. 
47 Quoted by Jain, ibid. 
4R Francioni. op. cit., at 260. One commentator took the view that rights which have been 
created under the municipal law of the host State should also to be revoked without reference to 
other legal systems. Sornarajah (1994: 367). 
49 Kaeckenbeeck, op. cit.. at 6. See also 1. Foighel, Nationalization: A study in the Protection 
of Alien Property in International Law, Stevens & Sons Ltd., Copenhagen (1957) at 52. 
'i0 . . 118 
- Jam. op. CIt., at . 
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Appreciation of the doctrine of acquired rights would be incomplete if we 
were to disregard the Iran-US Claims Tribunal's jurisprudence on this issue. The 
Tribunal, in the Amoco case, first reminds us that when the decision in the 
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case was rendered, "the principles of 
international law generally accepted some sixty years ago in regard to the 
treatment of foreigners recognized very few exceptions to the principle of respect 
for vested rights." However, it rightly acknowledges that: 
A very important evolution in the law has taken place since then with 
the progressive recognition of the right of States to nationalize 
foreign property ... This right is today unanimously accepted, even by 
States which reject the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, considered by a majority of States as the legal 
foundation of such a right. 51 
The foregoing discussion indicates that the doctrine of acquired rights has 
now become outmoded, and thus, in modem international law, it cannot be a 
solid basis for compensating foreign owners in the event of nationalisation or 
expropriation. 
2.2.2 Unjust Enrichment 
Given the inadequacy of the doctrine of acquired rights to constitute the 
legal basis for the duty to compensate in case of expropriation, the weight of 
authority has shifted in favour of the application of the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment (enrichissement sans cause). The latter doctrine, whose origin can be 
traced back to Roman law, "is codified or juridically recognised in the great 
majority of the municipal legal systems of the world.,,52 Article 301 of the 
Iranian Civil Code, for instance, provides that "Anyone who intentionally or 
inadvertently acquires goods to which he has no claim, is bound to deliver such 
d h I ,,53 goo S to t e actua owner. 
51 Amoco Award, op. cit., at 222, para. 113. 
52 Francioni, op. cit., at 273. 
53 Also, Article 303 of the same Code provides as follows: 
Anyone who receives any property without any right is responsible for the actual property and for 
any profits that may accrue thereto. whether or not he is aware of his having no right to the 
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In general, two main questions are raised in the context of the doctrine of 
unjust enrichment. The first is whether this doctrine can be considered as a 
general principle of law. The second question, which forms our discussion in 
this sub-section, is whether it constitutes a legal foundation for States' liability to 
compensate foreign owners. As to the first question, the view is that this doctrine 
has been considered by a majority of authorities as a principle of general 
international law. Among them, McNair, 54 Wortley,55 Friedmann,56 Scheruer,57 
Francioni,58 Arechaga,59 Schachter,60 and Mouri61 may be recalled. As regards 
the second question, our finding will be shown at the end of this sub-section. 
The doctrine of unjust enrichment has a clear meaning in both municipal 
and international law. Under the test of unjust enrichment, no person should 
become improperly enriched at the expense of another. As Mouri, in his recent 
thorough and studious work on the Iran-US Claims Tribunal's contribution to the 
development of international law, comments: 
There should be an enrichment of one party to the detriment of the 
other, and both must arise as a consequence of the same act or 
event.,,62 
It has been argued that when a State expropriates alien property without 
paying compensation "it would enrich itself without justification at the expense 
property." English translation by M. A. R. Taleghani, Littleton, Colordeo, Fred B. Rothman & 
Co. (1995) at 34 and 44. 
54 Lord McNair, "The Seizure of Property and Enterprises in Indonesia", 6 N.I.L.R. (1959) 218 
at 239. 
55 Wortley, op. cit., at 95. 
56 W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society, Stevens & Sons, London (1959) at 456. 
57 C. H. Scheruer, "Unjustified Enrichment in International Law", 22 A.J.C.L. (1974) 284 at 
289. 
58 Francioni, op. cit., at 276. 
59 E. J. de Arechaga, "International Law in the Past Third of a Century", 159 Hague Recueil 
(1978-1) 1 at 299-300. 
60 O. Schachter, "The Question of Expropriation/Compensation in the Light of Recent State 
Policy and Practice", Symposium on United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations (Peace Palace, the Hague, the Netherlands, 15-16 September 1989) 1 at 26-27. 
61 Mouri, op. cit., at 315. 
62 Ibid., at 316. See also Z. A. Kronfol, Protection of Foreign Im'estment - A Study In 
International Law, Sijthoff, Leiden (1972) at 96-97. 
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of a foreign State - a distinct political, economic and social community." 
Arechaga further stated that: 
This principle signifies that it is not the elements of the loss suffered 
by the expropriated individual owner, but rather the enrichment, the 
beneficial gain which has been obtained by the nationalizing State, 
which must be taken into account. Any measure which results in a 
transfer of wealth in favor of the nationalizing State or one of its 
agencies gives rise to a duty to compensate (emphasis added). 63 
In the same vein, Professor Francioni observes: 
The principle of unjust enrichment postulates in itself that not the loss 
of the expropriated owner ... but the beneficial gain of the 
nationalising State must be taken into account to establish the 
measure of reparation. 64 
The above two statements clearly indicate that, under the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment, what is relevant, for assumption of liability and determining the 
quantum of compensation, is the very enrichment of the State concerned and not 
the deprivation of the affected party. Therefore, "if no actual benefit, or at least 
no actual use, is obtained by the State or its organs, no remedy should be 
available.,,65 For example, if a State, for policy considerations, ends a 
detrimental or inconvenient industrial or commercial activity which belongs to an 
alien, there is no duty to pay compensation. Since in that case, nothing is gained 
by the State concerned, despite the loss suffered by the alien owner.66 
Some jurists have noticed the relation between the principle of equity and 
the doctrine of unjust enrichment and its equitable character. Thus, Sornarajah 
points out that, where this doctrine is applied, because of its equitable character, 
it requires that "the whole course of the relationship between the parties must be 
taken into account in the determination,,67 of compensation. Friedmann took a 
63 Arechaga (1978: 182). 
M Francioni, op. cit., at 272. Mouri, op. cit., at 319, also concludes that "under unjust 
enrichment it is the enrichment of the State which counts and not the deprivation of the aggrieved 
party." 
65 Mouri, op. cit., at 319. 
66 The example was proposed by Arechaga (1978: 182). 
67 Somarajah (1994: 366). See also Story, op. cit., at 319-325. 
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similar view. In his opInIon, "the history of the economic-political relations 
between the parties,,68 should be taken into account in considering the doctrine of 
unjust enrichment. In this connection, Francioni remarks: 
Only by going back to the equitable root of the principle of unjust 
enrichment can we achieve a fruitful application of such a principle 
in nationalisation situations.69 To this effect, we need to take into 
account all the elements of the specific situation in which the 
nationalisation measure applies, as well as the concrete character of 
the bilateral relationships involved. The notion of equity which 
thereby has to be applied ... will have to provide a tool for balancing, 
over a reasonable period of time, the claims of the dispossessed 
owner with the profits and advantages that he enjoyed prior to 
nationalisation (emphasis added). 70 
Likewise, Garcia-Amador, former Special Rapporteur on the subject of 
State responsibility to the ILC, comments that the doctrine of unjust enrichment 
"permits the taking into consideration of equities in favour not only of the 
individual but also of the community.,,71 Reference to the equitable character of 
the doctrine of unjust enrichment is made also by Latin American jurist, 
Arechaga, who expressed his view in the following terms: 
What makes the doctrine of unjust enrichment highly relevant to 
nationalization is its equitable foundation, which requires the taking 
into account of all the circumstances of each case specific situation 
and the balancing of the claims of the dispossessed alien with the 
undue advantage that he may have enjoyed prior to nationalization. 
Thus, the principle of unjust enrichment would take into account the 
undue enrichment gained by foreign companies during a period of 
monopoly or of highly privileged economic position, as, for instance, 
during a period of colonial domination. 72 
6R W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law, Stevens & Sons, London 
(1964) at 207. 
69 The same author believes that this doctrine is "logically admissible and also fruitful" in the 
case of nationalisation but not so in expropriation. Francioni, op. cit., at 278. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Garcia-Amador (1959: 5, para. 14). 
72 Arechaga (1978: 182-183). While accepting the need for an equitable corrective mechanism 
that accounts for current practice, Murphy casts doubt as to whether it can best be achieved by 
invoking the doctrine of unjust enrichment. J. Murphy "Compensation for Nationalization in 
International Law", 110 S.A.L.J. (1993) 79 at 86. 
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Reference to the principle of unjust enrichment has also been made in 
international arbitral awards. In the most well-known case in this connection 
, 
Lena Goldfields Arbitration,73 which involved the nationalisation of a foreign 
mining company by a State, the arbitrators based their award specifically on the 
principle of unjust enrichment. Another case, in which the applicability of this 
doctrine in the field of international law has been accepted, is the Spanish Zones 
of Morocco Claims.74 However, the United States-Mexican General Claims 
Commission, established under the General Claims Convention of 1923, in the 
Dickson Car Wheel Company case, took a different view. The Commission held 
that the theory of unjust enrichment "has not yet been transplanted to the field of 
international law." 75 
Reliance on the doctrine of unjust enrichment has contained in more recent 
arbitral awards. The Iran-US Claims Tribunal, in several of its awards on 
expropriation cases, discussed the relevance of the doctrine of unjust enrichment. 
After noting that this principle "is a specific application of the general principle 
of equity", the Tribunal, in the Amoco case, stated that the theory: 
Normally extends to cases where a physical or legal person benefits at 
the expense of another from enrichment which is the result of neither 
a legal right, nor of tort or breach of contract. 76 
Additionally, in contrast to what has been stated so far in this connection, 
the Tribunal, in the same case, in its discussion on the valuation of the 
nationalised property, has taken into account both "the measure of the enrichment 
of the nationalizing State" and "the deprivation of the expropriated owner." It 
goes further and ruled that "the theory of unjust enrichment is referred to in the 
writings of several authorities, as a ratio legis of the applicable rule rather than as 
the rule itself.,,77 In another case, Bl (Claim 4), the Tribunal noticed the United 
73 Lena Goldfields Arbitration Award, op. cit., paras. 23 and 25. 
74 2 R.I. A.A. (1925) 615 at 644. 
75 4 R.I.A.A. (1931) 669 at 676. 
76 Amoco Award, op. cit., at 268, para. 258. 
77 Ibid., at 269, para. 259. However, Mouri took a contrary view, when he observes that "under 
the theory of unjust enrichment it is the enrichment of the State accounts and not the deprivation 
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States' explanation at the Hearing "that it was willing to pay compensation in 
order to avoid being 'unjustly enriched' .,,78 After examining the Tribunal's 
approach on the issue, however, Mouri79 reached the conclusion that only in the 
Benjamin R. Isaiah case80 did the Tribunal specifically base its compensation 
award on the principle of unjust enrichment. 
Weare now able to respond to the second question which was raised earlier 
In this sub-section. It seems safe to assert that, because of its equitable 
foundation, the doctrine of unjust enrichment can be considered as the legal basis 
of States' liability to compensate aliens in cases of expropriation. 
2.2.3 Human Rights 
Human rights may be discussed in different fields. For the present purpose, 
it will be considered in the context of the responsibility of States for injuries to 
aliens. More precisely, the theories of human rights and their relation with 
expropriation and compensation will be dealt with. The argument is that the right 
to own property is a fundamental human right, and an encroachment of such a 
right entitles its owner, natural or juristic person, to indemnification. Since the 
end of World War II and the establishment of the United Nations, human rights 
theories were given a new lease of life. Thus, we have confined ourselves only to 
those human rights instruments which have been proclaimed from 1945 onwards, 
though several Declarations were previously acknowledged. 
The right to property has been recognised by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, of which Article 17(1) thereof provides that "Every one has the 
of the aggrieved party." The same author states that the Tribunal relied on this theory when it 
dealt with the methods of the valuation. Mouri, op. cit., at 319. 
7R Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, Partial Award No. 382-B 1 (Claim 4)-
FT, (31 August 1988), reprinted in 19 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 273 at 295, para. 68. 
79 Mouri, op. cit., at 317. 
RO Benjamin R. Isaiah v. Bank Mellat, Award No. 35-219-2 (30 March 1983), reprinted in 2 
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 232 at 236-237. See also Sea-Land Service. Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Award No. 135-33-1 (20 June 1984), reprinted in 6 ibid., 149 at 168-173 and Flexi-Van Leasing. 
Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 259-39-1 (11 October 1986), reprinted in 12 
ibid., 336 at 353. 
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right to own property alone as well as in association with others." Paragraph 2 of 
the same Article guarantees this right against arbitrary deprivations. 81 
In the spirit of Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations 82 Garcia-, 
Amador attempted to give the principles declared in the Charter on human rights 
an international concern. As discussed in chapter 2,83 in his reports to the ILC, 
he tried to resolve the long debate over the 'international minimum standard' and 
'national treatment standard' through the law of human rights. Readers may 
recall that while adherents to the former standard believe that there exists under 
international law a minimum standard on the protection of the property of aliens, 
advocates of the latter standard feel that equality of treatment with nationals was 
all the alien could expect in this matter. Turning to our main point, Garcia-
Amador based his draft on State responsibility upon human rights principles. 
Under the draft, aliens are entitled to enjoy the same rights and guarantees as 
nationals. In tum, the treatment of nationals, including the right to property, is 
determined by principles of human rights.84 However, the approach was not 
welcomed by the International Law of Commission due to a number of 
difficulties. 85 
Neither the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights nor the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights had private 
property protection clauses.86 When the rights acknowledged in the Universal 
R I Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution No. 217 (III), 10 
December 1948. As to the Declaration's legal status, Higgins states that it "was not, of course, a 
binding instrument, even if subsequently it has assumed a legal significance beyond its status as 
mere declaration." Higgins, op. cit., at 356. 
R2 Article 55 reads in part: 
H( c) Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." 
R3 See chapter 2 of this thesis, at 77-78. 
R-l 2 Y.B.I.L.C. (1957) 112. 
R5 One of the difficulties mentioned by Lillich was that the approach was too advanced for its 
time. R. B. Lillich (ed.), International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 
University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville (1983) at 26-29. See also the same writer's other 
literature, "Duties of States regarding the Civil Rights of Aliens", 161 Hague Recueil (1978-111) 
329 at 399-408; Brownlie (1998: 529-530). Interestingly, almost three decades later, even 
Garcia-Amador himself accepted that the approach was somewhat premature when he submitted 
his proposal to the ILC. Garcia-Amador (1984: 68). 
R6 Higgins believes the reason that the protection of the right to own property wa~ not 
incorporated in the Covenants, was that in the early 1960s, "the concept of permanent sovereIgnty 
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Declaration were put into effect in the Covenants, all other rights were 
incorporated except the right to property, which figured in Article 1 7 of the 
Universal Declaration. 
However, to enumerate "the basic rights of the human person",87 (including 
protection from slavery and racial discrimination), in whose protection "all States 
can be held to have a legal interest", 88 the right to own property was not 
mentioned by the world Court in the Barcelona Traction case. 
At the regional level, the European Convention on Human Rights89 also 
tried to put into effect the principles contained in the Universal Declaration. As 
Higgins observes, among various instruments on the issue, this Convention "is 
likely to provide the major focus for developments.,,9o In the original Convention 
there was no reference to the right to property at all. However, the omission was 
corrected by the First Additional Protocol to the Convention, Article I of which 
deals with private property and its protection.91 In the drafting committee of the 
over natural resources was emerging and being pressed as a legal obligation. To a significant 
degree it ran counter to the notions of property entitlement as a human right." Higgins, op. cit., at 
356. 
87 Barcelona Traction Judgment, op. cit., at 32, para. 34. 
88 Ibid., para. 33. 
89 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
signed on November 1950, 213 V.N.T.S. at 221. In spite of the more homogeneous ideological 
climate of the Council of Europe, the Council was not able to reach an agreement on the 
protection of the human right to own property. Many European countries felt that the economic 
reorganisation of Europe after World War II would be prevented by the recognition of this right. 
W. Peukert, "Protection of Human Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights", 2 
H.R.L.J. (1981) 37. Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights as well as Article 
14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights guarantee the right to property but permit 
encroachment in the public interest. Reprinted in: 9 I.L.M. (1970) at 99, and 21 I.L.M. (1982) 
58, respectively. 
90 Higgins, op. cit., at 375. 
91 Paragraph 1 of Article 1 reads: 
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one 
shall be deprived of his possession except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. In several cases, the 
European Court on Human Rights has had the opportunity to interpret this Article. See inter alia: 
the Sporrong and Lonnroth case, Judgment of 23 September, 1982, E.C.H.R. Series A, No. 52; 
the James et al. case (Case No. 3/1984175/199) Judgment of 21 February, 1986, ibid., Series A. 
No. 98; the Lithgow et al. case (Case No. 2/1984174112-118) Judgment of 8 July, 1986, ibid .. 
Series A, No. 102. 
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Protocol, there was considerable dispute as to whether compensation was due 
when property was expropriated for the public purpose. 92 
Although Garcia-Amador's approach did not receive wide approval from 
either State practice or authorities, since then many legal commentators have 
noticed the relevance of the concept of human rights in the context of private 
property. They may be divided into three main groups. The first group 
comprises those writers, such as the late Professor Lillich,93 who have advocated 
the approach and suggested that the concept might offer a legal foundation for the 
law of State responsibility for injuries to aliens. For the second group, like 
Amerasinghe94 and Professor Brownlie,95 the approach is thought to extend the 
substantive protection of aliens much beyond what States can reasonably be 
expected to accept and to aggravate the problems of co-operation between States 
of differing degrees of socialisation. The last group took the view that the 
approach may weaken the traditional remedy for the protection of aliens before 
any effective new remedy is established in replacement. In the words of 
McDougal and his associates: 
The consequence is thus, Dr Garcia-Amador insisted, that continuing 
debate about the doctrines of the minimum international standard and 
equality of treatment has now become highly artificial; an 
international standard is now authoritatively prescribed for all human 
beings. It does not follow, however, that these new developments in 
substantive prescription about human rights have rendered obsolete 
the protection of individuals through the traditional procedures 
developed by the customary law of the State responsibility for 
injuries to aliens.96 
92 Higgins, op. cit., at 357-361. 
93 Lillich (1983: 26). 
94 C. F. Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
(1967) at 1-7 and particularly 278-281. . 
95 Brownlie (1998: 530), and the same writer's other literature, "General Course of PublIc 
International Law", 255 Hague Recueil (1995) 1 at 84. 
96 M. S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell and Lung-chu Chen, "The Protection of Aliens from 
Discrimination and World Public Order: Responsibility of State conjoined with Human Rights", 
70 AJ.I.L. (1976) 432 at 464, and the same authors' other literature, Human Rights and World 
Public Order, Yale University Press, New Haven (1980) at 765. 
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Besides these writers, those who have generally discussed the subject under 
discussion without taking any specific position as to Garcia-Amador's thesis 
include: Jessup,97 Waldock,98 Bishop,99 Jennings,lOO Falk,101 Murphy, I 02 
M I 103 H· . 104 V 105 106 os er, Igglns, erwey and Schrijver, Seidl-Hohenveldem, 
Somarajah107 and Shaw. 108 Moreover, having examined the philosophical basis 
of the right to property, Waldron reached the conclusion that "The slogan that 
property is a human right can be deployed only disingenuously to legitimise the 
massive inequality that we find in modem capitalist countries.,,109 It should be 
noted that Garcia-Amador today still maintains his approach. 110 it is worthy of 
mention 
The proposition that the principles of human rights may be used as a legal 
basis for the law of State responsibility for injuries to aliens is potentially 
relevant. However, there are a number of difficulties with the proposition. First, 
as Somarajah has stated, there is doubt as to whether "multinational corporations, 
which usually make foreign investments, can benefit from any principle which 
97 P. C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, Mcmillan Publications, New York (1948) at 101-
102. 
98 Sir H. Waldock, "Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the significance of 
the European Convention", in: The European Convention on Human Rights, British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, Series No.5 (1965) 1 at 2-3. 
99 W. W. Bishop, "General Course of Public Law", 115 Hague Recueil (1965-II) 151 at 415. 
100 R. Y . Jennings, "General Course of Public International Law", 121 Hague Recueil (1967-11) 
323 at 488. 
101 R. A. Falk, "The New States and International Legal Order", 118 Hague Recueil (1966-11) 1 
at 94-96. 
102 C. F. Murphy, "State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens", 41 N.Y.U.L.R. (1966) 125 at 
128-130. 
103 M. Mosler, "The International Society as a Legal Community", 140 Hague Recueil (1974-
IV) 1 at 72. 
104 Higgins, op. cit., at 355-375. 
105 W. D. Verwey and N. J. Schrijver, "The Taking of Foreign Property under International 
Law: A New Legal Perspective", 15 N.Y.I.L. (1984) 3 at 7-8. 
106 I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1992) at 
130-135. 
107 Sornarajah (1994: 368-373). 
108 M. N. Shaw, International Law (4th ed.), Cambridge University Press (1997) at 570. 
109 J. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1988) at 3. 
110 Writing in 1984, he observes: 
"The increasing awareness of the high degree of development which international law has 
achieved in the field of human rights suggests an audatious departure from the past. Therefore, to 
think in terms of synthesis of the two traditional standards should no longer be considered 
premature." Garcia-Amador (1984: 70). 
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protects the right of the individual to property." 1 1 1 Piranl12 VIews the first 
problem from another angle when he observes that "the law of human rights is 
essentially to protect the fundamental rights of individuals", and the letter, spirit 
and substance of all human rights instruments prove this assertion. He rightly 
goes on to say that, nowadays, multinational corporations are the subject of the 
majority of cases of the expropriation of foreign property, and "it is hard to 
conceive that the founders of the law of human rights, had the protection of such 
companies in mind." Second, for some,113 what Garcia-Amador undertook was 
in fact attempting to innovate an international minimum standard with a new 
content in regard to the treatment of aliens. In effect, it is impossible to persuade 
States with widely differing ideological, political and economic systems to 
submit to any particular standard. Thus, it is submitted that the concept of human 
rights is still far from being an internationally recognised principle which would 
constitute the foundation of the law of State responsibility for injuries to aliens, a 
fortiori, of the basis for the duty to compensate. 
2.2.4 Damage or Loss 
As alluded to earlier, the International Court of Justice so far has not had 
the opportunity specifically to deal with nationalisation or compensation 
questions. However, the Court, in the ELSI case,114 examined some aspects of 
the compensation issue. The case arose from the requisition of an Italian 
corporation wholly-owned by two American companies. Given the facts of the 
case, the interference with the management control of the company by the Italian 
Government, as shown in chapter 3, was held to be justifiable, and hence it did 
not constitute an indirect expropriation. It appears that the Chamber based its 
judgment on the theory of damage or loss, where it concluded that since the 
III Somarajah (1994: 368). 
112 H. Piran, Nationalization of Foreign Property in International Law and Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Liverpool, 1992) at 327-328. The same 
writer observes: 
"It is common knowledge that some of such corporations were, or are, behind regimes which 
were, or are, the subject of the most severe criticisms for their violations of the human rights." 
Ibid., at 328, n. 116. 
113 Brownlie (1998: 530). 
114 Case concerning Elettronica Sigula S. P. A. (ELSJ), op. cit. (note 19). 
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requisition did not cause or precipitate the bankruptcy of the company, the 
shareholders did not suffer damage from the requisition. 115 
The jurisprudence of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal has shed some light on 
the theory. Strictly speaking, none of the Tribunal's awards on expropriation or 
other measures affecting property rights was specifically based on the doctrines 
of acquired rights, unjust enrichment or human rights. The question which arises 
is: upon what legal basis has the Tribunal rendered its awards? After a studious 
examination of the Tribunal's case law, the Iranian scholar, Mouri 116 reached the 
conclusion that the Tribunal used the theory of damage or loss. The test for 
assumption of liability and awarding compensation, and for determining its 
quantum by application of this theory, is that some "pecuniary damages" should 
be suffered by the owner of the property or right. Put in technical terms, under 
the theory it is "the loss sustained by the expropriated person, i.e., his 
deprivation" which is pertinent. 117 To support his statement, Mouri observes that 
there are a number of cases in which the Tribunal denied compensation, despite 
its finding that expropriation occurred. The reason was that the claimants of 
those cases could not establish the pecuniary damages which they suffered with 
any preclsIon, or because the property or right they lost was found to be 
worthless. 
3. The Impact of Lawfulness, Large-Scale Expropriations and Dual 
Nationality Status on the Standard of Compensation 
Having examined the legal foundations for the payment of compensation, 
defining the applicable standard of compensation under customary international 
law will be our next task. Before dealing with this issue, however, it is necessary 
to consider the possible effect of lawfulness, large-scale expropriation measures 
and dual-nationality status on the standard of compensation. 
115 Ibid., at 71,para. 119. 
116 Mouri, op. cit., at 319-320. 
117 Amoco Award, op. cit., at 269, para. 259. 
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3.1 The impact of lawfulness: Lawful and Unlawful Expropriation 
As shown in chapter 2,118 it is a well-established principle in international 
law that a sovereign State has the right to expropriate or nationalise foreign 
property in furtherance of a public purpose. This right is a corollary of the 
State's pennanent sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources. However, 
the right is not unlimited and international law lays down several conditions for 
lawful expropriation. Thus, the non-compliance of the expropriating State with 
those conditions may be construed as unlawful taking. The obvious instances of 
unlawful expropriation would be where the expropriation is in violation of a 
treaty commitment toward the home State of the foreign investor, or where there 
has been unreasonable discriminatory expropriation against foreigners. The 
public purpose requirement is of diminishing relevance, but it will help to 
establish unfair discriminatory taking. 
The distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation has two 
. I 119 practlca consequences. The first effect falls within the ambit of private 
international law, which is not our concern in this work. 120 The second is in the 
sphere of public international law, to the effect that when an expropriation is 
found to be unlawful, the amount of compensation due to the deprived party is 
more than that due for lawful expropriation. 
The distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation and its effect on 
the detennination of the quantum of compensation has been recognised by 
international jurisprudence and arbitral awards, and hence is now well settled in 
international law. The PCIJ, in its celebrated decision in the Chorzow Factory 
case,121 established this principle. The first issue for the Court was whether the 
expropriation of the factory in question was lawful or unlawful. It held that the 
liB See chapter 2 of this thesis, at 82-88. 
119 O. E. Bring, "Impact of Developing States on International Customary Law concerning 
Protection of Foreign Property", 24 Scandinavian Studies in Law (1980) 99 at 107. 
120 The consequence which is material to private international law: "an expropriation which is 
deemed unlawful may in foreign courts be considered as a nullity without any legal effects. The 
fomm will tend not to recognize titles which are based on the unlawful taking." Ibid. 
121 Chorzow Factory Judgment, op. cit. (note 18). 
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Polish Government's action was a violation of the Geneva Convention of 1922 
between Germany and Poland, that is, the expropriation was unlawful. The 
World Court had next to consider the amount of compensation payable by 
Poland. It ruled that the compensation to be paid in the case of unlawful 
expropriation should differ from that of lawful expropriation. At this point the 
practical relevance of the distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriations 
appeared. Thus, the Court applied the impact of this distinction on the 
determination of the quantum of compensation due to Germany. Relying on 
"international practice and in particular ... the decisions of arbitral tribunals", it 
held that unlawful expropriations required: 
Restitution, in kind, or if this is not possible, payment of a sum 
corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; 
[and] the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which 
would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of 
. 122 It. 
More than five decades later, this principle was recognised by the arbitral 
award in Aminoil. 123 Additionally, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, in several of its 
awards on expropriation cases, made a distinction between lawful and unlawful 
expropriation, and applied the impact of the distinction on the amount of 
compensation. Relying on the teachings of the Chorzow Factory case judgment 
and Aminoil award, in its award in the Amoco case, the Tribunal held that the first 
principle learned is that: 
A clear distinction must be made between lawful and unlawful 
expropriation, since the rules applicable to the compensation to be 
paid by the expropriating State differ according to the legal 
h .. f h k' 124 C aractenzatlon 0 t e ta Ing. 
Finding that the expropriation of the claimant company's fifty percent 
interest in its Iranian subsidiary was lawful, the Tribunal stated that "the 
compensation to be paid in [the] case of a lawful expropriation is limited to the 
122 b·d 4 I 1 ., at 7. 
123 Aminoil Award, op. cit., at 1032, para. 143. See also Liamco Award, op. cit., at 137. 
124 Amoco Award, op. cit., at 246, para. 192. 
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value of the undertaking at the moment of the dispossession, i.e., the just price of 
what was expropriated"l25 It is worth noting that the Tribunal in this award held , , 
that even in an unlawful expropriation, no punitive damages are payable. l26 
In its more recent award in the Ebrahimi case, the Tribunal reaffirmed the 
importance of the distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation. Since 
the claimant in that case sought compensation for damnum emergens only, not 
for lucrum cessans, the Tribunal did not find it necessary "to examine the effect 
of the characterization of the taking as lawful or unlawful on the available 
compensation."l27 However, in the Phillips Petroleum case, 128 the same Tribunal 
took a somewhat different position. While endorsing the significance of such a 
distinction in international law, the Tribunal stated that it is irrelevant to the 
decision-making process of this Tribunal. This is because the 1955 Treaty of 
Amity, between Iran and the United States, provides a single standard of 
compensation which is applicable to both lawful and unlawful expropriations. 129 
Likewise, the distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation and its 
practical consequences on the amount of compensation has been supported by 
. . fi ld F . . h I F 130 most scholars In thIS Ie. or Instance, one mIg t consu t atouros, 
Kronfol,l3l Bring, 132 Jain,l33 Marks,l34 Piran,135 Murphy,136 Mouri l37 and 
Brownlie. Thus, the latter author observes: 
The practical distinctions between expropriation unlawful sub modo, 
i.e. only if no provision is made for compensation, and expropriation 
unlawful per se, would seem to be these: the former involves a duty 
125 Ibid., at 247, para. 196. 
126 Ibid., at 248, para. 197. 
127 Ebrahimi Award, op. cit., para. 96. See also INA Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Award No. 184-161-1 (12 August 1985) reprinted in 8 Iran -U.S. C.T.R. 373 at 380. 
128 Phillips Petroleum Company Iran v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 425-39-2, 
(29 June 1989), reprinted in 21 Iran -U.S. C.T.R. 79. 
129 Ibid., at 121-122, para. 109. 
130 Fatouros, op. cit., at 315. 
131 Kronfol, op. cit., at 95-100. 
132 Bring, op. cit. , at 106-107. 
133 Jain, op. cit., at 163. 
134 S. Marks, "Expropriation: Compensation and Asset Valuation", 48 c.L.J. (1989) 170. 
135 Piran, op. cit., at 333-338. 
136 Murphy, op. cit., at 91-96. 
137 Mouri, op. cit., at 320-347. 
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to pay compensation only for direct losses, i.e. the value of the 
property, the latter involves liability for consequential loss (lucrum 
cessans). 138 
Having surveyed the Iran-US Claims Tribunal's case law on the issue of 
compensation, Sornarajah concludes that: 
One merit of some of the awards made by the Iran-US Claims 
tribunals [sic] is to set the law straight by making a meaningful 
distinction between the two types of takings [lawful and unlawful] 
and also rationalising the calculation of compensation in respect of 
the two types of takings (emphasis added). 139 
Before drawing a conclusion on the issue, it is necessary to deal with an 
important question which arises here with respect to unlawful expropriation. 
What is the appropriate remedy for an unlawful expropriation under international 
law? Some argue that 'restitution' or 'specific performance' is the principal 
reparation of a material wrong, compensation being subsidiary in character, 
applicable only when restitution is not possible or not claimed. The clearest 
statement in this respect can be found in the PCIJ's celebrated dictum in the 
Chorzow Factory case, as quoted above. As regards the Court's statement, two 
situations may be assumed. Firstly, restitution is impossible because of purely 
material reasons (material impossibility). For example, in cases where the 
expropriated property has already passed into the hands of a third party, or is 
destroyed. 140 The impossibility may be for legal reasons (legal impossibility). In 
this case, "it is no simple matter from the point of view of domestic law to 
contemplate compelling a state to rescind a legislative measure or to set aside a 
decision pronounced by its courtS.,,141 Secondly, claimants mostly do not seek 
restitution, since they regard damages which represent a compensation more 
d h · . 142 a vantageous t an restitutIon. Kronfol 143 has advanced a third situation, 
13R Brownlie (1998: 541). 
139 Somarajah (1994: 396 and 408) and (1986: 167-188). 
140 Higgins, op. cit.. at 315-316. Harris, op. cit., at 573, also shares the view that restitution in 
the case of expropriation would be impossible. 
141 Kronfol, op. cit., at 98. 
I'+~ Higgins, op. cit.. at 316. 
1.+\ ~ I . 99 
- Kronio. op. CIt.. at . 
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where he points out that restitution may not always "wipe out all the illegal act." 
For instance, the mere returning of the illegally expropriated property will not 
cover the lost profits occasioned by the expropriation. Interestingly, in the same 
case, the PCIJ describing payment of indemnity as "the most usual form of 
reparation", stated that "it is the form selected by Germany in this case and the 
admissibility of it has not been disputed." Thus, Kronfol rightly suggests that in 
anyone of the three above-mentioned situations, "reparation takes the form of the 
payment of damages and it is pecuniary in nature because in Grotius' well known 
phrase, 'money is the common measure of valuable things. ,,, 
In the light of these views, to order restitution as a principal remedy is not 
generally favoured by international tribunals. Thus, in the BP case, Arbitrator 
Lagergren ruled that restitution was not an available remedy and stated that the 
claimant was "entitled to damages arising from the wrongful act of the 
Respondent, to be assessed by this Tribunal in subsequent proceedings.,,144 In 
the Liamco case, while Arbitrator Mahmassani spoke of the acceptance of 
restitution in Islamic law, he declined to grant this remedy in the case because of 
its impossibility of performance "in the international field.,,145 However, in the 
third Libyan oil expropriation case, Texaco, Arbitrator Dupuy ordered restiutio in 
. f h . d'l . 146 zntegrum 0 t e expropnate 01 concessIons. 
Writers have also shared the view that, In practice, compensation 
constitutes the principal remedy, restitution being clearly an exceptional one. 147 
144 BP Award, op. cit., at 357. Note that almost a decade later, the same arbitrator restates the 
view that restitution, for practical reasons, is usually impossible of achievement. The Separate 
Opinion of Judge Lagergren in the INA Award, op. cit., 385 at 385. 
145 Liarnco Award, op. cit., at 124. Note that the reluctance of Arbitrators Lagergren and 
Mahmassani to consider restitution on the ground that it would be difficult to enforce has been 
criticised. See, R. B. von Mehren and P. N. Kourides, "International Arbitrations Between States 
and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases", 75 A.J.I.L. (1981) 476 at 533-
545. 
146 Texaco Award, op. cit., at 36, para. 109. 
147 S . I· ee, znter a za: 
- Higgins, op. cit., at 321: "I find very little evidence that restitution is perceived as a required 
remedy or that it is anticipated as being likely to be granted." 
- Friedman, op. cit., at 214: "To impose an obligation to make integral restitution, however. 
constitutes an intolerable interference in the internal sovereignty of States." Gray took a similar 
approach. C. D. Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1990) 
at 16-17. 
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From the foregoing discussion, one may conclude that the distinction 
between lawful and unlawful expropriation is well established in international 
law. The significance of such a distinction has been noticed and applied to the 
amount of compensation by international decision-makers. In the case of lawful 
expropriation, compensation may be due, and it is limited to the value of the 
expropriated property at the moment of the expropriation (damnum emergens). 
With respect to unlawful expropriation, the appropriate remedy would be 
damages, which, in addition to the value of the expropriated property at the 
moment of the expropriation, may include lost profits (lucrum cessans). The 
latter may be awarded according to what the claimant concerned reasonably 
expects. The conclusion was given the stamp of authority by Professor Bowett, 
when he observes that whilst loss of profits may be a legitimate head of damages 
for an unlawful act, is not an appropriate head of compensation for a lawful 
expropriation. 148 Thus, in view of the weight of authorities in international law, 
restitution is the appropriate remedy only in exceptional cases. 
3.2 The impact of Large-Scale Expropriations 
In chapter 1,149 the differences, in nature, scope and effect, between 
individual or ad hoc expropriation and expropriation on a large-scale, namely 
nationalisation, were addressed. There, it was indicated that nationalisation is a 
separate legal concept, which has been defined as measures of general economic 
reform designed to achieve greater social justice. The discussion in this sub-
section begins with the question of whether such measures merit a different 
treatment of the standard of compensation from that of other forms of takings. 
- Jain, op. cit., at 164-165. . 
- Fatouros, op. cit., at 313: "Compensation constitutes the principal mode of reparatlOn. 
Restitution is possible only in a limited number of special cases." 
- Referring to the Temple of Preah Vihear case, Sornarajah (1994: 351, n. 83) states th~t 
"specific performance can be the only remedy in territorial disputes," and it is difficult to extend It 
to areas outside territorial disputes. 
148 D. W. Bowett, "State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation 
for Termination or Breach", 59 B.Y.I.L. (1988) 49 at 63. 
149 See our discussion in chapter 1 of this thesis, at 8-9. 
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Put in technical terms, is payment of 'partial' compensation justifiable where 
economic reform is the goal of the measures? 
Generally speaking, there are two schools of thought in this connection. I so 
First, from the viewpoint of 'unitarians', despite profound ascertainable 
disparities between nationalisation and other forms of takings, international law 
requires 'full' compensation for major and minor expropriations alike. Second, 
from the viewpoint of 'dualists', 'full' compensation should be paid in cases of 
minor takings, but only 'partial compensation' in the case of major 
expropriations. The 'unitarian' school is represented by Wortley, who 
comments: 
The first point I want to make is that nationalization, which is the 
seizure of a country's economy, does not differ in principle from 
other forms of expropriation, i.e., from confiscation without payment, 
from requisition in an emergency with payment after the events, or 
from classical expropriation after prior payment. 151 
The 'dualist' school was supported by the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. 
While accepting that a State is bound to respect the property of aliens, he made 
these meaningful remarks: 
A modification must be recognized in cases in which fundamental 
changes in the political system and economic structure of the State or 
far-reaching social reforms entail interference, on a large scale, with 
private property. In such cases, neither the principle of absolute 
respect for alien private property nor rigid equality with the 
dispossessed nationals offer a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. 
It is probable that, consistently with legal principle, such solution 
must be sought in the granting of partial compensation (emphasis 
added). 152 
150 D. R. Weigel and B. H. Weston, Valuation upon the Deprivation of Foreign Enterprise: A 
Policy-Oriented Approach to the Problem of Compensation under International Law", in R. B. 
Lillich (ed.), The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law, Vol. I, University 
Press of Virginia, Charlottesville (1972) 3 at 7. 
151 Quoted in ibid. 
152 H. Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's International Law (8th ed.), London (1955) at 352. Note that 
the above-mentioned passage is missing in the new edition (Oppenheim's International La ... r (9th 
ed.), Vol. 1, Longman, London (1996) edited by Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arnold Watts). 
While this edition recognises the existence of much disagreement as to the standard of 
compensation, it is not partial to any view on the issue .. The new edition, at 921-922. 
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It has been stated that the origin of such a distinction can be traced back to 
the period between the two World Wars when both Romania, regarding its land 
reform, and Mexico, concerning its land reform and oil nationalisation, adopted 
such a position. In his words: 
A distinction was made between regular, individual expropriation of 
private property and expropriation of general, impersonal character, 
the latter being undertaken in the execution of economic and social 
reforms, such as an agrarian or land-refonn. Legal principles 
applicable to each type of expropriation, under the new approach, 
were no longer the same as have been traditionally applied to 
expropriations of the first type (emphasis added). 153 
While publicists who advocate the 'unitarian' school are not alone,154 the 
number of jurists who favour partial compensation in cases of nationalisation is 
rapidly increasing. Among earlier writers, one might consult Katzarov, 155 
Dunn,156 Kuhn,157 Delson,158 De Visscher, 159 Dawson and Weston, 160 Baade,161 
Foighel,162 Friedmanl63 Doman, 164 Bishopl65 and Fatouros.1 66 
153 Garcia-Amador (1984: 307 and 330). 
154 See, e.g., Schwarzenberger, op. cit., at 41, and Lord McNair, op. cit., at 251. 
155 Katzarov suggests that compensation for claims arising from nationalisation be fixed by 
"new criteria." K. Katzarov, "The Validity of the Act of Nationalisation in International Law", 22 
M.L.R. (1959) 639 at 647. Relying on State practice, many constitutional and legislative 
materials, he concludes that there is no place for 'full' compensation but only for 'suitable' or 
'equitable' compensation. To him, equitable compensation comprises a number of elements 
involving a subjective appraisal. The same writer's other literature, Theory of Nationalisation, 
Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague (1964) at 349. 
156 F. S. Dunn, "International Law and Private Property Rights", 28 Col.L.R. (1928) 166 at 178. 
157 A. K. Kuhn, "Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property in its Impact on International 
Law", 45 A.J.I.L. (1951) 709 at 711-712. 
158 R. Delson, "Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company: Issues of Public and Private 
International Law," 57 Col.L.R. (1957) 754 at 763-767. 
159 C. De Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law (transl. by P. E. Corbett), 
Princeton University Press (1968) at 203. 
160 F. G. Dawson and B. H. Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and Effective: A Universal Standard of 
Compensation?", 30 For.L.R. (1961) 727 at 732-736. 
16] H. W. Baade, Indonesian Nationalization Measures before Foreign Courts - A Reply", 54 
AJ.I.L. (1960) 801 at 804, n. 23. 
162 Foighel, op. cit., at 188. 
163 Friedman, op. cit., at 206-211. 
164 N. R. Doman, "Post-war Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe", 48 Col.L.R. (1948) 
1125 at 1128. In his view, the post-war nationalisation acts do not come under any traditional 
category of a legal system based on capitalist economy, and should be treated as lex specialis. 
165 Bishop, at 410. 
166 . 327 Fatouros, op. CIt., at : 
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A considerable number of modem writers in this field also share the view. 
Thus, Professor Bowett l67 points out that there are three standards of 
compensation: (1) for an unlawful taking; (2) for a lawful ad hoc taking; and (3) 
for a lawful, general act of nationalization. In his view, "the third standard is the 
lowest, which would accord with State practice and the trend in General 
Assembly resolutions to move towards a concept of 'appropriate' or 'just' 
compensation." He based his opinion on a two-fold rationale. First, in the case 
of nationalisation, unlike ad hoc taking, owners of the nationalised property are 
not singled out, "and therefore the measure is akin to taxation: it is a form of 
redistribution of wealth and resources." As in the case of taxation, "the owners 
do suffer a partially confiscatory measure, losing part of their wealth to the 
State." (referred to as 'taxation analogy'). Second, it is "based on the view that 
nationalizations commonly affect either those natural resources regarded as 
subject to 'permanent sovereignty', or else industries which are crucial to the 
State's economic welfare." Bowett argues that: 
The resources and means of production are either already owned by 
the state, or can properly be brought into ownership. The exploiter 
who is nationalized is therefore entitled to full compensation for his 
assets, and has a right to recover what he has invested. 
He continues: 
but he has no right to any expectation of profits, from the moment in 
time when the State takes over the actual exploitation of those 
resources or means of production. For profits produced after the 
State has taken over, are the fruit of the State's own efforts: they will 
not have been 'earned' by the previous owner, and therefore do not 
represent an element of compensation to which he is entitled. 
In the same vein, Professor Brownlie observes: 
Where major natural resources are concerned, cogent considerations 
of principle reinforced by the Declaration of 1962 and the Charter of 
"The main argument in support of the practice [of partial compensation] is its economic necessity 
... if full compensation had to be paid, the nationalizations would have been impossible or the 
nationalizing state would have been led into bankruptcy." 
167 Bowett, op. cit., at 73-74. 
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Economic Rights and Duties of States, militate against the 'adequate, 
effective, and prompt' formula. 168 
Seidl-Hohenveldem believes that a duty to pay full, prompt and effective 
compensation in the case of nationalization would prevent a poor State from 
adopting any nationalization measures, which will be essential for its social 
.C' 169 G . A d k"l . relorm. arCla- rna or too a SImI ar vIew, when he comments: 
It would be unjust to deprive those less wealthy, developing countries 
of the power to directly exploit their natural resources and public 
services, industries, or other undertakings established in their 
territory, just because of their inability to pay full compensation 
(emphasis added).170 
Piran reached the conclusion that in large-scale expropriations, if the 
expropriating State is not able to provide the compensation required, "partial 
compensation corresponding to the amount affordable by the State would be legal 
and acceptable.,,171 For some, 'partial' compensation in the extensive wealth 
deprivation context "has become more the norm than the exception."I72 
Professor Schachter173 quotes Sohn and Baxter,174 who wrote as early as in 1961 
that less than full value would be just compensation when the State would 
otherwise have "an overwhelming financial burden." 
Commenting on Weston's conclusion 175 on the practice of expropriating 
States to pay compensation, Professor Higgins observes that it is hard to disagree 
with his conclusion to the effect that: 
16R Brownlie (1998: 547). In another passage the same author comments: 
"The principle of nationalization un subordinated to a full-compensation rule may be supported by 
reference to principles of self-determination, independence, sovereignty, and equality." Ibid., at 
539. 
169 Seidl-Hohenveldem, op. cit., at 139. 
170 Garcia-Amador (1984: 332-333). 
171 Piran, op. cit., at 342 and 391-392. 
172 Dawson and Weston, op. cit., at 738. 
m O. Schachter, "Compensation Cases - Leading and Misleading", 79 A.l.LL. (1985) 420 at 
420, and the same author's other literature: (1984: 124), (1989: 16-19), and International Law in 
Theory and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1991) at 321-324. 
174 L. B. Sohn and R. R. Baxter, "Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests 
of Aliens", 55 A.l.LL. (1961) 545 at 560. 
175 B. H. Weston, 'The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of 
Foreign-Owned Property", 75 A.l.LL. (1981) 437 at 453-.f54. 
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'" one finds in the great majority of cases the depriving countries 
ultimately have granted compensation in an amount and form not 
inconsistent with the 'partial' compensation and valuation standards 
prevalent since World War II ... (emphasis added). 176 
Writing in 1997, Schrijver concludes that: 
It is accepted in most cases involving large-scale nationalisations of 
the natural-resource sector that only 'partial' compensation has to be 
paid. This is because the impact of 'full' compensation on the 
financial resources and the development plans of the nationalizing 
country would in practice nullify the effect of the nationalization 
(emphasis added). 177 
The European Court of Human Rights has also expressed a similar view on 
the issue. In its judgment in the James case, which involved the application of 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
Court held that: 
Article 1 does not ... guarantee a right to full compensation in all 
circumstances. Legitimate objectives of 'public interest', such as 
[those] pursued in measures of economic reform or measures 
designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for less than 
reimbursement of full market value (emphasis added).178 
Similar expressions were used by the Court in the Lithgow case, involving 
the nationalisation of the property of British nationals by their own government. 
Striking a balance between the demands of the general interests of the community 
and the private property interests of the individual,179 the Court ruled that "the 
standard of compensation required in a nationalisation case may be different from 
h . d' d h k' f rt ,,180 t at reqUIre In regar to ot er ta Ings 0 prope y. 
In presenting arguments to the Court in the same case, the counsel for the 
European Commission made the following comment on the issue: 
176 Higgins, op. cit., at 294. 
177 Schrijver, op. cit., at 293-294. 
178 James Judgment, op. cit. (note 91), at 36, para. 54. 
179 See also Sporrong and Lonnroth v. The Government of Sweden, Judgment of 23 September 
1982, E.C.H.R. (1982), Series A, No. 52, 7, at 26, para. 69. 
180 Lithgow Judgment op. cit. (note 91), at 51, para. 121. 
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I am not aware of one single case where, for nationalization of whole 
industries, full compensation was paid by the nationalizing state to 
the foreign owners ... In most cases of nationalization, lump-sum 
agreements were reached clearly below the value of the assets taken. 
At least for large-scale nationalization, the notion of sovereignty over 
natural resources and freedom of decision over the economic order 
may easily come into conflict with [the 1 claim of full compensation 
(emphasis added).181 
Commenting on the Lithgow judgment, Schachter enumerated three points 
concerning the significance of the judgment, including "it draws a distinction 
between nationalization and eminent domain takings." 182 
Reference to the view that the standard of compensation required in the 
case of nationalisation is different from that required in regard to an individual 
expropriation, may also be made to the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. The latter dealt 
with the issue in two of its awards, INA and Sedco. 183 • In the first award, the 
Tribunal characterised the nationalisations in question as "a classic example of a 
formal and systematic nationalization by decree of an entire category of 
commercial enterprises considered of fundamental importance to the nations' 
economy.,,184 It clearly regarded such nationalisations as falling into a special 
category. However, the Tribunal did not apply the consequences of such a 
distinction in its awards, and held full compensation. After noting that "no award 
of the Tribunal has invoked the far-reaching or reformative aspects of the 
measure for the purpose of awarding a lesser standard of compensation", Mouri 
comments: 
Rather ... those awards which referred to large-scale expropriations 
did so only to justify their own application to the 'full' standard 
and/or to circumvent the requirement of lesser compensation by 
IRI Quoted by Sornarajah (1994: 370-371). 
IR2 Schachter (1989: 17). 
183 Sedco Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company & The Islamic Republic of Iran, Interlocutory 
Award No. 55-129-3 (24 October 1985), reprinted in 9 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 248. 
IR4 INA Award, op. cit., at 378. 
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considering the particular case at hand not an instance of large-scale 
nationalization. 185 
The W orId Bank Guidelines also recognise that, from the viewpoint of the 
standard of compensation, large-scale expropriations warrant different 
treatment. 186 
In the light of the foregoing, there seems to be little room for doubt that 
large-scale expropriations or nationalisations merit a different standard of 
compensation from that of individual expropriations. It is not solely the financial 
capacity of the nationalising State that calls for such treatment,187 but also, 
perhaps primarily, the conflict between the permanent sovereignty of States over 
their natural resources and the claim for full compensation. Thus, in the case of 
nationalisation 'partial' compensation would be the appropriate compensation. 
The area in which the practice of 'partial' compensation is more evident 
than elsewhere is in the settlements of compensation disputes through lump-sum 
agreements. This will be considered later in this chapter. 
3.3 The Impact of Dual Nationality 
Under this heading, the possible impact of dual nationality on the amount 
of compensation will be addressed. To the present author's best knowledge, this 
issue has been raised for the first time in the recent awards of the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal. Under the pertinent provisions of the Algerian Declarations,188 the 
185 Mouri, op. cit., at 348. See also Sornarajah (1994: 387-391), and M. Pellonpaa and M. 
Fitzmaurice, "Taking of Property in the Practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 19 
N.Y.I.L. (1988) 53 at 114-120. 
186 The World Bank Guidelines, Section IV(10), op. cit. (note 30), at 1383, reads in part: 
"In the case of comprehensive ... nationalizations effected in the process of large scale social 
refolms ... the compensation may be determined through negotiations between the host State and 
the investor's home State. 
187 See also: 
_ C. F. Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
(1967) at 129, and the author's other literature, "The Quantum of Compensation for Nationalized 
Property", in R. B. Lillich (ed.), The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law, 
Vol. III, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville (1975) 91 at 124-125; and 
- Piran, op. cit., at 392. 
188 The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
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Tribunal's constituent instruments, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate 
claims between the two States, Iran and the United States, as well as their 
nationals' claims against the other State. However, the Algerian Declarations are " 
silent on the issue of whether a dual Iran-United States national may bring a 
claim before this Tribunal. Thus, in case No. A18,189 the Full Tribunal decided 
that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over claims by dual Iran-United States nationals ... 
"~ 
with dominant and effective United States nationality against the Government of 
Iran and vice versa. To this conclusion, however, the Tribunal added an 
important caveat: 
In cases where the Tribunal finds jurisdiction based upon a dominant 
and effective nationality of the claimant, the other nationality may 
remain relevant to the merits of the claim. 190 
Following this decision, many cases were filed with the Tribunal by dual 
Iran-United States nationals whose dominant and effective nationality was that of 
the United States. In those cases, claimants asserted that their properties, 
including real estate, were expropriated by the Government of Iran directly or 
indirectly, and hence it incurs the responsibility of Iran. Whatever arguments 
were presented by the claimants, the Government of Iran's arguments, as 
respondent, 191: are highly relevant to our present purposes. Iran based its 
arguments on: the A18 caveat, a number of international principles and several 
pieces of Iranian legislation. They may be summarised as follows 
1) since claimants brought claims before the Tribunal as United States 
nationals and because their claims involve benefits limited by Iranian law to sole 
Iranian nationals, their claims are barred by the A18 caveat; 
2) the mere ownership by a dual national of real property in Iran in itself 
bars the claim from compensation by the Tribunal, and thus the caveat filters out 
Government of the United States (signed on January 19, 1981), reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 3; 
75 AJ.I.L. (1981) 418, and 20 I.L.M. (1981) 224. 
liN The Islamic Republic of Iran v. The United States of America, Decision No. 32-AI8-FT (6 
April 1984), reprinted in 5 Iran-U.S. c.T.R. 251 at 265. 
190 Ibid., at 265-266. 
191 See the respondent's Evidence and Brief in Rebuttal, Vol. 2, Filed 30th August 1994 
(Document 113), Exhibit 16 in Kamran Hakim \', The Islamic Republic of Iran , Case No. 953. 
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claims incapable of proceeding to the stage of consideration of the substance. 
This occurs through the application of such principles as: abuse of rights, good 
faith, clean hands, misrepresentation, concealment of material facts, estoppel and 
State responsibility; and 
3) Iranian law, especially Articles 988 and 989 of the Civil Code, prohibits 
foreigners from owning real estate in Iran, save certain exceptions irrelevant to 
those cases. 
In the awards of those cases, the meaning and the scope of the A 18 caveat 
have been explicitly defined and determined by the three Chambers of the 
Tribunal. Here is one example in which Chamber Two of the Tribunal, after 
having a thorough review of all the earlier pronouncements on the Issue, 
concluded that: 
The caveat is evidently intended to apply to claims by dual nationals 
for benefits limited by relevant and applicable Iranian law to persons 
who were nationals solely of Iran. However,... the equitable 
principle expressed by this rule can, in principle, have a broader 
application. Even when a dual national's claim relates to benefits not 
limited by law to Iranian nationals, the Tribunal may still apply the 
caveat when the evidence compels the conclusion that the dual 
national has abused his dual nationality in such a way that he should 
not be allowed to recover on his claim. 192 
However, there is no consensus among the Chambers of the Tribunal on the 
issue. Thus, three categories of awards may be identified. The first category 
consists of awards in which the Tribunal applied the caveat, and hence the 
claimants concerned were denied compensation. In the Saghi case, one of the 
claimants, Allan Saghi, had renounced his Iranian nationality at the age of 18, but 
re-applied for and acquired the said nationality solely for the purpose of 
purchasing certain shares that he believed could only be owned by Iranian 
192 James M. Saghi et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 544-298-2, para. 54 (22 
January 1993) (unprinted). Note that the Tribunal's statement on the issue is not without 
precedent in the literature of international law. Thus, the IeJ, in the Nottebohm case, concerning 
the nationality of individuals for the purpose of diplomatic protection in international law, ruled 
that the right of diplomatic protection arises only when there is a 'genuine link (connection), 
between the claimant State and its nationals. See .I.e.J. Rep. (1955) 4. Regarding the nationality 
of corporations, see Barcelona Traction case, I.e.J. Rep. (1970) 3. 
295 
nationals. Having applied the caveat to the facts of the case, the Tribunal held 
that: 
Fundamental considerations of equity require that Allan Saghi - a 
dual national with dominant and effective U.S. nationality - should 
not be permitted to recover against Iran, even if the related benefits 
... he acquired with the use of his Iranian nationality, were not limited 
to Iranians by Iranian law. To rule otherwise would be to permit an 
abuse of right (emphasis added). 193 
The Tribunal therefore dismissed "those part of his claim where the 
equitable considerations giving rise to the application of the caveat are 
present.,,194 
To the same effect is the Tribunal's 1996 decided case of Karubian,195 in 
which the claimant, a dual Iran-United States national living in the United States, 
purchased real estate after he had acquired American nationality, that is after he 
had became a dual national. After reviewing all pertinent laws of Iran, the 
Tribunal unanimously concluded that apart from certain exceptions irrelevant to 
the present case, the right to acquire real property in Iran is reserved for Iranian 
nationals only. 196 As in the Saghi case, the Tribunal held that if it were to allow 
the claimant to recover against the Government of Iran in those circumstances, it 
would be permitting an abuse of right. 197 Consequently, it found that: 
The A 18 caveat bars the claimant ... from recovering against the 
Respondent for interference with property rights that, under Iranian 
. I I' . I 198 law, he could have acqUIred on y as an ranI an natlOna . 
In the next category of awards, the Tribunal held that the Al8 caveat was 
not applicable. In its view, there was no evidence that the claimants concerned 
concealed or otherwise abused their Iranian nationality when they acquired 
property rights or that they obtained any benefit available by law only to Iranian 
193 Ibid., para. 59. 
194 Ibid., para. 60. 
195 Rouhollah Karubian v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 566-419-2 (6 March 1996) 
(unprinted). 
196 Ibid., para. 159. 
197 Ibid., para. 161. 
19R Ibid., para. 162. 
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nationals. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that claimants' claims were not 
barred by the caveat. 199 
The third category compnses awards In which the Tribunal adopted a 
position somewhere in between the other two categories. A more recent 
reference to this category will be found in the Aryeh case. 200 There, what was 
before the Tribunal was an assertion by a dual Iran-United States national, whose 
dominant and effective nationality was that of the United States, that 16 pieces of 
land in Iran, purchased by him after his naturalisation in 1966, were expropriated 
by Iran. While accepting that Iranian law was generally averse to the ownership 
of real estate by foreign nationals, the Tribunal reached the conclusion that the 
said law does not prohibit foreigners or dual nationals from owning real property 
in Iran?OI It noted that Article 989 of the Iranian Civil Code is the controlling 
statute in this case, and that its pertinent part reads as follows: 
In case any Iranian subject acquired foreign nationality after solar 
year 1280 (1901-1902) without observance of the provisions of law, 
his foreign nationality will be considered null and void and he will be 
regarded as an Iranian subject. Nevertheless, all his landed properties 
will be sold under the supervision of the local public prosecutor and 
the proceeds will be paid to him after the deduction of the expenses 
202 
of the sale ... 
After noting that "the Claimant's actions do not rise to the level of an abuse 
of nationality", it concluded that this is a case in which the caveat in case No. 
Al8 should be applied.203 The tribunal, however, held that "it would not be 
equitable to apply the caveat in a way that would place the Claimant in a worse 
199 See inter alia: Faith L. Khosrowshahi et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et aI., Award 
No. 558-178-2 (30 June 1994); Feredoon GhafJari v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 
565-968-2 (7 July 1995); Edgar Protiva v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 566-316-2 
(14 July 1995); Jahangir Mohtadi et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran , Award No. 573-271-3 (2 
December 1996), and George E. Davidson (Homayounjah) v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Award No. 585-457-1 (5 March 1998). Note that all these awards are unprinted. 
200 Moussa Alyeh v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 583-266-3 (25 September 1997) 
(unprinted). 
201 Ibid., paras. 75-76. 
202 Quoted in the award. 
203 Ibid., para. 79. 
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position than Iranian law itself would have done under similar circumstances." 
And then: 
To do so under the rubric of a principle grounded in equity ... would 
not only work an injustice upon the Claimant but would also confer 
an unwarranted advantage upon the Respondent, which would be 
unjustly enriched thereby ... it would also be unfair to award the 
Claimant the full market value of his property in the present situation 
since he would have received less than full compensation under 
Iranian law ... had he purchased the property before acquiring United 
States nationality (emphasis added).204 
This statement tries to reconcile the barring of the entire claim and the 
nonn of full compensation. Thus, it suggests a discount to the full market value 
of the property in question. As for how much discount may be applied to the 
value of the property, the Tribunal, having regard to general principles of 
commercial practice, held that: 
The average difference between the full market value of a property 
and the price obtained for that property in a forced or juridical sale 
ranges between 10% and 15% ... Article 989 provides that 
compensation paid to a dual national fonner landowner should be 
comprised of the proceeds from a forced sale 'after the deduction of 
the expenses of the sale.' The costs associated with such a sale 
would, on average, reduce the amount of compensation by a further 
10% to 15%. Accordingly, in order to approximate most closely the 
effects of an application of Article 989 of the Iranian Civil Code, the 
Tribunal concludes that a discount of 25% should be applied to the 
value of the property (emphasis added).205 
However, the Iranian Arbitrator to the Tribunal, Aghahosseni,206 in his 
thorough and valuable Dissenting Opinion took a contrary view. In his view, the 
award in this case has introduced "a novel application" for the A18 caveat of 
which no trace is to be found in international precedent. Having surveyed the 
law of this Tribunal as well as international law on the issue, and applied it to the 
204 Ibid., para. 84. 
205 Ibid., para. 86. 
206 The Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator M. Aghahosseni in the Aryeh case. See also his 
Dissenting Opinion in the Mohtadi case. Note that both opinions are unprinted. 
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case at hand, the Arbitrator maintains that the claimant's claim should be barred 
by the caveat. 
In view of the foregoing considerations, we may conclude that dual 
nationality status would have a negative effect on the amount of compensation. 
In the case where a dual national acquires rights in immovable property, or 
continues to enjoy benefits not available to him through his dominant nationality, 
and such rights are expropriated by the original State, if one cannot say that such 
claims should be barred, then at least the deprived dual national should receive 
some compensation, but not full compensation. 
4. The Standard of Compensation 
Having examined the impact of three factors, namely lawfulness, large-
scale expropriation and dual-nationality on the amount of compensation, we now 
come to the core of our study on compensation, i.e. the standard of compensation. 
What is the current state of international law regarding the standard of 
compensation? In order to give a proper answer to this question, a brief review 
of the evolution of the compensation issue is necessary. 
4.1 Was 'Full' Compensation the Pre-World War II Standard? 
There are opinions that consider that prior to Wodd War II, 'full' or 
'adequate ,207 compensation was the standard of compensation in any case of 
expropriation of foreign property.208 No definition of full compensation has been 
suggested, but it is taken as encompassing the present market value of the 
property as well as its lost profits. 
207 The tenns 'full' and 'adequate' are often used interchangeably. As Schwarzenberger, op. 
cit., at 10, puts it: "the difference between the tenns 'full' and 'adequate' compensation is ~erely 
one between synonyms." See also INA Award, op. cit., at 378; Seidl-Hohenveldern, op. cIL at 
144, and Somarajah (1994: 359). 
20R In the words of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, e.g.: 
"The overwhelming practice and the prevailing legal opinion before World War II supported the 
view that customary international law required compensation equivalent to the full value of the 
property taken." Sedco Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company & The Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Interlocutory Award No. 59-129-3 (27 March 1986) reprinted in 10 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 180 at 1~4 
(footnote omitted). 
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There are a considerable number of international court decisions and 
tribunal awards which are used to support the norm of full compensation. One 
may first refer to the award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Norwegian 
Shipowners' Claims.209 The case dealt with the requisitioning of alien property 
by the United States for war-time purposes. The tribunal decided that ')ust 
compensation" should be determined by "fair actual value at the time and place ... 
in view of all surrounding circumstances.,,210 Proponents of full compensation 
argue that the tribunal "treated 'just,' 'full,' and 'fair' as virtually interchangeable 
notions so far as compensation was concerned." Whether or not the award 
supports the Hull formula will be discussed later in this sub-section, but "it 
certainly does not support the view that 'fair' compensation can be less than 
full.,,211 
However, Professor Schachter took a contrary view.212 Similarly, although 
the United States' action in this award was found to be legal (the exercise of the 
right of eminent domain), the case itself was concerned "with specific war-time 
circumstances.,,213 Thus, it is safe to say that its value for the present purpose 
would be limited. 
An early and often quoted source is the PCIJ's seminal judgment in the 
Chorzow Factory case.214 One committed advocate of full compensation 
contends that under the principles set forth in this judgment, as intimated above, 
"the minimum pecuniary obligation in all cases [both lawful and unlawful 
expropriations] was the payment of full value of the property taken. ,,215 
209 Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (Norway v. United States) Pennanent Court of International 
Arbitration, Award of 13 October, 1922, 2 R.LA.A. (1948) at 307-346 (also reprinted in 17 
A.J.LL. (1923) at 362-399). 
210 Ibid., at 339-341. 
211 M. H. Mendelson, "What Price Expropriation? Compensation for Expropriation: The Case 
Law", 79 A.J.LL. (1985) 414 at 416. See also P. M. Norton, "A Law of the Future or a Law of 
the Past? Modem Tribunals and International Law of Expropriation", 85 AJ.I.L. (1991) 474. 
212 Schachter (1984: 123), and the author's other literature, "Compensation Cases - Leading and 
Misleading", op. cit. (note 173), at 420. 
213 Schrijver, op. cit., at 354-355. 
~14 Chorzow Factory Judgment, op. cit., at 47. 
215 Mendelson, op. cit., at 416. 
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However, the utilisation of the judgment in such a manner has been 
criticised by some scholars. For them, since the aforesaid case itself was 
concerned with an unlawful expropriation,216 its use to support the norm of full 
compensation in all cases of expropriations is unjustified. In this connection, 
Sornarajah comments: 
The manner in which the case has been utilised in subsequent times is 
a sad commentary on the international law academe. Faced with a 
paucity of authority that supports full compensation, the case has 
been utilised improperly by the proponents of full compensation to 
support their claim. It should be obvious on any reading of the 
judgment of the Court that the Court did not seek to support full 
compensation as applicable to all instances, such as those in breach of 
a treaty ... 217 
Schachter maintains that the Chorzow Factory case judgment does not 
support full compensation, it "refers only to a duty to payment of fair [meaning 
less than full] compensation.,,218 This case, like the Norwegian Shipowners' 
Claims, was concerned "with specific war-time circumstances.,,219 
Likewise, there are other pre-World War II awards in which international 
tribunals held full compensation for the expropriation of private property owned 
by foreigners. Thus, in the Delagoa Bay case, which involved a breach of a 
railway construction contract between the home State and foreign concessionaire, 
the tribunal awarded damages "according to the universally accepted rules of law, 
the damnum emergens and the lucrum cessans: the damages that has been 
sustained and the profit that has been missed.,,22o Commenting on the award, 
Sornarajah221 points out that, due to the facts of this case, in which the foreign 
party provided the capital and expertise, the tribunal's finding "is fully justified." 
216 E. Lauterpacht, "Issues of Compensation and Nationality in the Taking of Energy 
Investments", 8 J.E.N.R.L. (1990) 241 at 243: 
"It [the Chorzow Factory case] was not concerned with the question of the level of compensation 
payable in the case of a lawful taking, such as the exercise of the undenied and undeniable right of 
any State to nationalise or expropriate foreign private property within its jurisdiction." 
217 Sornarajah (1994: 379 and 396). 
21R Schachter (1984: 123). 
219 Schrijver, op. cit., at 354-355. 
220 Quoted by Whiteman, Damages in International Law, op. cit., 1694-1703 at 1697. 
221 Sornarajah (1994: 381). 
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Additionally, in the Shufeldt claim,222 the tribunal decided that full compensation 
must be paid. In the Lena Goldfields Arbitration223, where the foreign 
concessionaire had been invited into the country by the host State to mine gold, 
full compensation was also granted. 
However, for several reasons, the relevance of these awards to support full 
compensation may be diminished. Firstly, in all these awards there were 
contracts involved. Secondly, both in Shufeldt claim and in Lena Goldfields 
Arbitration, the expropriations were found unlawful on the grounds of violation 
of the concessions in question. If such illegality was the basis of the awards, as 
indicated in chapter 2,224 modem international law does not consider such 
violation as unlawful. A third factor which causes upset about these awards has 
been advanced by Sornarajah: 
Arbitration seemed in them to be a means of settling disputes 
between clearly unequal parties in a diplomatic manner and the 
arbitrators seemed to have approached their task with this purpose in 
view.225 
Moreover, even Western scholars share the view that full compensation 
was not the pre-war standard. As Garcia-Amador observes: 
It should be emphasized that even in the pre-war inter-State practice, 
the rules concerning the quantum of compensation were not so strict 
d .. ~ b 1· d 226 an even severe as It IS olten e Ieve . 
Similarly, the main source from which the norm of full compensation has 
been claimed is the formula of 'prompt' , 'adequate' and 'effecti ve' 
compensation. It was first used by US Secretary of State Cordell Hull during the 
Mexican expropriations and is generally referred to in the literature as the 'Hull 
222 The Shufeldt claim, R.I.A.A. (1930) 1079. See also Whiteman, Damages in International 
Law, op. cit., at 1652-1660. . 
223 Lena Goldfields Award, op. cit. See further: the Goldenberg case (Germany v. Romania), 
Award of27 September, 1928,2 R.I.A.A. 615, and the De SabIa case (United States v. Panama), 
Award of29 June, 1933,6 R.I.A.A. 358 [reprinted also in 28 A.J.LL. (1934) 602]. 
224 On the issue, see our discussion in chapter 2, at 118-147. 
225 Somarajah (1994: 382). 
226 Garcia-Amador (1984: 301). See also White, op. cit., at 13-15. 
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formula' ,227 and sometimes called the 'traditional standard.' Since its 
proclamation in 1938 the formula has vigorously been challenged The first and 
most famous instance took place in the exchange between Hull and the Minister 
of Foreign Relations of Mexico regarding the expropriation of properties owned 
by American nationals. In that exchange, the United States maintained that its 
nationals were entitled under international law to "prompt, adequate, and 
effective" compensation. 'Prompt' means that compensation should be paid 
prior to or at the time of the expropriation. 'Effective' compensation is defined 
as compensation in effectively realisable form; that is, in convertible currency. 
'Adequate', the central requirement of this triple formula, has been interpreted as 
reflecting a full compensation, which includes present market value of the 
property as well as loss of profits. 
Although in our remaining discussion of the standard of compensation, 
reference to the Hull formula will be inevitable, we shall not emphasise this 
doctrine for two reasons. First, since its formulation, a great deal of writing has 
been produced for and against this formula and its status in international law,228 
and we cannot add more to what has been said. The second, and primary, reason 
"is that recent banishing of this formula by its founders and advocates, has put an 
end to its active life and therefore, there is no point in discussing something 
which is no longer supported or given much weight even by its very originators 
and proponents. ,,229 An elaboration of this second reason will be provided in due 
course. 
Thus, we may fairly conclude that neither the court decisions nor the 
arbitral awards firmly support the norm of full compensation, except in 
circumstances where there was a prior finding of illegality in the expropriation of 
the property. 
227 See G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. 3, Government Printing Office. 
Washington D.C. (1942) 655 at 658. 
nR It is not appropriate to give a list of such literature here. For a selective list of references. see 
the bibliography provided at the end of this thesis. 
229 Piran, op. cit., at 347. 
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4.2 The Post-World War II Standard 
In the previous sub-section we saw that full compensation was not the pre-
World War II standard. Even if it were, post-World War II practice has changed 
the norm. These changes will now be examined in State practice, case law, and 
resolutions as well as in inter-governmental declarations. 
4.2.1 State Practice 
As shown in chapter 1, after World War II a large number of expropriations 
occurred throughout the world, in Asia, Africa, Europe (East and West) and Latin 
America, and consequently numerous compensation agreements were concluded. 
These arrangements indicate that States' attitude towards the incidence of 
expropriation of foreign property, and especially regarding the issue of 
compensation, has changed since World War II. As Garcia-Amador observes: 
Post-World War II inter-State practice shows a marked and 
progressive departure from the traditional principles of international 
law ... especially with regard to compensation therefor. This practice 
developed in connection, and in particular, with nationalizations 
carried out as part of the broad programs of socio-economic reform 
undertaken by various countries of Eastern and Western Europe. A 
system of 'lump sum settlement' ... evolved out of said inter-State 
practice (emphasis added)?30 
Therefore, as promised before, in this sub-section we shall deal with lump-
sum agreements. These agreements are also called 'en block' or 'global' 
settlements. A pattern of settlement has evolved since the end of World War 
II,231 under which the expropriating State pays a lump-sum to the State of 
. f~ d b h .. 232 nationality of the alIens a lecte y t e expropnatIOn. The latter State, 
"generally through a national claims commission established pursuant to 
230 Garcia-Amador (1984: 306-307). 
231 This pattern seems to have been initiated by the Agreement of May 30, 194 L between 
Sweden and Russia. See Foighel, op. cit., at 97. 
232 Lump-sum compensation agreements have been defined by several writers. See, e.g., 
Foighel, op. cit., at 97; Wortley, op. cit., at 146; Garcia-Amador (1984: 309), and Seidl-
Hohenveldern, op. cit., at 146. 
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domestic leg' 1 t' d' d' IS a Ion .. , a ~u Icates the separate claims and allocates a share of the 
fund to each successful claimant. ,,233 
As indicated above, the main territory in which partial compensation enjoys 
the highest support is the practice of lump-sum agreements, A review of the 
lump-sum compensation agreements concluded by Eastern European States with 
Western countries in respect of the nationalisation of Western economic interests 
shows that the claims in question were settled substantially below full 
compensation,234 The overwhelming majority of authors also advocate the view 
that 'partial' compensation was the basis of lump-sum agreements, In this 
respect, Jain remarks: 
It is generally acknowledged that the amount of compensation agreed 
upon in most of the lump-sum agreements does not represent the full 
value of the expropriated property even if it is admitted that in most 
cases the claims are highly inflated,235 
Chowdhury had this to say: 
233 R, B. Lillich, "Lump-sum Agreements: Their continuing Contribution to the Law of 
International Claims", 82 A.J.LL. (1988) 69 at 69. 
234 See Kronfol, op. cit., at 111-112 and Foighel, op. cit., at 97-127. Note that these agreements 
also did not meet the two other requirements of the traditional standards, 'prompt' and' effective'. 
As regards the 'promptness' of compensation, for example, Garcia-Amador comments: 
"The time-limit for the payment of the agreed compensation necessarily depends on the 
circumstances in each case and, in particular, on the expropriating State's resources and actual 
capacity to pay. Even in the case of 'partial' compensation, very few States have in practice been 
in a sufficiently strong economic and financial position to be able to pay the agreed compensation 
immediately and in full." Garcia-Amador (1984: 312) and (1959: 22, para. 86). Regarding the 
'effectiveness' of compensation, the same writer, states: 
"Payment was generally effected through the use of frozen assets of the nationalizing State in the 
other State, or through delivery of specified raw materials or other goods." Garcia-Amador (1984: 
312). Note that payments in non-monetary form are called payment in kind, and State practice 
provides numerous examples of such compensation. (For some early examples, see Kronfol, op. 
cit., at 117-118). On various occasions the United States has agreed with expropriating States on 
a compensatory package deal. For instance, in the settlement of the expropriation by Venezuela, 
as shown in chapter 1, of American oil interests in 1975 and the expropriation by Peru of the 
Marcona ore company in 1974. In both instances, agreement was reached on a combination of 
moderate amounts of cash and a substantial long-term business relationship involving service, 
marketing, transport, production, sales and other contracts. With regard to Venezuela, see G. 
Coronel, The Nationalization a/the Venezuelan Oil Industry, Lexington Books, D.C. Health and 
Company, Lexington (1983) at 82-87, Regarding Peru, see G. Gantz, "The Marcona Settlement: 
New Forms of Negotiation Compensation for Nationalized Property", 71 A.J.I.L. (1977) 474 at 
485-487. 
235 J' 't t 156 am, op. Cl ., a . 
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Although the forms of the lump-sum agreements in the postwar 
period vary considerably, the general trend seems to establish that 
none of the three components of the Hull rule, i.e. promptness, 
adequacy and effectiveness, was followed by and large in postwar 
state practice. On the contrary, the trend indicates the adoption of 
partial and negotiated compensation arrangements, depending upon 
the circumstances of each case (emphasis added)?36 
In the same vein, Garcia-Amador comments: 
Lump-sum agreements, far from envisaging 'just' or 'adequate' 
compensation, provide for 'partial' negotiated indemnification, the 
amount of which may vary appreciably depending on the 
circumstances. In the case of lump-sum agreements, there is no 
uniformity with regard to the rule followed in valuing the property 
and determining the amount of compensation, which is 
understandable in view of the diversity of the situations giving rise to 
this type of international settlement.237 
Some, like Lillich and Weston, however, are In a minority when they 
support the view that the lump-sum agreements did not deviate from the standard 
of full compensation.238 
The acceptance of less than full compensation by Western States is not 
limited only to the lump-sum agreements which were concluded soon after World 
War II. The United States, for example, which vigorously supported the standard 
236 S. R. Chowdhury, "Permanent Sovereignty and its Impact on Stabilization Clauses, 
Standards of Compensation and patterns of Development Co-operation", in K. Hossain and S. R. 
(eds.), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in International Law, Frances Pinter, 
London (1984) 42 at 60. 
237 Garcia-Amador (1984: 311). See further: 
- Sornarajah (1994: 363-365) and (1986: 214-217); 
_ V. Pechota, "The 1981 US-Czechoslovakia Claims Settlement Agreement: An Epilogue to 
Post-war Nationalisation and Expropriation Disputes", 76 A.1.I.L. (1982) 639; 
_ R. Dolzer, "New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property", 75 A.J.I.L. 
(1981) at 553 at 560: "A survey of lump sum agreements from this perspective yields two basic 
conclusions: that the Hull rule has not been observed in practice ... " And 
- Piran, op. cit., at 342-346. 
23R R. B. Lillich and B. H. Weston, International Claims: Their Settlements by Lump-sum 
Agreements, University Press of Virginia. Charlottesville (1975) at 35, and Lillich, op. cit., at 76, 
n.40. 
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of full compensation In its agreement with Peru, has admitted partial 
compensation.239 
Having examined the idea that less than full, or partial, compensation is the 
basis of lump-sum agreements, our next task is to examine the impact of these 
agreements on the customary international law regarding expropriation of foreign 
property. There is no consensus among international lawyers on the subject and, 
loosely speaking, they are divided into three groups. The first group comprises 
scholars like Fatouros,240 Francioni,241 Amerasinghe,242 Schrijver,243 Dolzer,244 
Akinsanya,245 Sha~46 and Jain247 who see in lump-sum agreements a hopeful 
trend. White, for example, remarks that "post-war compensation agreements 
constitute a valuable potential source of customary international law.,,248 Lillich 
and Weston, who are the most devoted proponents of this view and who have 
produced an impressive body of writings on the issue,249 go further and maintain 
that these agreements constitute a norm of customary international law.25o 
Writers who belong to the second group, such as Schwarzenberger251 and Seidl-
239 Gantz, op. cit. (note 234). For recent examples of such settlements by the United States with 
Albania, Cambodia and Vietnam, see I.L.M. (1995) 595, 600 and 685, respectively. 
240 Fatouros, op. cit., at 331. 
241 F .. . 280 ranClOm, op. CIt., at . 
242 C. F. Amerasinghe, "Issues of Compensation for the Taking of Alien Property in the Light of 
Recent Cases and Practice", 41 I.c.L.Q. (1992) 22 at 28, n. 32. 
243 Schrijver, op. cit. (note 5), at 296. 
244 Dolzer, op. cit., at 561-565. 
245 A. A. Akinsanya, The Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third World, Praeger 
Publishers, New York (1980) at 68. 
246 Shaw, op. cit., at 583. 
247 Jain, op. cit., at 158-159. 
24R White, op. cit., at 183. 
249 See, e.g., the following literature: 
- Lillich and Weston, op. cit. (note 238); 
_ R. B. Lillich, International Claims: Postwar British Practice, University Press of Virginia, 
Charlottesville (1967); 
- R. B. Lillich, "Lump-Sum Agreements", Vol. 8, Encycl. P.LL., 367; 
_ R. B. Lillich, "Lump-Sum Agreements: Standards therein and Impact thereof', in Foreign 
Investment in the Present and a New International Economic Order (edited by D. Dicke), 
University Press Fribourg Switzerland (1987) 239; 
- Lillich, op. cit. (note 233); and . . . 
_ B. H. Weston, International Claims: Postwar French Practice, University Press of VIrgInIa, 
Charlottesville (1971). 
250 Lillich and Weston, op. cit., at 259-26l. See also Bring, op. cit., at 129. 
251 Schwarzenberger, op. cit., at 44. 
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Hohenveldern,252 argue that the law is being weakened by the practice of lump-
sum agreements. The third group of authors, who take a position somewhere in 
between the other two groups, believe that this practice "does not amount to a 
new trend, much less to an abrogation of the existing customary international 
law, but rather a compromise in a given situation. ,,253 
The International Court of Justice had the opportunity to deal with the issue 
and, in the Barcelona Traction case, held that "such arrangements are sui generis 
and provide no guide in the present case.,,254 However, a number of jurists have 
been critical of the Court's finding in denying the evidentiary value of lump-sum 
agreements. In his editorial comment on the issue, Lillich considered the Court's 
attitude as "unfortunate in the extreme", since it represents a "singularly 
restrictive attitude towards one potentially significant source of customary 
intemationallaw.,,255 In the same vein, Garcia-Amador observes: 
In light of this impressive response of the academic community to the 
well-established practice of lump-sum agreements, it is certainly 
difficult to understand the restrictive, somewhat 'conservative', 
dicta" of [the Court in this case]. 256 
The Iran-US Claims Tribunal also rejected the evidentiary value of these 
agreements.257 The Tribunal, in the Sedco case, held that "lump-sum settlement 
agreements can be so greatly inspired by non-judicial considerations '" that it is 
extremely difficult to draw from them conclusions as to opinio juris.,,258 
However, as in the case of the ICJ, the Tribunal's finding has been criticised by 
252 Seidl-Hohenveldern, op. cit., at 33. 
253 M. Domke, "Foreign Nationalizations, Some Aspects of Contemporary International Law", 
55 A.J.I.L. (1961) 584 at 609. 
254 Barcelona Traction Judgment, op. cit., at 40, para. 61. 
255 R. B. Lillich, "Two Perspectives in The Barcelona Traction Case - The Rigidity of 
Barcelona", 65 A.J.I.L. (1971) 522 at 526. 
256 Garcia-Amador (1984: 331). 
257 The tribunal in the Aminoil case took a similar view. Aminoil Award, op. cit., at 1036-1037. 
On the national level, the US Court of Appeals, in the Banco Nacional case, also rejected the 
juridical impact of these agreements. Banco Nacional Decision, op. cit., at 892. 
25R Sedco (the Second Interlocutory) Award op. cit. (note 208) at 185. See also the Amoc.o 
Award, op. cit., at 266, paras. 251-252, and the Phillips Petroleum Company v. The IslamiC 
Republic of Iran, Award No. 425-39-2 (29 June 1989), reprinted in 21 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 79 at 
121, para. 108. 
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I . 259 C· . 
severa wnters. ommentlng on the Tnbunal's holding in the Amoco award 
regarding the issue, Amerasinghe made the following meaningful remarks: 
Clearly the ICJ was not saying that settlement agreements could not 
be evidence of customary law. What it did say was that they were so 
varied as to the classes of beneficiaries of compensation that they 
could not be evidence of a consistent practice evidencing a norm 
relating to such beneficiaries. The statement of the IC] was confined 
to the question of beneficiaries and had nothing to do with the 
quantum of compensation. Moreover, even in saying that the 
agreements were sui generis, the IC] did not imply necessarily that 
they could not be evidence of customary practice based on ex post 
facto reflections of an opinio juris relating to the quantum of 
compensation.26o 
Thus, he considers the Tribunal's statements on lump-sum agreements as 
"obiter." One may say that the general tendency amongst those who seek to 
support the payment of full compensation is to downplay the juridical impact of 
these agreements. For instance, the American arbitrators to the Tribunal, who 
uniformly advocated the standard of full compensation in their Separate 
Opinions, have discussed these agreements, but underplayed their significance.261 
In view of the foregoing, there is little doubt that partial compensation is 
the basis of lump-sum agreements. Moreover, to the extent that these agreements 
help to establish a partial compensation rule, the present author regards them "as 
not only principle-reinforcing, but also norm-creating,,262 with regard to the 
standard of compensation. 
Likewise, regarding post-World War II inter-State practice and its impact 
on expropriation and compensation, Asante had this to say: 
The juridical impact of this formidable body of material [including 
the compensation arrangements] has virtually been ignored by writers 
wedded to traditional principles. Such writers conceive of State 
259 Schachter (1984: 126); Bowett, op. cit., at 65-66, and Lillich and Weston, op. cit. (note 238). 
260 Amerasinghe (1992: 29). 
261 See, e.g., the Separate Opinion of Judge Holtzmann in INA Award, op. cit., at 391-403; the 
Concurring Opinion of R. M. Mosk in American International Group Inc. et al. v. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Award No. 93-2-3 (19 December 1983), reprinted in 4 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 96 at 
111-121, and Judge Brower's Separate Opinion in Sedco Award, op. cit. (note 208) at 189-206. 
262 Lillich, op. cit., at 76, n. 40. 
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practice almost exclusively in terms of bilateral investment treaties 
which have been celebrated as a renaissance of traditional 
principles.263 
In a study of 30 lump-sum settlement agreements from 1953-1976, Bring264 
found that "the compensation afforded met the traditional requirement of 
adequacy" in only three cases. As to the promptness of compensation, he stated 
that prompt payment was not the rule in modem nationalisation practice. Rather, 
most compensation settlements provided for deferred payments. With regard to 
the adequacy of compensation, the same writer observed that it seemed to be 
based "more or less" on the 'book value' of the expropriated property. Bring 
reached the conclusion that the traditional standard of prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation, "was largely obsolete." For Professor Harris, since the 
Hull formula nowadays does not enjoy the support of the whole international 
community, it may not be considered as a general customary rule of 
compensati on. 265 
Similar conclusions were reached by Sunshine in a study of the 
compensation settlements concerning 154 cases of expropriations in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America in the 1970s. He found that the general practice was to apply 
the net book value concept, which fell substantially below the Hull and 
alternative formulas, such as fair market value and going concern value.266 
In conclusion, it may be safely laid down that the State practice of both 
developed and developing countries indicate that, at least since the end of W orId 
War II, the traditional standards have not been met. 
263 Asante, op. cit., at 604. 
264 Bring, op. cit., at 117. 
265 Harris, op. cit., at 570. 
266 R. B. Sunshine, Terms of Settlements in Developing Countries' Nationali:::ation Settlements -
A Study for the U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations (1981). Additionally, a~er a. su~ey 
of compensation practices of African States, Rood concludes that by and large the natlOnahsatlO~s 
involved only the payment of 'partial' compensation. L. Rood, "Compensation for Takeovers ill 
Africa", 11 l.Int.L.Eco. 521 at 525. 
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4.2.2 Case Law 
In this period there have been several important international arbitral 
awards which are relevant to the present purpose. Three of them, Texaco, BP and 
Liamco arose out of Libya's nationalisation of its oil industry in the early 1970s, 
and the last one is the Aminoil award. In enunciating the applicable standards of 
international law, the awards of these tribunals were varied. Even in the first 
three cases the three arbitrators differed in their legal reasoning with respect to 
the compensation and calculation of damages. In the Texaco case, Arbitrator 
Dupuy stated that the Libyan nationalisation of Texaco was unlawful, and 
accordingly ordered restitution. However, having found that Resolution 1803 of 
the General Assembly represented customary international law on 
expropriation,267 the Arbitrator acknowledged 'appropriate' compensation, which 
was set forth in the resolution as the generally applicable standard.268 In BP, 
Arbitrator Lagergren avoided the standard of compensation altogether by finding 
that the proper remedy was damages.269 Unlike Texaco and BP, in Liamco the 
nationalisation in question was found lawful by Arbitrator Mahmassani. Thus, 
he stated that in the light of contemporary developments the inclusion of lucrum 
cessans (lost profits) in the compensation payable could not be sustained. In his 
words: 
This classical doctrine [the Hull doctrine] was not always accepted 
neither in the inter-war period nor after World War II. Adequate 
compensation as including loss of profits, such as was awarded in the 
old above mentioned arbitral decisions (e.g. in Delagoa and Shufeldt 
. . 1 1 270 
cases), was no more acceptable as an ImperatIve genera ru e. 
In that case, the Arbitrator applied the formula of 'equitable' compensation 
.C'. h . . fd 271 as a measure lor t e estImatIon 0 amages. 
267 Texaco Award, op. cit., at 30, para. 87. 
26R Ibid. 
269 BP Award, op. cit. (note 22), at 355-357. 
270 Liamco Award, op. cit. (note 24), at 143. 
271 Ibid., at 145. 
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In Aminoil, which involved the nationalisation of rights under oil 
concession agreements by the host State, the tribunal also considered the relevant 
standard of compensation under customary international law. Interestingly, while 
the tribunal did not refer to the triple standard, 'prompt, adequate and effective' 
compensation, it used the terminology of the United Nations resolutions on 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. After concluding that Article 4 of 
Resolution 1803 "codifies positive principles",272 it pronounced that: 
The determination of the amount of an award of 'appropriate 
compensation' is better carried out by means of an inquiry into all the 
circumstances relevant to the particular concrete case.273 
On the national level, the US Court of Appeals in the Banco National case, 
also addressed the standard of compensation. Having a comprehensive survey of 
the developments in this branch of international law, it explicitly acknowledged 
that appropriate compensation is the prevailing standard. The Court held that: 
It may well be the consensus of nations that full compensation need 
not be paid in 'all circumstances' ... and that requiring an 
expropriating State to pay 'appropriate compensation' - even 
considering the lack of precise definition of that term - would come 
closest to reflecting what international law requires. But the 
adoption of an appropriate compensation requirement would not 
exclude the possibility that in some cases full compensation would be 
appropriate (emphasis added).274 
Thus, it is fair to say that none of the above-mentioned awards confirmed 
the full implications of 'prompt, adequate and effective' compensation. 
Although in the Texaco and BP awards there was reference to full compensation, 
in both instances the arbitrators found that the nationalisation measures were 
unlawful. In Liamco, which is perceived as the most "radical" of the awards,275 
the deviation from the traditional standards is much evident. Finally, though one 
may say that the amount of compensation awarded in the particular circumstances 
272 Aminoil Award, op. cit., at 1032, para. 143. 
273 Ibid., at 1033, para. 144. 
274 Banco Nacional. op. cit., at 892. 
275 Mendelson, op. cit., at 418. 
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of Aminoil approximated to full compensation, its findings on the issues, such as 
stabilisation clauses, the post-W orId War II developments concerning permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources and, primarily, the standard of appropriate 
compensation, seem to supersede the quantum of compensation in that award. 
4.2.3 Resolutions and Inter-governmental Declarations 
The examination of the standard of compensation would be incomplete 
without reference to the impact of the numerous UN resolutions on permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources. These resolutions also do not support the 
nonn of full compensation in the expropriation of foreign property. Among 
them, Resolution 1803 and the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States of the General Assembly are highly relevant to the present purpose. The 
fonner resolution, which was adopted almost unanimously, provides 'appropriate 
compensation' .276 There has been some effort to explain the use of 'appropriate' 
as meaning 'full' compensation?77 However, the travaux pn?paratories of the 
resolution indicate that "the formulation was a compromise, the capital-exporting 
States agreeing to the use of 'appropriate' provided there was a reference to 
international law as providing the standards.,,278 Thus, 'appropriate 
compensation' does not mean 'full compensation.' The latter resolution, the 
Charter, requires that "appropriate compensation be paid ... taking into account 
the relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers 
pertinent. ,,279 Leaving aside the debate among jurists as to whether these 
resolutions have law-making effect, at the least they indicate a desire on the part 
. . h d d f t' 280 of the States to reject full compensatIOn as t e stan ar 0 compensa Ion. 
Moreover, the inter-governmental declarations altogether do not support 
the whole triple standard of 'prompt, adequate and effective', compensation. In 
276 General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII). 
277 S. M. Schwebel, "The Story of the UN's Declaration of Pennanent Sovereign over Natural 
Resources", 49 A.B.A.J. (1963) 463 at 465. . 
278 Somarajah (1994: at 405). See also W. Friedmann, The Changing Stnlcture of InternatIOnal 
Law, Stevens & Sons, London (1964) at 138. 
279 Article 2(2)(c)ofthe 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. 
280 See our discussion on the legal status of the relevant UN resolutions in chapter 1, at 168-190. 
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Article 3 of the 1967 OECD Draft Convention,28I for instance, it was stipulated 
that expropriation measures must be accompanied by a provision for the payment 
of just compensation. Such compensation is to represent the genuine value of the 
property affected, be paid without undue delay, and be transferable to the extent 
necessary to make it effective for the party entitled thereto. Commenting on the 
Article, Asante observes that while it is difficult to accept that the traditional 
requirement of adequate compensation was met by the terms 'just' and 'genuine 
value', he observes: 
The provision for paying compensation without undue delay and for 
transferring compensation 'to the extent necessary to make it' 
recognises the constraints on the foreign exchange resources of 
developing countries and the fact that in some cases the particular 
circumstances of the investor may justify payment of compensation in 
local currency. 282 
Similarly, under the ILA Seoul Declaration, the standard of compensation 
is 'appropriate compensation' having regard to the legitimate expectations of the 
parties, and taking into account all pertinent circumstances.283 The 1980 Inter-
Arab Investment Agreement provides 'equitable' compensation.' Such 
compensation is to be effected within a period not to exceed one year from the 
date the expropriation decision becomes final. 284 Although the language of 
Article 10(2) of the Organisation of Islamic Conference Investment Agreement is 
reminiscent of the Hull formula, the same article stipulates that compensation due 
must be paid in accordance with the laws and regulations of the host State.285 
281 The OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property of 1967, reprinted in 7 
I.L.M. (1968) 128. 
282 Asante, op. cit., at 609-610 
283 Section 5.7 of the ILA Seoul Declaration, op. cit. (note 29). 
284 Article 9(2)(a) of the Inter-Arab Investment Agreement of 1980, cited in Schrijver, op. cit.. 
at 353, n. 212. See also Article VI of the Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
among South-East Asian Member States (ASEAN), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. (1988) 612 at 613. 
285 Article 10(2) of the Agreement for the Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investment 
among Member States of the Organisation of Islamic Conference. For the full text of the 
Agreement, see The Charter of the Islamic Conference and Legal Framework of Economic C~­
operation among its Member States, H. Moinuddin, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1987), AppendiX 
III, 197 at 201. Moinuddin himself characterised this provision as "blending between the 
classical compensation formula and the Calvo clause as embodied in Article 2(2)( c) of the 1974 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Ibid., at 163. 
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However, the qualifications used in the provisions for paying compensation 
by NAFTA286 and the Energy Charter Treat/87 concur with the classical formula 
of 'prompt, adequate and effective' compensation. 
4.2.4 Writings of Publicists 
Juristic opinions, like international law itself, are dynamic rather than 
static. Authors of different sciences express their views with regard to the needs 
of the time in which they live, and writers in the field of law are not excluded 
from this rule. In the past, there was a degree of practice which indicated that 
publicists mostly favoured full compensation for expropriation of foreign 
property. Since there was no meaningful literature on the issue in hand from 
developing countries, the debate was carried out among Western scholars, among 
whom many began to move away from full compensation.288 This division 
became more evident when the New International Economic Order was 
acknowledged in the mid 1970s. International lawyers from developing countries 
have produced a substantial body of writings on the issue which also advocate 
standards other than full compensation. 
In the United States the division of opinions among legal scholars on the 
standard of compensation became clear when the American Law Institute sought 
to recognise that there has been a movement away from full compensation in its 
Third Restatement. Professor Schachter, who served as one of the drafters, made 
the following comments: 
Advocates of the Hull formula often characterize it as a traditional 
rule of international law. The record does not support this. No 
international judicial or arbitral tribunal, before or after 1938, has 
declared the 'prompt, adequate and effective' payment formula to be 
generally accepted international law. The leading European scholars 
De Visscher, Lauterpacht, Rousseau have concluded that State 
practice does not support that standard. The Institute de Droit 
International reflected these views in a resolution adopted in 1950 
286 Article 1110(2-6) of NAFT A (North America Free Trade Agreement) reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 
(1993) 605 at 641. 
287 Article 13(1) of the European Energy Charter Treaty 1995, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. (1995) 
360 at 39l. 
288 Among them Sir H. Lauterpacht was the most important writer. 
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and numerous studies in Europe and the United States have 
confirmed these conclusions with detailed evidence. I draw attention 
to th~ European and American studies to show that the opposition to 
treatIng the Hull formula as customary law does not come only from 
the 'third world'. Even in the United States where the executive and 
legislative branches have sought to affirm the Hull formula as 
accepted law, the courts - including the Supreme Court - have noted 
the disagreement among States and have declined to find the prompt, 
adequate and effective standard to be customary law. The 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law adopted in 1965 by the 
American Law Institute considered that the formula was qualified by 
'what is reasonable in the circumstances' and it noted that 'less than 
full value' or 'fair market value' was accepted in certain cases. The 
revised Restatement of 1987 does not consider the Hull formula as 
internationally accepted law.289 
Murphy observes that in the light of the resolutions on permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, the drafters of the Restatement (Revised) 
hesitated to declare the Hull formula as a universally accepted standard of 
compensation.29o 
Besides the number of writers mOVIng away from the norm of full 
compensation having increased,291 a substantial number of them maintain the 
view that the universally accepted standard in international law would be the 
'appropriate compensation' formula. As Mouri puts it: 
It is this inherent flexibility (which may range from zero,292 if found 
to be just, to full value) and its evaluating from the point of view of 
both expropriating and expropriated parties which distinguishes the 
standard of 'appropriate compensation' from the inflexible and one-
2R9 The other American scholars took a similar view. For example, W. D. Rogers, "Of 
Missionaries, Fanatics, and Lawyers: Some Thoughts on Investment Disputes in the Americas", 
72 A.1.I.L. (1978) 1 at 16, and D. F. Vagts, "Minimum Standard", Vol. 8, Encycl. P.LL., 382 at 
384. 
290 1. Murphy, op. cit. (note 72), at 84. 
291 Shaw, e.g., observes: 
"In the sensitive and controversial process of assessing the extent of compensation, several 
distinct categories should be noted." Shaw, op. cit., at 579. 
292 Higgins, op. cit., at 277. One commentator also suggests that: 
"Appropriate compensation is a reference to a flexible standard which could range from the 
payment of full compensation, the amount of future profits lost, to the payme.nt o~ no 
compensation at all in circumstances where the foreign investor had visibly earned mordmate 
profits from his investment and the host state had no benefits at all from it." Sornarajah (1994: 
406). 
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sided standard of lull compensation' (emphasis added and the last 
two footnotes omitted).293 
Schrijver concludes that: 
The formula of 'appropriate compensation', as in the 1962 
Declaration and the ILA Seoul Declaration, or the formula of 'just' or 
'equitable' compensation which the present author would prefer,294 
may be the best to ensure that in determining compensation for a 
lawful taking of foreign property the interests of both host and home 
States, and those of the party whose property is taken, are accounted 
for. 295 
Additionally, among those who took a similar view, one may consult J. 
Murphy,296, Dolzer,297 Francioni,298 Piran,299 Murphy300 and Falk.301 
Therefore, it may be fair to conclude that since the end of W orId War II, 
inter-State practice has been profoundly changed with regard to expropriation, 
and especially compensation. Neither treaty law, with the exception of bilateral 
investment treaties, which will be considered in the next sub-section, nor 
customary practice supports the standard of full compensation. As to UN 
General Assembly resolutions, they have suggested the formula of appropriate 
compensation, which is the preferred standard of many writers in this field, 
including the present author. 
293 M· . 365 
. oun, op. CIt., at . 
294 Judge Lagergren suggests that the terms 'appropriate', 'equitable', 'fair' and 'just' may be 
used interchangeably as far as standards of compensation are concerned. See his Separate 
Opinion in the INA Award, op. cit., at 389. 
J9'i S h .. . 359 
- . c flJver, op. CIt., at . 
296 1. Murphy, op. cit., at 88. 
297 Dolzer, op. cit., at 599. 
29R Francioni, op. cit., at 276. 
299 Piran, op. cit., at 351-353. 
300 C. F. Murphy, "Limitations over the Power of a State to Determine the Amou.nt of 
Compensation Payable to an Alien upon Nationalization", in R. B. Lillich (~d .. ),. The ValuatIOn. of 
Nationalized Property in International Law, Vol. III, University Press ofVlrgmta, CharlottesvIlle 
(1975) 49 at 52: 
"The 'appropriate' compensation referred to in General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XV~I), 
understood as an amount that is reasonable under all the circumstances, is probably the governmg 
principle." 
101 F lk . t 29 
- a, op. CIt., a . 
I 
. 
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4.3 The Current Standard 
Under this heading, the possible impact of bilateral investment treaties on 
the standard of compensation and the jurisprudence of the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal and of the ICSID tribunals' practice on the issue in hand will be 
addressed. 
4.3.1 Bilateral Investment Treaties 
In the examination of the standard of compensation in treaty law, only 
bilateral investment treaties (hereinafter BITs) remain to be considered. Thus, 
our task will be the assessment of the possible impact of BITs on the standard of 
compensation. Since the 1960s, BITs have replaced their predecessor, the 
bilateral treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (the so-called FCN 
treaty). The number of BITs treaties increased rapidly, and up to 1996 more than 
1,000 were concluded.302 They are often used as one of the main authorities by 
proponents of full compensation in support of their arguments; they argue that 
BITs reflect the traditional international law standard of compensation for 
expropriation. 
However, there is a debate among writers as to their status and evidentiary 
value in international law. Some, like, Schrijver and De Waart,303 take the view 
that such treaties have appeared to create customary international law. Two main 
reasons are advanced for this statement: first, the existence of a large number of 
BITs and, second, many States which in the past rejected the traditional standards 
have now admitted them by conclusion of the treaties. The view is shared by 
Akehurst,304 Mann30S and Robinson.306 
302 Schrijver, op. cit., at 190-191. . ". 
303 P. Peter, N. 1. Schrijver and P. 1. 1. M. De Waart, "Foreign Investment and State Practice, III 
Hossain and Chowdhury (eds.), op. cit., at 88. 
304 M. Akehurst, "Custom as a Source ofIntemationallaw", 47 B.Y.I.L. (1974-75) 1 at 42-52. 
305 F. A. Mann, "British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments", 52 B.Y.I.L. 
(1981) 241 at 249-250 . 
306 D. R. Robinson, "Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 78 A.J.I.L. (1984) 176 at 178. 
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However, there are a considerable number of authors, such as Francioni,307 
D 1 308 S h ht 309 A 310 311 312 o zer, c ac er, sante, Bowett, Abi-Saab, Amerasinghe,313 
Somarajah,314 Shaw315 and Chowdhury316 who have taken a critical view of 
BITs. The latter scholar rightly observes that these BITs are often the product of 
"unequal bargaining powers on a 'take it or leave it' basis and admittedly in an 
inhospitable investment climate." If these treaties create special regimes for a 
closer form of economic co-operation in which protection is one of the aspects, it 
means that "developing states reconciled themselves as a matter of commercial 
bargain and not in response to any legal obligations." 
A third group of writers, who have taken a position somewhere in between 
the two groups, may be added. They suggest that if BITs do not create customary 
international law, they must be viewed as evidence of State practice.317 
One of the reasons that virtually no reference to BITs was made by the Iran-
US Claims Tribunal was the invocation of such treaties by few claimants. Mouri 
further observes that "this failure might, in tum, have been motivated by the fact 
that they [BITs] could offer little support for the 'full' standard of compensation 
sought by them. ,,318 Thus, the Tribunal only on one occasion, in the Sedco 
award, touched upon BITs, where it rejected the juridical impact of such treaties. 
It ruled that: 
307 Francioni, op. cit., at 264. 
30R Dolzer, op. cit., at 566. 
309 Schachter (1984: 126-127) and (1991: 323). 
310 For him, BITs "are at best only a part of the body of instruments relating to investments." 
Asante, op. cit., at 607-608. 
311 Bowett, op. cit., at 65. . ...". 
312 G. Abi-Saab, "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and EconomIC ActIvItIes, m 
M. Bedjaoui, International Law: Achievements and Prospects, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 
(1991) 597 at 612-613. 
313 Amerasinghe (1992: 30 and n. 38). 
314 In his view (1994: 362): . . 
"The divergence in the standards used and the fact that many of them prOVIde fo~ valuatl~n of 
compensation to be made by national authorities make the possibi~ity of such treaties creatmg a 
norm as to the standard of compensation remote." See also SomaraJah (1986: 40). 
315 . 583 Shaw, op. CIt., at . 
316 S. R. Chowdhury, "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources", in Hossain and 
Chowdhury (eds.), op. cit., 1 at 35 and 39. 
317 Schrijver, op. cit., at 296. 
31R Mouri, op. cit., at 359. 
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The bilateral investment treaty practice of States, which much more 
often than .not reflects the. tr~ditional international law standard of 
compensatzon for exproprzatzon, more nearly constitutes an accurate 
~easur~ of the High Contracting Parties' views as to customary 
InternatIonal law, but also carries with it some of the same 
evidentiary limitations as lump sum agreements. Both kinds of 
agreements involve in some degree bargaining in a context to which 
'opinio juris seems a stranger.,319 
Therefore, there is not sufficient reason to conclude that bilateral 
investment treaties reflect customary international law relating to the standard of 
compensation. 
4.3.2 Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
Following the hostage crisis in Tehran, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal320 was 
established in the Hague in 1981 to deal with claims over disputes then 
outstanding between the Government of Iran and American nationals arising out 
of 'expropriations or measures affecting property rights.' It mainly operates 
through three Chambers composed of a 'neutral' President, an Iranian arbitrator 
and an American arbitrator. The Tribunal's awards on compensation indicate 
that the American arbitrators uniformly advocated the standard of full 
compensation, and that the neutral arbitrators also did so, but with qualified 
support. The Iranian arbitrators took the view that compensation was always due 
on the expropriation of foreign property, but that this requirement was met if 
book value of the expropriated property was paid as compensation. 
There is an argument among jurists regarding the Tribunal's contribution to 
international law generally, and to its branch - expropriation law. Some argue 
319 Sedco Award, op. cit. (note 208), at 185. 
310 Among a substantial body of literature on the Tribunal, see inter alia: 
- Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, op. cit.; 
- R. Khan, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal - Controversies, Cases and Contribution, 
Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1990); 
- J. A. Westberg, "Compensation in Cases of Expropriation and Nationalization: Awards of 
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 5 I.C.S.I.D. Rev. (1990) 256, and the same writer's other 
literature, "Applicable Law, Expropriatory Takings and Compensation in Cases of Expropriation: 
ICSID and Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Case Law Compared", 8 I.C.S.I.D. Rev. (1993) 1; 
and 
- Mouri, op. cit. (note 4). 
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that the relevance of the work of the Tribunal to international law is limited 
because of the special circumstances in which it was created and because of the 
wide nature of powers given to it.321 As Schrijver states "It is not easy to identify 
common trends in the awards of the often deeply divided Chambers and to assess 
their impact on international law and expropriation law.,,322 In the same vein, 
Mouri concludes that the Tribunal's contribution to the question of 
compensation: 
Is weakened and blurred by a number of uncertainties not only 
because of contradictions in the Chamber's findings or changes of 
positions occasioned by vacillating between the customary rules of 
international law and the requirements of the Treaty of Amity, but 
also because in a number of important Cases the Chambers' primary 
efforts were aimed at challenging or distorting each others' rulings.323 
However, Schachter observes that "the number of expropriation cases 
submitted to the Tribunal, the large amount claimed, extensive pleadings and 
involvement of many lawyers have given the Tribunal prominence as a source of 
intemationallaw.,,324 In the same manner, Amerasinghe states that the awards of 
the Tribunal "are decided by inter-State arbitrations and have particular value as 
d . b 'd' fl ,,325 prece ents In a su SI lary source 0 aw. 
Many of the Tribunal's awards applied the standard of compensation which 
was incorporated in the 1955 Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United 
States.326 But some of them were based on customary international law (as lex 
generalis). The problem is that the Tribunal did not clarify when the awards 
were based on the Treaty and when they were rendered under the customary 
321 See, e.g., Higgins, op. cit., at 329; Abi-Saab, "Pennanent Sovereign~ over Natural 
Resources and Economic Activities", in Bedjaoui, op. cit., at 613, and Gray, op. CIt., at 181. 
322 Schrijver, op. cit., at 195. 
323 Mouri, op. cit., at 351. 
324 Schachter (1989: 4). 
325 Amerasinghe, op. cit., at 41-42. 
326 The 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between Iran and the 
United States (entered into force on 16 June 1957), reprinted in V.N.T.S .. Vol. 284. at 93, and 
U.S.T.S., Vol. 8, at 899. 
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rules. To some, this difficulty "will diminish the utility of the awards as 
evidentiary sources of customary law.,,327 
Juristic opinion is also divided as to whether the Tribunal's awards on 
compensation supported the standard of full compensation or not. Mangard, 
rather conservatively, considered the awards of the Tribunal as a victory for the 
full standard. 328. Others, such as Asante329 and Somaraj ah, 330 took a contrary 
View. One commentator331 has taken a somewhat different position. While 
concluding that the Tribunal's awards provided strong support for the payment of 
full compensation, Westberg points out that the monetary amounts of the awards, 
after the application of appropriate methods of valuation, were substantially 
below the amount claimed. 
The cases of expropriation before the Tribunal may be divided into two 
main groups: nationalisation cases and individual expropriation cases. Let us 
begin with the former. In these cases the takings resulted from, or were part of, 
the take-over by Iran of entire industries, like insurance and petroleum, in the 
course of implementing State control over areas of the economy. The Tribunal's 
first compensation award was rendered in the American International Group 
case, which involved the nationalisation of a 350/0 share interest of American 
claimants in an Iranian insurance company. The Tribunal rejected the contention 
of the claimants that the nationalisation was unlawful for lack of "prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation." Having applied general principles of 
public international law, the Tribunal held that "even in the case of lawful 
nationalization the former owner of the nationalized property is normally entitled 
to compensation. ,,332 It stated further that the appropriate standard was the going 
concern value "taking into account not only the net book value of its assets but 
also such elements as good will and likely future profitability, had the company 
327 Somarajah (1994: 395) and (1986: 202). 
32R Cited in ibid., at 396. See also Schrijver, op. cit., at 355-356. 
329 Asante, op. cit., at 603. 
330 Somarajah (1994: 395). 
331 Westberg (1990: 291) and (1993: 27). 
332 American International Group Award, op. cit., at 105. 
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been allowed to continue its business under its former management.,,333 The 
compensation awarded was virtually a quarter of the amount claimed. 
There are several problems with the last statement of the Tribunal. The 
statement indicates that the Tribunal equated the consequences of lawful with 
that of unlawful expropriation, which is in conflict with the logical finding of the 
PCIJ in the Chorzow Factory case. The distinction alluded to earlier between 
lawful and unlawful expropriation and its impact on the quantum of 
compensation is well settled in international law. Thus, one may say that the 
statement of the Tribunal is not an accurate one.334 Another problem relates to 
the distinction between individual expropriation and large-scale nationalisation, 
as discussed above, and its impact on the amount of compensation in a downward 
direction. While the nationalisation in question fell into the category of large-
scale nationalisation, the Tribunal held that full compensation should be the 
applicable standard of compensation in the award. The last difficulty concerns 
the brevity of the award, which "tried to avoid any analysis and discussion as to 
f . d· . 11 ,,335 the standard 0 compensatIon un er InternatlOna aw. 
In the INA Corporation case,336 which also involved the nationalisation of 
an insurance company, the Tribunal departed from the traditional rules by 
confirming the distinction between large-scale nationalisation and the 
expropriation of isolated items of property. In the case of the former category, it 
held that: 
In the event of such large-scale nationalisations of a lawful character, 
international law has undergone a gradual reappraisal, the effect of 
which may be to undermine the doctrinal value of any 'full' or 
'adequate' (when used as identical to 'full ') compensation standard as 
d · h· 337 propose In t IS case. 
333 Ibid., at 109. 
334 See Somarajah (1994: 387), and Mouri, op. cit., at 372 and n. 1091. 
335 Piran, op. cit., at 364. 
336 INA Award, op. cit., at 378. 
337 Ibid. 
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However, the Tribunal found that the nationalisation in the case did not fall 
into the category of large-scale nationalisation on the grounds that it was 
"involving an investment of a rather small amount shortly before the 
nationalisation." The applicable standard, accordingly, was compensation in the 
amount equal to the fair market value of the investment.338 
The Tribunal's finding as to the distinctions between large and small 
investments, and between investments made shortly before the nationalisation 
measures and those that had existed for a long time previously, is tenable and in a 
sense interesting.339 Such distinctions were made under customary international 
law, but the award was based on the standard of compensation incorporated in 
the Treaty of Amity. Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty provides that taking 
must be accompanied by provision for the payment of just compensation. Such 
compensation is to represent the 'full equivalent of the property taken'. The 
Tribunal understood this phrase to mean that it includes the fair market value of 
the claimant's share interests. 
However, the finding by the Tribunal that the Treaty, as lex specialis, was 
applicable to the award, makes the above distinctions superfluous. As Sornarajah 
observes: 
It [the Tribunal] did not have to apply these distinctions as it found an 
alternative basis on which to peg the standard of compensation in the 
fA . 340 Treaty 0 mlty. 
In this award two Separate Opinions and one Dissenting Opinion as to the 
status of compensation under customary international law were filed. As 
indicated above, the Tribunal in the award stated that international law has 
undergone a gradual reappraisal which undermines the viability of the 'full' or 
'adequate' compensation standard. This crucial point was elaborated by Judge 
Lagergren. In his words: 
338 Ibid. 
339 Sornarajah (1994: 388). See also Piran, op. cit., at 371-372. 
340 Ibid. 
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Whether .this standard [a~propriate compensation] is more correctly 
cha.rac~ensed as an ex~eptlOn to a still subsisting - though admittedly 
shnnking - Hull doctnn~, or, as evidence of a more general tendency 
towards t~e. w~ol.es~le d~splacement of that doctrine as the repository 
of the opznzo JUrzs, IS stlll the subject of debate. But the latter view 
appears by now to have achieved a rather solid basis in arbitral 
decisions and in writings.341 
He reached the conclusion that: 
An application of current principles of international law, as 
encapsulated in the 'appropriate compensation' formula, would in a 
case of lawful large-scale nationalisations in a state undergoing a 
process of radical economic restructuring normally require the 'fair 
market value' standard to be discounted may, of course, never be 
such as to bring the compensation below a point which would lead to 
'unjust enrichment' of the expropriating state. It might also be added 
that the discounting often will be greater in a situation where the 
investor has enjoyed the profits of his capital outlay over a long 
period of time, but less, or non, in the case of a recent investor, such 
as INA.342 
Lagergren based his statement on: (1) UN General Assembly resolutions, 
particularly Resolution 1803; (2) modem arbitral practice;343 (3) judgments of 
national or regional courts;344 and (4) writings ofpublicists.345 
The American Arbitrator, Holtzmann, seeking support from virtually the 
same authorities used by Judge Lagergren, drew an entirely different conclusion 
in his Separate Opinion. He forcefully rej ected any changes in the international 
d f . 346 law standar 0 compensatlon. Similarly, in his Dissenting Opinion, the 
Iranian arbitrator, Ameli, agreed with the Separate Opinion of Judge Lagergren 
that current intemationallaw requires 'appropriate compensation' as opposed to 
d f :c . , t' 347 'prompt, adequate an e lectlve compensa IOn. 
341 The Separate Opinion of Lagergren in INA Award, op. cit., 385 at 387. 
342 Ibid., at 390. 
343 References made to the Texaco (known also as Topco) and Aminoil awards. 
344 References to: the Banco Nacional, and Lithgow judgments. 
345 References to, including: Sir H. Lauterpacht; Arechaga; Schachter; Higgins and Dolzer. 
346 Judge Holtzmann's Separate Opinion, op. cit. (note 261), at 391. 
347 The Dissenting Opinion of Ameli in the INA Award, op. cit. (note 127), 403 at 415. 
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The other case of this category is Phillips Petroleum,348 in which there was 
a claim by an American oil company for compensation in respect of the 
nationalisation of its interest in an Iranian joint venture. Having established the 
liability of Iran to pay compensation, the Tribunal held that the applicable 
standard of compensation was the Treaty standard. 349 
In the Amoco case, involving the expropriation of the American-owned 
share interest of an oil-producing agreement, the Tribunal rejected the claimant's 
allegation that the expropriation was illegal. Relying on the teaching of the 
Chorzow Factory case judgment, the Tribunal made a distinction between lawful 
and unlawful expropriation and applied the practical consequences of such a 
distinction to the standard of compensation?50 With regard to the standard of 
compensation, it concluded that the Treaty standard was applicable in the case. 
However, the Tribunal held that loss of future profits (lucrum cessans) was not 
compensable in lawful expropriations.351 Commenting on the award, one 
observer states that: 
This finding undermines the existence of a uniform requirement of 
full compensation for all expropnatlOns and subverts the 
conventional wisdom that Chorzow Factory provides the remedy of 
restitution equally for all types of nationalisation ... The award 
punches a big hole in the case of those who support the Hull 
352 
standard. 
Besides nationalisation cases, there were a considerable number of 
individual expropriation cases with which the Tribunal had to decide. In these 
cases, the standard of full compensation was applied. However, "in calculating 
the compensation the Tribunal took into account factors such as the changes that 
had been brought into the Iranian economy by the revolution and the effects it 
would have on the value of the shares and the property involved. ,,353 In the Sedco 
348 Phillips Petroleum Company of Iran v. The Islamic republic of Iran, Award No. 425-39-2 
(29 June 1989), reprinted in 21 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 79. 
349 Ibid., at 119, para. 106. 
350 Amoco Award, op. cit. (note 3), paras. 192-193 and 196-197. 
351 However, other elements, such as goodwill and commercial prospects may be awarded. 
352 Somarajah (1994: 394-395). 
353 Ibid., at 391. 
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case, the Tribunal began with the premise that prior to W orId War II, full 
compensation was the standard for any kind of expropriation. It then stated that 
the question was whether practice changed this rule. Having examined the 
relevant authorities, the Tribunal found that the evidence provided by lump-sum 
agreements and bilateral investment treaties are inconclusive, except Resolution 
1803. It considered the resolution, which requires 'appropriate compensation' 
for expropriation of foreign property, as reflecting current international law.354 
However, in applying the law to the case, the Tribunal drew a distinction between 
individual expropriation and large-scale nationalisation and it held that in the 
case of the former, international law still requires full compensation.355 Although 
the Tribunal made such a distinction, it ruled that the Treaty standard was 
applicable in the award. 
The distinction between ad hoc expropriation and large-scale 
nationalisation made by the Tribunal, and its effect on the standard of 
compensation is in conformity with the view of the majority of scholars in this 
field. However, its finding that the Treaty standard was applicable in the award 
makes its analysis of the international law standard of compensation superfluous. 
In the Sola Tiles Inc. case,356 the standard of compensation was also 
addressed. After examining the state of international law on the issue of the 
standard of compensation, the Tribunal found that the standard of 'appropriate 
compensation' represents the current customary international law. However, the 
Tribunal equated the 'appropriate compensation' standard with that of 'adequate' 
or 'full' compensation.357 A number of authors, who surveyed the case law of 
the Tribunal on the issue in hand, have been critical of its interpretation of the 
term 'appropriate compensation.' According to Amerasinghe: 
354 Sedco (the Second Interlocutory) Award, op. cit. (note 208), at 186. 
355 Ibid., at 187. . 
356 Sola Tiles Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 298-317-1 (22 Apnl 1987), 
reprinted in 14 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 223. See also Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton .\'. TA.~fS­
AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran et al., Award No. 141-7-2 (29 June 1084), reprinted In 6 
ibid., 219; Thomas Earl Payne v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. ~45-335-2 .(8 August 
1986, reprinted in 6 ibid., 3, and Phelps Dodge Corp. et al. v. The IslamiC Republic of Iran. 
Award No. 217-99-2 (19 March 1986), reprinted in 10 ibid., 121. 
357 Ibid., at 234-235, paras. 41-45. 
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The Tri~unal ignored entirely the avowed intention of the resolution 
[ResolutIo~ 1803] as espoused by the majority of States supporting 
the resolutIon and warranted by the travaux preparatories.358 
In the same vein, Sornarajah comments: 
The explanation of the change from adequate compensation to 
appropriate compensation as a mere terminological convenience in 
the award is too facile. It is, once more, a technique to conserve the 
cla~ms Of. the capital-exporting states in the face of the contrary 
claims WhICh have been made by the capital-importing states.359 
Though the Tribunal applied the standard of full compensation in the 
award, in assessing the value of the property, it rejected the claim for goodwill 
and lost future profits on the grounds that the business in question was unlikely to 
continue as a going concern after the Iranian Revolution of 1979.360 
In its more recent award in the Ebrahimi case, where the expropriation was 
through the appointment of directors in an Iranian construction firm in which the 
claimants had shares, the Tribunal also found that the 'appropriate compensation' 
standard represents the prevailing standard of compensation. It was held that: 
International law theory and practice do not support the conclusion 
that the 'prompt, adequate and effective' standard represents the 
prevailing standard of compensation. Rather, customary 
international law favors an 'appropriate' compensation standard ... 
the gradual emergence of this rule aims at ensuring that the amount of 
compensation is determined in a flexible manner, that is, taking into 
account the specific circumstances of each case (emphasis added).361 
It continues: 
Considering the scholarly opinions, arbitral practice and Tribunal 
precedents noted above, the Tribunal finds that once the full value of 
the property has been properly evaluated the compensation to be 
358 Amerasinghe (1992: 45). , 
359 Somarajah (1994: 392). Mouri, op. cit., at 368-369, has also advanced several reasons that 
the award is in error. 
360 Sola Tiles Award, op. cit., at 240-241, paras. 61-64. . ' 
361 Ebrahimi Award, op. cit. (note 26), para. 88. Similarly, although the Tnbunal, m the Am~co 
case, did not apply the 'appropriate compensation' standard, it treated the standard as reflectmg 
the current rule of international law. Amoco Award, op. cit., at 258, para. 226. 
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awarded must be appropriate to reflect the pertinent facts and 
circumstances of each case.362 
Having recognised the importance of the distinction between lawful and 
unlawful expropriation and its impact on the standard of compensation, the 
Tribunal awarded the claimants damnum emergens only, but not lucrum cessans 
(lost profits).363 By endorsing the 'appropriate compensation' standard in 1994, 
the Tribunal has deviated not only from the traditional standards, but also from 
its own precedents in this regard. 
From the above it would appear that the jurisprudence of the Tribunal does 
not support the standard of full compensation. In some awards, the Tribunal 
made a distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation, and applied the 
effect of such distinction to the standard of compensation. In the former, the 
amount of compensation did not include lost profits. It also drew a distinction, in 
some awards, between large-scale nationalisation cases and ad hoc expropriation 
ones. While in the former case the standard of full compensation was applied, by 
and large it left the door open for a departure from full compensation in the latter 
case. Moreover, where loss of profits were awarded, it was recognised that such 
profits would be negligible in the context of the regime change and the hostile 
climate towards foreign investment which was generated.364 
The ICSID tribunals have also had occasion to dealt with the standard of 
compensation. They are established under the Convention for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, which is an international Convention.365 In the absence of 
an express choice of law, Article 42(2) of the Convention requires the tribunal to 
apply the law of the Contracting State party (the host State) and international law 
to the dispute. It has been suggested that "such disputes remain mainly under 
362 Ibid., para. 95. 
363 Ibid., para. 96. 
364 Sornarajah (1994: 395). . 
365 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D.) ConventlOn of Settleme~t 
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, reprinted in 4 l.L.M. (196~) 
524. 
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.. I I ,,366 . 
munlclpa aw. Put dIfferently, it is generally accepted that the interpretation 
of the above-mentioned article gives primacy to the law of the host State. 
Therefore, in the Agip case,367 which involved the expropriation of a foreign 
investment project, the tribunal was prepared to apply the Congolese law in 
holding that Congo had to indemnify the loss suffered and the profit lost as a 
result of the expropriation. "Since the tribunals did not indicate whether they 
were applying domestic [sic] law or the law of the host State, the practice of 
these tribunals is of limited use.,,368 
The foregoing discussion indicates that none of the authorities which have 
been considered under the heading of the current standard supports the norm of 
full compensation. Supposing that bilateral investment treaties uniformly 
advocate the Hull compensation standard, they neither create customary 
international law nor State practice in this respect. Moreover, the jurisprudence 
of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal does not support the view that full compensation 
must be paid for any kind of expropriation. In some awards, a departure from 
full compensation was permitted in the case of large-scale nationalisation, and 
when the expropriation measures were lawful. 
5. Valuation of Expropriated Property 
A brief examination of the valuation of expropriated property will be our 
last discussion on the issue of expropriation of foreign property in this thesis. 
There was no meaningful case law which addressed the subject of valuation in 
the context of compensation, until recent awards of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
and the ICSID tribunals. Benefiting from the teaching of the Chorzow Factory 
369 I 1 . . 1 
case judgment, Somarajah observes that for present purposes ega pnnclp es 
366 Kronfol, op. cit., at 148. 
367 Agip Co. v. The Republic of Congo, Award of (ICSID), Award of 30 ~ovember 1979. 
reprinted in 21 LL.M. (1982) 726. In SARL Benvenuti & Bonfant v. The Repltblz~ of the C~~go. 
Award of 8 August 1980, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. (1982), 740. the tribunal took.a sImilar pO~ltlOn. 
For a survey of the ICSID tribunals' case law on the standard of compensatlOn. see Westberg 
(1993: 1-28). . . I d 
36R Somarajah (1994: 384). Presumably the contrast is in fact between mtematlOna an 
domestic law. 
369 Ibid., at 378-379 and 411-412. 
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must be first identified, and then compensation or damages be assessed on the 
basis of such principles. It should not be the case that accountancy principles of 
valuation dictate the relevant legal principles. Put in technical terms, "valuation 
is a secondary issue", and "the primary issue is the standard on which the law 
requires compensation to be paid." Further, he noted that "Methods of valuation 
should not be the means by which the tail is made to wag the dog." 
As in the case of the standard of compensation, different valuation methods 
were used by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. There were several reasons370 for this 
disharmony: (1) the existence of contradictions in the findings of the Chamber; 
(2) the change of positions occasioned by vacillating between the requirements of 
customary international law and those of the Treaty of Amity between Iran and 
the United States; and (3) the challenge between the Chambers' rulings in a 
number of important cases. This comes close to what one commentator has 
observed: "No conclusion of general relevance can be drawn from the valuation 
practice of the Tribunal.,,3 71 
There is now a substantial body of literature on the issue. Much of the 
literature is designed to create new standards of compensation through the 
principles of valuation, which is not tenable. As Somarajah observes: 
Valuation is an objective process. It should not be permissible for 
standards or theories of compensation to be built in through valuation 
principles. If there are technical problems of valuati?n the tribu~al 
can always get experts to help it in making the valuatIOn. ValuatIOn 
is not the main issue of controversy ... these principles should not be 
the means of reintroducing standards of compensation through the 
back-door ... they are secondary to the fi~ding of t~7~ compensation 
standard applicable to the dispute (emphasIs added). 
It seems to be in order to mention the methods of valuation which have 
been used in determining the value of an expropriated property. There are two 
main methods of valuation: book value and market value. 
370 Mouri, op. cit., at 351. 
371 Somarajah (1994: 412). 
372 Ibid. 
331 
5.1 Book Value 
In the book value method, the value of a property is assessed on its value in 
the books of the undertaking, having regard to its depreciation. Schachter 
observes that most proponents for appropriate compensation favour this method 
h ..C'. 373 as t e appropnate lormula for valuation. "They also argue that there should be 
flexibility in the applicable valuation formula to take into account all the 
circumstances of the investment, the length of investment, profits and past 
returns in determining the appropriate compensation.,,374 As indicated in chapter 
2, in the 1970s Middle Eastern oil-producing States replaced the old 
concessionary system, partly by negotiation and partly by nationalisation. This 
method of valuation was used in virtually all nationalisation measures, though the 
undertakings in question were productive and in working order (or, in the jargon, 
'going concerns,)?75 A decade later, it was also invoked by Kuwait in the 
Aminoil case,376 and by Iran in all expropriation cases before the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal. Interestingly, in 1989 the United States, in the ELSI case377 which 
involved the expropriation of an American company by the Italian Government, 
argued that the book value of the corporation was the most appropriate criterion 
in this regard. Similarly, in a study commissioned by the United Nations Centre 
for Transnational Corporations, it was stated that the prevailing practice was the 
application of the book value concept.378 Therefore, where damages for an 
unlawful expropriation are not involved and where the award of lost profits is not 
permissible, book value should be the logical method.379 
373 Schachter (1989: 13). 
374 Ibid., at 13-14. 
375 Bowett, op. cit., at 65 n. 65. . 
376 However the tribunal regarded book value as appropriate only ill cases ~f a recent 
investment, where original cost is close to replacement cost. Aminoil Award, op. Cit., at 1039, 
para. 165. 
377 ELSI case (1989), l.e.J. Pleadings, at 81 and 85. 
37R Sunshine, op. cit. (note 266). 
379 Somarajah (1994: 413). 
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5.2 Market Value 
This method of valuation is designed to assess a property based on its real 
value in a given market. The market value of a property was defined by the Iran-
US Claims Tribunal as: 
~he price that. a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller in 
CIrcumstances In which each had good infonnation each desired to 
maximize his financial gain, and neither was ~nder duress or 
threat. 380 
Unlike book value, market value takes into account future profitability. 
This method of valuation was favoured by those who supported the Hull fonnula. 
All authors who have rejected that formula have also rejected market value as the 
applicable method of valuation. 
This method of valuation is permissible only if an award can be rendered 
on the basis of both the loss of actual profits (damnum emergens) and the loss of 
future profits (lucrum cessans). The overwhelming view is that the method of 
market value is applicable only when the expropriation measure is unlawful. 
To determine the market value of a property, several methods, such as 
value of shares on the stock market,381 going concern value382 and discounted 
cash flOW383 are available. Besides these well known methods of valuation, there 
are some other methods which have been used in this respect. They include: the 
latest tax value, balance-sheet values and the insurance value. The latter is the 
only reliable method, since it "shows how high the owner himself had valued his 
property.,,384 
3RO Starrett Housing Corp. et. al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 314-24-1 (14 
August 1987), reprinted in 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 112 at 201. . 
3Rl The title of the method is self-explanatory. In the post-war nationalisations in France, ill 
1946 and 1982, as well as in the United Kingdom in 1974, this method was used. 
3R2 When a productive enterprise is the subject of an expropriation act, and there is no readily 
available market for the property in question, the method of 'going concern' value has been 
suggested. This method takes into account not only the tangible assets of t~~ enterprise but also 
other elements, such as goodwill, contractual rights and likely future profitabllity. 
3R3 For a full discussion about these methods and their implications in the awards of the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal, see: Piran, op. cit., at 393-442, and Mouri, op. cit., at 40.5-500. 
3R4 Seidl-Hohenveldern, op. cit., at 145. 
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Among the above-mentioned methods, the discounted cash flow method 
(hereinafter DCF) merits further explanation. DCF represents future profits and 
discounting of certain amount for costs and commercial risks. Some writers took 
a critical view as to this method. For instance, Sornarajah expressed his view in 
the following terms: 
Thi~ is a new banner pressed in to stem the tide running strongly 
agaInst the market value ... This introduces standards of 
compensation through the back-door and makes the distinction 
between lawful and unlawful takings meaningless. To the extent that 
the method requires the future factors to be taken into account, those 
who seek its application must show that the taking involved was an 
unlawful taking. 385 
Additionally, in the case of large-scale nationalisation, the DCF method has 
not been welcomed by the international tribunals. Two reasons have been 
advanced in this respect. 386 First, since nationalisation per se is lawful, it does 
not allow the calculation of lucrum cessans for detennining the amount of 
compensation. Second, DCF "is entirely based on the speculation of the future 
cash flow of the business and the speculation of a discount rate which itself is 
based on several uncertain elements." 
6. Conclusion 
Our study of the issue of compensation suggests that nowadays there is no 
doubt that compensation is due in the event of expropriation or nationalisation of 
foreign property. 387 The duty to compensate is based on several theories, 
amongst which the doctrine of unjust enrichment may be considered as a finn 
legal basis, because of its equitable foundation. 
As to the standard of compensation, supposing that full compensation was 
the pre-World War II standard, it is no longer so because post-World War II 
inter-State practice has changed. It was replaced by flexible standards. At the 
385 Sornarajah (1994: 413-414). 
386 Piran, op. cit., at 400. . .. 
387 Exceptions to the principle of compensation have been recogmsed by Junsts. 
citations in note 5 of this chapter. 
See the 
334 
present stage of intemationallaw, among different standards such as, 'equitable', 
'fair' or 'appropriate' compensation, it seems that the latter standard, which the 
present author would prefer, has reached a status that may be considered as a \ 
universally accepted standard. This formula is flexible enough to take into 
account various interests in each particular case. Although there is no definition 
of the term 'appropriate' compensation, it cannot be taken as 'full' compensation. 
Besides giving unnatural meaning to the term, as alluded to earlier, the travaux 
preparatories of Resolution 1803 also indicates that the resolution was adopted 
. . l' 388 In a compromIse c Imate. Moreover, the drafting history of the 1974 Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States of the General Assembly demonstrates 
that it also does not mean 'no' compensation. The position of 'no compensation' 
which was originally adopted was abandoned during the discussion of the 
instrument. 389 
Likewise, the payment of less than full or partial compensation is not only 
justifiable in large-scale nationalisations, such as land reform, indigenisation 
programmes, expropriation of natural resources or general restructuring of the 
economy, but has also become a settled rule. As indicated above, the main 
reason for the partial compensation rule is that the nationalising State cannot 
afford full compensation, and "imposing such a requirement on the State would 
deprive it from exercising its sovereign right to take control of its essential 
economic activities. ,,390 The legality of the expropriation measures and dual 
nationality status have also a negative effect on the quantum of compensation. In 
the former, the compensation to be paid in a lawful expropriation is limited to the 
value of the undertaking at the moment of the dispossession. In the latter, where 
a dual national acquires rights in immovable property, or continues to enjoy 
benefits not available to him through his dominant nationality, and such rights are 
expropriated by the original State, the deprived dual national should receive some 
compensation, but not full compensation. 
3RR See note 278 of this chapter. 
3R9 Arechaga (1978: 184), and Schachter (1991: 321-324). 
390 Piran, op. cit., at 353. 
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With regard to the valuation of an expropriated property, legal principles 
must be first identified and then compensation or damages must be assessed on 
the basis of such principles. The present author shares the view that accountancy 
principles of valuation should not be the means of reintroducing standards of 
compensation through the back-door and that they are secondary to the finding of 
the compensation standard applicable to the dispute. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
1. There is an argument that expropriation and nationalisation, which are 
our concern in this thesis, have lost much of their importance in the 1990s. With 
the collapse of Socialism in 1991, the concepts of expropriation and 
nationalisation waned, if not disappeared. "Both Socialist and 'dirigiste' state 
economies have undergone a political sea-change, moving toward privatization 
and a liberalized economy."\ Moreover, nearly all countries welcome foreign 
investment; there is a climate which is now favourable to foreign investment. 
However, "expropriation has nothing to do with Socialism. It existed 
[long] before the emergence of Socialism and will continue to do so as long as 
property and property laws exist." Although nationalisation first emerged with 
the Soviet Revolution of 191 7, "it did not remain a monopoly of Communism." 
By its very definition, nationalisation "occurs whenever there is a conviction in a 
society that a certain class of property should not be owned by private persons, 
national or alien, and should come under the public ownership.,,2 As shown in 
chapter 1, this conviction has emerged in all kinds of societies with different 
political, legal and ideological systems. As regards the current position towards 
foreign investment, Sornarajah3 has enumerated several reasons. They include 
"The shortage of foreign investment, the belief that foreign investment will lead 
to economic growth and the fact that trade, lending and aid are tied to developing 
O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1991) 
at 325. 
2 H. Piran, Nationalization of Foreign Property in International Lmv and Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Liverpool, 1992) at 443-444. 
3 M. Somarajah The International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press 
(1994) at 410. See also ibid., at 281 and 357. 
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countries maintaining a favourable stance towards foreign Investment are all 
responsible for such a climate." He goes on to say that: 
The picture ~~uld ~hange after a period when foreign investors have 
become stabIlIsed In the host states. Nationalistic feelings will be 
ar~used when the dominance of foreign corporations becomes 
eVIdent. Ideological or economic attitudes to foreign investment 
could change. Then, one could expect a fresh bout of 
nationalisations. 
Thus, it is submitted that expropriation - nationalisation or other fonns of 
expropriation - will be a cyclical phenomenon, and could always take place. 
2. Traditional principles of customary international law relating to 
expropriation revolve around the law of State responsibility for injury to aliens 
and alien property. Since the emergence of this doctrine in the nineteenth 
century, there has been a controversy over the principles governing the treatment 
of aliens. Thus, one of the issues that has generated much debate is the standard 
by which to measure the international responsibility of the State with regard to 
the treatment of aliens. As discussed in chapter 2,4 due to the shortcomings of 
the two standards, viz., the 'international minimum standard' and 'national 
treatment', neither of them can be used to test the international responsibility of 
the State regarding the treatment of aliens. To the same effect is the argument 
that there are several human rights instruments which, instead of referring to 
nationals or aliens, are concerned with 'individuals' within a certain jurisdiction 
without discrimination. The above account suggests that the international legal 
scene demands the formulation of new standards. 
As in the case of the treatment of aliens In general, in the context of 
expropriation there are no established rules to govern the expropriation of foreign 
property. Thus, the standard of compensation is highly controversial. HAs a 
result of this lack of common ground [i.e., established rules], judges and 
arbitrators trying foreign expropriation cases, have added to the confusion by 
4 See our discussion in this respect, in chapter 2, at 77-78. 
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rendering contradictory and irreconcilable decisions.,,5 The contemporary 
important international tribunal, viz., the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, also shares 
this confusion as evidenced by its rendering contradictory awards in this respect. 
3. The above does not mean that we should be entirely hopeless. As 
discussed in chapter 2, the General Assembly of the United Nations dealt with 
the issue under discussion for over twenty years, between 1952-1974, and 
adopted numerous resolutions. In essence, the Assembly made several important 
contributions in this regard. The first contribution is the elevation of the concept 
of permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources to the status of a 
well-settled principle of international law. To the present writer, the principle is 
one of the candidate rules which may have the special status of jus cogens. 
Similarly, as indicated in chapter 2, in the pertinent resolutions on the principle, 
the latter has been qualified by such terms as 'permanent', 'inalienable' and 
'full'. The purpose of these terms is to emphasise that sovereignty is the rule and 
can be exercised at any time. Limitations on this rule are exceptions and cannot 
be permanent, but are limited in scope and time. A basic corollary right from the 
principle of permanent sovereignty is the right to nationalise foreign property. 
4. The second contribution of the General Assembly is the recognition of 
an international obligation to pay compensation in the case of expropriation or 
nationalisation. Although it seems that the existence of such an obligation was 
generally recognised before World War II, the permanent sovereignty resolutions 
reaffirm this obligation. 
5. The last contribution of this principal organ of the U ni ted Nations relates 
to the key question of the standard of compensation. In the 1962 Declaration, for 
the first time the Assembly, after reaffirming the sovereign right of a State to 
expropriate foreign property in the public interest, prescribed the duty to pay 
'appropriate compensation' as the consequential obligation in such a case. 
Appropriate compensation is a reference to a flexible standard which could range 
from zero compensation, if found to be just (e.g. "in the circumstances where the 
Piran, op. cit., at 445. 
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foreign investor visibly earned inordinate profits from his investment and the host 
state had no benefits at all from it,,,6) to full compensation, including lost future 
profits (lucrum cessans). The standard is flexible enough to accommodate 
various interests in a particular case. Since the formula of appropriate 
compensation has been recognised by the international community, the triple 
standard of 'prompt, adequate and effective' compensation (referred to as the 
Hull formula) ceased to be considered as a valid principle of contemporary 
international law. 7 
6. Having stated the General Assembly's contributions to this branch of 
international law, it is timely to summarise our findings on the question of the 
standard of compensation, i.e., the heart of the issue under discussion, for 
expropriated property. As indicated above, a State is required to pay 
compensation to the owner of the affected property. However, "no rigid or 
exclusive standard of compensation is either feasible or admissible in all cases of 
expropriation." Put in technical terms, we can say that besides "some established 
preliminary considerations",8 which were studied in chapter 4, it is impossible to 
suggest a fixed and precise standard which can apply to all circumstances and 
situations. These preliminary considerations include: (1) different treatment of 
lawful and unlawful expropriations from the viewpoint of compensation; (2) 
consideration of the ability of the State to pay compensation when the measures 
involve large-scale expropriations, namely nationalisations, of the natural-
resource sector; and (3) consideration of the dual nationality status of a dual 
national who acquires rights, in the original State, in immovable property which 
are not available to him through his dominant nationality, and its impact on the 
amount of compensation. 
6.1 In its judgment in the Chorzow Factory case, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice acknowledged that the consequences of lawful expropriation 
cannot be equated with that of an unlawful measure. Thus, the Court recognised 
6 
7 
R 
Sornarajah, op. cit., at 406. 
See our discussion in this respect, in chapter 4, at 298-329. 
Piran, op. cit., at 448. 
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that the legality of the measures has a negative effect on the amount of 
compensation, and now is a well-settled rule in international law.9 Under this 
rule, lawful expropriation attracts liability for compensation which bears a 
reasonable relation to the value of the property; it is limited to the value of the 
expropriated property at the moment of expropriation (damnum emel-gens). In 
the case of unlawful expropriation, the appropriate remedy would be damages, 
which in addition to the value of the expropriated property at the moment of the 
expropriation, may include lost profits (lucrum cessans). 
6.2 Nationalisation, as a separate concept from expropnatlOn, merits a 
different standard of compensation from that of individual expropriations. It is 
defined as "the transfer of an economic activity to the public sector as part of a 
general programme of social and economic reform."IO By this definition, "it is 
always a lawful measure, II and, therefore, the nationalizing State's liability is 
limited to the value of the property taken at the time of nationalization.,,12 It is 
not only the financial capacity of the nationalising State that calls for such 
treatment, but also, perhaps primarily, the conflict between the permanent 
sovereignty of States over their natural resources and the claim for full 
compensation. That is why the overwhelming view is that in the instance of 
nationalisation 'partial' compensation would be the appropriate compensation. 13 
6.3 The impact of dual nationality status on the quantum of compensation, 
for the first time in the history of the subject, has been recognised by the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal in its recent awards. Following the establishment of the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction over the dual nationality claims, many cases were filed 
with the Tribunal by Iran-United States dual nationals whose eminent and 
effective nationality was that of the United States. In those cases, claimants 
asserted that their properties, including real estate, were expropriated by the 
9 See our discussion in this respect, in chapter 4, at 280-285. 
10 N. Schrijver, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, Cambridge University Press (1997) at 
285-286. 
11 See also Somarajah, op. cit., at 13 and n. 38. 
12 Piran, op. cit., at 449. 
13 See our discussion in chapter 4, at 285-292. 
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Government of Iran directly or indirectly, and hence it incurs the responsibility of 
Iran. The latter's main arguments in these cases were that because claimants 
come before the Tribunal as United States nationals and because their claims 
relate to benefits limited by Iranian law to sole Iranian nationals, their claims 
should be barred by the A18 caveat. Iran also invoked principles, such as clean 
hands, estoppel, good faith and abuse of rights, which operate in international 
law. 
As discussed in chapter 4, there is no consensus among the Chambers of 
the Tribunal on the issue. Thus, three categories of awards can be identified. In 
the first category, the Tribunal took the position that the claimants concerned 
should be barred from recovering against the Government of Iran for interference 
with property rights that, under Iranian law, they could have acquired only as 
Iranian nationals. In the second category of awards, the Tribunal took a contrary 
position. In the last category, which is highly relevant to the present purposes, 
the Tribunal explicitly endorsed the negative effect of such a status on the 
quantum of compensation. While noting that leaving the claimant concerned 
without compensation would be unjust to him, the Tribunal insisted that it would 
also be unfair to award the claimant the full market value of his property. Thus, 
it applied a discount of 25% to the value of the property in question. Although 
the statement of the Tribunal is not without its difficulty from the viewpoint of 
the novel application of the A18 caveat to the case in question, which is outside 
the scope of this study, it is tenable, as far as our present purposes are concerned. 
From the above it would appear that dual nationality status has a negative 
effect on the quantum of compensation. Thus, in the case where a dual national 
acquires rights in immovable property, or continues to enjoy benefits not 
available to him through his dominant nationality, and such rights are 
expropriated by the original State, the deprived dual national should receive less 
than full compensation. 
In view of the foregoing, we can say that, besides the above-mentioned 
considerations which should be observed by adjudicators in detennining 
compensation, it is impossible to suggest a specific and definite standard which 
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would apply to all cases of expropriation. However, as shown in chapter -t. the 
weight of authority has shifted in favour of the application of 'appropriate 
compensation'. This standard has received recognition not only among 
scholars,14 but also in recent international arbitral awards,15 judgments of 
. 1 16 • 
natlona courts and In the permanent sovereignty resolutions. 17 Thus, as seen in 
this thesis, the appropriate compensation standard was applied in a number of 
important arbitrations, such as Texaco, Liamco and Aminoi/. Two outcomes, 18 as 
far as the issue in hand is concerned, have emerged from the awards of these 
cases. The first is that the standard of appropriate compensation "must not be 
construed either to always require partial compensation or to always exclude full 
compensation." The second outcome is that "these awards reflect a consistent 
concern not to determine the amount of compensation rigidly, i.e., without taking 
14 See inter alia: 
- A. Mouri, The International Law of Expropriation as Reflected in the Work of the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1994) at 365; 
- Schrijver, op. cit., at 297 and 359; 
- C. F. Murphy, "Limitations over the Power of a State to Determine the Amount of 
Compensation Payable to an Alien upon Nationalization", in R. B. Lillich (ed.), The Valuation of 
Nationalized Property in International Law, Vol. III, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville 
(1975) 49 at 52; 
- J. Murphy, "Compensation for Nationalization in International Law", 110 S.AL.J. (1993) 79 
at 88; and 
- R. Dolzer, "New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property", 75 AJ.I.L. 
(1981) 553 at 559. 
15 See, for example: 
- Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government 
of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award of 19 January 1977, reprinted in 17 LL.M. (1978) 1; 
- Libyan American Oil Company (Liamco) v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic. 
Award of 12 April 1977, reprinted in 20 LL.M. (1981) 1 at 145; and 
- The Government of Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil), Award of 24 
March 1982, reprinted in 21 LL.M. (1982) 976 at 1032, para. 143; and 
- The Iran-US Claims Tribunal's awards, including INA Corporation v. The Islamic Republic 
of Iran , Award No. 184-161-1 (12 August 1985) reprinted in 8 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 373 at 378, and 
its recent award in Shahin Shaine Ebrahimi et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 
560-44/46/47-3, para. 88 (12 October 1994) (unprinted). . 
16 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, at 892 (2d Clf. 
1981 ). 
17 See, inter alia: 
- Paragraph 4 of the General Assembly Resolution No. 1803 (XVII), adopted on 14 December 
1962. For the full text of the resolution, see 1. Brownlie, Basic Documents in International Law 
(3rd ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford (1991) 230, and Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States (Resolution No. 3281 (XXIX), adopted on 12 December 1974). ~or 
the full text of the resolution, see 14 I.L.M. (1975) 25 L and Brownlie, Basic Documents, op. CIt., 
at 235. 
18 Ebrahimi Award, op. cit., para. 93. 
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into account the specific circumstances of each concrete case." Therefore, it is 
submitted that at this stage of international law, with regard to its flexible 
character, appropriate compensation may be the best standard to ensure that in 
, 
determining compensation for the expropriation of foreign property, the interests 
of both the expropriating and expropriated parties are accounted for. 
7. Before ending the conclusion a word must be said on the contribution of 
the Iran-US Claims Tribunal to international law generally, and to its branch _ 
expropriation law. As indicated in this thesis, this is a unique situation in which 
many cases on the issue of expropriation, especially indirect expropriation, have 
been decided by an international tribunal, and the rendered awards should 
reasonably be a fruitful source in this respect. However, it seems that this is not 
the case for two reasons. In the first place, the Tribunal dealt with takings that 
took place in the context of a revolutionary upheaval, following the overthrow of 
the Shah of Iran in 1979, not in a normal situation, and hence the propositions the 
Tribunal formulate may not have relevance outside this context. Second, the 
Algerian Declarations 19_ the Tribunal's constituent instruments - gave it a wide 
power to deal not only with expropriations but also "other measures affecting 
property rights.,,2o As discussed in chapter 3, such a wide definition of 
expropriation is untenable in international law for the simple reason that many 
normal activities of States, such as taxation, affect property rights and cannot be 
expected to give rise to international concern.21 
As in the case of international law in general, the Tribunal's contribution to 
the standard of compensation is weakened and blurred by a number of 
uncertainties. These uncertainties include: firstly, as shown in chapter 4, the 
Tribunal's awards were based on two sets of standards, viz., the standard of 
compensation which was incorporated in the 1955 Treaty of Amity between Iran 
19 The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
Government of the United States (signed on January 19,1981), reprinted in: 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 3; 
75 A.1.I.L. (1981) 418, and 20 I.L.M. (1981) 224. 
20 Article lI( 1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration. . 
21 On the issue, see R. Higgins, "The Taking of Property by the State: ~ecent D~velopm~l~ts III 
International Law", 176 Hague Recueil (1982-11) 259 at 329, and Sornarajah, op. CIt., at 28_-_83. 
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and the United States (as lex sn ecia/is)22 a d th '. 
r ,n e customary InternatIOnal 1a \\' 
standard (as lex generalis), albeit in few awards. The problem is that the 
Tribunal did not clarity when the awards were based on the Treaty and when they 
rested on the customary rules S dl I . . 
. econ y, not on yare there contradIctIons in the 
findings of the different Chambers of the Tribunal, but also in the findings of the 
same Chamber. This comes close to what Mouri observes: 
The Tribunal's contribution to this question [the standard of 
compe~sa~ion] ... is weakened and blurred by a number of 
uncertaintIes not only because of contradictions in the Chamber's 
findings or changes of positions occasioned by vacillating between 
the customary rules of international law and the requirements of the 
Treaty of Amity, but also because in a number of important Cases the 
Chambers' primary efforts were aimed at challenging or distorting 
each others' rulings.23 
However, the last word should always be an optimistic one. In the light of 
the uncertainties and disagreement which surround the law regarding the standard 
of compensation, bearing in mind that bilateral investment treaties do not reflect 
customary international law in this respect, the best solution that could be hoped 
for in the present stage of international law is for States to settle the question of 
compensation through ~~_ch treaties. States are increasingly resorting to this 
strategy. Where such a treaty exists, the standard referred to in the treaty is 
conclusive. Nevertheless, reference should be made to a specific standard; a 
generally worded standard may not be helpful, for it would only revive the 
controversy over what is the proper standard of customary international law in a 
given situation. In present circumstances both legal and political considerations 
suggest that the most effective way forward in the most problematic area - that of 
compensation - lies through the flexible 'appropriate compensation' standard. 
This cannot, of course, put an end disputes over expropriation or even over level 
of compensation. It can, however, set a framework within which understanding 
22 The 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations. and Consular Rights between Iran and the 
United States (entered into force on 16 June 1957), reprinted in U.N.T.S .. Vol. 284. at 93, and 
U.S.T.S., Vol. 8, at 899. 
23 Mouri, op. cit., at 351. For a brief account of the shortcomings of the Tribunal's awards. see 
Piran, op. cit., at 451-468. 
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may develop and out of which an international jurisprudence may emerge which 
ultimately can provide a clearly agreed structure for compensation awards. In so 
doing most of the heat may be taken out of other controversial questions in this 
area which may, as the Iran-US Claims Tribunal proceedings to some degree 
suggest, lead to a more rational resolution of these questions then was currently 
available. 
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